High CourtDivision BenchAppeal partly allowed; no order as to costs.

Madhya Pradesh Administration v. Tribhubhan

Case / Petition Number:Civil Appeal No. 1817 of 2007
Neutral Citation:[2007] 4 S.C.R. 918

Case Details & Bench

Court
High Court
Hon'ble Judges
  • S. B. Sinha
  • Markandey Katju
Judgment Date
2007-04-05
Court Decision / Holding
Appeal partly allowed.
Final Disposition
Appeal partly allowed; no order as to costs.

Parties to the Case

Appellants / Petitioners

  • State of Madhya Pradesh Administration

Respondents

  • Tribhuvan

Legal Representation & Advocates

Counsels for Petitioners

  • • Vikas Singh, ASG.
  • • Sibo Sankar Mishra

Counsels for Respondents

  • • Sanjoy Ghosh
  • • Anitha Shenoy
  • • Nitin

Case Synopsis & Summary

Respondent Tribhuvan was employed on a temporary basis at Madhya Pradesh Bhawan in Delhi, with intermittent breaks in service, and was eventually terminated. The ensuing industrial dispute was referred to an Industrial Tribunal, which held that the appellant had failed to comply with Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and awarded retrenchment compensation along with other statutory entitlements but did not direct reinstatement with full back wages. The respondent challenged the Tribunal’s Award in a writ petition before the Delhi High Court. A learned Single Judge directed reinstatement with full back wages, a decision that was affirmed by the Division Bench. The Supreme Court, however, partly allowed the appeal. It clarified that the Industrial Court’s exercise of its discretionary jurisdiction under Section 11A—to determine compensation that would have been due had Section 25F been complied with—must be given due weight, and that the High Court should have factored in the peculiar circumstances of the case to determine the appropriate remedy. Given the public funds involved and the evolving doctrine on when reinstatement with back wages is appropriate, the Court directed the appellant to pay Rs 75,000 by way of compensation as a just substitute arrangement. The judgment emphasizes that reinstatement with back wages is not automatic and that relief must be tailored to the facts, with consideration of the nature of the appointment and other relevant factors. The appeal was partly allowed; there was no order as to costs.

Provisions of Law Cited

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, Section 11AIndustrial Disputes Act, 1947, Section 25FIndustrial Disputes Act, 1947, Section 2(j)Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, Section 2(s)Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, Section 2(oo)(bb)Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, Section 6-NConstitution of India, Articles 14 and 16

Legal Doctrines & Maxims

  • Doctrine of public employment and involvement of public funds
  • Constitutional obligation to comply with Articles 14 and 16 (Uma Devi)
  • Discretionary relief under Section 11A, considering ends of justice and peculiar facts
  • Public funds and ends-of-justice considerations in reinstatement decisions

Submissions & Arguments

Contentions of Appellants / Petitioners

The MP Bhawan is not an “Industry” under Section 2(j) of the ID Act. It is a circuit house of the government and its activities fall outside the statutory definition of “industry,” and therefore the dispute could not be resolved under the ID Act. The termination involved artificial breaks in service and non‑compliance with Section 25F; the High Court’s direction for reinstatement with full back wages would require public expenditure and is inconsistent with evolving jurisprudence on discretionary relief. Even if the establishment is treated as industry, the court should apply the discretionary framework under Section 11A, weighing factors such as the public nature of funds, the type of appointment, and the existence of sanctioned posts, instead of automatic reinstatement. In light of Uma Devi (3) and related decisions, the court should offer compensation (Rs 75,000) to meet ends of justice instead of full back wages, as a more appropriate remedy given the peculiar facts of the case.

Contentions of Respondents

The MP Bhawan’s functions and the manner of entertainment of private guests suggest it falls within “industry” for purposes of the ID Act, and thus the dispute is properly within the ID Act’s ambit. The industrial tribunal’s Award, which found non‑compliance with Section 25F and granted retrenchment compensation, should be respected, and reinstatement with full back wages (as ordered by the High Court) is a permissible relief in appropriate cases. The State should not be shielded from legitimate redress where the public interest and funds are involved, and the decision to reinstate with back wages aligns with the evolving jurisprudence on discretionary relief for public‑sector employers.

Cited Precedents (11)

Case NameCitationTreatmentExplanation
Secretary, State of Karnataka and Ors. v. Umadevi (3) and Ors.[2006] 4 SCC 1PositiveUsed to establish constitutional obligations of the State and to limit automatic reinstatement; supports ends‑of‑justice approach and public‑fund considerations.
M.P. Housing Board and Anr. v. Manoj Shrivastava[2006] 2 SCC 702PositiveCited for principles on appointment nature and discretionary relief; context for public‑employment considerations.
State of MP. and Ors. v Arjunlal Rajak[2006] 2 SCC 711PositiveCited for factors to consider in relief and reinstatement in public employment cases.
M.P. State Agro Industries Development Corpn. Ltd and Anr. v. S.C. Pandey[2006] 2 SCC 716PositiveCited for public‑employment relief principles in ID Act disputes.
Jasbir Singh v. Punjab & Sind Bank and Ors.[2007] 1 SCC 566DistinguishedNot applicable to the present facts; distinguished.
Muir Mills Unit of NTC (U.P.) Ltd. v. Swayam Prakash Srivastava and Anr.[2007] 1 SCC 491Mentioned OnlyCited in passing to discuss 6N context; not central to decision.
Uttranchal Forest Development Corporation v. M.C. Joshi[2007] 3 SCALE 545PositiveSupports discretionary relief not automatic; factors to consider.
Haryana State Electronics Development Corporation Ltd. v. MamniAIR 2006 SC 2427PositiveReviewed compensation in lieu of back wages and reinstatement considerations.
North-Eastern Karnataka Rural Corporation v. Ashappa[2006] 5 SCC 137PositiveCited for factors in discretionary relief and reinstatement considerations.
U.P. State Brassware Corpn. Ltd. v. Uday Narain PandeyUnknownPositiveDiscussed back wages and compensation guidelines in related cases.
State of Uttar Pradesh v. Jai Bir Singh[2005] 5 SCC 1Mentioned OnlyMentioned as pending consideration before a seven‑judge bench.

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Extracted Judgment Text

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A ## MADHYA PRADESH ADMINISTRATION ## v. ## TRIBHUBAN ## APRIL 05, 2007 ## B [S.B. SINHA AND MARKANDEY KA TJU, JJ.] _Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Section I IA-Termination of temporary appointee with break in service-Retrenchment compensation by Industrial court-Reinstatement with full back wages by High Court- Correctness of-_ C _Held: In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, High Court should have taken into consideration the jurisdiction exercised by indus_trial courtThus, in the interest of justice, employee directed to be paid compensation._ Respondent was appointed on temporary basis from time to time with D break in service with the appellant. His services were terminated. Thereafter, an industrial dispute was raised and was referred to the Industrial Tribunal. Tribunal awarded retrenchment compensation since the appellant did not comply with the requirement of section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Appellant did not challenge the award. However, respondent filed the writ petition. Single Judge of High Court directed re-instatement of respondent E with full back wages. Division Bench upheld the order. Hence the present appeal ## Partly Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1.1. The Industrial Court exercised its discretionary jurisdiction F under section llA of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It merely directed the amount of compensation to which the respondent was entitled to, had the provisions of section 25F been complied with should be sufficient to meet the ends of justice. It is not suggested that the High Court could not interfere with the said order, but the discretionary jurisdiction exercised by the G Industrial Court, should have been taken into consideration for determination of the question as to what relief should be granted in the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case. Each case is required to be dealt with in the fact situation obtaining therein. (Para 13) (924-F-G) H > 1.2. In view of the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case and 918 MADHYA PRADESH ADMINISTRATION 1•. TRIBHUBAN (S.B. SINHA, J.) 919 .... ~ ---- particularly the fact that the High Court had directed re-instatement with full back wages, interest of justice would be subserved by directing the appellant to pay a sum of Rs. 75,000/- by way of compensation to the respondent (Para 14) (924-H; 925-A] - ~ / _Secretary, State of Karnataka and Ors._ v. _Umadevi (3) and Ors.,_ [2006) 4 SCC 1; _M P. Housing Board and Anr._ v. _Manoj Shrivastava,_ (2006) 2 SCC 702; _State of MP. and Ors._ v. _Arjunlal Rajak,_ [2006) 2 SCC 711 and _MP. State Agro Industries Development Corpn. Ltd and Anr._ v. _S.C. Pandey,_ [2006) 2 sec 716, relied on. _Jasbir Singh_ v. _Punjab & Sind Bank and Ors.,_ [2007) 1 SCC 566, c distinguished. _Muir Mills Unit of NTC (U.P.) Ltd._ v. _Swayam Prakash Srivastava and Anr.,_ [2007) 1 SCC 491 and _Uttranchal Forest Development Corporation_ v. _M_ C. _Joshi,_ (2007) 3 SCALE 545, referred to. CIVIL APPEALLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1817 of2007.[D ] From the Final Judgment and Order dated 19.04.2005 of the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in L.P.A. No. 622 of 2005. Vikas Singh, ASG. and Sibo Sankar Mishra for the Appellant E Sanjoy Ghosh, Anitha Shenoy and Nitin for the Respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by S.B. SINHA, J. 1. Leave granted. F > ~ -( -- 2. State of Madhya Pradesh runs an establis.hment in Delhi known as Madhya Pradesh Bhawan. Respondent was appointed on temporary basis from time to time with breaks in services. He worked for the period 13.12.1991 ·to 1.3.1994. After his services were terminated, an industrial dispute was raised. The said dispute was referred for its determination before the Industrial G Tribunal. The Industrial Tribunal by an Award dated 26.7.2002, while holding that in terminating the services of the respondents the appellant has failed to comply with the statutory requirements contained in Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, awarded only retrenchment compensation alongwith notice pay together with interest@9% per annum. Validity of the said Award was not questioned by the appellant. Respondent, however, filed a Writ H _y_ SUl'Rt~ME COURT REPORTS [2007] 4 S.C.R. 920 ""':' - A[Petition thereagainst. ][By ][a Judgment and Order dated 24.2.2005 and 15.4.2005, ] a learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court allowed the said Writ Petition directing re-instatement of the respondent with full back wages. An intracourt appeal preferred thereagainst has been dismissed by a Division Bench of the said Court by reason of the impugned judgment. B 3. Mr. Vikas Singh, learned Additional Solicitor General appearing on behalf of the appellant would submit that Madhya Pradesh Bhawan being merely a Circuit House of the Government of Madhya Pradesh, is not an "Industry" within the meaning of Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Learned counsel urged that in that view of the matter, it was not a fit case c[where a direction ][of ][re-instatement with full back wages should have been ] issued. 4. Mr. Sujoy Ghosh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent, on the other hand, would submit that although the question as to whether sovereign functions of the State would come within the purview D[of ][the definition ][of ]["Industry" ][is ][pending for consideration before the Seven ] Judges' Bench having been referred to by a Constitution Bench in _State of UP._ v _.Jai Bir Singh,_ [2005] _5_ SCC l, but so long the existing law is not set aside, Madhya Pradesh Bhawan wherein even the private guests are also entertained would bring the establishment within the purview of "Industry". In any event, the industrial court having arrived at a finding to that effect in E its Award dated 26.7.2002 which having not been questioned, the appellant cannot be permitted to raise the same before this Court. It was contended that artificial breaks after 89 days of service being not _bonafide,_ the termination of the services of a workman would not come within the exceptions envisaged under Section 2( oo) (bb) of the Act. It was urged that Industrial Disputes Act F[does not make any distinction between a daily wager and the permanent ] employee, in view of the definition of"workman" as contained in Section 2(s) thereof. The High Court, therefore, cannot be said to have committed any illegality in directing the re-instatement of the respondent with full back wages as admittedly the provisions of Section 25 F of the Industrial Disputes Act had not been complied with. ~ -~ ,. G H 5. The question as to whether the activities of the Appellant satisfy the tests laid down in the statutory definition of "Industry" as contained in Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act or not, in our opinion need not be gone into in .this case. Industrial Court opined that it was an Industry. The legality of the Award of the Industrial Court was not questioned. So far as -- 921 MAD HY A PRADESH ADMINISTRATION 1•. TRIBHUBAN [S.B. SINHA, J.] _, E the appellant is concerned, it, thus, attained finality. It, therefore, in our ' A opinion cannot now be permitted to tum round and contend that its Delhi e:;tablishment does not come within the purview of the definition of"Industry". ..... _)_ 6. The question, however, which arises for consideration is as to whether in a situation of this nature, the learned Single Judge and consequently the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court should have directed re-instatement B of the respondent with full back wages. Whereas at one point of time, such a relief used to be automatically granted, but keeping in view several other factors and in particular the doctrine of public employment and involvement of the public money, a change in the said trend is now found in the recent decisions of this Court. This Court in a large number of decisions in the matter ' c c of grant of relief of the kind distinguished between .a daily wager who does not hold a post and a permanent empk1yee. It may be that the definition of "workman" as contained in Section 2(s) of the Act is wide and takes with in its embrage all categories of workmen specified therein, but the same would not mean that even for the purpose of grant of relief in an industrial dispute referred for adjudication, application for constitutional scheme of equality _b_ adumbrated under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution oflndia, in the light of a decision of a Constitution Bench of this Court in _Secretary, State of Karnataka and Ors._ v. _Umadevi (3) and Ors.,_ [2006] 4 SCC 1, and other relevant factors pointed out by the Court in a catena of decisions shall not be taken into consideration. ' c _b_ 7. The nature of appointment, whether there existed any sanctioned post or whether the officer concerned had any authority to make appointment are relevant factors. -"( 8. See _MP. Housing Board and Anr._ v. _Mano} Shrivastava,_ [2006] 2 SCC F 702, _State of MP. and Ors._ v _Arjunlal Rajak,_ [2006] 2 SCC 711 and _M.P. State Agro Industries Development Corpn. Ltd and Anr._ v. S.C. _Pandey,_ [2006] 2 sec 716. 9. Our attention has been drawn to a recent decision of this Court in _Jasbir Singh_ v. _Punjab & Sind Bank and Ors.,_ reported in [2007] 1 SCC 566 by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent. We do not see[G' ] as to how the said decision is applicable to the fact of the present case. _..r_ 10. In _Jasbir Singh_ (supra}, the Order of termination was passed on the ground of misconduct. The said question was also the subject matter of a suit, wherein the Civil Court had held that the appellant therein was not guilty H ,,. _r_ (2007] 4 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 922 E A[of ][the misconduct. ln that ][cont~xt ][only, the question ][in ][regard to the relief ] granted by the Court was considered in the light of the relief which may be granted by the Industrial Court under Section 11 A of the Industrial Disputes Act stating; B c D "It was, however, urged that no back wages should be directed to be paid. Reliance in this behalf has been placed on _U.P. State Brassware Corpn. Ltd._ v. _Uday Narain Pandey._ In that case, this Court was dealing with a power of the Industrial Courts under Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act. Therein, as the establishment was closed, the question of reinstatement of the workman did not arise. Still ~hen, 25% back wages were directed to be paid as also the compensation payable in terms of Section 6-N of the U .P. Industrial Disputes Act. > The judgments of both the civil court and the criminal court established that the appellant was treated very unfairly and unreasonably. For all intent and purport, a criminal case was foisted upon him. A confession, according to learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, was extracted from him ~y the bank officers in a very cruel manner. It is, therefore, not a case where back wages should be denied. The· respondent Bank has tried to proceed against the appellant in both . in civil proceedings as well as in criminal proceedings and. at both the independent forums, it failed." .... • J ' **==> picture [9 x 5] intentionally omitted <==** **----- Start of picture text -----**<br> .A.<br>**----- End of picture text -----**<br> I_, ) 11. We may notice that recently in _Muir Mills Unit of NTC (U.P.) Ltd._ v. _Swayam Prakash Srivastava and Anr.,_ [2007] I SCC 491, a Bench of this Court opined : F G H "With regard to the contention of the respondents that in the present fact scenario retrenchment is bad under law as conditions under Section 6-N, which talks about a reasonable notice to be served on an employee before his~er retrenchment, is not complied with; we are of the view that even under Section 6-N the proviso states that "no such notice shall be necessary if the retrenchment is under an agreement which specifies a date for the termination of service". In the present case on the perusal of the appointment letter it is clear that no such notice needs to be issued to Respondent No. 1. The respondents had referred to many cases with regard to back wages to be paid to the retrenched workman. The learned counsel · )"-- --..., **==> picture [6 x 5] intentionally omitted <==** **----- Start of picture text -----**<br> F<br>**----- End of picture text -----**<br> 923 MADHYA PRADESH ADMINISTRATION 1•. TRIBHUBAN [S.B. SINHA,J.] cited a string of decisions of this Court in support of this contention. A We are however not addressing this plea of the respondents as we have already observed that Respondent 1 is not a workman under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and the U.P. ID Act, 1947 and also that the retrenchment was not illegal and therefore the question of back wages does not arise." B 12. We may also notice that in _Uttranchal Forest Development Corporation_ v. _MC. Joshi,_ [2007] 3 SCALE 545, this Court held; ... "Although according to the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant the Labour Court and the High Court committed an error in arriving at a finding that in terminating the services of the C respondent, the provisions of Section 6N of the UP Industrial Disputes Act were contravened, we will proceed on the basis that the said finding is correct. The question, however, would be as to whether in a situation of this nature, relief of reinstatement in services should have been granted. It is now well-settled by reason of a catena of D decisions of this Court that, the relief of reinstatement with full back wages would not be granted automatically only because it would be lawful to do so. For the said purpose, several factors are required to be taken into consideration, one of them being as to whether such an appointment had been made in terms of the statutory rules. Delay in raising an industrial dispute is also a relevant fact". E In _Haryana State Electronics Development Corporation_ v. _Mamni,_ AIR (2006) SC 2427, this Court directed payment of compensation. Similar orders were passed in _North-Eastern Karnataka Rt. Corporation_ v. _Ashappa,_ (2006] 5 SCC 137 and _UP. State Road Transport Corporation_ v. _Man Singh,_ [2006] 7 sec 752] F In _Man Singh_ (supra) it was held :- "7. The respondent admittedly raised a dispute in 1986, i.e. after a peri9d of about 12 years, it may be true that in an appropriate case, as has been done by the Labour Court, delay in raising the G dispute would have resulted in rejection of his clai'm for back wages for the period during which the workman remains absent as has been held by this Court in _Gurmail Singh_ v. _Principal, Govt. Co,flege of Education._ But the discrP-tionary relief, in our opinion, must be granted upon taking into consideration all H 924 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 4 S.C.R. A B. attending circumstances. The appellant is a statutory corporation Keeping' iri view the fact. that the respondent .was appointed .on a temporary basis, it was unlikely that he remained unemployed for such a long time. In any event, it would be wholly unjust at this distance of time. i.e. after a period of more than 30 years, to direct reinstatement of the respondent in service. Unfortunately, the Labol:!r Court or the High Court did. not consider these aspects of the matter. 8. Keeping in view the particular facts and circumstances of this '·.,'..· '''<lifedion' ... c.~~e, .'Y~ ,are fo~ reinst~tefuent of the. opinion that instead and in place ofthetesporiderittogether with back of the wages from 1986, interest of justice would be subserved if the . . appellant is directed to pay a sum of Rs. 50,000 to him. Similar orders; we may place on record, have been passed by this Court _:_ ~· -: .... ' , ... ,.... ;in Sta(e.of[Jajas.thrr~v _.. (ihyan Chand, State of MP_ v. _Arjun/al_ ·· . ·. · •· ; _kcdiik;_ N~ga; _Mah'apdl{Jca_ (n~w 'M~nicfpiit _Corpdrati6n)_ v. _State_ D _of U.P.,_ and _Haryana State Electronics Development Corporation ltd_ v. _Mamni."_ .It was further held : "The legal position has since undergone a change in the light of a .. B. · :Constittiiion: Senct:i decision _qf_ this Court in _Secretary: State. of" Karnataka_ & _Ors._ v. _Uma Devi (3) & Ors.,_ [2006] 4 SCC 1 wherein this Court held that 'State' within th~ ~eaning of A£ticle 1.2 of the Constitution of India is under a constitutional obligation to comply with the provisions contained in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India." F 13. In this case, the Industrial Court exercised its discretionary jurisdiction under Section 11 A of the Industrial Disputes Act. It merely directed the amount of compensation to which the respondent was entitled to, had the provisions of Section 25F been complied with should be sufficient to meet the ends of justice. We are not suggesting that the High Court could not interfere · · Ci with' the said order, but th~ discretionary jurisdiction exercised by the Industrial Coµ rt, in our . opinion, should have been taken into consideration for detennination of the question as to what relief should be granted in the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case. Each case is required to be dealt with in the _fact_ situation . obtaining· therein~ H 14. We, therefore, are of the opinion that keeping in view the peculiar MAD HY A PRADESH ADMINISTRATION'" TRIBHUBAN [S.B. SINHA, J.] 925 facts and circumstances of this case and particularly in view of the fact that the High Court had directed re-instatement with full back wages, we are of the opinion that interest of justice would be subserved if appellant herein be directed to pay a sum of Rs. 75,000/- by way of compensation to the respondent. This appeal is allowed to the aforementioned extent. 15. However, in the facts and circumstances of this case, there shall be B' no order as to costs. N.J. Appeal partly allowed. --