High CourtDivision BenchAppeal allowed; impugned judgment set aside; co...

MAHABIR SINGH v. SUBHASH AND ORS.

Case / Petition Number:Civil Appeal No. 4881 of 2007
Neutral Citation:[2007] 11 S.C.R.

Case Details & Bench

Court
High Court
Hon'ble Judges
  • S.B. Sinha
  • Harjit Singh Bedi
Judgment Date
2007-10-12
Court Decision / Holding
Appeal allowed. The impugned judgment cannot be sustained. The appeal is allowed with costs.
Final Disposition
Appeal allowed; impugned judgment set aside; costs awarded

Parties to the Case

Appellants / Petitioners

  • Mahabir Singh

Respondents

  • Subhash
  • Ors.

Legal Representation & Advocates

Counsels for Petitioners

  • • A. Nehra
  • • Gagandeep Sharma
  • • Rameshwar Prasad Goyal

Counsels for Respondents

  • • Manjit Singh
  • • B.K. Satija
  • • D. Mahesh Babu

Case Synopsis & Summary

An ex parte decree was passed on 19 February 1986 in a suit filed by the appellant; the respondent did not appear despite service of summons. A mutation based on the decree was allowed in 1996. The respondent moved to set aside the ex parte decree under Order IX Rule 13 CPC on 7 February 1997. The Trial Court dismissed, the Appellate Court affirmed, and the High Court reversed, holding that summons were not properly served and that publication in newspapers was not effected. The present appeal challenges that reversal. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's approach was incorrect, reaffirming a presumption that official acts are performed in regular course. It held that in ex parte decrees, the defendant bears the burden to show either non-service of summons or lack of notice and sufficient cause for absence. It examined Article 123 of the Limitation Act, which provides a 30-day window to set aside such decrees, and applied Section 3 of the Limitation Act to bar the application if the knowledge of the decree was established long before the filing. The respondent admitted in cross-examination that he had approached the appellant about non-enforcement of the decree about 18 months earlier; thus the limitation period ran from that date. Since the application was filed later, it was barred, and the High Court's decision was set aside; the appeal is allowed.

Provisions of Law Cited

Limitation Act, 1963 - Section 3Limitation Act, 1963 - Article 123Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Order IX Rule 13Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Order V Rule 19ACode of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Rule 20 of Order V

Legal Doctrines & Maxims

  • Presumption of regularity in official acts
  • Burden on defendant to show lack of service or knowledge of decree; limitation runs from knowledge
  • No court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or application after expiry of the period of limitation

Submissions & Arguments

Contentions of Appellants / Petitioners

Applicants contended that the ex parte decree was validly passed following service of summons; the High Court erred in treating the service as defective and in relying on absence of newspaper publication. They urged that the decree can be challenged only under Order IX Rule 13 CPC within the statutory period under Article 123 of the Limitation Act, and that the maintenance of such application could be barred by delay if knowledge of the decree had been established long before filing. The age of the decree and presumption of regularity favored upholding the lower decree, unless the respondent could demonstrate lack of service or sufficient cause for non-appearance.

Contentions of Respondents

Respondents contended that summons were not properly served and substituted service/munadi failed; publication in newspapers was not effected. They argued that the setting-aside application should be examined for irregular service and that the period of limitation should start from the date of knowledge of the decree, which, in their view, was earlier than the filing. They pressed that the High Court was justified in allowing revision on the grounds of improper service and lack of due process.

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Extracted Judgment Text

Exact text extracted from official judgment records.

-r~ A ## MAHABIR SINGH _v._ SUBHASH AND ORS. ## OCTOBER 12, 2007 B [S.B. SINHA AND HARJIT SINGH BEDI, JJ.] ~ "f _Limitation Act, 1963-Section 3 and Schedule Article 123Limitation for filing application for setting aside ex-parte decree-_ c _Non-appearance of defendant despite delivery of summons-Ex-parte decree-Application for setting aside the decree after its executionDefendant admitting to the effect that he had knowledge of the decree one and half years prior to filing of application-Maintainability of the application-Held: Application was not maintainable-Defendant_ D _was unable to establish absence of service of summons-Application was also barred by limitation-Code of Civil Procedure, 1908-0r. 9 r. 13._ An _ex-parte_ decree was passed on 19.2.1986, in a suit filed by the E appellant, as the respondent-defendant did not appear in the court despite service of summons on him. An application for mutation on the basis thereof was allowed on 7.3.1996. Respondent filed application for setting aside of the _ex-parte_ decree on 7.2.1997. The respondent in his cross-examination admitted that he had approached the appellant for F not giving effect to the decree one and a half year prior to filing of the application. Trial Court dismissed the application. Appeal thereagainst was also dismissed. High Court allowed the Revision application, on the ground that summons were not properly served and the appellant had not taken recourse to publication in the Newspapers. Hence the G[present appeal. ] ## Allowing the appeal, the Court "'\- )..... HELD: 1. The approach of the High Court was not correct There 436 H _!_ MAHABIR SINGH _v._ SUBHASH 437 exists a presumption that the official act has been done in ordinary course A of business. Admittedly, an ex-parte decree was passed. Defendant for getting it set aside was required to establish that either no summons was served on him or he had sufficient cause for remaining absent on the date fixed for hearing the suit _ex- parte._ [Para 6J [440-E, F] j __y_ 2. Article 123 of the Limitation Act, 1963 provides for 30 days time[B ] for filing such an application. Even assuming for the sake of argument that no proper step was taken by the appellant herein for service of summons upon the respondent and/or the service of summons was irregular, evidently, it was for the defendant-respondent to establish as C to when he came to know about the passing of the ex-parte decree. Even in his cross-examination, the first respondent has categorically admitted that he had approached the appellant herein for not giving effect thereto one and half year prior to filing of the application, and, thus, he must be deemed to have knowledge about passing of the said ex-parte decree. D The period oflimitation would, thus, be reckoned from that day. As the application under Order IX Rule 13 CPC was filed one and a half year after the first respondent came to know about passing of the ex-pa rte decree in the suit, the said application evidently was barred by limitation. In terms of Section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963, no court shall have E jurisdiction to entertain any suit or application if the same has been filed after expiry of the period oflimitation. The High Court could not have ignored the said jurisdictional fact. [Paras 7, 8 and 9] [440-F; 441-C, D, E, F] CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 4881 of F 2007. From the Judgment and final Order dated 14.02.2005 of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Civil Revision Petition No. 5999 of 2003. A. Nehra, Gagandeep Sharma and Rameshwar Prasad Goyal for G the Appellants. Manjit Singh, B.K. Satija and D. Mahesh Babu for the Respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by H 438 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 11 S.C.R. _{'-_ A ## **S.B. SINHA, J.** 1. Leave granted. 2. Appellant is before us being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with a judgment and order dated 14.2.2005 passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Civil Revision Petition No.5999 of2003 whereby and whereunder the Revision Application filed by the first respondent herein B was allowed. 3. Appellant filed a civil suit on or about 6.4.1985. Summons of the suit were served upon the first respondent. He did not appear. An _ex parte_ decree was passed against him on 19 .2.1986. An application for C mutation on the basis thereof was filed which was allowed on 07.03.1996. Allegedly, the first respondent having come to know about passing of the said _ex parte_ decree on 03.02.1997, filed an application on 07.02.1997 for setting aside the same, in terms of Order IX Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The learned Trial Judge, by reason of an order dated D 28.07.2000, dismissed the said application, _inter alia,_ holding that summons had been duly served upon the first respondent. It was furthermore noticed that the first respondent herein, while examining himself in the said proceedings under Order IX Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure in his cross-examination, admitted that one and a half year prior E to filing of the said application, he and his brother approached Dharam Singh for getting the judgment and decree set aside but he negated their plea. 4. An appeal was preferred thereagainst. The Appellate Court also F affirmed the said finding holding : G "12.In this case, Ex.Al to Ex.A3 are the record of ownership which is not disputed. Ex. R3 I the copy of summon which clearly shows that Subhash refused to accept the service of summons. It also shows that the copy of summons was also affixed on his house. This report is duly attested by clerk of Court as per Ex.R4/ B and affidavit has also been given by Jogi Ram process server and affidavit has also been given by Jogi Ramprocess server and Subhash was to appear in court on 7.5.85 but he did not appear in the court and then the coUit has ordered for substituted service. "\'.- ~ H _j_ MAHABIR SINGH _v._ SUBHASH [SINHA, J.] 439 } _,-1..._ But after munadi effected in the village also, the defendant failed A to appear in court as per Ex.RI, Ex.R2 is the report of Ram Mehar, process server who got effected the munadi. No doubt Nand Lal Chjow'tcidar has denied his thumb impression but it carried no help to the defendant in view of the statement of R W-1 Ram Mehar, process server. There is no report on the file that the B summons does not bear the thumb impression of Nand Lal Chowkidar. Statement of PW2 Nand Lal is self contradictory as he has pleaded that he has no knowledge that the process server has affixed the copy of summons on the house of Subhas. He has also stated that he has no knowledge that about ten years back c court officials brought this summon to him. He has shown his ' ignorance about the pendency of the case. He has also shown his ignorance about the munadi effected by him twelve years back. He has even not been able to tell that he was shown as a witness. There is no reason to disbelieve the statement of Ram Mehar,, D process server with regard to the report of refusal of Subhas, appellant RW-2 Dilbag Rai Jain has also proved that the summon were duly executed upon the defendant who refused to accept the same. So there is no illegality or irregularity in thie service of summons. Rather the learned trial court has given doubl~ E opportunity not only after the refusal by the defendant to appear in the court but as well as by getting the defendant served througq munadi. Since the defendant intentionally did not appear in the court so the learned trial court has rightly passed the _ex parte_ judgment and decree dated 19.2.86. F 13. Admittedly the decree under challenge was passed in the year 1986 while the present application for setting aside the _ex parte_ judgment and decree was filed on 6.2.97 i.e. almost after eleven years of passing of the impugned decree. So far as the delay iµ filing the application is concerned, no doubt the defendant has trie~ G to prove that he came to know recently about the decision of t~e case but this version is not tanable when PWl Ram Mehar, proce~ served has categorically stated that about 1-1/2 years back he alongwith his brother, went to Dharam Singh and Dharam Singh H 440 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 11 S.C.R. A B ## c told them that they have got no concern with the plot in question and that he would not set aside the decree. He has also stated that he has told his relatives that 10/11 days prior filing this application. This clearly shows that the defendant was well aware of the decree in question and he can file the present application within one month of the passing of the decree. He is to explain each days delay. So it can be safely eld that the application is time barred. Thus, the findings of the learned trial court recorded under issue No.1 and 2 are hereby affirmed and these issues are decided against the appellant-defendant a11d in favour of the respondentsplaintiffs. 5. The Revision Application filed thereagainst by the first respondent herein was allowed by the High Court. The High Court in the impugned judgment opined that the appellant had played fraud on the Court as neither D the summons were properly served, nor the publication was made in the newspapers. Order V Rule 19A of the Code of Civil Procedure, which, according to the High Court, could have been taken recourse to, had also not been resorted to. Adverse comments were also made by the High Court in regard to the application for mutation filed by the appellant only E after 10 years, i.e., in the year 1996. 6. The approach of the High Court, in our opinion, was not correct. There exists a presumption that the official act has been done in ordinary course of business. Admittedly, an _ex parte_ decree was passed. Defendant for getting it set aside was required to establish that either no F summons was served on him or he had sufficient cause for remaining absent on the _date fixed for hearing the suit _ex parte._ "1-- 7. Article 123 of the Limitation Act, 1963 provides for 30 days time for filing such an application. The said provision reads thus : G MAHABIR SINGH _v._ SUBHASH [SINHA, J.] 441 |Descriptionofapplication|Periodof|Timefromwhich|A| |---|---|---|---| ||Limitation|periodbeginstorun|| |123.Toset aside adecree|Thirtydays|Thedateofdecree or|| |passed_exparte_orto||wherethesummons|| |re-hearanappealdecreed||ornoticewasnotduly|| |or heard_exparte. _||Served,whenthe|B| |||applicanthad|| |Explanation:-Forthe||knowledgeofthe|| |Purposeofthisarticle,||decree.|| |Substitutedserviceunder|under||| |Rule20ofOrder V ofthe|||c| |CodeofCivilProcedure,|Procedure,||| |1908(5of1908)shallnot|||| |Bedeemedtobedueservice.|||| 8. Thus, even assuming for the sake of argument that no proper step was taken by the appellant herein for service of summons upon the D respondent and/or the service of summons was irregular, evidently, it was for the defendant-respondent to establish as to when he came to know about the passing of the _ex parte_ decree. Even in his cross-examination, the first respondent has categorically admitted that he had approached the appellant herein for not giving effect thereto one and half year prior E to filing of the application, and, thus, he must be deemed to have knowledge about passing of the said _ex parte_ decree. The period of limitation would, thus, be reckoned from that day. As the application under Order IX Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure was filed one and a half year after the first respondent came to know about passing of the _ex_ F _parte_ decree in the suit, the said application evidently was barred by limitation 9. In tem1s of Section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963, no comi shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or application if the same has been filed after expiry of the period of limitation. The High Court could not G have ignored the said jurisdictional fact. 10. For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained. It is set aside accordingly. The appeal is allowed with costs. The counsel's fee assessed at Rs. I 0,000/- (Rupees ten thousand only). K.K. T. allowed. Appeal allowed. H