High CourtDivision BenchAppeal dismissed; eviction order upheld.

KRISHNAN NAIR & ANR. ETC. A v. GHOUSE BASHA

Case / Petition Number:Civil Appeal Nos. 689D 90 of 1987
Neutral Citation:[1988] 1 SCR 66

Case Details & Bench

Court
High Court
Hon'ble Judges
  • Sabyasachi Mukharji
  • G. L. Oza
Judgment Date
1987-09-08
Court Decision / Holding
Appeal dismissed. The Court upheld the eviction order, affirming that the sons’ active participation in the partnership and their need for accommodation for the family business satisfied the requirements of s. 10(3)(a)(iii). No order as to costs.
Final Disposition
Appeal dismissed; eviction order upheld.

Parties to the Case

Appellants / Petitioners

  • Krishnan Nair
  • Anr.

Respondents

  • Ghouse Basha

Legal Representation & Advocates

Counsels for Petitioners

  • • A. T. M. Sampath

Counsels for Respondents

  • • Sanjay Parekh
  • • Sudershan Menon

Case Synopsis & Summary

This Supreme Court decision concerns an eviction under s. 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960. The landlord sought to evict to use the demised premises for the business of his two sons, who had previously carried on a leather business with him and subsequently entered into a partnership with others, with half of the shares held jointly. The partnership allegedly included strangers, and the question was whether the eviction was valid where the landlord’s alleged need appeared to be for a partnership business rather than solely for the landlord’s family’s use. The High Court had upheld the eviction order. The appellant argued that eviction under s. 10(3)(a)(iii) should be dismissed because the landlord sought accommodation to benefit a partnership in which his sons and outsiders were partners, which cannot fall within the section’s requirement of bona fide need for the landlord or his family. The Supreme Court, while not disputing the bona fide need finding, examined the meaning of “his business” and whether the sons’ active participation in the partnership could justify the eviction. Relying on D.N. Sanghavi & Sons v. Ambalal Tribhuvan Das and distinguishing Shantial Thamordas v. Chimanlal Maganlal Teleware, the Court held that if the sons were active partners in the family business, the eviction under s. 10(3)(a)(iii) is permissible. The appeal is dismissed and the eviction order stands.

Provisions of Law Cited

Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, s. 10(3)(a)(iii)Partnership Act, s. 4Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961, s. 12(1)(f)

Legal Doctrines & Maxims

  • Bona fide need governs eviction under s. 10(3)(a)(iii).
  • Partnership Act s. 4 defines a firm; the status of partners (active vs sleeping) affects the interpretation of occupancy needs.
  • Sleeping partner concept in partnership and its relevance to tenancy occupancy.

Submissions & Arguments

Contentions of Appellants / Petitioners

The appellants argued that eviction under section 10(3)(a)(iii) was not maintainable because the landlord sought accommodation for a partnership in which his sons and others were partners, which would not meet the section’s requirement. The partnership deed did not specify the sons’ roles, and evidence suggested the sons' ongoing involvement in the leather business prior to the move to the premises, casting doubt on whether the eviction was for the landlord’s immediate family’s use rather than the business partnership. They contended that the expression ‘his business’ should be understood in light of the partnership’s structure and the act’s object.

Contentions of Respondents

The respondent landlord contended that the sons actively participated in the leather business through the partnership with others, sharing control and involvement; since the firm carried on business from the premises, eviction was bona fide for the sons’ business, not merely for accommodating relatives. The High Court’s finding of bona fide need was not challenged, only the statutory eligibility under 10(3)(a)(iii) was questioned.

Cited Precedents (2)

Case NameCitationTreatmentExplanation
D.N. Sanghavi & Sons v. Ambalal Tribhuvan Das[1974] 3 SCR 55PositiveCourt applied the meaning of 'his business' under similar provisions to interpret the current statute.
Shantilal Thamordas & Ors. v. Chimanlal Maganlal Teleware(1977) 1 SCR 341DistinguishedCourt distinguished this decision as not directly applicable to the facts, noting the differences in whether the landlord’s family members were active partners.

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Extracted Judgment Text

Exact text extracted from official judgment records.

KRISHNAN NAIR & ANR. ETC. A _v._ GHOUSE BASHA SEPTEMBER 8; 1987 [SABYASACHi MUKHARJI AND G.L. OZA, JJ.) B ,-1~ _Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease_ _&_ _Rent Control) Act,_ _1960: s. 10(3)_ _(a)(iii)-DemiSed_ premise~Requirement _of by landlord for sons'_ _business in partnership with_ stranger~Eviction order~Validity _of._ The landlord was carrying on leather business in which his two sons used to take active part. Thereafter they went into a partnership with others to carry on the business and jointly held halfthe shares. The # ) ###### The landlord was carrying on leather business in which his two c sons used to take active part. Thereafter they went into a partnership with others to carry on the business and jointly held halfthe shares. The landlord needed the demised premises bona fide ro.r the business of his sons. The High Court maintained the order of eviction passed by the courts below. D In the appeal, it was contended for the appellant that an applicalion for eviction under s. 10(3)(a)(iil) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 was liable to be dismissed solely on the grollnd that the landlord had chosen to file it to accommodate a partnership firm in which his sons and some strangers were partners, ## '( which was not in conformity with the provisions of the section. E partnership firm in which his sons and some strangers were partners, which was not in conformity with the provisions of the section. E Dismissln~ the ~ppeal, HELD: If the deed of partnership excludes ihe son expressly or impliedly from the management of the firm of business and makes him a sleeping partner it cannot be said that the accommodation is F needed directly of substantially for his occupation by way of his business. [68A) _D.N. Sanghavi_ & _Sons_ v. _Ambalal Tribhuvan Das,_ [1974] 3 SCR 55, applied. _('_ G _Shanti/al Thamordas_ & _Ors._ v. _Chimanlal Magan/al Te/ware,_ (1977) 1SCR341, distinguished. _i_ Partnership is a compendious way of describing those wh·o consti-. lute the firm under s. 4 of the Partnership Act. If a person carries on a ., business alongwith other partners and it was the other partner who H 65 66 SUPREME COURT REPQRTS [1988] I S.C.R. A actually carried on the business the position perhaps would have been l<-..._ entirely different. If the same were only sleeping partners that would have been different. [67CD], B ###### c In the instant case, the partnership deed was silent as to what role the sons of the landlord would perform in it. There is, however, evidence that they were in the leather business and had carried on the business previously before shifting to the premises in question. If that is the position, it cannot be said that they were sleeping partners. Having regard to the past conduct of the sons and having regard to their shares in the partnership it can be said that the sons were carrying on business actively along with other partners. As such, the sons needing the accommodation with others would be for the sons' business in terms of s. 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. The landlord was, therefore, entitled to the benefit of eviction. [67B, 68BC, 67DE, 68C, 67E] CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 689D 90 of 1987. From the Judgment and Order dated 27. ll .1986 of the Madras High Court in C.R.P. No. 3306 of 1984. A.T.M. Sampath for the Appellant. ).._ _A_ E San jay Parekh and Sudershan Menon for the Respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, J. This is an appeal by the tenant F against the judgment and order of the High Court of Tamil Nadu. By the aforesaid judgment the Hi~h Court upheld the landlord's contention of _bona fide_ requirement of the premises in question for the business of his sons and maintained the order of eviction passed by the courts below. So far as the question of _bona fide_ need is concerned it has been upheld by the courts below and that finding is not assailed G before us. But what was contended was that the application itself under section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, hereinafter called the Act was not maintainable. as the requirement of the land was not for the landlord or members of his family as such but for two sons who were running a leather business in partnership with strangers. The deed of partnership was H examined by the High Court but it is, however, not before us. It KRISHNAN NAIR _v._ GHOUSE BASHA (MUKHARJI, J.] 67 _;<_ appears from the evidence that previously the father and the two sons A used to carry on leather business from long time. The sons went into the partnership with others and two of the sons were partners. They jointly hold half the shares. From the evidence it appears that the sons used to take active part even before the partnership started in the leather business carried on by the father. Thereafter, the partnership firm with the other partners carried on the business. We must proceed B on the basis that the partnership deed was silent as to what role the ,,.- sons of the landlord would perform in this. The only. question which was urged before us was that the application for eviction under section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act was liable to be dismissed solely on the ground that the landlord has chosen to file this application to accommodate a ##### ~ ##### partnership firm in which his sons and some strangers are partners and c it is not in conformity with the provisions of section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the said Act. Partnership, as is well settled has a compendious way of ~ describing those who constitute the firm under section 4 of the Part· nership Act. Now, if that is the position, in our opinion, if a person carries on a business alongwith other partners and it was the other partner who actually carried on the business the position perhaps D would have been entirely different. If the same were only sleeping partners that would have been different. On the contrary, here having regard to the past conduct of the sons and having regard to the shares this was their only application where sons were carrying on the busi· ness along with other partner. If that is the position in our opinion ..... under section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act as the sons and members of the E family carrying on the business in terms of the section will be entitled to the benefit of eviction. Our attention was drawn to a decision of this Court in _D.N._ _Sanghavi_ _&_ _Sons_ v. _Ambalal Tribhuvan Das,_ [1974] 3 SCR 55 where the meaning of the expression "'his business' under section 12( l)(f) of F _, the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 came up for \ consideration. The said section was in _pari materia_ with the present section. Therefore this court held that the meaning of the expression 'his business' under section 12(1)(f) of the said Act is to be determined by the examination of the object of the Act and setting of the phrase 'his business'. There Dwivedi, J. speaking for the court found that G before the partnership, it was stated that the father was to run the shop. Father died during the pendency of the suit and neither of these _.._ two passages nor anywhere else in the facts during the pendency had stated that on the terms of the partnership they were entitled to man· age the partnership business or even that would also occupy the suit accommodation along with his other partners on obtaining possession H 68 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] 1 S.C.R. A from the appellant was not stated that the other partners have agreed _f._ to shift the business. The court ooserved that if the deed of partnership had excluded the son expressly or impliedly from the management of the firm's business and had made him a sleeping partner it could not be held that the accommodation was needed directly and substantially B [for his occupation by way ] [of ][his business. The firm is carrying on the ] business in the premises in respect of which the eviction was asked for the said firm. But here there is no evidence that the sons were sleeping partners. On the contrary, there is evidence that they were in the .... leather business and had carried on the business previously before shifting to the premises in question. If that is the position, it cannot be accepted that they were sleeping partners. On the contrary, having #### c [regard ][to the number, they were active partners in the business and as ] ### such the sons needed the accommodation with others would be for may sons' business under section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Tamil Nadu Act. mention that in the subsequent decision of this Court in Shanti/al We ~ ) _Thamordas_ & _Ors._ v. _Chimanlal Magan/al Te/ware,_ [1977] 1SCR341 D [this question did not directly arise ][but ][there this Court noted that some ] of the High Courts have taken the view that occupation by partner who was a member of the family would be the occupatlon of the landlord. This Court felt that they should not express any opinion in that regard, but doubt was expressed as to whether the requirement of the premises by the landlord for the occupation of the partnership firm in which he E [was a ] [partner ] [would tantamount to the occupation by landlord. It ] '). appears that the attention of this Court was not drawn to the earlier decision referred to hereinbefore. In any event, the court had no occasion to express any opinion where the sons are active partners in a partnership firm whether such business carried on by the sons would not come within the provisions of section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act. F In the aforesaid view of the matter we uphold the order and judgment of the High Court and we are unable to accept the challenge #### _>_ to the order. The appeal must therefore, fail and is accordingly dismissed. In the facts and circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs. G P.S.S. Appeal dismissed.