High CourtDivision BenchAppeal allowed. Remitted to High Court to frame...

MAHANT RAM KHILAWAN DAS v. STATE OF M.P.

Case / Petition Number:Civil Appeal No. 5194 of 2001
Neutral Citation:[2008] 4 S.C.R. 601

Case Details & Bench

Court
High Court
Hon'ble Judges
  • Tarun Chatterjee
  • Harjit Singh Bedi
Judgment Date
2008-03-10
Court Decision / Holding
Appeal allowed. The High Court’s framing of a substantial question of law is set aside. The second appeal is remitted to the High Court for framing a proper substantial question of law and thereafter deciding the appeal on merits on the evidence already on record. The High Court is directed to dispose of the second appeal within six months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. There will be no order as to costs.
Final Disposition
Appeal allowed. Remitted to High Court to frame proper substantial question of law and decide on merits within six months; no costs.

Parties to the Case

Appellants / Petitioners

  • MAHANT RAM KHILAWAN DAS

Respondents

  • STATE OF M.P.

Legal Representation & Advocates

Counsels for Petitioners

  • • K.G Bhagat
  • • Vineet Bhagat
  • • Monohar Singh Bakshi
  • • Manju Malhotra
  • • Ehraz Zafar
  • • Debasis Misra

Counsels for Respondents

  • • S.S. Banthia (NP)

Case Synopsis & Summary

This is an appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure against a Madhya Pradesh High Court decision in Second Appeal No. 443/1994, arising from a suit for declaration of title and permanent injunction concerning a temple known as Shala Janki Raman Mandir and adjacent agricultural lands in village Gadhi Padrariya. Mahant Ramdas, the guru of the appellant, was the Manager and bequeathed the temple properties to the appellant to succeed as Manager. In 1987-88 the Collector of Panna initiated auction proceedings against the lands; the appellant filed suit seeking declaration of title and injunction restraining interference. The Trial Court dismissed the suit; the Additional District Judge allowed the appeal; the High Court, in second appeal, framed a substantial question of law framed as whether admissions that the appellant’s name did not appear in revenue records and that he was forcibly dispossessed in 1987, and whether those admissions justified reversal of the first appellate decree. The High Court reversed the first appellate court and decreed in favor of the appellant. The Supreme Court held that the High Court did not frame a proper substantial question of law; the question framed was essentially a question of fact, and even if admitted, other materials supported the appellant's title. It reaffirmed that records of rights create a presumption of possession but can be rebutted by evidence. It remitted the matter to the High Court, directing framing of a proper substantial question of law and merits evaluation on the existing record; the matter to be decided within six months, with no costs.

Provisions of Law Cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 s. 100 (Second Appeal)M.P. Land Revenue Act, Section 115

Legal Doctrines & Maxims

  • Entries in the record of rights raise a presumption of possession, which can be rebutted by documentary or oral evidence on record.
  • In a second appeal, the High Court should not substitute its own findings for those of the lower courts unless there is total absence of consideration of material evidence.

Submissions & Arguments

Contentions of Appellants / Petitioners

The appellant argued that the High Court committed error by framing a substantial question of law that was actually a question of fact. Even if there was an admission that his name did not appear in revenue records and that he was forcibly dispossessed in 1987, the other material evidence on record supported his title. The other documents and testimony should have been considered before reversing the first appellate court. The second appeal’s scope should be confined to whether the legal question framed is substantial and whether the lower courts’ findings were properly based on evidence; hence, remand for framing a proper substantial question of law was necessary.

Contentions of Respondents

The respondents contended that the High Court acted correctly in reversing the first appellate court and restoring the trial court’s decree. They argued that admissions about non-entry in revenue records and forcible dispossession indicate lack of title and justify reversal; the High Court’s framing was within permissible bounds to reassess the evidence and outcomes, given that the second appeal allowed reconsideration of facts on record.

Cited Precedents (1)

Case NameCitationTreatmentExplanation
Kondiba Dagadu Kadam v. Savitribai Sopan Gujar1999 (3) SCC 722PositiveCited to support the principle that in a second appeal the High Court should not substitute its findings for those of the lower courts and must consider material evidence.

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Extracted Judgment Text

Exact text extracted from official judgment records.

[2008] 4 S.C.R. 601 _,, A • T ## MAHANT RAM KHILAWAN DAS _v._ STATE OF M.P. (Civil Appeal No. 5194 of 2001) MARCH 10, 2008 B ## [fARUN CHATTERJEE & HARJIT SINGH BEDI, JJ.] - - _Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 s. 100 Second Appeal_ - _High Court setting aside the order of first appellate court_ - _without formulating the substantial question of law properly_ c _Justification of- Held: Not justified- Question so framed was not substantial question of law but was only_ a _question of fact_ - _It was based on alleged admissions ·of appellant ignoring other documents and evidence already on record on basis of which first appellate court decreed the appellant's suit- Hence,_ D _matter remitted to High Court for framing proper substantial question of law._ ~ iViR owned a temple and agricultural lands as a if/ianager of the same. He bequeathed the lands to the appellant to succeed the same as Manger. In 1987-88, the E Collector started auctioning the lands. The appellant filed a suit for declaration of title with regard to the suit lands and also c. decree for permanent injunction restraining the respondent-State from interfering with the enjoyment and possession of the same. Trial Court dismissed the F suit. However, the appellate court allowed the same. In second appeal the High Court framed the substantial question of law that whether in the light of the admission of the appellant-plaintiff that his name did not find place in the revenue records and that he was forcibly G dispossessed by the Collector in 1987, the courts below erred in granting a decree for declaration and injunction. The High Court allowed the appeal. Hence the present appeal. H 601 602 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2008] 4 S.C.R. "1- A Allowing the appeal and remitting the matter, the Court HELD: 1. In second appeal, the High Court should not substitute the findings of the courts below with its own findings unless there is total absence of the 8 consideration of material evidence. (Para 6) [606-0, E] _Kondiba Dagadu Kadam Vs. Savitribai Sopan Gujar_ 1999 (3) sec 722 - relied on. 2.1 In the instant case, the High Court did not frame C the substantial question of law properly in the second appeal so as to interfere with the judgment of the first appellate court. The question of law as framed by the High Court was totally based on the alleged admission of the appellant that his name did not find mention in the revenue D records and that he was forcibly dispossessed by the Collector of the District. At the same time, even assuming that there was an admission on the part of the appellant, before reversing the judgment of the first appellate court, the High Court ought to have considered the other material E evidence on record on which the first appellate court had based its findings. (Para 5) [605-F, G, H; 606-A] 2.2 The entries in the record of rights only raise a presumption that the person whose name is entered in the record of rights is in possession of the suit lands but F the same can be rebutted by adduction of evidencedocumentary or oral on record. Therefore, even if there was alleged admission of the appellant that his name did not find place in the revenue records, it would not conclusively prove that the appellant had failed to prove G his title to the suit lands when there was ample evidence on record to prove such title. So far as the question whether the appellant was forcibly dispossessed in 1987, the same was a question of fact, which could not at all be taken to be a substantial· question of law. Therefore, the H substantial question of law so framed by the High Court .. MAHANT RAM KHILAWAN DAS _v._ STATE OF M.P. 603 was not a substantial question of law on the basis of which A the decision of the first appellate court could be reversed. (Para 5) [606-A, B, C, DJ 2.3 From the findings of fact arrived at by the first appellate court, it is clear that the other material evidence on record would clearly show that the presumption of the[8 ] entries in the record of rights relating to the suit lands was amply rebutted and the finding that the appellant had title to the suit lands was amply proved. The first appellate court had drawn an adverse inference against the respondent by coming to a finding that th~ respondent C had not adduced any evidence to the effect that for doing an amendment in the Khasra or other government records, the appellant or his Guru Baba Ram Dass were given any notice under section 115 of the M.P. Land Revenue Act and accordingly, it wa& held by the first D appellate court that the appellant was not bound by those entries. (Para 6) [607-A, B, C, DJ 2.4 The substantial question of law was not properly framed and in that view of the matter the judgment of the High Court is set aside and the second appeal is remitted E to the High Court for framing a proper substantial question of law and thereafter decide the appeal on merits on the evidence already on record. (Para 6) [607-G, H; 608-AJ CIVILAPPELLATEJURISDICTION: CivilAppeal No. 5194 of2001 F From the Judgment and Order dated 17 .10.2000 of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur in S.A. No. 443/ 1994 G K.G Bhagat, Vineet Bhagat, Monohar Singh Bakshi, Manju Ma!hotra Ehraz Zafar and Debasis Misra for the Appellant. S.S. Banthia (NP) for the Respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by H _i_ I 604 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 4 S.C.R. ~- ## A A **TARUN CHATTERJEE, J.** 1. This is an appeal by special leave against the judgment and decree dated 17th of October, 2000 of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur in Second Appeal No. 443 of 1994 whereby the High Court had set aside the judgment and decree of the Additional District B[Judge, ][Panna ][who ][in ][his ][turn ][had ][allowed ][the ][appellant's ][appeal ] against the decree of the trial court dismissing the suit for declaration and permanent injunction filed by the appellant. 2. The case of the appellant is that a temple in the name of "Shala Janki Raman Mandir' in village Gadhi Padrariya and the c agricultural lands (in short "the suit lands") as fully described in paragraph 1 of the plaint were owned by Mahant Ramdas, who was the guru of the appellant, as Manager of the same. The temple and the suit lands were bequeathed to the appellant by Mahant Ramdas to succeed to the same as Manager. In the D year 1987-88, the cl:>llector Panna started auctioning the suit lands and therefore, the appellant filed a suit for declaration of title with regard to the suit lands and also a decree for permanent injunction restraining the respondent from interfering with the enjoyment and possession of the same. The suit filed by the E[appellant ][was ][contested ][by ][the ][respondent ][on ][the ][ground ][that ] the temple and the suit lands were the property of the state and that Mahant Ramdas was appointed as a priest and after his death, the appellant was appointed in his place as the priest. It was furth~ralleged that when the appellant sent a resignation F[letter ][to ][the ][Collector, ][the ][same ][was ][accepted ][and ][another ] person was appointed in place of the appellant as the priest. Neither Mahant Ramdas nor the appellant owned the temple or the suit lands, which were the property of the state and the Will in question was a fabricated document, which was prepared to G[grab ][the ][temple ][and ][the ][suit ][lands. ][The ][trial ][court ][dismissed ][the ] suit of the appellant. Feeling aggrieved, the appellant preferred an appeal before the Additional District Judge, Panna and the same was allowed. Against this decision of the first appellate court, the respondent filed a second appeal, which, as noted herein earlier, was allowed. It is this judgment of the High Court c H .. ..., ·~ I 605 MAHANT RAM KHILAWAN DAS _v._ STATE OF M.P. A .. _"'_ ~- # [TARUN CHATTERJEE, J.] -t- which is impugned in this appeal. 3. While allowing the second appeal, the High Court had - framed the following substantial question of law: "Whether in the light of the admissions of the plaintiff that his name does not find place in the revenue records and 8 that he was forcibly dispossessed by the Collector in 1987, the courts below have committed an error in granting a decree for declaration and injunction? 4. The learned counsel for the appellant contended, inter alia, that the High Court had committed an error in as much as c the question framed by it was not a substantial question of law but in fact only a question of fact and therefore, the substantial question of law as framed by the High Court could not be treated as a substantial question of law so as to interfere with the well reasoned judgment of the first appellate court. It was also D contended that the High Court had based its judgment on the alleged admission of the appellant ignoring the other documents and evidence already on record on the basis of which the first appellate court had decreed the suit of the appellant. This submission of the learned counsel for the appellant was seriously E contested by the learned counsel for the respondent who contended that the High Court was fully justified in reversing the judgment of the first appellate court and in restoring the judgment of the trial court. F 5. Havin~ heard the learned counsel for the parties and after examining the judgment of the High Court as well as of the courts below and other materials on record, we are of the view that the High Court had not framed the substantial question of law properly in the second appeal so as to interfere with the judgment of the first appellate court. We are of the opinion that G the question of law as framed by the High Court was totally based on the alleged admission of the appellant that his name did not find mention in the revenue records and that he was forcibly dispossessed by the Collector of the District. At the same time, even assuming that there was an admission on the part of H SUPREME COURT REPORTS 606 [2008] 4 S.C.R. A the appellant, before reversing the judgment of the first appellate court, the High Court ought to have considered the other material evidence on record on which the first appellate court had based its findings. It is well settled law that the entries in the record of rights raise a presumption of possession and when the parties 8[adduce ][evidence, ][it ][is ][open ][to ][the ][court ][to ][come ][to ][a ][conclusion ] that the entries in the record of rights in respect of the suit land were erroneous. Therefore, even if there was alleged admission of the appellant that his name did not find place in the revenue records, it would not conclusively prove that the appellant had c[failed ][to ][prove ][his ][title ][to ][the ][suit ][lands ][when ][there ][was ][ample ] evidence on record to prove such title. So far as the question whether the appellant was forcibly dispossessed in 1987, the same was a question of fact, which could not at all be taken to be a substantial question of law. Therefore, in our view, the D[substantial ][question ][of ][law ][so ][framed ][by ][the ][High ][Court ][was ][not ] a substantial question of law on the basis of which the decision of the first appellate court could be reversed. ..... ... **6.** It is well settled that in second appeal, the High Court should not substitute the findings of the courts below with its E[own ][findings ][unless ][there ][is ][total ][absence ][of ][the ][consideration ] of material evidence. [See _**Kondiba Dagadu Kadam**_ Vs. _**Savitribai Sopan Gujar**_ [(1999) 3 SCC 722]. That apart, a perusal of the impugned judgment of the High Court would show that practically, the High Court had reversed the findings of the F[first ][appellate ][court ][only ][on ][the ][alleged ][admission ][of ][the ][appellant ] to the extent that his name did not find mention in the relevant record of rights in respect of the suit lands. In our view, as noted herein earlier, even if such an admission was made by the appellant, then also no inference could be drawn that the G[appellant ][had ][no ][title ][to ][the ][suit ][lands ][when, ][admittedly, ][the ] appellant had substantiated his plaint case by production of enough material-documentary and oral on record before the courts. It is also well settled that the entries in the record of rights only raise a presumption that the person whose name is entered in the record of rights is in possession of the suit lands but the H .. .., 607 MAHANT RAM KHILAWAl\i DAS _v._ STATE OF M.P. [TARUN CHAT.,..ERJEE, J) -· same can be rebutted by adduction of evidence-documentary A or oral on record. In the present case, as we have already roted that the High Court, relying only on the alleged admission of tre appellant, had reversed the findings of the first appellate court on the question of fact. However, from the findings of fact arrived at by the first appellate court, it is clear that the other material B evidence on record would clearly show that the presumption of the entries in the record of rights relating to the suit lands was amply rebutted and the finding that the appellant had title to the suit lands was amply proved. The first appellate court had drawn an adverse inference against the respondent by coming to a c finding that the respondent had not adduced any evidence to the effect that for doing an amendment in the Khasra or other government records, the appellant or his Guru Baba Ram Dass were given any notice under section 115 of the M.P. Land Revenue Act and accordingly, it was helq by the first appellate D court that the appellant before us was not bound those entries. So far as the question of possession of the suit lands is concerned, the first appellate court, which was the final court of fact, had made the following findings: - ~ .. -"'· _"In addition to PWs of appellants, Angad Prasad Panda_ E _(RW-3) and K.L. Paikray (RW-4) have accepted on their cross-examination that appellant was priest of the temple and till this day, he had been cultivating the lands till the last 2 years back. Appellant has stated in para No. 3 of his statement that he has been cultivating 30 acres of_ F _land and remaining is left for cows and calves. The respondent has not examined auction purchaser Asha Ram Pujari. In the absence of his deposition, the defence become baseless and contrary to it, the presumption is that appellant is still doing puja of the temple Shala_ G _Janaki Raman and upon his lands, it is his possession._ " Be that as it may, without coming to a positive conclusion on the above aspect, we are of the view that the substantial question of law was not properly framed and in that view of the matter, thl;! appeal needs to be allowed and the judgment of the H \ _I_ [2008] 4 S.C.R. _}-_ ## 608 SUPREME COURT REPORTS - A High Court set aside and the second appeal is remitted to the High Court for framing a proper substantial question of law and after framing such question, proceed to decide the appeal on merits on the evidence already on record. Whatever observations have been arrived at by us in this judgment shall - R be taken to be tentative and the High Court would be free to decide the second appeal after framing a proper substantial question of law. 7. For the reasons aforesaid, the appeal is allowed to the ' extent indicated above. We request the High Court to dispose C of the second appeal within a period of 6 months from the date of supply of a copy of this order. There will be no order as to costs. N.J. Appeal allowed. y