Macherla Hanumantha Rao and others v. The State of Andhra Pradesh

396 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1958) 1957 his appointement under a Committee which is a _Maulana Abdul_ statutory body and such appointment cannot be called _Shakur_ an appointment by or under the control of the Govern_Rikhahc1and and_ ment of India nor is hi~ salary paid out of the revenues _Another_ of the Government but out of the funds of Durgah _Kapur_ _1._ Endowment. In the. circumstances the majority of the Tribunal has erred in holding that the appellant held an office of profit under the Government and the opinion of the Chairman to the contrary lays down the correct position. In view of this finding in regard to the office of profit under the Government, it is not necessary to go into the question whether there were any "thrown away" votes or whether the respondent has been rightly declared to have been elected. We are of the opinion that the election of the appellant has been wrongly set aside and we would allow the appeal and set aside the order of the majority of the Tribunal. The appellant will have his costs in this court as also before the Tribunal. _Appeal al/01red._ 1957 _**')eptember**_ **17.** _v._ THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH MACHERLA HANUMANTHA RAO AND OTHERS (with connected petition) (S.R. DAS C.J., VENKATARAMA AYYAR, B.P. SINHA, J.L. KAPUR and A. SARKAR JJ.) _**Sessions Tria/-Co1111nitment proceeding instituted**_ _**011**_ _**Police**_ _report-Proeedure._ _if_ _makes for inequality before_ _law-Code_ _of_ _Criminal Procedure (Act V_ _of_ 1898) _as_ _amended_ _by_ _tire_ _Code_ _of_ _Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act,_ 1955 (26 _of_ 1955), _ss.,_ 207, _207A-Constitutin of India, Art._ 14. The point in controversy in this appeal was whether ss. 207 and 207 A inserted into the Code of Crimninal Procedure by the amending Act 26 of 1955, violated the provision of Art. 14 of the Constitution and were, therefore, invalid in law. The appellants were committed for trial to the Court of Session by the inquiring S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 397 Magistrate in a proceeding instituted against them on a Police 1957 report and he. followed the procedure laid down in s, 207 A of the _Macher/a_ Code as reqmred by s. 207 of the Code. The appellants moved _Ha11umantlia Rm··_ the High Court for quashing the · order of commitment on the _and_ _others_ ground that the provisions of s. 207A introduced discrimination v. as against accused persons instituted on Police report and were unconstitutional again&t whom proceedings were in character. _Arn;,, /1_ _ra si;te ra ;1es 1_ The High Court held against them. The contention was reiterated in this Court and it was sought to be made out that the provisions of s. 207 A of the Code in comparison and contrast to other provisions of Ch. XVlil of the Code, prescribed a less advantageous procedure for the accused persons in a proceeding started on Police report than the procedure prescribed for other cases in the suocceding sections of the chapter. _lle/d,_ that ss. 207 and 207 A of the Code were not discriminatory and did not contravene Art. 14 of the Constitution and their constitutional validity was beyond question. Although there can be no doubt that the impugned sections introduced substantial difference in the procedure relating to commitment proceedings applicable .to the two classes of cases, they did not in any way affect the procedure at the· trial, and the true test of the constitutional validity of the classification they made, wa' whether it was reasonable and pertinent to the object the Legislature had in view, namely, a speedy trial of offences with the least possible delay. So .iudged there could be no doubt that the Legislature in prescribing the two different procedures at th<l commitment stage, one for proceedings instituted on Police report and the other for those that were not, had acted on a consideration that was reasonable and connected with the object it had in view. _Budhan Choudhry_ v. _The State_ _of Bihar,_ (1955) S.C.R. 1045, applied. _Matajog Dobey_ v. _H._ C. _Bhari,_ (1955) 2 S.C.R. 925, _Chiranjit_ _Lal Chmrdhuri_ v. _The_ _Union_ ~f _India,_ (1950) S.C.R. 869, _The State_ _of Bombay_ v. _F._ _N. Balsara,_ (1951) S.C.R. 682, _The State of West_ _Bengal_ v. _Anwar_ _Ali_ _Sarkar,_ (1952) S.C.R. 284, _Kathi_ _Raning-_ _Rawat_ v: _The State_ _of Saurashtra,_ (1952) S.C.R. 435, _Lachmandas_ _Kewalram Ahuja_ v. _The State of Bombay,_ (1952, S.C.R. 710, _Qasim_ _Razvi_ v. _The_ _State_ _of Hyderabad,_ (1953) S.C.R. 581, _Habeeb_ _Mohamad_ v. _The State_ _of Hyderabad,_ (1953) S.C.R. 661 _and The_ _State of Punjab_ v. _Ajaib Singh,_ (1953) S.C.R. 254, referred to. CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 57 of 1957 and Cirminal Misc. Petition No. 294 of 1957. Appeal from the judgment and order dated September 28, 1956, of the former Andhra High Court at Guntur in Criminal Revision Case No. 241 of 1956. 1957 _**Macherla**_ _**Hanumantha**_ _**Rao**_ _**and**_ _**01her1**_ v. _Th<_ _State_ _of_ _**Andhra Pradesh**_ _**Sinha**_ _**J.**_ 398 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1958} _T._ _V._ _Sarma, K. Ramaseshayya Chaudhury_ and _T._ _S._ _Venkataraman,_ for the appellants. _T._ _V._ _R._ _Tatachari_ and _T._ _M._ _Sen,_ for the respondent. #### C. K. Daplitary, Solicitor-General of India and _T._ _M._ _Sen,_ for the Intervener (Union of India). 1957. September 17. The following Judgment of the Court was delivered by #### SINHA J.-The only question that arises for determination in this appeal on a certific~te granted by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad, under Art. 134 (I) (c) of the Constitution, is the constitutionality of the provisions of ss. 207 and 207A, Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the Code), which, read together, were introduced into the Code by Act XXVI of 1955. The 26 appellants have been committed to the Court of Session, Guntur Division, to take their trial for offences punishable under ss. 147, 148, 323, 324 and 302, read with ss. 34 and 149, Indian Penal Code. They impleaded the State of Andhra Pradesh as the sole respondent. The Union of India has been allowed to intervene on an application made in that behalf in view of the fact that the provisions of the Central Act have been impugned as unconstitutional. For the purposes of this appeal, it is only necessary to state the following relevant facts. The local police took cognizance of a serious occurrence of rioting with murder on December 22, 1955. The local police investigated the case, and after recording such evidence as it could collect in respect of the occurrence, submitted a charge-sheet under the aforesaid sections of the Indian Penal Code, to the magistrate having jurisdiction to entertain the case. The magistrate, following the procedure laid down in s. 207 A of the Code committed the persons shown in the chargesheet as the accused persons, to take their trial before the Court of Session. A number of applications in revision, under ss. 435 and 439 of the Code, were made on behalf of the accused persons, to the High Court of S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 399 Andhra Pradesh, to quash the order of commitment, 1957 chiefly on the ground that the said order having been _Macherla_ passed under the provisions of s. 207 A of the Code, _Hanumantha_ _Rao_ wa!: void, as those provisions were unconstitutional _and_ 0:~ers wa!: void, as those provisions were unconstitutional _and_ 0:~ers for the reason that they introduced discirmination as Th~ _State_ _of_ against accused persons in respect of whom a police _A.ndhra_ _Pradesh_ charge-sheet had been submitted. The revisional _Sinha_ _J._ applications were heard b~ Krishna Rao J. who dismissed them, holding that the provisions impugned were · not unconstitutional and that, therefore, the order of commitment was valid in law. The appellants applied for and obtained the necessary certificate under Art. 134 (1) (c) of the Constitution that the case was a fit one for appeal to this Court. The arguments addressed to the High Court have been repeated in this Court and are to the effect that ss. 207 and 207 A, as they now stand, provide for two separate procedures in the committing court, namely, (1) in respect of a case instituted on a police report for which the procedure specified in s. 207 A is prescribed, and (2) in respect of any other proceeding, the procedure laid down in other provisions of Chapter XVIII is prescribed. The argument is that a com parison and contrast of the two different procedures prescribed in respect of the two classes of cases, when examined in their details, show that the procedure in respect of a case instituted on a police report is less advantageous to the accused than the other procedure. Thus, it is further argued in the sections following s. 207 A in Chapter XVIII of the Code, the accused have been granted facilities which are not available to them in the procedure laid down in s. 207 A. By way of illustration, it was urged that under s. 208(3), it is open to an accused person to apply to the magistrate to issue process to compel the attendance of any witness or the production of any document, but sub-s.(2) of s. 207 A, which corresponds to the provisions of s. 208 (3), speaks only of the prosecution and not of the accused. Again, it is p_ointed out that sub-s. (4) of s. 207 A, makes reference only to the prosecution evidence, whereas the corresponding s. 208 (1) makes reference to the evidence that may be produced in 400 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1958} 1957 support of the prosecution or on behalf of the accu ed. _Macherla_ Similarly, it has been pointed out that there are no _Hanumantha Rao_ provisions in s. 207 A corresponding to those of _and_ ~ihm s. 209 (2), and s. 213 (2), empowering the magistrate to _T':;, Stat• ;t1_ discharge the accused; nor is there any provision in _An_ _ra_ _Pra_ _cs'_ the impugned s. 207 A corresponding to s. 215 relating _Sinha 1._ to quashing of commitments. Further, it was pointed out that whereas s. 209 (1) contains the words "not sufficient grounds for committing the accused person", sub-s.(6) of s. 207A has the words "no grounds for committing the accused". It has further been argued that in the new procedure adopted in the impugned s. 207A, the accused person has been deprived of the benefits under ss. 162 and 215 of the Code, and under ss. 27, 101 to 106 and 114-ill. (g) of the Evidence Act. #### It has, thus, been sought to be made out that the procedure laid down in s. 207A in the matter of commitment is less advantageous to the accused persons than the one prescribed in the succeeding sections of Chapter XVIII. We shall assume for the purpose of examining the constitutionality of the impugned provisions of the amended Code that there are differences in the two kinds of procedure envisaged in Chapter XVIII of the Code, relating to commitment proceedings, but it is by no means clear that the changes introduced by the amending Act XXVI of 1955 are always to the disadvantage or prejudice of an accused person. It is a well-known fact that the amending Act aforesaid introduced changes into the old Code with a view to simplifying and expediting procedure relating to trial #### of offences and to inquiries preceding such trials. It has also to be remembered that the Code has always prescribed different procedures for trial of offences varying with the gravity of the offences charged, or with the power of the court before which an accused person is placed on trial. Generally speaking, minor offences have been made triable summarily, or the same accused person in respect of an offence triable summarily, may be so tried by a magistrate specially empowered in that behalf, or may be tried according to the ordinary procedure by a magistrate not so S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 401 empowered. Less serious offences are triable by 1957 magistrates and more serious offences are triable by a _Macherta_ Court of Session or by a High Court after there has _Hanumantha_ _Ra.-._ . . d · . . b _and_ _Others_ b een a pre 1mmary mqmry an mvest1gation y a 1 [. . ] v. police officer, or an inquiry by a magistrate, com- l~ _sr}!e g1 h_ monly described as commitment proceedings, or, after _n Ira_ _ra_ _es_ inquiry by a Civil or Revenue Court, in connection _Sinha_ _J._ with certain specified offences committed in the course of or in relation to judicial proceedings or in respect of proceedings affecting the administration of justice. The Code has further classified offences triable by magistrates of any class or by magistrates of higher classes. There is, again, a cross-division . of cases into warrant cases and summons cases. With reference to the powers of police officers, offences have been classified as cognizable offences and non-cognizable offences. Thus, the principle of classification of offences and of different categories of cases relating to the trial of offences is a well-established rule of crimi#### nal procedure. It is true that for the first time, the impugned sections have prescribed two different procedures in respect of commitment proceedings as already indicated, but we have to remember that there is absolutely no difference in the _procedure at_ _the trial_ in contra-distinction to the procedure relating to the enquiry leading up to commitment of an accused person to a Court of Session or a High Court in cases triable exclusively by such a Court. It must also be remembered that every case involving a serious offence comes under the category of 'cognizable case' in respect of which a police officer may arrest a person named as an accused person without warrant and investigate the case without any order of a magistrate in that behalf. Hence, ordinarily speaking, as soon as information of the commission of a cognizable offence has been laid before a police officer in-charge of a police station, it becomes his duty to record the first information; and even in the absence of such a first information if such an officer receives information leading to a suspicion that a cognizable offence has been committed, he has to investigate the case and take all steps necessary for the apprehension and M2SC/61-7 402 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1958] _19s1_ arrest of the persons alleged to have been concerned _Macherla_ with the crime. Even in cases which are not, in the _Hanumantha Rao_ first i_nstance, of cognizable nature, it becomes the duty _and e.thers_ of a police officer to investigate such a case if he is so _The State_ _of_ ordered by a competent magistrate, taking cognizance _Andhra Pradesh_ of the offence under s. 190 of the Code. In all such _Sinha_ _J._ cases, it becomes the duty of a police officer in-charge #### of a police station, or of a superior officer if deputed to investigate a case, to follow the procedure laid down in Chapter XIV of the Code. Under s. 169 of the Code, if, as a result of the investigation under Chapter XIV, the police officer making the investigation, comes to the conclusion that there is no sufficient evidence or reasonable ground of suspicion to justify the forward' ing of the accused to a magistrate, he has to release the accused person if in custody. If, on the other hand, on such an investigation, it appears to the investigating officer that there is. sufficient evidence or reasonable ground of suspicion, it becomes his duty to forward the accused to a competent magistrate to try the accused or to commit him for trial. Section 173 of the Code requires the investigation to be concluded without any unnecessary delay and the submission of a report containing the result of the investigation, to a competent magistrate. After the submission of the police report, the police officer in-charge of a police station, before the commencement of the inquiry or trial by a magistrate, has to furnish to the accused, free of cost, a copy of the report aforesaid, of the first information report and of all other documents or relevant extracts thereof, on which prosecution proposes to rely, including statements and confessions, if any, recorded under s. 164, and the statements recorded under 3ub-s. 3 of s. 161, of all persons whom the prosecution proposes to examine as witnesses. On receipt of the police report and the documents aforesaid, under s. 173 of the Code, the magistrate concerned has to make up his mind whether the case has to be tried by him or by some other competent magistrate or by a Court of Session or a High Court. #### If the magistrate finds that the case is triable exclusively by a Court of Session or a High Court, he has S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 403 to follow the new procedure laid down in s. 207 A. 1957 At the commencement of the inquiry before the magis- _Macherla_ trate, when the accused appears before him, the _Hanumantha_ _Rao_ magistrate has to satisfy himself that the documents _and_ ~thers referred to in s. 173 have been furnished to the _Tlte_ _srate_ _01_ accused and to have them furnished if the police officer _Andhra_ _Pradesh_ has not done his duty. The magistrate then has to _Sinha_ _J._ record the evidence of such witnesses as figure as eyewitnesses to the occurrence, and are produced before him. He has also the power, in the interest of justice, to record such other evidence of the prosecution as he may think necessary, but he is not obliged to record any evidence. Without recording any evidence but after considering all the documents referred to in s. 173 and after examining the accused person _and after hearing the parties, it is open to the magistrate to discharge the accused person after recording his reasons that no ground for committing the accused for trial has been made out, unless he decides to try the accused himself or to send him for trial by another magistrate. If, on the other hand, he finds that the accused should be committed for trial, is required to frame a charge disclosing the offence with which the accused is charged. The accused is then required to submit a list of persons whom he wishes to be summoned, to give evidence at his trial. After all this; the case is placed before the Court of Session or the High Court for trial in accordance with the procedure laid down by the Code. But if the investigating police officer, instead of submitting a charge-sheet as required by s. 173, submits what is popularly called the "final report" to the effect that there was no evidence in support of the prosecution case and that it was not a fit case for a trial either by a magistrate or by a Court of Session or . #### High Court, the matter may not end there. It is open to the first informant or any other person interested in prosecuting the accused persgn, to make a regular petition of complaint before a competent magistrate under s. _190_ of the Code. The magistrate; upon taking cognizance under that section, may start an inquiry of his own, notwithstandirtg the fact that the police 404 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1958] 1957 has refused to prosecute the case. The magistrate, in _Mocher/a_ a case triable exclusively by a Court of Session or by a _Han"",]'7}t, Rao_ High Court, has to follow the procedure laid down in _an_ / _rs_ s. 208 and subsequent sections of Chapter XVIII. The ]:/dir~''ffr~afsh m~dgistrate . natl.lrballyth has to ev1 ence given y 1 m~dgistrate . natl.lrballyth has to i;nake a rdecordh of hthe ev1 ence given y e comp amant an 1 sue ot er _Sinha_ _J._ witnesses as may have been produced in support of the prosecution or on behalf of the accused if the accused chooses to adduce any evidence at that stage. Ordinarily, an accused person does not choose to do so for the fear that he might disclose his defence too early. After recording the evidence adduced on behalf of the prosecution as also on behalf of the accused, if adduced, and examining the accused for the purpose of enabling him to explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against him, the magistrate may either discharge the accused person if he finds that there is no sufficient ground for committil'\g him for trial after recording his reason, or direct him to be tried by himself or some other magistrate. The order of discharge may be made by the magistrate even at an earlier stage if he records the reasons for considering the charge to be groundless, or, he may commit the accused for trial after framing a charge declaring the offence with which the accused has been #### charged. It is also open to an accused person, if the magistrate in his discretion allows him to do so, to ### examine more witnesses. If after examining those additional witnesses, the magistrate is satisfied that there are no sufficient grounds for committing the accused, he may cancel the charge and di;charge the accused. #### It will, thus, be seen that where the magistrate conducts commitment proceeding as on a complaint, the accused has the advantage of three stages at which #### he may be .discharged. It has, therefore, been contended on behalf of the appellants that the procedure under s. 207 A is less advantageous to the accused than the other procedure. The answer to this contention is that the Legislature, in its wisdom, has proceeded on the basis that it is primarily the function of the State through its police officers who are charged with the S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 405 duty of preventing the commission of crime and of 1957 bringing offenders. to justice, to prosecute ciriminals or _MacJiert•·_ alleged criminals in serious cases, that is to say, cases _Ha1111ma1111ia_ _Rao_ involving not only personal injury to the complainant _mid_ ~.titers but also public peace and order. Such police officers _The_ _siate_ _of_ _1_ _1_ have been enjoined by law to see to it that all persons _Andhra Prades_ alleged to have been concerned in a crime of that _Sinha_ _J._ character, should be speedily brought to justice. Chapter XIV of the Code, as stated above, lays down the procedure which police officers have to follow. Hence, the Code has provided that all casess involving public peace and order, should be investigated by public. servants who are expected to be vigilant in bringing all offenders to justice without any avoidable ### delay. If the police have not thought it necessary or feasible to do so after following the procedure laid down in Chapter XIV, the private party may figure before the magistrate as complainant. The magistrate has got, therefore, to be more vigilant in seeing that private vendetta and considerations other than those of vindicating justice, are not allowed to interfere with the administration of public justice. Hence, the procedure laid down in section 208 and the sections following that section, naturally gives greater facilities to persons accused of an offence, to vindicate their character. As indicated above, there is no doubt that there are material differences in the two procedures relating to commitment according as the case lias been investigated by a competent police officer who has submitted a charge-sheet and a report under section 173 of the Code, or, a competent magistrate has taken cognizance of an offence on a complaint. In the latter case, the procedure before the committing magistrate is more elaborate. But is it always to the advantage of an accused person that there should be an elaborate procedure before such a magistrate and not a summary #### one? It is the avowed policy of the Legislature and there can be no doubt that it is in the general interest of administration of justice, that crimes should be investigated and criminals brought to justice as expeditiously as circumstances of the case would 406 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1958] _19s1_ permit. That must also be in the interest of an _Macherla_ accused person himself if he claims not to be guilty of Ha'::lO'l~,:·• v. any1 rea v. any1 rea offiffiencde. o en er wou Gen1edrablly e mtereste m pro ongmg t e ~peakingd, ~herefo1re, . onlyha offiffiencde. o en er wou Gen1edrablly ~peakingd, ~herefo1 ,{~Z _St'Jf• 0 ;th_ inquiry or trial so as to postpone the day of judgment. ### n ra ' " If a person has been falsely or wrongly accused of an _0_ ### ra ' " If a person has been falsely or wrongly accused of an _Sinha_ _J._ offence, .it is in his interest that he should get himself declared innocent by a competent court as early as possible. In view of these considerations, there cannot be the least doubt that the Legislature has been well advised to amend the procedure relating to commitment proceedings in cases which have been investigated by a competent police officer. The Legislature has rightly retained the old elaborate procedure only in those cases which have not been investigated by such a public officer, or, after investigation, have been declared not to be fit to be proceeded with in public interest. Having found that there are substantial differences introduced by the impugned provisions, we have to consider the question of the constitutionality of those provisions. At the threshold, it is pertinent to observe that these provisions have not in any way affected the procedure at the trial. After a case has been committed to a Court of Session, the procedure for the trial of offences in either <;lass of cases, remains the same. Hence, all those cases which came up to this Court in which it \vas laid down that the law introduced substantial changes in the procedure at the trial to the disadvantage of an accused person, have absolutely no relevance to the present case. The main attack on the constitutionality of those provisions is based on Art. 14 of the Constitution. This Court had #### to consider the provisions of that article in a series of cases, namely, #### Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri v. The Union of India.('), _The State of Bombay_ v. _F._ _N. Balsara_ (2), _The State of_ _West Bengal_ v. _Anwar Ali Sarkar_ (')i _Kathi Raning_ #### Rawat v. The· State of Saurashtra ( ), Lachmandas (1) [19SoJ S.C.R. 86g. (2) [1951] S.C.R. filb. (3) [1952] S.C.R. 284. (4) [1952] S.C.R. 435. S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 407 _Kewalram Ahuja_ v. _The State of Bombay_ (1), _Qasim_ 1957 _Razvi_ v. _The State of Hyderabad(2) Habeeb Mohamad_ v. _Macht!f!la_ T.A~e .bsta~e _ohif_ _({!)_ _yderabad_ (3), _The State·_ _of Punjab_ v. _Ha":/ut<J':her1:°"_ ~ 8~ ~ # · . The State of which were all referred to in the case of _Bhudhan Chou-_ _Andhra_ _Pradesh_ _dhry_ v. _The State of Bihar_ (5), which is the nearest case _Sinha_ _J._ to the case now before us, with this distinction that in that case, there was a difference at the trial stage itself. In that case, the same accused person in respect of the same offence, could be tried under section 30 of the Code by a magistrate empowered under that section, #### and by a Court of Session, if the offence happened to have taken place in a jurisdiction to which section 30 had not been applied. In that case, this Court upheld the constitutibnality of that section of the Code, and repelled the contention that the provisions of that section infringed the fundamental right to equality guaranteed by art. 14 of the Constitution. · In tAe course of his judgment, Das J. (as he then was) made the following observations which apply to the case in hand with full force : " ........ It is now well-established that whlle article 14 forbids class legislation, if does not forbid reasonable classification for the purposes of legislation. In order, however, to pass the test of permissible classification two conditions must be fulfilled, namely, (I) that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others left out #### of the group and (II) that that differentia must have a Tational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question. The classification may be founded on different basis; namely, geographical, or according to objects or occupations or the like. What is necessary is that there must be a nexus between the basis of classification and the object of the Act under #### consideration. It is also well-established by the decisions of this Court that article 14 condemns (1) [1952] S.C.R. 710. (2) [19531 S.C.R. 581. (3) [1953] S.C.R. 661. (4) [1953] s.c.R. 25.j. (5) [1955] 1 s.c·R. 1045, 1049. 408 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1958] l957 discrimination not only by a substantive law but also _Macherla_ by a law of procedure." _**Hanumantha Rao**_ . - _aiul Others_ The later case bt:fore this Court dealmg with the #### The ;,~,e question of discrimination in respect of provisions of _01_ _Andhra Pradesh_ the Code is the one reported in _Matajog Dobey_ v. _H.C._ _s;nha_ _J._ _Bhari(1)._ In that case, the constitutionality of section 197 of the Code, was questioned. The contention raised in that case was that the section vested arbitrary power in the Government to grant or withhold sanction which could be withheld or granted at the sweet will of the Executive. This Court overruled that contention and held that a discretionary power is not necessarily discriminatory. Applying the principles laid down by this Court to the case in hand to judge whether or not there has been objectionable discrimination, there could not be the least doubt that the Legislature has provided for a clear classification between the two kinds of proceedings at the commitment stage based upon a very relevant consideration, namely, whether or not there has been a previous inquiry by a responsible public servant whose duty it is to discover crime and to bring criminals to speedy justice. This basis of classification is clearly connected with the underlying principle of administration of justice that an alleged criminal should be placed on his trial as soon after the commission of the crime as circumstances of the case woi;ld permit. This classification cannot be said to be unreasonable and not to have any relation to the object of the legislation, namely, a more speedy trial of offences without any avoidable delay. For the reasons given above, it must be held that there is no discrimination and that the provisions of Art. 14 of the Constitution have not been contravened: The provisions of the Code, impugned in this case, must, therefore, be held to be constitutional. The appeal is, accordingly, dismissed. _Appeal dismissed._ (<) [r~ssl 2 s.c.R. 925.