# **IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM**
## **PRESENT**
**THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE P.B.SURESH KUMAR**
## **&**
**THE HONOURABLE MRS. JUSTICE C.S. SUDHA**
**TUESDAY, THE 10[TH] DAY OF JANUARY 2023 / 20TH POUSHA, 1944**
**RCREV. NO. 235 OF 2016**
**ARISING FROM JUDGMENT DATED 24.11.2015 IN R.C.A NO.162/2011 OF RENT CONTROL APPELLATE AUTHORITY, THRISSUR ORDER DATED 11.04.2011 IN RCP NO.52/2006 OF RENT CONTROL COURT,**
## **THRISSUR**
## **REVISION PETITIONER:**
**LATHA, W/O.VADAKKOOT SIDHAKUMAR, D/O.NANDILATHUPARAMBIL KUMARAN, AYYANTHOLE VILLAGE, TRICHUR TALUK.**
**BY ADV SRI.C.UNNIKRISHNAN (KOLLAM)**
## **RESPONDENTS:**
|**1**|**C. SANKARAN NAIR (DIED),**|
|---|---|
||**CHAKKADATH HOUSE, HARI NAGAR P.O., ERUVU, TRICHUR**|
||**TALUK, PIN-680 020.**|
|**2**|**THANKAMMA,**|
||**W/O.LATE C. SANKARAN NAIR,CHAKKADATH HOUSE, HARI NAGAR**|
||**P.O., ERUVU, TRICHUR TALUK, PIN-680 020.**|
|**3**|**SATHY,**|
||**D/O.LATE C. SANKARAN NAIR,CHAKKADATH HOUSE, HARI NAGAR**|
||**P.O., ERUVU, TRICHUR TALUK, PIN-680 020.**|
|**4**|**OMANA,**|
||**D/O.LATE C. SANKARAN NAIR,CHAKKADATH HOUSE, HARI NAGAR**|
||**P.O., ERUVU, TRICHUR TALUK, PIN-680 020.**|
|**5**|**AMBIKA,**|
||**D/O.LATE C. SANKARAN NAIR,CHAKKADATH HOUSE, HARI NAGAR**|
||**P.O., ERUVU, TRICHUR TALUK, PIN-680 020.**|
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**6 HARIKUMAR, S/O.LATE C. SANKARAN NAIR,CHAKKADATH HOUSE, HARI NAGAR P.O., ERUVU, TRICHUR TALUK, PIN-680 020. 7 PRADEEPKUMAR, S/O.LATE C. SANKARAN NAIR,CHAKKADATH HOUSE, HARI NAGAR P.O., ERUVU, TRICHUR TALUK, PIN-680 020. 8 VINODKUMAR, S/O.LATE C. SANKARAN NAIR,CHAKKADATH HOUSE, HARI NAGAR P.O., ERUVU, TRICHUR TALUK, PIN-680 020. 9 VIJAYAKUMAR, S/O.LATE C. SANKARAN NAIR,CHAKKADATH HOUSE, HARI NAGAR P.O., ERUVU, TRICHUR TALUK, PIN-680 020. 10 SUNITHA, D/O.LATE C. SANKARAN NAIR,CHAKKADATH HOUSE, HARI NAGAR P.O., ERUVU, TRICHUR TALUK, PIN-680 001. 11 SANDHYA, D/O.LATE C. SANKARAN NAIR,CHAKKADATH HOUSE, HARI NAGAR P.O., ERUVU, TRICHUR TALUK, PIN-680 001. 12 RAJI, D/O.LATE C. SANKARAN NAIR,CHAKKADATH HOUSE, HARI NAGAR P.O., ERUVU, TRICHUR TALUK, PIN-680 001.**
**BY ADVS. SMT.R.RAJITHA SRI.SANTHOSH P.PODUVAL SMT.VINAYA V.NAIR**
**THIS RENT CONTROL REVISION HAVING COME UP FOR FINAL HEARING ON 10.01.2023, ALONG WITH RCRev..16/2017, 194/2020, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:**
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## **IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM**
**PRESENT THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE P.B.SURESH KUMAR**
**&**
**THE HONOURABLE MRS. JUSTICE C.S. SUDHA**
**TUESDAY, THE 10[TH] DAY OF JANUARY 2023 / 20TH POUSHA, 1944**
**RCREV. NO. 16 OF 2017**
**AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 29.08.2016 IN RCA NO.84 OF 2008 OF ADDITIONAL RENT CONTROL APPELLATE AUTHORITY, THRISSUR CONCURRING WITH THE COMMON ORDER IN RCP NO.152 OF 2005 DATED 30.06.2008 OF**
## **RENT CONTROL COURT, THRISSUR**
## **REVISION PETITIONER:**
**LATHA, W/O. VADAKKOOT SIDHAKUMAR, D/O. NANDILATHUPARAMBIL,KUMARAN AYYANTHOLE VILLAGE,THRISSUR TALUK. BY ADV SRI.C.UNNIKRISHNAN (KOLLAM)**
## **RESPONDENTS:**
**1 P.VENUGOPALAN (DIED), S/O. THEPPUKARAN NARAYANAN,VISHNU VIKAS, KOVILAKAM LANE,PERINGAVU, THRISSUR. 2 BABY, W/O. LATE VENUGOPALAN,VISHNU VIKAS, KOVILAKAM LANE,PERINGAVU, THRISSUR.**
**BY ADVS. SMT.R.RAJITHA SRI.SANTHOSH P.PODUVAL SMT.VINAYA V.NAIR SRI.VYSAKH VIJAYAN**
**THIS RENT CONTROL REVISION HAVING COME UP FOR FINAL HEARING ON 10.01.2023, ALONG WITH RCRev..235/2016 AND CONNECTED CASES, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:**
R.C.R.No.235 of 2016 and connected cases.
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## **IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM**
## **PRESENT**
**THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE P.B.SURESH KUMAR**
**&**
**THE HONOURABLE MRS. JUSTICE C.S. SUDHA**
**TUESDAY, THE 10[TH] DAY OF JANUARY 2023 / 20TH POUSHA, 1944**
**RCREV. NO. 194 OF 2020**
**AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 12.02.2020 IN RCA NO.26/2010 AND CROSS APPEAL IN RCA NO.26/10 ON THE FILE OF IV ADDITIONAL RENT CONTROL APPELLATE AUTHORITY, THRISSUR ARISING FROM THE ORDER DATED 14/1/2010 IN RCP NO.49/2006 OF RENT CONTROL COURT, THRISSUR**
## **REVISION PETITIONER:**
**DINESAN, AGED 58 YEARS, S/O. PULIKKATHARA SANKARAN, KANJIRANGADI, KOORKKANCHERRY VILLAGE, THRISSUR DISTRICT.**
**BY ADVS. SANTHOSH P.PODUVAL SMT.R.RAJITHA SMT.CHITHRA.S.BABU SRI.R.N.SANDEEP**
## **RESPONDENT:**
**LATHA, AGED 68 YEARS, W/O. VADAKKOOT SIDHAKUMAR, AYYANTHOLE VILLAGE, THRISSUR TALUK, THRISSUR DISTRICT - 680 003.**
**BY ADVS. SRI.C.UNNIKRISHNAN (KOLLAM) SHRI.ANANDA PADMANABHAN SRI.SANJAY JOHNSON SMT.LIYA ELZA ALEX SHRI.MAHESH CHANDRAN**
**THIS RENT CONTROL REVISION HAVING COME UP FOR FINAL HEARING**
**ON 10.01.2023, ALONG WITH RCRev..235/2016 AND CONNECTED CASES, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:**
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**P.B.SURESH KUMAR & C.S.SUDHA, JJ. -----------------------------------------R.C.R Nos. 235 of 2016, 16 of 2017**
**and 194 of 2020**
**----------------------------------------------------Dated this the 10[th] day of January, 2023**
## **ORDER**
## **C.S.Sudha, J.**
These R.C.Rs have been filed under Section 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease & Rent Control) Act, 1965 (the Act).
2. The petitioner-landlady filed four R.C.Ps namely R.C.P.No.152/2005, R.C.P.No.49/2006, R.C.P.No.50/2006 and R.C.P.No.52/2006 seeking eviction of the respondents-tenants in occupation of the tenanted premises in the respective R.C.Ps. In R.C.P.No.152/2005 filed on 26/09/2005, eviction of the respondent was sought under Section 11(4)(i) of the Act. The remaining three R.C.Ps were filed seeking eviction under Section 11(2)(b) and 11(3). According to the petitioner, she needs vacant possession of the schedule rooms for the purpose of starting a garment business. She has no other suitable rooms or buildings in her possession for the proposed business. She also alleged that the respondents are not entitled to the
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benefit of the second proviso to Section 11(3). It was also alleged that rent was in arrears in all the R.C.Ps.
3. The respondents-tenants entered appearance and filed counter in their respective R.C.Ps denying the allegation regarding arrears of rent and the bonafides of the need alleged. According to them, the need put forward is only a ruse for eviction.
4. All the four R.C.Ps were tried separately and disposed of by separate judgments. In R.C.P.No.152/2005, PW1 was examined and Exts.A1 to A5 were marked on the side of the petitioner. RW1 to RW3 were examined and Exts.B1 to B7 were marked on the side of the respondent. In R.C.P.No.49/2006, PW1 was examined and Exts.A1 and A2 were marked on the side of the petitioner. RW1 was examined and Exts.B1 to B7 series were marked on the side of the respondent. In R.C.P.No.52/2006, PW1 was examined and Exts.A1 to A3 were marked on the side of the petitioner. RW1 was examined and Exts.B1 to B10 were marked on the side of the respondent.
4.1. R.C.P.No.152/2005 seeking eviction under Section 11(4)(i) was dismissed by the Rent Control Court (RCC) by order dated 30/06/2008. R.C.A.No.84/2008 filed by the petitioner has also been dismissed by impugned judgment dated 29/08/2016 of the Rent Control Appellate Authority (RCAA),
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Thrissur. It is against the judgment in R.C.A.No.84/2008, R.C.R.No.16/2017 has been filed by the petitioner-landlady.
4.2. R.C.P.No.49/2006 was partly allowed by the RCC, Thrissur under Section 11(2)(b). The ground for eviction sought under Section 11(3) was dismissed. R.C.A.No.26/2010 filed by the petitioner was allowed by judgment dated 12/02/2020. The cross appeal filed by the tenant has been dismissed. It is against the judgment in R.C.A.No.26/2010, R.C.R.No.194/2020 has been filed by the respondent-tenant.
4.3. R.C.P.52/2006 was partly allowed and eviction ordered under Section 11(2)(b). Eviction sought under Section 11(3) was dismissed. R.C.A.No.162/2011 filed by the petitioner has been dismissed by the RCAA, Thrissur by judgment dated 24/11/2015 confirming the order of the RCC. It is against the judgment in R.C.A.No.162/2011, R.C.R.No.235/ 2016 has been filed by the petitioner-landlady.
4.4. As far as R.C.P.No.50/2006 is concerned, we are told that the order of the RCC granting eviction under Section 11(3) has been confirmed in R.C.A.No.147/2016 by judgment dated 07/12/2022. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the respondents, that a revision would be filed shortly against the said judgment.
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5. The only point that arises for consideration is whether the findings of the RCAA suffer from any illegality, irregularity or impropriety.
6. Heard Sri.C.Unnikrishnan, the learned counsel for the petitionerlandlady and Sri.Santhosh.P.Poduval, the learned counsel for the respondent-tenants.
7. Section 20 of the Act allows the aggrieved party to challenge the legality, regularity or propriety of the order or proceeding of an appellate authority. The revisional authority has to satisfy itself of the legality, regularity or propriety of the order or proceedings of the appellate authority. It is true that this Court under Section 20 is not expected to re-appraise the evidence adduced by the parties in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction and the limited question that falls for its consideration is whether the procedure followed by the RCC or the appellate authority is illegal, irregular or improper. As held by the apex court in **Nalakath Sainuddin v. Koorikadan Sulaiman, 2002 (6) SCC 1,** when the aid of the High Court is invoked on the revisional side, it is done because it is a superior Court and it can interfere for the purpose of rectifying the error(s) of the Court below. Subject to the limitations placed on the exercise of revisional jurisdiction, it remains a part of the general appellate jurisdiction of a superior Court in a wider and larger sense. It has been further held that, the jurisdiction to examine the propriety of the order or decision carries with it the same jurisdiction as the original authority to come to a
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different conclusion on the said set of facts. If any other view is taken, the expression "propriety" would lose its significance. The only limitation on the scope of the High Court's jurisdiction is that the order or proceedings sought to be scrutinized must be of the subordinate authority. Any illegality, irregularity or impropriety coming to its notice is capable of being corrected by the High Court by passing such appropriate order or direction as the law requires and justice demands. The Court can examine whether the findings rendered by the appellate authority are plausible and to consider that aspect, the Court can refer to the pleadings and evidence adduced by the parties. A pedantic approach cannot be made while examining the issue in the light of the requirement of the Act **(** see also **Simon v. Rappai, 2008 (2) KHC 863).**
7.1. It is no doubt true that this Court sitting in revision cannot convert itself into an evidence collecting or fact finding court. The scope of interference by the revisional court is restricted to cases where the RCC or RCAA have relied an irrelevant consideration, ignored valuable items of evidence or applied wrong principles of law. Further as held by the Apex Court in **Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Dilbahar Singh, AIR 2014 SC 3708,** a finding of fact recorded by the RCC or the RCAA if perverse, or has been arrived at without consideration of the material evidence or such finding is based on no evidence or misreading of the evidence or is grossly erroneous that, if allowed to stand, would result in gross
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miscarriage of justice, then it is open to correction, because it is not treated as a finding according to law. In that event, the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under the Act is entitled to set aside the impugned order as being not legal or proper. Keeping the aforesaid principles in mind, we will now consider whether the findings of the RCC or the RCAA is any way perverse or has been arrived at without consideration of the material evidence or whether it has misread the evidence on record.
8. As noticed earlier, the petitioner-landlady is the same in all the four R.C.Ps. The respondent-tenants are different. Except in R.C.P.No.152/2005, the need alleged is the same. Therefore, it would have been better had the said R.C.Ps been tried together and disposed of by a common judgment. If the said course was not practical or would have in any way caused prejudice to the respondents-tenants, the least that could have been done was to try the R.C.Ps simultaneously and dispose of the same also simultaneously. As neither of these options were adopted, the same has resulted in conflicting judgments regarding the need alleged. The pleadings in the R.C.Ps and the manner in which the cases have been conducted on behalf of the petitioner, leaves much to be desired. However, in a proceedings of this nature which is summary in nature, strict rules of pleadings are not applicable. Nevertheless, basic material facts should be pleaded. The petition schedule room in
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R.C.P.No.49/2006 is stated to bear no.25/5123 and in R.C.P.No.52/2006, the number of the petition schedule room is 35/5126. In both the R.C.Ps the allegation is that in addition to the petition schedule rooms, the petitioner requires rooms bearing no.5124 and 5125 also, which are situated adjacent to the petition schedule rooms for starting the proposed business. Rooms bearing no.5124 and 5125 seem to be the subject matter in R.C.P.No.152/2005 and R.C.P.No.50/2006. However, in R.C.P.No.152/2005, the number of the petition schedule room is stated to be 25/1030 (old number 25/841). Though the numbers do not tally, it is the admitted case of the parties that the petition schedule room in R.C.P.No.152/2005 is also a room in the same building housing the petition schedule rooms in R.C.P.No.49/2006 and R.C.P.No.52/2006. It is also admitted that the other two rooms referred to in the said R.C.Ps, that is, rooms bearing no.5124 and 5125 are the tenanted premises in R.C.P.No.152/2005 and R.C.P.No.50/2006. Therefore, though proper pleadings are not there connecting all the four R.C.Ps, no prejudice has been caused to the respondents-tenants as they have no case that they never understood the case put forward by the petitioner due to which they were unable to defend the case properly or effectively. In spite of deficiency in the pleadings, the respondents-tenants are seen to have understood the case put forward by the petitioner, proceeded to trial on the basis of the same and also adduced evidence in support of their respective
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versions. R.C.P.No.50/2006 is not before us. However, we are told that the order of eviction granted by the RCC under Section 11(3) has been confirmed in R.C.A.No.147/2016 on the file of RCAA, Thrissur. As the cases presently before us are connected and as requested by both sides, we are disposing of the aforesaid three revision petitions by this common order.
9. R.C.P.No.152/2005 was filed by the petitioner-landlady seeking eviction under Section 11(4)(i) of the Act. In the petition, it is alleged that the petitioner is the owner of the petition schedule room as per sale deed No.1624/2005. After the purchase of the room, the respondent has attorned to her and has been paying rent at the rate of ₹30/- per month. According to the petitioner, the respondent without the knowledge or consent of the prior owner or her consent has sublet the tenanted premises to one Akthar Bai, who is conducting a business in the name and style 'Bright Saree Cleaners'. Though registered notice was sent to the respondent asking him to terminate the sublease, he has not done so and hence the R.C.P.
10. The respondent filed counter denying the allegation of sublease. According to him, the schedule room was taken on lease by his father on 01/01/1940 for conducting a laundry shop. After his father's demise, he is conducting the business in the premises, in which his wife is also assisting him. Earlier, the business
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was being run in the name 'Dress Cleaners'. The customers of the respondent started requesting for dry cleaning of their clothes. Akthar Bai is running a dry cleaning workshop. So the respondent passes on the clothes of his customers to Akthar Bai, who dry cleans the same and returns it to the respondent. In this arrangement, the respondent gets a commission. There is no subletting as alleged in the R.C.P. and hence the contention of the respondent is that the petitioner is not entitled to the relief prayed for.
11. The petitioner relies on Ext.A5 report of the advocate commissioner in a suit filed by her against the respondent, namely, O.S.No.460/2005 on the file of the Munsiff Court, Thrissur, to substantiate her case of sublease. In Ext.A5, it is stated that when the advocate commissioner visited the schedule room, he found one George and Ambika in the premises. On enquiry, Ambika informed him that the business in the premises is being run by Akthar Bai and that she is his employee. The advocate commissioner also noted the fact that the residential phone number of Akthar Bai was seen provided in the cash receipt kept in the tenanted premises. The advocate commissioner who prepared Ext.A5 report was examined as PW2 to prove the report. It is true that PW2 stands by the facts reported by him in Ext.A5. However, Ambika the person who is purported to have given the information to PW2 has not been examined. Further, PW2 has also reported in Ext.A5 report regarding
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the endorsements seen in the day book kept in the tenanted premises. It was seen recorded that a sum of ₹220/- and a sum of ₹20/- had been paid to Akthar Bai on 08/02/2005. These endorsements according to both the courts, probabilise the case of the respondent that he is getting the clothes of his customers dry cleaned through Akthar Bai, for which payment is made to the latter. Added to this is Ext.B7, which is the commission report, in yet another case filed by the petitioner against the respondent and his wife. In order to prove Ext.B7, the respondent has examined the advocate commissioner who prepared the same, that is, RW2. In Ext.B7 report, RW2 has reported that when he had visited the schedule room, the respondent and his wife were very much present in the premises. PW2 the advocate commissioner who prepared Ext.A5 report had visited the tenanted premises on 09/02/2005. RW2 on the other hand visited the schedule room for the preparation of Ext.B7 report on 11/08/2005 at 03.30 p.m. Both the courts noticed that Ext.B7 is an ex-parte commission report. That being so, there was no chance for the respondent to anticipate the visit of the advocate commissioner to the premises and take the precaution to be present there along with his wife. Yet another aspect that has been taken note of by both the courts is Ext.B6 registration certificate which shows that the business being run in the premises is in the name of the respondent. Both the RCC as well as the appellate court have considered all the aspects of the case in
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detail and on a proper appreciation of evidence has held that the petitioner failed in establishing the case of subletting as alleged in the R.C.P. No illegality, irregularity or impropriety warranting an interference by this Court has been made out in this case. Hence we do not find any ground(s) to interfere with the impugned judgment of the RCAA.
12. Now coming to R.C.P.No.49/2006 and R.C.P.No.52/2006. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the respondents-tenants that the petitioner is entitled to an order of eviction under Section 11(3) only if she succeeds in all the four R.C.Ps. If she fails in even one petition, say in R.C.P.No.152/2005, she would not be entitled to an order of eviction under Section 11(3), as the specific case in the petitions is that she requires all the four rooms for the purpose of starting the proposed business. It was also pointed out that one another aspect that affects her bonafides is the conspicuous absence of any case under Section 11(3) in R.C.P.No.152/2005. In the said case the only ground raised is one of subletting. _Per contra_ , it was submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner-landlady that the evidence on record fully substantiates the case of the petitioner under Section 11(3) and hence she is entitled to an order of eviction under Section 11(3).
13. In R.C.P.No.49/2006, the RCC found the need to be bonafide. However, the R.C.P. was dismissed finding the same to be not maintainable in the
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light of the third proviso to Section 11(3), that is, the R.C.P. had been filed before the expiry of one year from the date of purchase of the petition schedule room by the petitioner. In R.C.A.No.26/2010, this finding has been reversed in the light of Ext.A3 sale deed dated 28/02/2005, which makes it clear that the R.C.P. had been filed after the expiry of one year. The finding of the RCC regarding the bonafides of the need alleged as well as the finding that the tenant is not entitled to the benefit of the first or the second proviso to Section 11(3) have been confirmed in R.C.A.No.26/2010. We went through the evidence adduced as well as the findings of both the courts regarding the bonafides of the need alleged. The grounds under which the bonafide need was challenged are – (i) that the petitioner's husband and son are employed abroad, her daughter is married off and so there is no possibility of the petitioner starting a business in the tenanted premises; (ii) that she has no prior experience in conducting the proposed business and (iii) that the petition schedule rooms are not suitable for the proposed business as the building housing the rooms are quite old and dilapidated. As rightly held by both the courts, these are no grounds to reject the bonafide need. No illegality, irregularity or infirmity has been shown in the finding regarding the bonafides of the need alleged. Hence no interference is called for into the said finding of the RCAA or the RCC.
14. In R.C.P.No. 52/2006, the need alleged has been rejected by the RCC
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and the said finding has been confirmed by the RCAA in R.C.A.No.162/2011 on the ground that the need is not bonafide. This finding is based on two aspects- (i) the petitioner when examined as PW1 admitted that one R.C.P. filed by her has been dismissed and (ii) that the tenants in the other two rooms in which she intends to start the proposed business are continuing in the occupation of the premises. In R.C.P.No.49/2006 and R.C.P.No.52/2006 the case of the petitioner is that she requires four rooms, that is, petition schedule rooms bearing no.5123 and 5126 as well as the rooms bearing no.5124 and 5125. The fact that these rooms are adjacent rooms is not disputed. It is also alleged that the intention of the petitioner is to cut open the walls in between the rooms and fix doors so as to convert it into a single unit. It is true that in R.C.P.No.152/2005, the ground alleged is not under Section 11(3). On the other hand the ground alleged is under Section 11(4)(i), which ground has been rejected by both the RCC and RCAA. The said order suffers from no infirmity and so we have confirmed the same. Merely because the petitioner has been unsuccessful in one of the R.C.Ps is no ground to reject her case in the remaining R.C.Ps. It is not the bonafides of the need alleged that has been found against in R.C.P.No.152/2005. No case under Section 11(3) has been put forward in R.C.P.No.152/2005. It is right, as pointed out by the learned counsel for the tenants that when R.C.P.No.152/2005 was filed on 26/09/2005, the petitioner had no case
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that the room was required for starting the proposed business. It is also true that when R.C.P.Nos.49/2006, 50/2006 and 52/2006 were filed on 26/05/2006, the ground put forward is under Section 11(3). Therefore, pointing to this it was argued that when the first R.C.P. was filed the petitioner had no case of bonafide need. But when the remaining three R.C.Ps were filed, which is just about 7 to 8 months thereafter, the petitioner has come up with a new case, which is just an afterthought and a mere ruse for eviction, contends the respondents.
15. We went through the deposition of the petitioner as well as the respondent in this case. The respondent when examined as RW1, was asked as to why he says the need alleged is not bonafide to which he replied that the petitioner is quite well off and that she has other rooms in her possession. Merely because the petitioner-landlady is quite well off is no ground to reject the need alleged. Further, though the respondent takes up a contention that the petitioner is in possession of other suitable rooms, no cogent evidence has been let in and hence the courts rightly rejected the said contention of the tenant. That being the position, there is no material on record to doubt the bonafides of the need alleged. In the said circumstances, merely because the petitioner was unsuccessful in getting an order of eviction relating to one of the rooms, cannot be made a ground to reject the remaining R.C.Ps. The learned counsel for the tenant pointed out that the petition
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schedule room in R.C.P.No.152/2005 is a room situated in between the other three rooms and as the said R.C.P. has been dismissed, the need projected will have to fail in the light of the pleadings in the R.C.P. that the petitioner intends to fix doors on the connecting walls of the rooms to make into a single unit. There is no pleading or evidence to show the lie or location of the rooms. Apart from the admitted case that they are all adjoining rooms in a single building, the evidence does not show anything else. In the R.C.Ps, the petitioner does not have a case that it would be impossible or impractical to start the business unless all the four rooms are obtained. On the other hand, her only case is that she intends to start the business in the four rooms. Merely because she lost in one case, is no ground to doubt her bonafides.
16. Further, the finding of the RCC and the RCAA that no steps have been taken to evict the tenants of all the four rooms is obviously incorrect. Except R.C.P.50/2006, the subject matter of all the other three R.C.Ps are before us. As noticed earlier, we are told that there is concurrent finding under Section 11(3) in favour of the landlady in R.C.P.No.50/2006. It is true that all the rooms are presently in the possession of tenants. Unless and until a finality is reached in the proceedings, it is not possible for the landlady to obtain possession of the rooms. The litigation started way back in the year 2006. The proceedings are yet to reach a finality. Therefore, the grounds on which the bonafide need was rejected by the RCC and the
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RCAA are apparently wrong and have been arrived at on a mis-appreciation or misreading of the evidence on record. Hence, the said finding is liable to be interfered with.
17. Both the RCC as well as the RCAA have found that the tenants are not entitled to the benefit of the first or the second proviso to Section 11(3). We find no illegality, irregularity or infirmity in the said findings. No ground for interference is made out.
In the result, R.C.R.No.16/2017 and R.C.R.No.194/2020 are dismissed. R.C.R.No.235/2016 is allowed. The respondents-tenants in R.C.R.No.235/2016 and R.C.R.No.194/2020 shall vacate the premises within a period of one month from the date of this order.
Interlocutory applications, if any pending, shall stand closed.
**Sd/-**
**P.B.SURESH KUMAR JUDGE Sd/C.S.SUDHA JUDGE**
Jms/05.01