High Court of KeralaDivision Bench2010-03-31Writ petition dismissed; costs of Re. 1 to be p...

Lalitha Vasudevan v. Guruvayoor Devaswom & State of Kerala

Case / Petition Number:WP(C).No. 6839 of 2010(D)

Case Details & Bench

Court: High Court of Kerala
Hon'ble Judges: Thottathil B. Radhakrishnan
P. S. Gopinathan
Judgment Date: 2010-03-31
Court Decision / Holding: Writ petition dismissed with costs fixed at Re.1/-.
Final Disposition: Writ petition dismissed; costs of Re. 1 to be paid by the petitioner.

Parties to the Case

Appellants / Petitioners

Lalitha Vasudevan

Respondents

Guruvayoor Devaswom
State of Kerala

Legal Representation & Advocates

Counsels for Petitioners

• P.K. Jose
• M. Sivadasan Unni Nair
• Tessy Jose

Counsels for Respondents

• V. Krishna Menon

Case Synopsis & Summary

The petitioner, Lalitha Vasudevan, seeks a writ of mandamus directing the Guruvayoor Devaswom to allow Sri K.J. Yesudas to enter Guruvayoor Temple for worship and Hindu rites. She contends Yesudas is a devout Hindu and that no law prevents his entry or its conduct of Hindu rites, arguing under Article 25(1) of the Constitution that she has a right to propagate religion and that preventing Yesudas’ entry would infringe that right. The court questioned whether a private individual’s access to temple worship can be entangled with a petitioner’s right to propagate religion and whether a petition from a private citizen can justify PIL-like relief for the benefit of another individual. It explained that Article 25 protects freedom to profess, practise and propagate religion, but propagation does not authorize compelling a third person to act in a particular religious manner or to endorse entry into a temple. The court emphasized that the right to propagate religion is personal and cannot be used to enforce entry for another person, and that neither the Constitution nor any law supports forcing temple entry for Yesudas. The judge highlighted the dangers of unnecessary litigation and imposed a nominal cost of Re. 1. The writ petition was dismissed with costs, signaling that temple administration and entry are governed by internal religious and administrative prerogatives rather than private propagation rights.

Provisions of Law Cited

Article 25(1) of the Constitution of IndiaPart III of the Constitution

Legal Doctrines & Maxims

Right to propagate religion is to transmit or spread one's religion by exposition of its tenets, and does not amount to converting another person to one's own religion.
Freedom of conscience and the right to profess, practise and propagate religion under Article 25(1) is subject to regulation so as not to violate public order, morality and health or other provisions of Part III of the Constitution.
Propagation cannot entail coercive entry of a third person into a temple or endorsement of another's beliefs.

Submissions & Arguments

Contentions of Appellants / Petitioners

The petitioner contends that Sri K.J. Yesudas, a devout Hindu, should be allowed to enter Guruvayoor Temple to worship according to Hindu rites. She argues there is no law prohibiting Yesudas’ entry, and that Article 25(1) guarantees the right to propagate religion. She asserts that denying entry would infringe her fundamental right to propagate her religion and insists that the petition targets a matter of religious practice by another individual, appealing to PIL-like protection. She seeks a writ to compel temple access for Yesudas, invoking rights of propagation over entry controls.

Contentions of Respondents

The Guruvayoor Devaswom Board and state officials respond that the petition is not on behalf of Sri Yesudas; the petitioner cannot compel the entry of a third person through a writ. They emphasize temple administration is regulated by temple authorities and personal religious practice is subject to discipline, public order, morality, and health considerations. They argue there is no enforceable legal right that requires Yesudas’ entry and that the petition cannot be used to impose entry as a matter of propagation rights.

Cited Precedents (2)

Case Name	Citation	Treatment	Explanation
Punjab Rao v. Dr. D.P. Meshram	AIR 1965 SC 1179	Positive	Cited to illustrate the concept that the right to profess is akin to freedom of thought and that propagation rights are bounded by public order and other rights.
Rev. Stainislaus v. State of Madhya Pradesh	AIR 1977 SC 908	Positive	Cited to define the scope of 'propagate' as transmitting or spreading one’s religion by exposition of its tenets, not the right to convert others.

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Extracted Judgment Text

Exact text extracted from official judgment records.

## **IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM** **PRESENT :** **THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE THOTTATHIL B.RADHAKRISHNAN & THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE P.S.GOPINATHAN** **WEDNESDAY, THE 31ST MARCH 2010 / 10TH CHAITHRA 1932** **WP(C).No. 6839 of 2010(D)** **---------------------------------------** ## **PETITIONER(S):** **--------------------------** **LALITHA VASUDEVAN, AGED 51 YEARS, D/O.NARAYANAN NAIR, PONNADIPARAMBATHU HOUSE, ELATHUR AMSOM, MOKAVOOR DESAM, ERANHIKKAL POST, KOZHIKODE DIST.** **BY ADVS. SRI.P.K.JOSE, SRI.M.SIVADASAN UNNI NAIR, SMT.TESSY JOSE.** ## **RESPONDENT(S):** **----------------------------** ## **1. GURUVAYOOR DEVASWOM,** **REP.BY THE ADMINISTRATOR, GURUVAYOOR DEVASWOM, GURUVAYOOR PO, THRISSUR DISTRICT,** **2. STATE OF KERALA, REP.BY THE CHIEF SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM PO, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM.** ## **R1 BY ADV. SRI. V.KRISHNA MENON, SC** **THIS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 03/03/2010, THE COURT ON 31/03/2010 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:** **Kss** # **THOTTATHIL B.RADHAKRISHNAN & P.S.GOPINATHAN, JJ.** ------------------------------------------- W.P(C).No.6839 OF 2010 ------------------------------------------Dated this the 31[st] day of March, 2010 ## **JUDGMENT** **“C.R.”** ## Thottathil B.Radhakrishnan,J. 1.The petitioner seeks issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the first respondent Guruvayoor Devaswom Board not to prohibit Sri.K.J.Yesudas from entering Guruvayoor Temple to worship observing Hindu religious rites. The petitioner says that Sri.Yesudas is a devout Hindu and that there is no law prohibiting such a person from entering Guruvayoor Temple observing all rites of Hindu religion and that there is no law made by the second respondent Government of Kerala preventing those who believe in Hinduism from entering Guruvayoor Temple and worshiping according to Hindu religious rites. The plea of the petitioner is that Article 25 of the Constitution of India guarantees the rights to the aforesaid effect and that the materials on record WPC.6839/10 2 would show that Sri.K.J.Yesudas deserves to be permitted to enter Guruvayoor Temple. 2.When this matter came up for admission, we required the learned counsel for the petitioner to address on the need to entertain a writ petition at the instance of a stranger since Sri.K.J.Yesudas does not appear to be an individual who needs the assistance of the Public Interest Litigation mechanism for redressal of his grievances, if any. Nor is there any pleading that he needs such aid. Then, the learned counsel for the petitioner stated that this writ petition is not filed on behalf of Sri.K.J.Yesudas and the petitioner's case is that there is violation of her fundamental rights under Article 25 of the Constitution of India, to propagate religion, which, according to her, includes the right to insist that a person who believes in and is prepared to follow the Hindu rites shall be permitted entry into Guruvayoor Temple. To the petitioner, this is part of her fundamental rights which she could insist on, as referable WPC.6839/10 3 to her right to propagate the religion which she professes and practises. It is argued that the failure to permit entry of Sri.K.J.Yesudas into Guruvayoor Temple at the petitioner's request or insistence would amount to negation of the petitioner's right to propagate religion in terms of Article 25(1) of the Constitution. - 3.Article 25(1) of the Constitution provides that all persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practise and propagate religion. The right to profess religion is the freedom to have one's belief and the right to even avow publicly; to make an open declaration of one's belief. See **Punjab Rao** v. **Dr.D.P.Meshram** [AIR 1965 SC 1179]. The right 'freely to profess' is akin to the freedom of thought which emanates out of freedom of conscience. A survey of the constitutional provisions would show that no restriction whatsoever is placed on the freedom of conscience and freedom of thought. For, conscience and mind which WPC.6839/10 4 generate thoughts, ideas and beliefs are essentially elements over which no law could be made. The society would be invaded by the conscience or thought of an individual only when ideas generated by them get transformed into words or actions. The Constitution and the laws can regulate only what may flow out of the conscience or mind, as words or deeds. When one has the freedom of conscience and in exercise of that, he has a particular belief, he will have the right to profess that as a religion, provided, by professing such religion, he shall not act in any manner violating public order, morality and health or any other provisions of Part III of the Constitution. Practice of religion proceeds from such right to profess religion. Religion is a matter of faith. The right to propagate religion is one's right to spread; to disseminate or diffuse; from person to person or from place to place; a statement, belief, practice etc. This meaning of the word 'propagate' was adopted by the Apex Court in **Rev.Stainislaus** v. **State of Madhya Pradesh** [AIR 1977 SC 908] to enunciate WPC.6839/10 5 the scope of the word 'propagate' in Article 25(1) of the Constitution. The Apex Court clearly stated that this right is to transmit or spread one's religion by an exposition of its tenets and does not amount to granting a right to convert a person to one's own religion. 4.The aforesaid concepts of 'professing' and 'propagating' religion clearly show that the right of a person to profess and propagate religion does not include the right to insist that a third person be permitted to act in terms of a particular religion and its tenets. The right of the petitioner to freedom of conscience and her right freely to profess, practise and propagate religion in connection with her faith in religion, attendant to Guruvayoor Temple, cannot be mixed up with any similar right that Sri.K.J.Yesudas may claim, if he needs. We are clear in our mind that the petitioner cannot make the question of entry of Sri.K.J.Yesudas into Guruvayoor Temple as a justiciable one as part of the petitioner's right to propagate WPC.6839/10 6 religion. By filing this writ petition, the petitioner is trying to extend to Sri.K.J.Yesudas an unsolicited aid, which even he may not relish, since belief is one that is purely personal and cannot be foisted on another and anyone aggrieved by any encroachment into the freedom to freely profess, practise and propagate religion has the guaranteed fundamental right to protection of such entitlements and hence to remedy in case of violation. Sri.K.J.Yesudas may profess or practise a religion, belief or faith. But, his doing so or his inability to do so cannot be referable to an issue falling within any right of the petitioner to propagate a religion of her choice. We do not, therefore, find any shred of right in the petitioner to sustain this writ petition. - 5.Before parting, we wish to point out that when unnecessary litigations of this nature flood the courts, they waste space, time, as also judicial and executive energy which should otherwise be available for those who wait in the queue and are WPC.6839/10 7 part of a large sector of docket exclusion. In token of that, we deem it appropriate to impose a symbolic order of costs which by its expression is itself an exemplary imposition. We, hence, dismiss this writ petition with costs fixed at Re.1/-. Sd/- **THOTTATHIL B.RADHAKRISHNAN, Judge.** Sd/- **P.S.GOPINATHAN, Judge.** kkb.