High CourtDivision BenchAppeal allowed.

LABOUR UNION v. INTL. FRANCHISES (Wanchoo, J.)

Case / Petition Number:Civil Appeal No. 274 of 1964
Neutral Citation:1966 SCR 494

Case Details & Bench

Court
High Court
Hon'ble Judges
  • P. B. Gajendragadkar
  • K. N. Wanchoo
  • M. Hidayatullah
  • V. Ramaswami
Judgment Date
1966-01-26
Court Decision / Holding
Rule abrogated; the abrogation shall take effect from the date of the judgment; appellants to receive costs from the respondent-company. Appeal allowed.
Final Disposition
Appeal allowed.

Parties to the Case

Appellants / Petitioners

  • LABOUR UNION representing the workmen of Messrs International Franchises Pvt. Ltd.

Respondents

  • Messrs International Franchises Pvt. Ltd.

Legal Representation & Advocates

Counsels for Petitioners

  • • S. B. Naik
  • • K. R. Chaudhury

Counsels for Respondents

  • • S. V. Gupte, Solicitor-General, G. B. Pai, J. B. Dadachanji, O. C. Mathur, Ravinder Narain; A. S. R. Chari, K. Rajendra Chaudhury, M. S. K. Aiyangar, M. R. K. Pillai

Case Synopsis & Summary

The respondent company operated a rule in its packing and labeling department that a woman employee who marries would have her service automatically terminated. The Labour Union, representing the workmen of Messrs International Franchises Pvt. Ltd., raised an industrial dispute, which was referred to the Industrial Tribunal, Maharashtra. The Tribunal held the rule justified, and the union challenged this decision in the Supreme Court by special leave. The respondent justified the rule on grounds of the department’s requirement for regular attendance in a team–based workflow and argued that industrial adjudication should not interfere with the employer’s prerogative to impose working conditions when hiring new staff. The union contended that the rule was discriminatory, unnecessary in this department, and not supported by evidence that married women are more prone to absenteeism; maternity leave differences could be managed by temporary leave reserves and additional staffing. The Supreme Court scrutinized the justification, finding no convincing reason that marriage inherently reduces efficiency or regularity, and noted the rule exists in other concerns but cannot be justified on its own merits. It also recognized the evolving stance that industrial adjudication can modify or abrogate such conditions in the interest of social justice. The Court ultimately abrogated the rule, directing that it cease to apply from the date of judgment, with costs to the appellants.

Provisions of Law Cited

Rule 5(3) of the Indian Administrative Service (Recruitment) Rules, 19641954 Indian Administrative Service (Recruitment) Rules

Legal Doctrines & Maxims

  • Social justice doctrine
  • Industrial adjudication may consider and vary conditions of employment as necessary

Submissions & Arguments

Contentions of Appellants / Petitioners

The Labour Union submitted that forcing unmarried women to resign on marriage is discriminatory, lacks a solid basis in efficiency or economics, and cannot be justified by the presence of maternity leave alone. The department’s activities (packing, labeling, filling) are not sufficiently arduous to justify such drastic discrimination, and absenteeism can be managed by modest staffing and leave reserves. Prior decisions upholding similar rules in Boots and Sandoz were not enough to sustain the rule; industrial adjudication should protect social justice and adapt employment conditions accordingly. The union urged abrogation of the rule and sought a ruling that marriage cannot automatically terminate employment in this context, with costs awarded against the company.

Contentions of Respondents

The respondent company contended that the department required regular attendance due to its team-based work; married women are presumed less likely to maintain regular attendance, potentially disrupting production. They argued for the prerogative of the employer to impose reasonable conditions of employment and cited analogous rules in government and other sectors as justification. It was asserted that maternity leave, though available, creates a burden on the department’s operations, and that the company’s economic and operational interests justify maintaining such a rule in the relevant department. The respondent also compared IAS recruitment rules as a non-universal analogue to illustrate a broader policy context.

Cited Precedents (2)

Case NameCitationTreatmentExplanation
Boots Pure Drug Co. (India) Ltd. v. Their Workmen1956OverruledThe Court notes that Boots had upheld a similar rule, but it abrogates such a rule in the present case, effectively overruling that precedent in this context.
Sandoz (India) Limited v. Workmen employed under it1962 Industrial Court Reporter 22OverruledThe Court followed the earlier Sandoz rule but ultimately abrogates the rule in this judgment, overruling the continuing applicability of that precedent to this controversy.

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Extracted Judgment Text

Exact text extracted from official judgment records.

A BOMBAY LABOUR UNION REPRESENTING THE WORKMEN OF MESSRS INTERNATIONAL FRANCHISES PVT. LTD. B _V._ MESSRS INTERNATIONAL FRANCHISES PVT. LTD _November_ 3, 1965 [P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, M. HIDAYATULLAH AND V. RAMASWAMI, JJ.] _Industrial_ _Dispute-Rule_ _terminating emplayment_ _of_ _women_ _automa-_ _tlcally on marriage-Validity_ _of_ _rule-Industrial adjudication_ _whether_ ·C _should_ _interfere._ D E F ·G H The respondent concern had a rule in its packing and labelling department that if a woman employee got married her service would stand automatically terminated. The appellant union raised an industrial dispute on this question and it was referred to the Industrial Tribunal, Maharashtra. The Tribunal held that the rule was justified whereupon, the appellant came to this Court by special leave. The justification given on behalf of the respondent for the said rule was that in the particular department \Vhere the rule ope-rated team v. [1] ork was required for which regular attendance was necessaryi and married women, for obvious reasons, could not be expected to be regular in attendance. It was also contended for the respondent that industrial adjudication should not interfere with the employer's right to impose . any condition in the matter of employment when he employs new work~ men. Rule 5(3) of the Indian Administrative Service (Recruitment) Rules. 1964, was referred to as carrying a similar condition. HELD : (i) There was nothing to show that married women would neceo;sarily he more likely to be absent than unmarried women or widows. The only difference was that married women would ask for maternity leave. This could be provided for by having a few extra women as leave reserve. So far as efficiency was concerned it could hardly be said that married women would be less efficient than unmarried ones or widows. The economic interest of the concern was also not affected in any material way. There was thus no good an!l convincing reason why such a rule should continue in one department of the pharmaceutical industry. The fact that such a rule existed in other concerns also \vas no justification. if the rule could not be justified on its own merits. The rule, therefore, had to be abrogated. [495E, G-H; 496A·B, DJ (ii) It is too late in the day to stress the absolute freedom of an empk1yer to impose any condition which he likes on labour. It is always open to industrial adjudication to consider the conditions of employment of labour and to vary them if it is found necessary. (496 E-FJ {iii) Rule 5(3) of the Indian Administrative Service (Recruitment) · Rules only lays down that where an unmarried woman marries subs<>quently, the Central Government may, if the maintenance of the effi. ciency of the service so requires, call upon her to resign. This rule do.,. not compel unmarried women to resign on ma'rriage as a matter of course as in the case of the respondent concern. (497 B-C) Crv!L APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 274 of 1964. 494 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1966] 2 S.C.R. Appeal by special leave from the award dated May 31, 1963 of the Industrial Tribunal, Maharashtra in Reference **(I.T.)** No. 59 of 1963. _S._ _B. Naik_ and _K._ _R._ _Chaudhury,_ for the appellants. _S._ _V._ _Gupte, Solicitor-General,_ G. _B._ _Pai,_ _J._ _B. Dadachanji,_ _0._ _C._ _Mathur_ and _Ravinder Narain,_ for respondent No. **1.** _A._ _S._ _R. Chari,_ _K._ _Rajendra Chaudhury, M._ _S._ _K._ _Aiyangar_ and _M._ _R._ _K._ _Pillai,_ for respondent No. 2. _A._ _S._ _R._ _Chari, M. K. Ramamurthi,_ for interveners. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by **A** **B** ###### **c** **Wanchoo,** **J.** The only question raised in this appeal by spe cial leave is the propriety of a service condition in the respondentconcem by which unmarried women in a particular department have to resign on their getting married. A dispute was raised about this condition by the appellant-union on behalf of the workmen and was referred to the Industrial Tribunal, Maharash- **D·** tra, in the following terms : "The existing bar on ladies that on their getting married they have to leave the service of the company should. be removed." The respondent is a pharmaceutical concern. It appears that **E** there is a rule in force in the respondent-concern according to which if a lady workman gets married, her services are treated as automatically terminated. It appears that such a rule is in force in other pharmaceutical concerns in that region and the matter came up on two occasions before industrial tribunals for adjudication with reference to other pharmaceutical concerns, and on **F** both occasions the challenge by the workmen to such a rule failed. On the first occasion the dispute was between _the Boots Pure Drug_ _Co._ _(Indla) Limited_ v. _Their Workmen(')_ and a similar rule was upheld in 1956. On the second occasion the dispute was between _Sandoz (India) Limited_ v. _Workmen employed under_ it( [2] ). There was agitation in the respondent concern in **G** connection with this rule and the present reference was even tually made in February 1963. The tribunal followed its earlier decision in _Sandoz Limited's case(2)_ and rejected the contention that the rule be abrogated. The appellant obtained special leave to appeal from this Court; and that is how the matter has come up before us. **R** (I) B.G.G. Part I -L, dated Jan. 26, 1966. (2) (1962) Industrial Court Reporter 22. LABOUR. UNION _V,_ INTL. FRANCHISES _(Wanchoo,_ _J.)_ 495 A _!_ ### _(_ ' •' A Ordinarily we see no reason for such a . rule requiring un married women to give up service on marriage, particularly when it is not disputed that no such rule exists in other industries. It is also not in dispute that no such rule exists in other departments. of the respondent-concern itself and it is only in one department that the rule is in force. It can only be upheld if the respondent B shows that there are good and convincing reasons why in this particular department of the pharmaceutical industry it is necessary to have such a rule. The only reason given for enforcement of this rule in this department of the respondent-concern is that the ·workmen have to work in teams in this department and that #### c [requires that they should be regular and that this cannot be ] pected from married women for obvious reasons, and that there [ex' ] We are not impressed by these reasons for retaining a rule of D this kind. The work in this department is not arduous for the department is concerned with packing, labelling, putting in phials and other work of this kind which has to be done after the pharmaceutical product has been manufactured. Nor do we think that because the work has to be done as a team it cannot be done by married women. We also feel that there is nothing to :r, show that married women would necessarily be more likely to be absent than unmarried women or widows. If it is the presence of children which may be said to account for greater absenteeism ainong married women, that would be so more or less in the case of widows with children also. The fact that the work has got to be done as a team and presence of all those workmen is ilecesF sary, is in our opinion no disqualification so far as married women are concerned, It cannot be disputed that even unmarried women or widows are entitled to such leave as the respondent's rules provide and they would be availing themselves of these leave facilities. The only difference in the matter of absenteeism that we can see between married women on the one hand and unmarried G women and widows on the other is in the matter of maternity leave which is an extra facility available to married women. To this extent only, married women are more likely to be absent than unmarried women and widows. But such absence can in our opinion be easily provided for by having a few extra women as leave reserve and can thus hardly be a ground for such a drastic H rule as the present which requires an unmarried woman to resign as soon as she marries. We have been unable to understand how it ·can be said that it is necessary in the interest of efficient ope pected from married women for obvious reasons, and that there is greater absenteeism among married women than among unmarried women or widows against whom there is no bar of this, kind, 496 SUPREME COURT ·' REPORTS [1966] 2 S.C.R. ration and in the company's economic interest not to employ married woinen. So far as efficient operation is concerned, it can hardly be said that married women would be less efficient than unmarried women or widows so far as pure efficiency in work is concerned, apart of course from the question of maternity leave. As to the economic interest of the concern, we fail to see what difference the employment of married women will make in that .connection for the emoluments whether of .. n unmarried woman .or of a married woman are the same. The only difference between the two as we have already said is the burden on account .of maternity leave. But as to that the respondent contends that A B the reason for having this rule is not the respondent's desire to avoid the small burden to be placed on it on account of maternity C leave. If that is so, we fail to see any justification for a rule •-Of this kind which requires an unmarried woman to give up service immediately she marries. We are therefore of opinion that there is no good and. convincing reason why such a rule should continue in one department of the pharmaceutical indus- D try. The fact that such a rule exists in other such concerns is no justification, if the rule cannot be justified on its own merits. Then. it is urged that the employer was free to impose any ·condition in the matter of employment when he employs a new workman and that industrial adjudication should not interfere with this right of the employer. All that need be said in this E connection is that it is too late in the day now to stress the absolute freedom of an employer to impose any condition which he likes on labour. It is always open to industrial adjudication to consider the conditions of employment of labour and to vary them if it is found necessary, unless the employer can justify an extraordinary condition like this by reasons which carry convic- F tion. In the present case the reasons which the respondent ha~ advanced and which were the basis of the two decisions referred to earlier do not commend themselves to us as sufficient for such a rule. We are therefore of opinion that such a rule should be abrogated in the interest of social justice. G Lastly it is urged that a similar rule exists in certain govem·ment services and in this connection our attention is drawn in F G ~ ~ _}_ •'1 ## ##### • ###### • particular to r. _5_ ( 3) of the 1954 lndian Administrative Service #### •{Recruitment) Rules. That rule reads as follows : "No married woman shall be entitled as of right to be appointed to the Service, and where a woman appointed to the Service subsequently marries, the Central Government may, if the maintenance of the H A LABOUR UNION _v._ INTL. FRANCHISES _(Wanchoo,_ _J.)_ 497 efficiency of the Service so requires, call upon her to resign." # ' It will be seen that this rule for the Indian Administrative Service is not unqualified like the rule in force in the respondent's concern. It only lays down that where an unmarried woman marries B subsequently, the Central Government may, if the maintenance of the efficiency of the Service so requires call upon her to resign. Therefore this rule does not compel unmarried women to resign on marriage as a matter of course as is the case in the respondentconcern. It is only when the Central Government considers that marriage has impaired the efficiency of the woman concerned that ###### c the Central Government may call upon her to resign. The rule which is in force in the respondent-concern however assumes that merely by marriage the efficiency of the woman-employee is impaired and such an assumption in our opinion is not justified. At any rate this rule for the Indian Administrative Service which has been brought to our notice only for purposes of comparison does D not justify the drastic rule that we have in the present case where an unmarried woman is compelled to resign immediately she marries without regard to her continued efficiency . On a careful consideration of the reasons advanced on behalf of the respondent in support of the existing rule we are of opinion E that the reasons do not justify such a drastic rule. We therefore allow the appeal and direct that the rule in question in the form in which it exists at present be abrogated. The abrogation shall take effect from the date of this judgment. The appellants will get their costs from the respondent-company. _Appeal allowed._