KUNNATHODI ISHAQ @ MOHAMMED ISHAQ S/O. CHEKKUTY HAJI v. STATE OF KERALA

## IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM PRESENT: THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE V.K.MOHANAN WEDNESDAY, THE 9TH DAY OF OCTOBER 2013/17TH ASWINA, 1935 CRL.A.No. 318 of 2008 ---------------------[AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DTD.15.12.2007 IN ST 168/2006 of J.M.F.C.-II (FOREST OFFENCES),MANJERI] APPELLANT(S)/COMPLAINANT: ------------------------ KUNNATHODI ISHAQ @ MOHAMMED ISHAQ S/O. CHEKKUTY HAJI, ANNAKAYAM CHECK POST, VALIKKAPATTA MALAPPURAM DISTRICT. BY ADV. SRI.M.K.CHANDRAMOHANDAS RESPONDENTS(S)/STATE & ACCUSED: ------------------------------- 1. STATE OF KERALA THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT OF KERALA ERNAKULAM. 2. ALIKKAL ABDUL SAMMED, S/O. ABOOBACKER, KAKKOOTH AMSOM, PERINTHALMANNA P.O. R1 BY PUBLIC PROSECUTOR SMT.M.T.SHEEBA. THIS CRIMINAL APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 09-10-2013, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: ## **V.K.MOHANAN, J.** **---------------------------------------Crl.A.No. 318 of 2008 ----------------------------------------** Dated this the 9[th] day of October, 2013 ## **J U D G M E N T** Challenging the judgment dated 15.12.2007 in S.T.No.168 of 2006 of the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court-II (Forest Offences), Manjeri, the appellant herein/the complainant therein preferred the present appeal since by the above judgment, the learned Magistrate acquitted the accused, who faced the prosecution for the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act,1881 (for short 'the N.I.Act'), instituted at the instance of the complainant. 2. The case of the complainant is that on 20.10.2004, the accused had borrowed an amount of `14,000/- with an undertaking that it will be paid within one month. As the accused failed to pay the amount within the time prescribed, on demand, the accused subsequently executed and issued a cheque for `14,000/-. The said cheque is dated 1.1.2005, which when presented for encashment, was Crl.A.No.318 of 2008 :-2-: dishonoured for insufficiency of fund in the account maintained by the accused. According to the complainant, on dishonour of the cheque, a formal notice was served on the accused demanding the repayment of the amount covered by the dishonoured cheque, but no payment was made and hence the accused has committed the offence punishable under Section 138 of the N.I.Act. During the trial of the case, the complainant was examined as PW1 and he produced Exts.P1 to P5. No evidence either oral or documentary was produced from the side of the defence. The trial court, after having considered the entire evidence on record, finally found that the prosecution has not been able to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt and accordingly, the accused was found not guilty for the offence under Section 138 of the N.I.Act and consequently, he was acquitted under Section 255(1) of the Cr.P.C. It is the above finding and order of acquittal challenged in this appeal. 3. Heard Sri.M.K.Chandramohan Das, learned counsel for the Crl.A.No.318 of 2008 :-3-: appellant. Though notice is served on the second respondent/accused, he has neither engaged a lawyer nor appeared himself, to defend the appeal. 4. The learned counsel for the appellant vehemently submitted that the trial court went wrong in comparing the signature of the accused contained in Ext.P1 cheque with other documents and holding that the complainant has not succeeded in proving the signature in Ext.P1 cheque with that of the accused. According to the learned counsel, it is the burden of the accused to prove that the signature contained in the cheque is not his signature and the accused has not taken any effective step in this regard. In support of the above submission, the learned counsel placed reliance upon the decision in v. **Ajith Kumar Rejin Kumar and another** [2009(3) KHC 221) and submitted that no burden is cast on the complainant to prove that the signature appearing on the cheque is that of the accused and it is for the accused to establish his defence that the cheque was not signed by Crl.A.No.318 of 2008 :-4-: him. 5. In the light of the contentions advanced by the counsel for the appellant and in view of the defence taken by the accused in the above case, the question to be considered is whether the trial court is justified in its finding that the complainant has not been able to prove the signature contained in Ext.P1 with that of the accused after verification of the admitted signature of the accused contained in various documents available on record and whether the said finding is perverse so as to interfere in an appeal by this court while exercising the appellate jurisdiction of this Court. 6. According to me, in an appeal, this Court can reconsider the entire prosecution case and re-appreciate the evidence on record to find out whether the complainant has succeeded in establishing his case and the allegation against the accused that he had committed the offence under Section 138 of the N.I.Act. Thus, on considering the averments in the complaint, it can be seen that no details are given in Crl.A.No.318 of 2008 :-5-: the complaint showing the relationship between the complainant and the accused, and the depth of the intimacy between the complainant and the accused so as to give such huge amount without obtaining any security. The complainant has no case either in the complaint or in the chief affidavit that the amount was given after obtaining any security including Ext.P1 cheque. In the absence of convincing evidence, particularly the absence of evidence from independent sources to corroborate the claims of the complainant, the very transaction claimed by the complainant, according to me, is under shadow of doubt. 7. Now let me examine, whether the evidence on record are sufficient to prove the execution of cheque. Learned counsel for the appellant vehemently submitted that when it is shown that Ext.P1 cheque pertains to the account maintained by the accused, no other evidence is necessary to prove the execution of Ext.P1 cheque. In this particular case, it is relevant to note the specific pleading of the Crl.A.No.318 of 2008 :-6-: accused that he never executed and issued Ext.P1 cheque in favour of the complainant. Thus, on scrutiny of evidence of PW1, during the cross-examination, he put forward entirely a different case made either in the complaint or in his chief examination. During the crossexamination, he had deposed that ച�ക�ല ത�കച�ഴ�ത��ത�� പ�ച�ഴ�ത��ത�� ഒപ�ടത�� വ�ത�സത മഷ�കള�ല�ണ. Further, he stated that ച�ക�ല പ�ച�ഴ�ത��ത�� ത�കച�ഴ�ത��ത�� പ�ത��ല�. പ�ത���ച� ക ച���ള ആള�ണ. The complainant has no such case either in the complaint or in the chief examination. He had stated in the cross-examination that ഒപ�ടത പ�ത���ണ. In the complaint, the case of the complainant is to the effect that at the time of borrowing the amount and at the time of execution and issuance of the cheque, there was no other person, but during cross-examination, it is stated that പ�ത���ച� ക ച� ഒ��ള ഉണ�����ന�ചവന( അന���ത�പല� chief affi davit-ചല� �റഞ�ട�ല �. അ��ള8ച� പ�പ�� പമലവ�ല�സപമ� എന�കറ���ല�. �ണ( പ�ര പ�രന�ണ Crl.A.No.318 of 2008 :-7-: ച�ക( എന�ക( എഴ�ത�തനത. So, the evidence of the complainant regarding the execution of the cheque is unreliable and in conflict with the averments in the complaint. On a reading of Section 138 of the N.I.Act, it can be seen that it is the burden of the complainant to establish that the cheque in question is executed and issued by the accused against whom the offence is alleged. But, in the present case, except the claim of the complainant/PW1, there is no independent evidence to prove the transaction including the borrowal of the amount as well as the execution of the cheque. The available evidence shows that the cheque is written not by the accused, even as per the admission of the complainant. Therefore, according to me, the complainant has miserably failed to prove the transaction under which the amount was received by the accused as well as the execution and issuance of the cheque. 8. In the present case, as I indicated earlier, the specific case raised by the accused is that he did not execute and issue the cheque in Crl.A.No.318 of 2008 :-8-: favour of the complainant. During the cross-examination, PW1-the complainant was constrained to depose before the court that the accused is the driver of the bus of the complainant's son. There is no such averment either in the complaint or in the chief affidavit, but the said fact discloses for the first time during the cross-examination of the complainant. He had also admitted that സ�ധ��ണ ബസ പ?�ല�ക���ച� കകയ�ല ന�ന�� security വ�ങ�റ�ണ(. But, he added that ഞ�ന വ�ങ���ട�ല� . മകന security വ�ങ���ട�ല�.എചI മകന ഇപപ�ള ബസ�ല�. According to me, the above admissions obtained by the accused, during the crossexamination of PW1, would show as to how Ext.P1 cheque reached in the hands of the complainant. The above answer given by PW1, probabilise the case of the defence as to how and when Ext.P1 cheque reached at the hands of the complainant. According to me, it is under the above factual scenario and particularly, in the light of the admission of the complainant, the court by exercising the powers ## Crl.A.No.318 of 2008 :-9-: conferred on it, particularly in view of Section 73 of the Indian Evidence Act,1872 was inclined to compare the signature of the accused that is seen in Ext.P1 with other admitted documents. So, the finding arrived on by the learned Magistrate about the signature seen in Ext.P1 after comparison of the admitted documents is fully within the competency of the learned Magistrate and the said act of the learned Magistrate is fully justified in view of Section 73 of the Indian Evidence Act. The learned counsel for the appellant strenuously submitted that no reason is stated by the learned Magistrate for his conclusion that the signature is not that of the accused. According to me, the court, which is exercising the powers under Section 73 of the Indian Evidence Act, is not expected to state the reason as in the case of an expert opinion. But, according to me, such powers are given to the court for its subjective satisfaction. More over, in the light of the submission made by the counsel for the appellant, I have compared the signature that is seen in Ext.P1 with that of the signature seen Crl.A.No.318 of 2008 :-10-: in Ext.P5 acknowledgment card. On seeing the signature and its comparison, according to me, an expert opinion is absolutely unwarranted because there is no similarity in the signature. The question of expert assistance is required only if there is similarity in the disputed signature. But, in the present case, the entire signatures are entirely different and the said fact can be realised without the assistance of an expert. So, according to me , there is no illegality in the finding arrived on by the court below based upon the difference observed in the signature that contained in Ext.P1. 9. In the light of the above facts and circumstances and the discussion, I am of the view that the complainant has miserably failed to prove the transaction and the execution of the cheque and absolutely, there is no evidence to show that Ext.P1 cheque is duly executed by the accused as claimed by the complainant and therefore, I find no perversity in the finding of the court below so as to interfere with the order of acquittal recorded by the trial court in favour of the Crl.A.No.318 of 2008 :-11-: accused and to disturb the double presumption of innocence available in favour of the accused, particularly in view of the decision reported in Mokkiah & Anr. v. State, Rep. by the Inspector of Police, Tamil Nadu [2013 (1) Supreme 88], wherein while laying down the general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal, it was held in paragraph 8 as follows:- “ _8. In a recent decision in Murugesan & Ors. vs. State Through Inspector of Police, 2012 (10) SCC 383, one of us Ranjan Gogoi, J. elaborately considered the broad principles of law governing the power of the High Court under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure while hearing the appeal against an order of acquittal passed by the trial Judge. After adverting to the principles of law laid down in Sheo Swarup vs. King Emperor, AIR 1934 PC 227 (2) and series of subsequent pronouncements in para 21 summarized various principles as found in para 42 of Chandrappa & Ors. vs. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 as under:_ _“21. xxxxxxxxxx_ _42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge:_ _(1) An appellate court has full power to review, re-appreciate and re-consider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded._ Crl.A.No.318 of 2008 :-12-: _(2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law._ _(3) Various expressions, such as, 'substantial and compelling reasons', 'good and sufficient grounds', very strong circumstances', 'distorted conclusions', 'glaring mistakes', etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of 'flourishes of language' to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion._ _(4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court._ _(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.”_ Crl.A.No.318 of 2008 :-13-: In the result, there is no merit in this appeal and accordingly, the same is dismissed. **V.K.MOHANAN, Judge** MBS/ Crl.A.No.318 of 2008 :-14-: