High Court of KeralaDivision BenchWrit appeal allowed; Section 90 revision permit...

K.V. Sreekumar v. Prakasan and The Secretary, Regional Transport Authority, Ernakulam

Case / Petition Number:W.A. No. 229 of 2022

Case Details & Bench

Court
High Court of Kerala
Hon'ble Judges
  • S. Manikumar
  • Shaji P. Chaly
Judgment Date
2022-02-16
Court Decision / Holding
Writ appeal allowed; liberty to file a revision under Section 90 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988; the impugned judgment in WP(C) No. 22860 of 2021 is set aside; pending interlocutory applications shall stand closed.
Final Disposition
Writ appeal allowed; Section 90 revision permitted; impugned directions set aside; interlocutory applications closed; appellate court clarifies route for challenging timing decisions.

Parties to the Case

Appellants / Petitioners

  • K.V. Sreekumar

Respondents

  • Prakas an
  • The Secretary, Regional Transport Authority, Ernakulam

Legal Representation & Advocates

Counsels for Petitioners

  • • M. Jithesh Menon

Counsels for Respondents

  • • Sri Prasad Chandran
  • • Sri V. Tek Chand, Sr GP

Case Synopsis & Summary

This writ appeal challenges a learned Single Judge’s direction in WP(C) No. 22860 of 2021 directing the Secretary, Regional Transport Authority, Ernakulam to consider the objections (Exhibit P2) against the timings fixed for the route KL-28/5671 (Vypin-Munambam with extension to High Court). The appellant, K. V. Sreekumar, a senior permit holder, contends the order would improperly revise settled timings—contrary to the statutory regime and the law laid down in Krishnankutty v. John and M. C. Kumaran v. K. M. Jacob. It is argued that a timing conference held on 12.12.2019 produced a clash-free, settled timetable after which permits were issued and not open to routine challenge; timely objections should be entertained only on specific grounds or changed circumstances. The contention further notes that Section 90 of the Motor Vehicles Act contemplates revision by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal and that the present petition should not be treated as a mandate to reopen timing decisions. The Division Bench observes that Krishnankutty and Kumaran require that revision of timings is permissible only if a ground exists; mere ipse dixit is not enough. Ultimately, the court sets aside the impugned directions and permits the respondents to pursue a Section 90 revision, while closing interlocutory applications. This clarifies the scope of the RTA’s power and natural justice in timing matters.

Provisions of Law Cited

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 - Section 90Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 - Rule 212Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 - Rule 145(7)Constitution of India - Article 14

Legal Doctrines & Maxims

  • from time to time means 'as occasion may arise' (as cited in Krishnankutty v. John)
  • principles of natural justice
  • need for grounds or reasons to revise timings (not arbitrary action)

Submissions & Arguments

Contentions of Appellants / Petitioners

The appellant argues that the direction to the Secretary, RTA to consider Exhibit P2 objections against the timings fixed for KL-28-5671 contravenes settled law. Citing Krishnankutty v. John and M. C. Kumaran v. K.M. Jacob, he contends that timings can be revised only on a specific ground or changed circumstances, not at the mere dictat of authority. The 12.12.2019 timing conference produced a clash-free, settled timetable after a robust process attended by numerous operators; hence, objections should be entertained only if legitimate grounds arise. The remedy should be under Section 90, not direct mandamus to reopen settled timings, and the petitioning party should not be permitted to impermissibly inflame the existing schedule without due process.

Contentions of Respondents

The respondents contend that the 12.12.2019 conference produced settled timings and that those timings were issued after due process with 60 operators present; objections to those timings were not properly entertained previously. They argue that Krishnankutty and Kumaran justify a revision only on grounds or changed circumstances, not arbitrarily. They propose that Section 90 Revision is the proper remedy and that the impugned direction was erroneous but remediable by invoking Section 90; natural justice concerns are raised if the direction leads to reconsideration without proper grounds.

Cited Precedents (3)

Case NameCitationTreatmentExplanation
Krishnankutty v. John1992 (2) KLT 883PositiveUsed to establish that RTA can revise timings only on a ground or changed circumstances; ‘from time to time’ means ‘as occasion may arise’.
M.C. Kumaran v. K.M. Jacob1995 KHC 214PositiveFollowed Krishnankutty; held that directions must observe natural justice and that changes should not affect a party without notice or hearing; supports that revision requires proper procedure.
Krishnankutty v. John1992 (2) KLT 883PositiveRepeated reference to the core principle that timings can be revised only if a ground exists; underscores limits on revision authority.

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Extracted Judgment Text

Exact text extracted from official judgment records.

# **`IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM`** # **`PRESENT`** # **`THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR.S.MANIKUMAR`** ## **`&`** ``` THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SHAJI P.CHALY ``` ``` WEDNESDAY, THE 16[TH] DAY OF FEBRUARY 2022 / 27TH MAGHA, 1943 ``` ``` WA NO. 229 OF 2022 ``` ``` AGAINST THE JUDGMENT IN WP(C) 22860/2021 OF HIGH COURT OF KERALA ``` ## **`APPELLANT/2ND RESPONDENT:`** ``` K.V.SREEKUMAR AGED 38 YEARS, S/O. VENKITESWARAN, KATTUKARAN HOUSE, KUZHUPPILLY, AYYAMPILLY P.O., NORTH PARUR, PIN-682 501. ``` ``` BY ADV M.JITHESH MENON ``` ## **`RESPONDENTS/PETITIONER AND 1ST RESPONDENT:`** ``` 1PRAKASAN S/O. RAMAN, HOUSE NO.14/462, MANNALI HOUSE, CHERAI P.O., NORTH PARUR, PIN-683 514. ``` ``` 2THE SECRETARY, REGIONAL TRANSPORT AUTHORITY, ERNAKULAM, OFFICE OF THE REGIONAL TRANSPORT OFFICER, CIVIL STATION, KAKKANAD, ERNAKULAM, PIN-682 030. ``` ``` SRI. PRASAD CHANDRAN FOR R1 SRI. V.TEKCHAND, SR GP FOR R2 ``` ``` THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 16.02.2022, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: ``` **W.A.No.229 of 2022** **2** ## **JUDGMENT** ## Dated this the 16[th] day of February, 2022 ## **S.Manikumar, C.J.** Before the writ court, the petitioner therein has sought ## for the following reliefs: - “i. Issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ direction or order directing the 1[st] respondent to consider Exhibit P2 objection submitted by the petitioner in respect of the set of timings issued to the 2[nd] respondent on the route Vypin - Munambam in respect of his stage carriage KL-28/5671 forthwith or within a time limit; - ii) Issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ direction or order directing the 1[st] respondent to convene a timing conference by considering Exhibit P2 objection and make necessary changes as envisaged under rule 145(7) in respect of the timings issued to the 2[nd] respondent forthwith or within a time limit” 2. Facts leading to the filing of the writ petition are as ## hereunder: Petitioner is operating service on the route Munambam- **3** ## **W.A.No.229 of 2022** Vypin-High Court. The 2[nd] respondent is issued with a set of timings ahead of the petitioner's service. It is pertinent to note that the time gap of the petitioner's service is considerably reduced and the 2[nd] respondent is not presently adhering to the timings in respect of his service also. It is submitted that the timing of the petitioner, who is a senior permit holder, has been arbitrarily and considerably reduced and thereby he is seriously aggrieved and affected. Petitioner submitted Exhibit P2 and the Secretary, Regional Transport Authority, 1[st] respondent, is duty bound to settle the timings after taking into consideration the objections of the petitioner. 3. After hearing the learned counsel for the petitioner, vide judgment in W.P.(C)No.22860 of 2021 dated 29.10.2021, a learned single Judge of this court directed the Secretary, Regional Transport Authority, the 1[st] respondent therein, to consider Exhibit P2 objections against the timings of Mr.K.V.Sreekumar, the appellant herein. **W.A.No.229 of 2022** **4** 4. Being aggrieved, instant writ appeal is filed on the grounds inter alia that the said directions are contrary to the law laid down by this court in **Krishnankutty v. John** reported in 1992 (2) KLT 883 and **M.C.Kumaran v. K.M.Jacob and Another** reported in 1995 KHC 214. 5. Contention has also been made that the Regional Transport Authority, Ernakulam on 12.12.2019, had convened timing conference which was attended by 60 operators on the sector including KSRTC. Thereafter, permits were issued with settled set of timings. Submission is also advanced that the said timing was not challenged in accordance with law and therefore, no objections can be received by the Secretary, Regional Transport Authority, Ernakulam (respondent No.1). 6. It is the sum and substance of the appellant’s contention that the impugned judgment is contrary to the statutory provisions and the settled position of law, thus warranting interference. 7. When attention of the above said decisions were **W.A.No.229 of 2022** **5** brought to the notice of Mr.Prasad Chandran, learned counsel for respondent No.1, he submitted that a revision under Section 90 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 would be preferred, challenging the timing conference fixed on 12.12.2019 (Annexure A). Submission of the learned counsel for the respondent No.1 is placed on record. 8. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 9. Annexure A order in timing conference held on 12.12.2019, settling the timings, is reproduced: “ **Proceedings of the Secretary, RTA, Ernakulam Present: K. Manoj Kumar** Sub:- MVs Dept. - S/C KL 28-5671 - operating on the route - Vypin-Munambam With extension from Kalamukku Jn To Collector's Square Through Goshree Bridges as ordinary MOFFUSIL Service - Variation of permit granted - Settlement of Timings - Proceedings – Issued - reg. Ref:-1) Decision of RTA Ernakulam dated 18.09.2019 vide item No.86 2) Minutes of Timing conference dated 12.12.2019. **W.A.No.229 of 2022** **6** ## **Order No.N3/10204/2019/E dated 12.12.2019** The S/C KL 28-5671-covers a regular permit 7/2/1997 to operate on the route Vypin-Munambam With Extension From Kalamukku Jn To Collector's Square Through Goshree Bridges. The permit holder applied for variation of permit so as to operate Second trip from Munambam I R Valavu to Kuzhipilly via Cherai Beach, Kuzhipilly Beach and in the second trip curtail the route portion from Kalamukku Junction to Vyppin and the same trip extended from Kalamukku to High Court. Vide reference 1[st] cited, the application is considered by the RTA in its sitting dated 18.09.2019 vide item No. 86 and granted the variation, subject to settlement of timings. Accordingly a timing conference was convened on 12.12.2019 with due notice, 60 offenders on the sector including KSRTC were attended and a clash free and objection free timings was arrived at the conference. Hence, I, the secretary, RTA, Ernakulam, here by approve and issue the settled set of timings to stage carriage KL 28-5671 for operating service on the varied route Munambam – Vypin - High Court as granted by RTA with immediate effect. (Time sheet attached separately). Secretary, RTA, Ernakulam” **W.A.No.229 of 2022** **7** 10. In the decision in **Krishnankutty v. John** (supra), the 2[nd] respondent in O.P.No.12735 of 1992 was the appellant therein. Petitioner and the first respondent in the original petition were the respondents. The original petition was filed for the issuance of a mandamus directing the first respondent therein namely the Secretary, Regional Transport Authority, Ernakulam to dispose of Exhibit P1 timings representation dated 7.7.1992, after hearing the petitioner, the 2[nd] respondent and other affected parties. 11. A learned single Judge of this court disposed of the original petition at the admission stage itself, directing the representation to be considered. Being aggrieved, respondent No.2 in the original petition preferred the appeal. 12. After considering Rule 212 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989, which deals with the schedule of timings and in particular, the expression ‘from time to time’, a Hon’ble Division Bench of this court set aside the direction issued by **W.A.No.229 of 2022** **8** the learned single Judge. ## 13. It is worthwhile to extract paragraph 7 to 9 of the judgment in **Krishnankutty v. John** (supra): “7. It was argued that the Secretary, R.T.A. can revise the timings from "time to time" as enjoined in R.212. It was contended that the timings once fixed can be changed or varied any number of times. We are unable to accept this plea. The words "from time to time" means, "as occasion may arise". - See Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary, 5th Edn., Page 1053. Black’s Law Dictionary, 5th Edn., Page 601, gives the meaning "occasionally, at intervals, now and then". It is evident that to revise the timings an "occasion should arise" and it can be so only when there is a change or alteration in the situation or circumstances. Without anything more, the order fixing the timings of the stage carriages cannot be altered or changed at the ipse dixit of the statutory authority under R.212 of the Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989. If the interpretation placed by counsel for the first respondent is accepted, it will render R.212 of the rules infirm. It will clothe the statutory authority with uncanalised and unguided power to change the timings once made, arbitrarily and without any reason. That will be "unfair" and will be violative of Art.14 of the Constitution of India. An interpretation of the statutory provision which will expose it to an attack based on Art.14 of the Constitution should be avoided. The scope and operation of **W.A.No.229 of 2022** **9** the statutory power vested in the authority under R.212 will be construed as to render it legal and effective. So, we hold that R.212 of the Motor Vehicles Rules, the statutory authority can act only if any "ground" or "reason" exist for the revision of timings. That can exist only in altered or changed situation or circumstances or by emergence of new state of affairs which did not exist when the earlier order was passed. 8. So, we hold that the request of the petitioner in Ext.P1 to change the departure time of his bus from 1.55 p.m. to 1.51 P.M. and to fix the departure time of appellant’s bus KL-7/A5751 to 1.55 P.M. is incompetent and impermissible in the light of the earlier order dated 14-1-1992 (Annexure-B) in the absence of any altered situation or changed circumstances. Accordingly, we hold that Ext.P1 representation itself will not lie. The Secretary, R.T.A. was incompetent to entertain or consider the said representation. 9. The attempt of the petitioner in the O.P. was to direct the Secretary, R.T.A. to consider his representation which will adversely affect the appellant herein in the departure time of his bus. The appellant was impleaded as second respondent in the O.P. Even so, without notice and hearing the second respondent in the O.P. the prayer of the petitioner was allowed and the Secretary, R.T.A. was directed to dispose of Ext.P1 representation. Such a direction affects the appellant adversely. A prejudicial order cannot be passed against the appellant without notice or **W.A.No.229 of 2022** **10** hearing him. To that extent, the learned single Judge was in error in directing the Secretary, R.T.A, to consider Ext.P1 representation filed by the petitioner in the O.P. The direction so given violates the principles of natural justice. We hold so.” 14. In yet another decision in **M.C.Kumaran v. K.M.Jacob** (supra), another Hon’ble Division Bench of this court had an occasion to consider a similar matter and following the judgment in **Krishnankutty** ’s case, held thus: “6. The learned single Judge has lost sight of the law stated by Division Bench of this Court in the decision referred to earlier while disposing of the Original Petition. The party affected by the decision, namely the second respondent, was not afforded an opportunity of being heard in the matter either. Consequently, we are clear in our mind that the judgment rendered by the learned single Judge is void and it cannot be sustained. So, the only course that is now open to us is to set aside the judgment rendered by the learned single Judge. We do so.” ## 15. Perusal of the judgments show that in both the cases the Hon’ble Division Bench had imposed costs on the respondents therein. Going through the material on record, **W.A.No.229 of 2022** **11** particularly the impugned order, we find that no notice has been ordered to the appellant nor the learned single Judge had occasion to consider the Division Bench judgments stated supra. 16. In the light of the settled proposition of law, as extracted in the foregoing paragraphs, the impugned judgment warrants interference. Accordingly, the directions issued in W.P.(C)No.22860 of 2021 dated 29.10.2021 is set aside. 17. Section 90 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 reads thus: “90. Revision.—The State Transport Appellate Tribunal may, on an application made to it, call for the record of any case in which an order has been made by a State Transport Authority or Regional Transport Authority against which no appeal lies, and if it appears to the State Transport Appellate Tribunal that the order made by the State Transport Authority or Regional Transport Authority is improper or illegal, the State Transport Appellate Tribunal may pass such order in relation to the case as it deems fit and every such order shall be final: Provided that the State Transport Appellate **W.A.No.229 of 2022** **12** Tribunal shall not entertain any application from a person aggrieved by an order of a State Transport Authority or Regional Transport Authority, unless the application is made within thirty days from the date of the order: Provided further that the State Transport Appellate Tribunal may entertain the application after the expiry of the said period of thirty days, if it is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by good and sufficient cause from making the application in time: Provided also that the State Transport Appellate Tribunal shall not pass an order under this section prejudicial to any person without giving him a reasonable opportunity of being heard.” 18. As per the version of Mr.Prasad Chandran, learned counsel for the respondent No.1, a revision would be filed as against the proceedings of the Secretary, Regional Transport Authority, Ernakulam (respondent No.2) dated 12.12.2019 fixing the timings. 19. Statute provides a revision with an application for delay. It is for the State Transport Appellate Tribunal to entertain the revision if it is satisfied that the revision petitioner was prevented by any sufficient cause from making **13** ## **W.A.No.229 of 2022** the same in time. Thus, giving liberty to the 1[st] respondent to prefer a revision as per section 90, writ appeal is allowed. Pending interlocutory applications, if any, shall stand closed. Sd/- **S.Manikumar Chief Justice** Sd/- **Shaji P.Chaly Judge** ## **vpv** **14** ## **W.A.No.229 of 2022** ## **`APPENDIX OF WA 229/2022`** ## **`PETITIONER’S ANNEXURES`** ``` Annexure ATRUE COPY OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2ND RESPONDENT ISSUING THE CLASH FREE TIMINGS TO THE APPELLANT DATED 12.12.2019. ``` ``` Annexure BTRUE COPY OF THE JUDGMENT IN 1992(2)KLT 883. Annexure CTRUE COPY OF THE JUDGMENT IN 1995(1)KLJ 296. ``` //TRUE COPY// P.A. TO JUDGE