M. Shaji v. SNDP Sakha Yogam No.610, Punnapra East, Punnapra Village, Alappuzha District, represented by its Secretary, K.S. Syamalal; and 2 President Uthaman of Do Do

# **IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM** # **PRESENT THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL K.NARENDRAN** ## **&** **THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE P.G. AJITHKUMAR** **THURSDAY, THE 21[ST] DAY OF OCTOBER 2021 / 29TH ASWINA, 1943** **RCREV. NO. 284 OF 2015 AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 03/10/2015 IN R.C.A.NO.9 OF 2015 OF RENT CONTROL APPELLATE AUHTORITY (DISTRICT COURT, ALAPPUZHA ARISING FROM THE ORDER DATED 24/01/2015 IN R.C.P.NO.23 OF 2014 OF THE RENT CONTROL COURT (PRINCIPAL MUNSIFF), ALAPPUZHA** ## **REVISION PETITIONER/APPELLANT/CR.PETITIONER/TENANT:** **M.SHAJI, S/O.MADHAVAN, AGED 43 YEARS, MANAPARAMBU HOUSE, PUNNAPRA MURI, PUNNAPRA VILLAGE, ALAPPUZHA DISTRICT** **BY ADVS.SRI.K.S.HARIHARAPUTHRAN SRI.GEORGE MATHEW SRI.SUNIL KUMAR A.G** ## **RESPONDENT/RESPONDENT/PETITIONER/LANDLORD:** **1 S.N.D.P. SAKHA YOGAM NO.610 PUNNAPRA EAST, PUNNAPRA, ALAPPUZHA DISTRICT, REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY, K.S.SYAMALAL, S.N.D.P.SAKHAYOGAM NO.610 PUNNAPRA EAST, ALAPPUZHA PIN 688004** - **2 PRESIDENT UTHAMAN OF DO DO** **BY ADVS.SRI.A.N.RAJAN BABU(B/O) SRI.R.AZAD BABU SRI.G.KEERTHIVAS** **THIS RENT CONTROL REVISION HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 21.10.2021, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:** RCREV. NO. 284 OF 2015 -2- ## **ORDER** ## Anil K. Narendran, J. The petitioner is the respondent-tenant in R.C.P.No.23 of 2014 on the file of the Rent Control Court (Munsiff), Alappuzha, a petition filed by the respondent herein-landlord seeking eviction of the tenant from the petition schedule building under Sections 11(2)(b) and 11(3) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965. During the pendency of that Rent Control Petition, the landlord filed I.A.No.2576 of 2014 under Section 12 of the Act, seeking an order directing the tenant to deposit admitted arrears of rent and continue to pay the same during the pendency of the Rent Control Petition. In that interlocutory application, the tenant did not file objections. The Rent Control Court passed an order dated 15.12.2014, in exercise of its powers under Sections 12(1) and (2) of the Act, whereby the tenant was required to deposit the admitted arrears of rent, within the time limit specified in that order. 2. The tenant failed to deposit the arrears of rent, in terms of the aforesaid order, either within the time limit specified therein or within the extended time granted by the -3- RCREV. NO. 284 OF 2015 Rent Control Court. On account of the default committed by the tenant in remitting the said amount, the Rent Control Court passed an order dated 24.01.2015 under Section 12(3) of the Act, thereby stopping further proceedings in R.C.P.No.23 of 2014 and directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the petition schedule building. 3. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid order passed by the Rent Control Court, the tenant filed R.C.A.No.9 of 2015 before the Rent Control Appellate Authority (District Judge), Alappuzha, invoking the provisions under Section 18(1)(b) of the Act. That appeal ended in dismissal by the judgment dated 03.10.2015. Challenging the order dated 24.01.2015 of the Rent Control Court in R.C.P.No.23 of 2014 and also the judgment dated 03.10.2015 of the Rent Control Appellate Authority in R.C.A.No.9 of 2015, the petitioner-tenant is before this Court in this Rent Control Revision, invoking the provisions under Section 20 of the Act. 4. On 13.11.2015 when this Rent Control Revision came up for admission, this Court admitted the matter on file and issued urgent notice to the respondent returnable within -4- RCREV. NO. 284 OF 2015 ten days. In I.A.No.2874 of 2015 this Court granted an interim stay of the execution proceedings in R.C.P.No.23 of 2014 before the Principal Munsiff Court, Alappuzha, for a period of one month. The said interim order was not extended thereafter. 5. In view of conflicting decisions as regards the interpretation to be placed on Section 12(3) of the Act, the Division Bench by the order dated 14.12.2015 adjourned this Rent Control Revision to be heard by a Full Bench of this Court, after placing the matter before the Honourable the Chief Justice for orders. The Full Bench answered the reference in its order dated 28.04.2020, which is reported in **Shaji M. v. SNDP Sakhayogam No.610, Alappuzha and another [2020 (2) KHC 574]** . 6. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant and also the learned counsel for the respondent-landlord. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant would contend that the Rent Control Court as well as the Appellate Authority lost sight of the scope of an application under Section 12 of the Act while passing the impugned order and -5- RCREV. NO. 284 OF 2015 judgment. The courts below have not given sufficient opportunity to the tenant to pay the admitted arrears of rent. 8. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondentlandlord would contend that the impugned order and judgment of the courts below are perfectly legal, which warrants no interference in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction of this Court under Section 20 of the Act. 9. Section 12 of the Act deals with payment or deposit of rent during the pendency of proceedings for eviction. As per Section 12(1), no tenant against whom an application for eviction has been made by a landlord under Section 11, shall be entitled to contest the application before the Rent Control Court under that Section, or to prefer an appeal under Section 18 against any order made by the Rent Control Court on the application, unless he has paid or pays to the landlord, or deposits with the Rent Control Court or the A ppellate A uthority, as the case may be, all arrears of rent admitted by the tenant to be due in respect of the building up to the date of payment or deposit, and continues to pay or to deposit any rent which may subsequently become due in respect of the -6- RCREV. NO. 284 OF 2015 building, until the termination of the proceedings before the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be. As per Section 12(2), the deposit under sub-section (1) shall be made within such time as the c ourt may fix and in such manner as may be prescribed and shall be accompanied by the fee prescribed for the service of notice referred to in sub-section (4). As per the proviso to Section 12(2), the time fixed by the court for the deposit of the arrears of rent shall not be less than four weeks from the date of the order and the time fixed for the deposit of rent which subsequently accrues due shall not be less than two weeks from the date on which the rent becomes due. As per Section 12(3) of the Act, if any tenant fails to pay or to deposit the rent as aforesaid, the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be, shall, unless the tenant shows sufficient cause to the contrary, stop all further proceedings and make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building. As per Section 12(4), when any deposit is made under sub-section (1), the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be, shall cause notice of the deposit to be served on -7- RCREV. NO. 284 OF 2015 the landlord in the prescribed manner, and the amount deposited may, subject to such conditions as may be prescribed, be withdrawn by the landlord on application made by him to the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority in that behalf. 10. Section 12(1) of the Act enjoins a tenant, against whom an application for eviction has been made by a landlord under Section 11, to pay to the landlord, or deposit with the Rent Control Court, all arrears of rent admitted by the tenant to be due in respect of the building, up to the date of payment or deposit, and continue to pay or deposit any rent which may subsequently become due in respect of the building, until the termination of the proceedings before the Rent Control Court, in order to contest that application for eviction before the Rent Control Court. Similarly, Section 12(1) of the Act enjoins a tenant, in order to prefer an appeal under Section 18 of the Act against any order made by the Rent Control Court on an application made by a landlord under Section 11, to pay the landlord, or deposits with the Appellate Authority, all arrears of rent admitted by the tenant to be due in respect of the -8- RCREV. NO. 284 OF 2015 building up to the date of payment or deposit, and continues to pay or to deposit any rent which may subsequently become due in respect of the building, until the termination of the proceedings before the Appellate Authority. 11. In order to have recourse to the provisions of Section 12(1) of the Act, it is a pre-requisite that, there should be an application for eviction made by a landlord under Section 11, or an appeal filed by the tenant under Section 18 against any order made by the Rent Control Court on such an application made by a landlord under Section 11. Without satisfying any one of the conditions given in Section 12(1), the landlord cannot recourse to the provisions of Section 12 of the Act. 12. In **Joy Daniel v. N.A. Ibrahimkutty and others [2020 (2) KHC 543]** , on the question as to whether Section 12(1) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act casts an obligation on the tenant to pay the admitted arrears of rent in order to contest an appeal filed challenging an order under Section 12(3), which is to the effect of stoppage of the proceedings and directing the tenant to put the landlord in -9- RCREV. NO. 284 OF 2015 possession of the premises, a Full Bench of this Court held that, Section 12(1) provides such an obligation only in the case of an application under Section 11 or in the case of an appeal preferred under Section 18 against an order passed by the Rent Control Court on an application under Section 11. 13. In **Pochappan Narayanan v. Gopalan [1990 (2) KLT 1]** one of the contentions put forward by the learned counsel for the landlord was that, payment or deposit of arrears of rent admitted by the tenant to be due is a condition precedent which has to be satisfied by the tenant, before he can prefer an appeal against an order of eviction made by the Rent Control Court. Reliance was placed on the language of Section 12(1) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, which provides that no tenant shall be entitled to prefer an appeal under Section 18 against an order of eviction made by the Rent Control Court unless he has paid or deposited all arrears of rent admitted by the tenant to be due till the date of preferring the appeal. The Division Bench, found that the right of appeal against an order of eviction made by the Rent Control Court is not conferred by Section 12 of the Act. The -10- RCREV. NO. 284 OF 2015 right of appeal is conferred by Section 18. Section 12 imposes certain obligations on the tenant of paying or depositing admitted rent during the pendency of the proceedings for eviction, and the consequences for committing default in fulfilling those obligations. The word 'prefer' used in Section 12(1) is not to convey the same meaning with which it has been employed in Section 18, which confers a right of appeal against an order of the Rent Control Court. The word 'prefer' not having been defined in the Act, it has to be assigned the ordinary meaning having regard to the context in which the said word is used. The meaning of the word 'prefer' given in Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition is “t o bring before; to prosecute; to try; to proceed with". It is therefore clear that the word 'prefer' can be used in the context of Section 12(1) for conveying the lodging of the appeal or prosecution of the appeal or proceeding with the appeal. Section 12(3) of the Act, which speaks of the consequences of the failure to pay or deposit the rent as contemplated by Sections 12(1) and (2), says that all further proceedings should be stopped and an order made directing the tenant to put the landlord in -11- RCREV. NO. 284 OF 2015 possession of the building. The consequence contemplated is not dismissal of the appeal on the ground that it is not maintainable but only to stop all further proceedings in the appeal. Therefore, the Division Bench held that the word 'prefer' has been used in Section 12(1) of the Act not to convey the lodging of the appeal but to convey that the appeal already lodged in accordance with Section 18 shall not be proceeded with or prosecuted further if the conditions specified in Section 12(1) are not fulfilled. Paying or depositing of all arrears of rent admitted by the tenant is not a condition precedent for presenting an appeal under Section 18 of the Act. The appeal gets properly lodged when the same is presented in accordance with Section 18 of the Act. 14. The liability of a tenant under Section 12(1) of the Act, against whom an application for eviction has been made by a landlord under Section 11, or who prefer an appeal under Section 18 of the Act, against any order made by the Rent Control Court on an application made by a landlord under Section 11, is limited to all arrears of rent admitted by the tenant to be due in respect of the building, up to the date of -12- RCREV. NO. 284 OF 2015 payment or deposit, and he shall continue to pay or deposit any rent which may subsequently become due in respect of the building, until the termination of the proceedings before the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be. 15. The object of the provisions of Section 12(1) of the Act is to deny the defaulting tenant the right to contest the application for eviction before the Rent Control Court, or to prefer an appeal under Section 18 of the Act against any order made by the Rent Control Court on an application made by a landlord under Section 11, unless he pays to the landlord, or deposits with the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be, all arrears of rent admitted by him to be due in respect of the building, up to the date of payment or deposit, and continues to pay or to deposit any rent which may subsequently become due in respect of the building, until the termination of the proceedings before the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be. 16. Section 12(2) of the Act enjoins a tenant to deposit -13- RCREV. NO. 284 OF 2015 the admitted rent under sub-section (1), within such time as the court may fix and in such manner as may be prescribed. The time fixed by the court for the deposit of the arrears of rent and the time fixed for the deposit of rent which subsequently accrues due shall not be less than that specified in the proviso to Section 12(2). As per the statutory mandate of Section 12(1), on an application filed by the landlord under Section 12, the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be, has to order payment or deposit of arrears of rent admitted by the tenant to be due in respect of the petition schedule building, up to the date of payment or deposit and the tenant shall also be directed to continue to pay or deposit any rent which may subsequently become due in respect of the building, until the termination of the proceedings before the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, regardless of the relief sough for in that application. Therefore, even in a case in which the relief sought for in an application filed under Section 12 of the Act is confined to payment or deposit of admitted arrears of rent up to the date of application or up to the date of order to be passed in that -14- RCREV. NO. 284 OF 2015 application, the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be, is statutorily bound to pass an order directing the tenant to pay or deposit admitted arrears of rent up to the date of payment or deposit and continue to pay or deposit rent which may subsequently become due, until termination of that proceedings. 17. As per Section 12(3) of the Act, if any tenant fails to pay or to deposit the rent as aforesaid, the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be, shall, unless the tenant shows sufficient cause to the contrary, stop all further proceedings and make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building. 18. In **Pochappan Narayanan [1990 (2) KLT 1]** a Division Bench of this Court noticed that, Section 12(3) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act deals with consequences flowing as a result of the failure on the part of the tenant to pay or deposit admitted rent. When the tenant fails to pay or deposit the admitted rent, as provided in Section 12(1) and (2), the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case maybe, will be required to ask the -15- RCREV. NO. 284 OF 2015 tenant to show cause why all further proceedings should not be stopped and an order be made directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession. When such an opportunity is afforded to the tenant, the tenant is entitled to show, if there is sufficient cause, for his failure to pay the amount or deposit the rent as provided in Section 12(1) and (2). If the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority is satisfied that there is sufficient cause for not making the payment or deposit of the rent within time, it will not make any order stopping further proceedings and directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession. If, however, the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority is not satisfied about the cause shown, an order has to be made stopping all further proceedings and directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession. 19. In **Pochappan Narayanan** the Division Bench held that, before the consequences contemplated by Section 12(3) of the Act can ensue, the conditions specified in Section 12(1) and (2) have to be satisfied. It is therefore clear that, before any steps can be taken under Section 12(3) for making an order against the tenant who has committed default in paying -16- RCREV. NO. 284 OF 2015 or making the deposit as contemplated by Section 12(1), the procedure prescribed by Section 12(2) has to be satisfied. A tenant who does not fulfil the obligations imposed on him by Section 12(1) cannot be visited with the penal consequences contemplated by Section 12(3), unless all the conditions specified by Section 12(2) are satisfactorily fulfilled. Even after the court acts in accordance with Section 12(2) and the tenant still commits default, the tenant has to be given one more opportunity of showing cause as to why penal consequences contemplated by Section 12(3) should not be imposed on him. It is only when the court is not satisfied with the cause shown that it can pass an order stopping all further proceedings and directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building. 20. In **Narayanan v. Vinod [2004 (3) KLT 955]** the order passed by the Rent Control Appellate Authority under Section 12(3) of the of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act was assailed before the Division Bench, on the ground that the petitioner-tenant was not granted time as stipulated in Section 12(2) to deposit the arrears of rent and -17- RCREV. NO. 284 OF 2015 that, he had not been issued with any notice under Section 12(3) to show sufficient cause for not depositing the rent and, therefore, the order directing eviction of the tenant is contrary to the provisions of Section 12. The Division Bench noticed that, the provisions of Section 12 of the Act are mandatory and no tenant against whom an application for eviction has been made by a landlord is entitled to contest the same or to prefer an appeal under Section 18, against any order passed by the Rent Control Court, unless he had paid or pays to the landlord or deposits with the Rent Control Court or with the Appellate Authority, all arrears of rent admitted by him to be due in respect of the demised premises up to the date of payment and continues to pay or deposit the rent which may subsequently become due in respect of the building until the termination of the proceedings before the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority. Section 12(3) of the Act then mandates that if any tenant fails to pay or deposit the rent as aforesaid the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority shall ‘unless the tenant shows sufficient cause to the contrary’ stop all further proceedings and make an order directing the -18- RCREV. NO. 284 OF 2015 tenant to put the landlord in possession of the demised premises. In other words, if the admitted rent due is not deposited during the pendency of the proceedings before the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, all further proceedings have to stop and the authority concerned is required to make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in vacant possession of the premises, unless the tenant shows sufficient cause for not depositing that rent. 21. In **Narayanan** , on the question as to whether the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be, where admitted rent has not been paid, is required to issue a separate notice to the tenant to enable him to show sufficient cause for the default in payment of admitted rent or is it for the tenant himself to file an application and bring to the notice of the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority the reasons which prevented him from depositing the rent, the Division Bench held that, if the admitted arrears of rent are not deposited within the time fixed by the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority the tenant makes a default resulting in the penal consequences of his immediate eviction -19- RCREV. NO. 284 OF 2015 by stopping all further proceedings. This, however, will not happen if the tenant is able to show sufficient cause for making the default in not depositing the admitted rent. From the language of Section 12(3) of the Act and the legislative intent, it is not for the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority to issue any separate notice to the tenant to enable him to show sufficient cause for not depositing the admitted arrears of rent. When the time fixed for the deposit of arrears of rent runs out and the tenant has not deposited the same, the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be, is not expected to pass an order of ejectment of the tenant forthwith. 22. In **Narayanan** the Division Bench held that, the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, while fixing the time within which the arrears of rent shall be deposited by the tenant should normally adjourn the hearing of the case to a date beyond the date fixed for depositing the rent, thereby allowing reasonable time to the tenant to show sufficient cause for not depositing the rent, if he has committed default in payment. It will then be for the tenant to move an -20- RCREV. NO. 284 OF 2015 application before the concerned authority to show sufficient cause for the non-payment of rent. In other words, the interval between the date up to which the rent is to be deposited and the date on which the order under Section 12(3) is passed should be reasonable to enable the tenant to show sufficient cause for committing the default, if he so chooses. If the tenant moves such an application and points out the reasons which prevented him from depositing the arrears of admitted rent, the concerned authority will examine the issue on merits to find out whether sufficient cause has been shown or not. If sufficient cause has been shown, the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority will not order immediate ejectment of the tenant. If no application is filed by the tenant or if the reasons shown by the tenant are insufficient, the penal consequences as contemplated in Section 12(3) of the Act shall follow. Section 12(3) of the Act is a mandate to the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority to order immediate ejectment of the tenant, if the tenant does not deposit the admitted arrears of rent, the only exception being, if he is able to show sufficient cause for -21- RCREV. NO. 284 OF 2015 not doing so. In that view of the matter, the Division Bench concluded that, the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be, where admitted rent has not been deposited by the tenant, is not required to issue any separate notice to the tenant, to enable him to show sufficient cause for committing the default. 23. In **Shaji M. [2020 (2) KHC 574]** a Full Bench of this Court held that, in view of the principle evolved in **Narayanan [2004 (3) KLT 955]** , from the language of Section 12(3) of the of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, and from the legislative intent, it is not for the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority to issue any separate notice to the tenant to enable him to show sufficient cause for not depositing the admitted arrears of rent. Instead, when the time fixed for deposit of the arrears of rent runs out and the tenant has not deposited the same, the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be, is not expected to pass an order ordering ejectment of the tenant forthwith. The Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be, should normally adjourn the hearing of -22- RCREV. NO. 284 OF 2015 the case to a date beyond the date fixed for deposit, thereby allowing reasonable time to the tenant to show sufficient cause for not depositing the rent, if he has committed default in payment of the arrears of rent. The interpretation made and the directions issued in **Narayanan** is more apt and appropriate to be held, as a view which can be legally sustained. The opportunity to be afforded to the tenant to show sufficient cause with respect to the failure to pay or deposit rent, as directed in Section 12(1) and (2), within the date stipulated, is not an empty formality. The principles of natural justice would mandate that the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be, should afford the tenant with such an opportunity. 24. In **Shaji M.** , on the question as to whether the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority is required to issue any specific notice to the tenant to show cause, the Full Bench noticed that, the consequences provided under Section 12(3) of the Act follows when there occurred a default in complying with the direction for deposit or payment of the admitted arrears. Therefore, on the date stipulated for -23- RCREV. NO. 284 OF 2015 effecting such payment, by virtue of the order passed under Section 12(1) and (2), the tenant becomes fully aware that, unless sufficient cause has not been shown for the default committed, the consequence of stoppage of the proceedings and direction to put the landlord in possession of the building, would follow automatically. Therefore, there is no necessity to alert the tenant by issuing any specific notice in this regard, calling upon him to show sufficient cause. On the other hand, providing of a further opportunity after the last date stipulated for effecting the payment or the deposit, is mandatory. If no sufficient cause is shown within such extended date to which the rent control petition is posted, it is absolutely within the authority and competence; and is the natural consequence that the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be, should stop the proceedings and direct the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building. Such a procedure, if followed, would be sufficient compliance for providing reasonable opportunity satisfying the statutory requirement contained in Section 12(3). Hence the Full Bench conculded that the decision in **Narayanan [2004 (3) KLT** -24- RCREV. NO. 284 OF 2015 **955]** , eventhough passed without noticing the decision in **Pochappan Narayanan [1990 (2) KLT 1]** had laid the correct law. The Full Bench noticed that its view in this regard has got support from the decision of the Apex Court in **Sankaran Pillai v. V.P. Venuguduswami [(1999) 6 SCC 396]** , the decisions of this Court in **C.V. Xavier v. Francis Leonard Pappali [1975 KLT 542]** and **Narayanan v. Muraleedhara Maran [1964 KLT 509]** . 25. In **Sankaran Pillai v. V.P. Venuguduswami [(1999) 6 SCC 396]** the Apex Court held that, it is for the tenant to show sufficient cause and not for the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be, to issue any show cause notice calling upon the tenant to show cause why an order of eviction shall not be passed. 26. In **C.V. Xavier v. Francis Leonard Pappali [1975 KLT 542]** a Division Bench of this Court held that, the reasonable opportunity contemplated under Section 12(3) of the Act must be a reasonable and real opportunity and is not an empty formality and that, if the tenant is not given such opportunity to show sufficient cause, an order passed under -25- RCREV. NO. 284 OF 2015 Section 12(3) would be unsustainable. 27. Section 12 of the Act imposes certain obligations on the tenant to pay or deposit admitted rent, during the pendency of the proceedings for eviction under Section 11, before the Rent Control Court, and also the proceedings in an appeal filed under Section 18, before the Appellate Authority, against such an order of eviction. Section 12(3) of the Act also provides for the consequences, which were to follow, for committing default in fulfilling those obligations. Section 12(3) of the Act deals with the consequences flowing as a result of the failure of the part of the tenant to pay or deposit admitted rent. Before the consequences under Section 12(3) can ensue, the conditions specified in Section 12(1) and (2) have to be satisfied. Section 12(3) mandates that if any tenant fails to pay or deposit the admitted rent as provided under Section 12(1) and (2), the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be, shall, unless the tenant shows sufficient cause to the contrary stop all further proceedings and make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building. Therefore, if the Rent Control Court -26- RCREV. NO. 284 OF 2015 or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be, is satisfied about the cause shown by the tenant, it will not make any order under Section 12(3) of the Act, stopping further proceedings and directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building. 28. It is clear from the plain language and also the legislative intent of Section 12 of the Act that, it is not for the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be, to pass an order under Section 12(3), stopping further proceedings and directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building, once the time limit fixed for payment or deposit of admitted rent runs out, and the tenant defaulted payment or deposit of rent in terms of the order passed under Section 12(1) and (2). Though it is not for the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be, to issue any separate notice to the tenant to enable him to show sufficient cause for not paying or depositing the admitted arrears of rent, as held by the Division Bench in **Narayanan [2004 (3) KLT 955]** and approved by the Full Bench in **Shaji M. [2020 (2) KHC 574]** , the Rent Control -27- RCREV. NO. 284 OF 2015 Court or the Appellate Authority is not expected to pass an order forthwith, stopping further proceedings and directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building, under Section 12(3). 29. Before passing an order under Section 12(3) of the Act, the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be, should normally adjourn the hearing of the case to a date beyond the date fixed for payment or deposit of admitted rent, thereby allowing reasonable time to the tenant to show sufficient cause for not paying or depositing the admitted rent, if he has committed default in payment of the same, within the time limit stipulated in the order passed under Section 12(1) and (2). Such an opportunity to be afforded to the tenant to show sufficient cause is not an empty formality. The principles of natural justice would mandate that the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority should afford such an opportunity to the tenant before passing an order under Section 12(3). 30. The consequences provided under Section 12(3) of the Act follow when there occurred a default by the tenant in -28- RCREV. NO. 284 OF 2015 complying with the direction in an order passed under Section 12(1) and (2), for deposit or payment of the admitted arrears of rent. On the date stipulated for effecting such payment, by virtue of that order, the tenant becomes fully aware that, unless sufficient cause has not been shown for the default committed, the consequence of stoppage of the proceedings and direction to put the landlord in possession of the building, under Section 12(3) would follow automatically. There is no necessity to alert the tenant by issuing any specific notice in this regard, calling upon him to show sufficient cause. On the other hand, providing of a further opportunity after the last date stipulated for effecting payment or deposit of admitted rent, is mandatory. If no sufficient cause is shown within such extended date to which the rent control petition is posted, it is absolutely within the authority and competence, and is the natural consequence that, the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be, should stop the proceedings and direct the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building. As held by the Full Bench in **Shaji M. [2020 (2) KHC 574]** , such a procedure, if followed, -29- RCREV. NO. 284 OF 2015 would be sufficient compliance for providing reasonable opportunity satisfying the statutory requirement contained in Section 12(3) of the Act. 31. In **Venugopalan v. Raphael [1974 KLT 640]** the Division Bench of this Court was dealing with a case in which the landlord filed Rent Control Petition under Section 11(2)(b) of the Act claiming eviction of the petition schedule building on the ground of arrears of rent. The Rent Control Court passed an order directing the tenant to pay admitted arrears of rent on or before the 20.09.1971. In the said order it was made clear that, on default of deposit within the specified period, an order for possession under Section 12(3) of the Act, will be passed. The order under Section 12(1) and (2) was not complied with, despite the fact that time for payment was extended. Therefore, the Rent Control Court passed an order for possession under Section 12(3) of the Act, which was dated 25.10.1971. Within thirty days of the said order, the tenant filed I.A.No.4143 of 1971 to receive what was claimed to be the admitted arrears; and I.A.No.4142 of 1971 to set aside the order for possession passed under Section -30- RCREV. NO. 284 OF 2015 12(3) of the Act on 25.10.1971. The Rent Control Court dismissed I.A.No.4142 of 1971 holding that an order under Section 12(3) cannot be set aside or vacated on the mere ground that the admitted arrears of rent had been deposited subsequent to the order. It declined to receive the arrears of rent tendered along with the I.A.No.4143 of 1971, and accordingly dismissed the same. The appeals preferred by the tenant under Section 18(1)(b) of the Act against those orders were dismissed by the Rent Control Appellate Authority. On further revision, the revisional court, namely the District Court, Trichur, allowed the revision and set aside the orders of the Rent Control Court and of the Appellate Authority and remanded I.A.Nos. 4142 of 1971 and 4143 of 1971 back to the Rent Control Court for fresh disposal directing that the time for making deposit of the arrears of rent, will be extended by the Rent Control Court. Feeling aggrieved landlord preferred revision petition before this Court. 32. In **Venugopalan** the Division Bench noticed that, under Section 11(2)(c) of the Act a tenant, against whom a decree for eviction has been passed by the Rent Control Court -31- RCREV. NO. 284 OF 2015 on the ground that rent had been kept in arrears, is allowed relief against the forfeiture of tenancy incurred by nonpayment of rent, by depositing the arrears of rent decreed, within a certain period. In **Kurien v. Saramma Chacko [1964 KLT 1]** it was held that the power under Section 11(2) (c) can be exercised by the Appellate Authority and also by the Revisional Authority. Section 12 of the Act provides for a totally different contingency. The deposit of the admitted arrears enjoined by Section 12, is a condition precedent to the tenant entering on his defence and contesting the application for eviction, or an appeal filed therefrom. The scope and purpose of the deposit of arrears of rent enjoined by Section 12 is fundamentally different from the scope and the purpose of the deposit envisaged by Section 11(2)(c) of the Act. In **K.P. Mohammed v. Madhavi Amma [1963 KLT 688]** the Division Bench held that, Section 11 and Section 12 of the Act are not dependent on each other. They provide for different contingencies though the consequence of the non compliance of the mandates of either Section is eviction. An order of eviction passed under Section 12(3) of the Act is not -32- RCREV. NO. 284 OF 2015 amenable to correction under Section 11(2)(c), which relates to orders of eviction passed under Section 11(2)(b) only. In **T.B. Mohanan v. Kanakaraja Pillai [1970 KLT 1024]** a learned Judge of this Court held that an order passed under Section 12 of the Act, cannot be reopened or vacated by tendering the rent subsequent to the passing of the said order. In **Venugopalan** , the Division Bench held that, even assuming that for purpose of execution an order under Section 12(3) of the Act can be equated with and treated as the same, as one under Section 11 of the Act, the consequence enjoined by an order under Section 12(3) for failure to deposit the admitted arrears in time can not be vacated or obliterated by payment at any subsequent stages or periods. 33. In **Venugopalan** it was argued before the Division Bench that Section 12(3) of the Act is discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The Division Bench observed that, the scope and the purpose of Section 11(2)(c) and Section 12 are fundamentally different. The one is meant to relieve against forfeiture, and the other, as a -33- RCREV. NO. 284 OF 2015 condition precedent to be performed by the tenant before entering on his defence. The law itself does not encourage or put a premium on dishonesty, although those inclined to be dishonest may make use of its provisions to suit their purpose. Therefore, the Division Bench repelled the contention of the tenant that Section 12(3) of the Act is discriminatory. 34. In **Davy v. Indu [1999 (3) KLT 434]** a Division Bench of this Court reiterated that Section 11 and Section 12 of the Act operate in different fields and circumstances. The compliance of these mandatory provisions will lead to eviction of the tenant. But an order of eviction once passed under Section 12(3) cannot be undone by resorting to Section 11(2) (c) of the Act. Section 11(2)(c) of the Act relates to orders of eviction passed under Section 11(2) only. Therefore, Section 11 and 12 of the Act are not dependent on each other. 35. In **Nasiruddin v. Sita Ram Agarwal [(2003) 2 SCC 577]** the question as to the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, in the matter of default in deposit of rent as also interpretation of the word 'shall' occurring in Section 13(4) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and -34- RCREV. NO. 284 OF 2015 Eviction) Act, 1950, came up for consideration before a ThreeJudge Bench of the Apex. Section 13(1)(a) of the Act enables a landlord to sue for a decree of eviction in the event a tenant has neither paid nor tendered the amount of rent due from him for six months. In terms of Section 13(3), which was substituted by Section 8(i) of Rajasthan Act 14 of 1976, it is obligatory on the court to provisionally determine the amount of rent wherefor no application is required to be filed. As per Section 13(4) of the Act, the tenant shall deposit in court or pay to the landlord the amount determined by the court under Section 13(3) within fifteen days from the date of such determination, or within such further time, not exceeding three months, as may be extended by the court. The tenant shall also continue to deposit in court or pay to the landlord, month by month, the monthly rent subsequent to the period up to which determination has been made, by the fifteenth of each succeeding month or within such further time not exceeding fifteen days, as may be extended by the court, at the monthly rate at which the rent was determined by the court under Section 13(3). Under Section 13(5), if a tenant -35- RCREV. NO. 284 OF 2015 fails to deposit or pay any amount referred to in Section 13(4), on the date or within the time specified therein, the court shall order the defence against eviction to be struck out and shall proceed with the hearing of the suit. 36. In **Nasiruddin** the Apex Court held that, a bare perusal of the aforementioned provisions would show that in terms of Section 13(4), a tenant is required to deposit the amount of rent determined by the court under Section 13(3) within fifteen days of the date of determination or within such further time not exceeding three months, as may be extended by the court. By reason of the 1976 Amendment, the following was specifically inserted: “within such further time, not exceeding three months as may be extended by the court” or the words “or within such further time, not exceeding fifteen days, as may be extended by the court, at the monthly rate at which the rent was determined by the court under sub-section (3)” The word “shall”, which is ordinarily imperative in nature, has been used in Section 13(4). The power of the court has also been limited to the extent that it can extend time for such deposit not exceeding three months and so far as the deposit -36- RCREV. NO. 284 OF 2015 of monthly rent is concerned, by fifteen days. The court's power, therefore, is restricted. In case the tenant deposits the provisional rent as determined by the court within the stipulated period the tenant is relieved by the eviction decree. 37. In **Nasiruddin** the Apex Court noticed that, Section 13(1) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 dealt with in the decision in **Shyamcharan Sharma v. Dharamdas [(1980) 2 SCC 151]** the court has been conferred power to extend the time for deposit of rent to any such further time, as it may, on an application made to it, allow in this behalf. The power of the court under the M.P. Act Act is not restricted. However, discretion available to the court under the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act is limited. Furthermore, in Section 13(6) of the M.P. Act, the word “may” has been used which is directory; in contradistinction with the word “shall” employed in the Rajasthan Act. The M.P. Act provides for the power of the court to extend the time in the event sufficient cause therefor is shown which is absent in the Rajasthan Act. Furthermore, in terms thereof once the rent has been determined, the same -37- RCREV. NO. 284 OF 2015 has to be deposited within the prescribed period wherefor there exists no provision for filing an application. Wherever the special Act provides for extension of time or condonation of default, the court possesses the power therefor, but where the statute does not provide either for extension of time or to condone the default in depositing the rent within the stipulated period, the court does not have the power to do so. In that view of the matter it must be held that in absence of such provisions in the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, the court did not have the power to either extend the period to deposit the rent or to condone the default in depositing the rent. 38. In **Nasiruddin** the Apex Court observed that, it is true that the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act does not expressly exclude the application of the Limitation Act, 1963. But Section 5 of the Limitation Act in its terms is not applicable to wherever there is a default in depositing the rent by the tenant. The provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act must be construed having regard to Section 3 thereof. For filing an application after the expiry of -38- RCREV. NO. 284 OF 2015 the period prescribed under the Limitation Act or any other special statute, a cause of action must arise. Compliance with an order passed by a court of law in terms of a statutory provision does not give rise to a cause of action. On failure to comply with an order passed by a court of law, instant consequences are provided for under the statute. The court can condone the default only when the statute confers such a power on the court and not otherwise. In that view of the matter the Apex Court held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act has no application in the case on hand. 39. As already noticed hereinbefore, the consequences provided under Section 12(3) of the Act follow when there occurred a default by the tenant in complying with the direction in an order passed under Section 12(1) and (2), for deposit or payment of the admitted arrears of rent. On the date stipulated for effecting such payment, by virtue of that order, the tenant becomes fully aware that, unless sufficient cause has not been shown for the default committed, the consequence of stoppage of the proceedings and direction to put the landlord in possession of the building, under Section -39- RCREV. NO. 284 OF 2015 12(3) would follow automatically. 40. As held by a Division Bench of this Court in **Venugopalan [1974 KLT 640]** and reiterated in **Davy [1999 (3) KLT 434]** even assuming that for purpose of execution an order under Section 12(3) of the Act can be equated with and treated as the same, as one under Section 11 of the Act, the consequence enjoined by an order under Section 12(3) for failure to deposit the admitted arrears in time can not be vacated or obliterated by payment at any subsequent stages or periods. The law laid down by a ThreeJudge Bench of the Apex Court in **Nasiruddin [(2003) 2 SCC 577]** is to the effect that, where the statute does not provide either for extension of time or to condone the default in depositing the rent within the stipulated period, the court does not have the power to do so. 41. In the instant case, as can be seen from the order of the Rent Control Court dated 24.01.2015 in R.C.P.No.23 of 2014, by an order dated 01.11.2014 the tenant was directed to pay arrears of rent at the rate of Rs.7,139/- from March, 2013 onwards within 4 weeks from the date of that order. On -40- RCREV. NO. 284 OF 2015 15.12.2014, the tenant filed a petition seeking 15 days time for depositing arrears of rent. That interlocutory application was allowed and the tenant was directed to pay arrears of rent on or before 01.01.2015. On 05.01.2015, when the case was taken up for consideration, it was submitted that the tenant has filed an application seeking further period of two weeks. However, no such application was seen filed. Even then the Rent Control Court granted a further period of two weeks and posted the case to 20.01.2015 for payment of arrears of rent. On 20.01.2015 also no amount was paid as arrears of rent. The tenant filed another application seeking extension of time by ten days for payment. Since the reason stated in the affidavit filed in support of that application was not sufficient and convincing the Rent Control Court dismissed that application and the tenant was directed to deposit arrears of rent within 3 days and the case was posted to 24.01.2014. On that day no amount was paid by the tenant towards arrears of rent and it was in such circumstances the Rent Control Court by the impugned order dated 24.01.2015 stopped the proceedings in R.C.P.No.23 of 2014 and ordered eviction of -41- RCREV. NO. 284 OF 2015 the tenant under Section 12(3) of the Act. 42. In the impugned judgment dated 03.10.2015 in R.C.A.No.9 of 2015 the Appellate Authority confirmed the finding of the Rent Control Court that the tenant failed to deposit the admitted arrears of rent within the time limit fixed by the Rent Control Court and as such the landlord is entitled to the benefit contemplated under Section 12(3) of the Act. In view of the law laid down in the decisions referred to supra, the conclusions of the Rent Control Court and the Appellate Authority are perfectly legal. 43. Section 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act deals with revision. As per sub-section (1) of Section 20, in cases, where the appellate authority empowered under Section 18 is a Subordinate Judge, the District Court, and in other cases the High Court, may, at any time, on the application of any aggrieved party, call for and examine the records relating to any order passed or proceedings taken under this Act by such authority for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality, regularity or propriety of such order or proceedings, and may pass such -42- RCREV. NO. 284 OF 2015 order in reference thereto as it thinks fit. As per sub-section (2) of Section 20 of the Act, the costs of and incident to all proceedings before the High Court or District Court under subsection (1) shall be in its discretion. 44. Section 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act deals with revision. As per sub-section (1) of Section 20, in cases, where the appellate authority empowered under Section 18 is a Subordinate Judge, the District Court, and in other cases the High Court, may, at any time, on the application of any aggrieved party, call for and examine the records relating to any order passed or proceedings taken under this Act by such authority for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality, regularity or propriety of such order or proceedings, and may pass such order in reference thereto as it thinks fit. As per sub-section (2) of Section 20 of the Act, the costs of and incident to all proceedings before the High Court or District Court under subsection (1) shall be in its discretion. 45. In **Rukmini Amma Saradamma v. Kallyani Sulochana [(1993) 1 SCC 499]** , the scope of revisional -43- RCREV. NO. 284 OF 2015 powers of the High Court under Section 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 came up for consideration before the Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court. While considering whether the High Court could have re-appreciated entire evidence, the Apex Court held that, even the wider language of Section 20 of the Act cannot enable the High Court to act as a first or a second court of appeal. Otherwise, the distinction between appellate and revisional jurisdiction will get obliterated. Hence, the High Court was not right in re-appreciating the entire evidence both oral or documentary in the light of the Commissioner's report. The High Court had travelled far beyond the revisional jurisdiction. Even by the presence of the word ‘propriety’ it cannot mean that there could be a re-appreciation of evidence. Of course, the revisional court can come to a different conclusion but not on a re-appreciation of evidence; on the contrary, by confining itself to legality, regularity and propriety of the order impugned before it. 46. In **T. Sivasubramaniam v. Kasinath Pujari [(1999) 7 SCC 275]** the Apex Court held that, the words ‘to -44- RCREV. NO. 284 OF 2015 satisfy itself’ employed in Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 no doubt is a power of superintendence, and the High Court is not required to interfere with the finding of fact merely because the High Court is not in agreement with the findings of the courts below. It is also true that the power exercisable by the High Court under Section 25 of the Act is not an appellate power to reappraise or reassess the evidence for coming to a different finding contrary to the finding recorded by the courts below. But where a finding arrived at by the courts below is based on no evidence, the High Court would be justified in interfering with such a finding recorded by the courts below. 47. In **Ubaiba v. Damodaran [(1999) 5 SCC 645]** the Apex Court considered the exercise of revisional power by the High Court, under Section 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, in the context of an issue as to whether the relationship of landlord-tenant existed or not. It was urged that whether such relationship existed would be a jurisdictional fact. Relying on the decision in **Rukmini Amma Saradamma** it was contended that, however wide the -45- RCREV. NO. 284 OF 2015 jurisdiction of the revisional court under Section 20 of the Act may be, it cannot have jurisdiction to re-appreciate the evidence and substitute its own finding upsetting the finding arrived at by the appellate authority. The Apex Court held that, though the revisional power under Section 20 of the Act may be wider than Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 it cannot be equated even with the second appellate power conferred on the civil court under the Code. Therefore, notwithstanding the use of the expression ‘propriety’ in Section 20 of the Act, the revisional court will not be entitled to re-appreciate the evidence and substitute its own conclusion in place of the conclusion of the appellate authority. On examining the impugned judgment of the High Court, in the light of the aforesaid ratio, the Apex Court held that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction by reappreciating the evidence and in coming to the conclusion that the relationship of landlord-tenant did not exist. 48. In **Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Dilbahar Singh [(2014) 9 SCC 78]** a Five-Judge Bench of the Apex Court considered the revisional powers of the High -46- RCREV. NO. 284 OF 2015 Court under Rent Acts operating in different States. After referring to the law laid down in **Rukmini Amma Saradamma** the Apex Court reiterated that even the wider language of Section 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 does not enable the High Court to act as a first or a second court of appeal. The Constitution Bench agreed with the view of the Three-Judge Bench in **Rukmini Amma Saradamma** that the word ‘propriety’ does not confer power upon the High Court to re-appreciate evidence to come to a different conclusion, but its consideration of evidence is confined to find out legality, regularity and propriety of the order impugned before it. 49. In **Thankamony Amma v. Omana Amma [AIR 2019 SC 3803 : 2019 (4) KHC 412]** considering the matter in the backdrop of law laid down in **Rukmini Amma Saradamma** , **Ubaiba** and **Dilbahar Singh** the Apex Court held that the findings rendered by the courts below were well supported by evidence on record and could not even be said - to be perverse in any way. The High Court could not have re appreciated the evidence and the concurrent findings -47- RCREV. NO. 284 OF 2015 rendered by the courts below ought not to have been interfered with by the High Court while exercising revisional jurisdiction. 50. Viewed in the light of the law laid down in the decisions referred to supra, it cannot be said that the order of eviction passed by the Rent Control Court under Section 12(3) of the Act, which now stands confirmed by the Appellate Authority, is either perverse or patently illegal or it suffers from any legal infirmity warranting interference under Section 20 of the Act. Therefore, we find no reason to interfere with the order of eviction concurrently passed by the authorities below. In such circumstances, this Rent Control Revision fails and the same is accordingly dismissed. Sd/- ## **ANIL K. NARENDRAN, JUDGE** Sd/- ## **P.G. AJITHKUMAR, JUDGE** AV/22/10