High CourtDivision BenchAppeal allowed; High Court’s order set aside; n...

KRISHI UTPADAN MANDI SAMITY, MANGALORE v. PAHAL SINGH

Case / Petition Number:Civil Appeal No. 1871 of 2007
Neutral Citation:2007 (4) S.C.R. 1087

Case Details & Bench

Court
High Court
Hon'ble Judges
  • S.B. Sinha
  • Markandey Katju
Judgment Date
2007-04-10
Court Decision / Holding
Appeal allowed; High Court’s judgment set aside.
Final Disposition
Appeal allowed; High Court’s order set aside; no costs.

Parties to the Case

Appellants / Petitioners

  • KRISHI UTPADAN MANDI SAMITY, MANGALORE

Respondents

  • PAHAL SINGH

Legal Representation & Advocates

Counsels for Petitioners

  • • R. Santhan Krishnan
  • • K. Radha Rani
  • • P. Vijaya Kumar
  • • Praveen Kumar Pandey
  • • D. Mahesh Babu
  • • T. Mahipal
  • • Pradeep Mishra

Counsels for Respondents

  • • P.S. Narasimah (for M/s. P.S.N. & Co.)
  • • Rajesh
  • • Anurag Tomar
  • • Sudha C Gupta
  • • T. Anamika

Case Synopsis & Summary

This Supreme Court decision concerns the legality and remedy for termination of a workman employed by Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samity, Mangalore. Respondent Pahal Singh, initially appointed as Kamgar in 1970, was terminated on 21 January 1974. He raised an industrial dispute in 1992; the Labour Court in 1996 held the termination illegal and directed reinstatement with full back wages. The High Court of Judicature at Allahabad (Allahabad HC) modified the Labour Court award, directing reinstatement with 50% back wages, while proceeding under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court, in turn, held that the High Court’s order was not a reasoned one and that both it and the Labour Court had failed to address essential questions, including whether the termination was illegal, the long delay in raising the dispute, and whether the employee had continuous service as required by law. The Court reiterated that delay defeats equity and that discretionary relief under the Industrial Disputes Act must be exercised judiciously, considering statutory requirements such as Section 2(g) of the UP ID Act and Section 6-N, and Rule 12(9) of UP ID Rules 1957. It cautioned against automatic relief merely because an affidavit was uncontroverted. The appeal is allowed and the High Court’s judgment is set aside without costs; the implications clarify the need for reasoned, contentions-based judgments in art. 226/227 proceedings.

Provisions of Law Cited

Constitution of India, Arts. 226 and 227U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947Section 2(g) of the U.P. Industrial Disputes ActSection 11A of the Industrial Disputes ActSection 6-N of the U.P. Industrial Disputes ActRule 12(9) of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Rules, 1957U.P. Krishi Utpadan Mandi (Amendment and Validation) Act, 1970Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

Legal Doctrines & Maxims

  • Delay defeats equity
  • Acceptance sub silentio (doctrine)
  • Discretionary power to grant relief must be exercised judiciously

Submissions & Arguments

Contentions of Appellants / Petitioners

The appellant-employer contends that the High Court’s order is non‑reasoned and that the long delay in raising the dispute, lack of evidence on continuous service, and non‑compliance with statutory prerequisites warrant a rejection of back‑wage relief and reinstatement. It argues that the Labour Court failed to address essential legal requirements (sections 2(g) and 6-N) and that Article 226/227 jurisdiction requires a reasoned decision.

Contentions of Respondents

The respondent-workman asserts termination was illegal and seeks reinstatement with back wages. He relies on the Labour Court’s findings that the termination was illegal and argues for protective relief under the IDA, asserting continuity of service and the proper application of statutory provisions.

Cited Precedents (4)

Case NameCitationTreatmentExplanation
Haryana State Co-operative Land Development Bank v. Neelam[2005] 5 SCC 91PositiveCited to support the principle that courts have discretionary power to grant relief and that entitlement is not automatic; emphasizes that procedural doctrines like estoppel, waiver, and acquiescence can limit relief.
U.P. State Electricity Board v. Rajesh Kumar(2003) 12 SCC 548PositiveCited to illustrate that even with a prescribed period of limitation for references, facts and circumstances of each case must be considered in dealing with stale claims.
Assistant Engineer, C.A.D., Kata v. Dhan KunwarAIR 2006 SC 2670PositiveCited for the proposition that there is no universal formula for delay in seeking references; outcome depends on facts of each case.
Uttranchal Forest Development Corporation v. MC Joshi[2007] 3 SCALE 545PositiveCited as a related case acknowledging discretionary relief and the need to assess delay and circumstances.

Diagnostic Tool

Beta

Does this judgment govern your specific facts?

Don't risk relying on a distinguishable precedent. Enter your facts or proposition below. We will test it against KRISHI UTPADAN MANDI SAMITY, MANGALORE v. PAHAL SINGH and instantly map out authorities that support, challenge, or govern your position.

Extracted Judgment Text

Exact text extracted from official judgment records.

-)_ A KRISHI UTPADAN MANDI SAMITY, MANGALORE _v._ ~ ## PAHALSINGH ## APRIL 10, 2007 (S.B. SINHA AND MARKANDEY KA TJU, JJ.] ~ ## _Judgment/Order:_ > _Reasoned order-Award passed by Labour Court-Upheld in writ petition, by High Court with modification in quantum of back wages without_ c _giving reasons-On appeal, held: High Court while exercising power under Arts.226 and 227 has to apply its mind to contentions raised hy parties and give reasoned order-High Court's order is not reasoned one and is set aside-Constitution of India, 1950-Arts.226 and 227._ --~ D ## _UP. Industrial Disputes Act, 194?:_ _s.2(g)-Terinination of_ workman~Before _Labour Court, workman required to prove that his termination was illegal-Merely because he filed affidavit and employer did not file rejoinder affidavit thereto, would not imply that award in favour of workman automatically follows-Labour Laws-_ E _Industrial Disputes Act, 1947._ _Industrial dispute raised by workman after l 8 years-Labour Court ordered reinstate"!ent with full back wages-Correctness of-Held, incorrect-Delay defeats equity--Delay/laches._ _.r_ - - "" Respondent-Workman appointed on a temporary basis was terminated[F ] from seniices in 1974. He raised industrial dispute in 1992. The Labour Court directed reinstatement with full wages. While directing so, Labour Court held that the employen have not controverted the written statement (affidavit) of workman by filing the rejoinder alongwith affidavit and the far.ts regarding termination of services pleaded by the workman were also not c;ontroverted G by employers either in arguments or in evidence. Appellant preferred writ petition wherey the High Court modified the award directipg reinstatement with 50% back wages. Hence the present appeal. ## Allowing the appeal, the Court H 1085 1086 (2007) 4 S.C.R. ## SUPREME COURT REPORTS A HELD: 1. The judgment of the High Court is not a reasoned one. Why the Award was upheld with modification in quantum of back wages has not been stated. [Para 6) (1088-D] 2.1. The High Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India upon issuance of a rule nisi is B expected to apply its mind to the contentions raised by the parties and arrive at findings thereupon. The Labour Court also committed the same error. [Para 7 & 8) (1088-E) 2.2. The Labour Court, thus, also did not advert itself to the questions C which were required to be gone into. The workman in the said proceedings was required to show that the termination was illegal. Only because it filed an affidavit and the respondent did not file any rejoinder affidavit thereto, the same by itself would not mean that an Award would automatically follow. (Para· 10) [1089-B) D 2.3. The Labour Court was also under an obligation to consider as to whether any relief, if at all could be granted in favour of the workman in view of the fact that the industrial dispute had been raised after 18 years. It is now well-settled principle of law that "delay defeats equity". It was obligatory on the part of the Labour Court to consider that the respondent was in E employment for very short period. It had also not arrived at a finding that the respondent was in continuous service within the meaning of s.2(g) of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act or for that matter in terminating the services of the respondent, the appellant did not comply with the requirements of law particularly Section 6-N thereof. In absence of such a finding, the High Court should have interfered with the Award. [Paras 11] (1089-C-D] F 3. The Labour Court exercises its wide jurisdiction under Section 1 lA of the Industrial Disputes Act, but such jurisdiction must be exercised judiciously. A relief of re-instatement with all back wages is not to be given without considering the relevant factors therefore, only because it would be lawful to do so. In this case, even the basic requirements for grant of any G relief had not been found by the Labour Court. {Para 13) (1089-FJ _Assistant Engineer, C.A.D., Kola_ v. _Dhan Kunwar,_ AIR [2006] SC 2670 and _Uttranchal Forest Development Corporation_ v. _M_ C. _Joshi,_ [2007] 3 SCALE 545, relied on. _-f--_ H _Haryana State Co-operative Land Development Bank_ v. _Nee/am,_ [2005] KRISHI UTPADAN MANDI SAMITY, MANGALORE v. PAHAL SINGH [S.B. SINHA, J.] 1087 5 SCC 91 and _U. P. State Electricity Board_ v. _Rajesh Kumar,_ (2003) 12 _SCC_ A 548, referred to. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1871 of2007. From the Judgment and Order dated 23.09.2003 of the High Court of Uttranchal at Nainital in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 3112 (MIS) of2001 (Old B No. 5878of1997). R. Santhan Krishnan, K. Radha Rani, P. Vijaya Kumar, Praveen Kumar Pandey, D. Mahesh Babu, T. Mahipal and Pradeep Mishra for the Appellant. P.S. Narasimah (for M/s. P.S.N. & Co.), Rajesh, Anurag Tomar, Sudha C Gupta and T. Anamika for the Respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by S.B. SINHA, J. 1. Leave granted. D 2. Respondent herein was appointed as Kamgar on or about 1.1.1970. He was allegedly appointed in excess of the sanctioned strength. The post was also not :ipproved by the Director of the Mandi Samiti. Indisputably, he was not appointed in terms of the procedures laid down in U.P. Krishi Utpadan Mandi (Amendment and Validation) Act, 1970 (Act) or the regulations framed thereunder. He was again appointed on a temporary basis without approval E of the Director as a Clerk Typist on 30. 9 .1972. One of the terms of the offer of appointment issued in his favour was that his services could be tenninated at any time upon giving one month's notice or pay in lieu thereof. The Authority was informed that several such appointments have been made in excess of the staff and that too without following the provisions of the Act F and rules and regulations therein and also without obtaining the approval of the Director. It was directed that the services of the persons concerned be tenninated, by a letter dated 10.01.1974; pursuant to or in furtherance whereof, the services of six employees including the respondent herein was terminated on 21.1.1974. One month's notice allegedly was given therefor. It is stated that the relevant provisions of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act were also complied G with in relation thereto. 3. Respondent herein raised an industrial dispute on 2.5.1992. The State of Uttar Pradesh referred the following dispute for adjudication by the Labour Court, Meerut. H {2007] 4 S.C.R. 1088 A ## SUPREME COURT REPORTS "Whether action of employers in terminating the services of their workman Sh. Paha! Singh, S/o Sh. Amrit Singh is ilfogal or invalid? If · yes, then·. to what relief/compensation the concerned workman is entitled? And with what other details?" 4. The parties before the Labour Court submitted their'respective written B statements. Respondent adduced evidence. The Labour Court by an Award dated 24. l 0. l 996 holding that the termination of the services of the respondent was illegal, directed him to be re-instated in service with continuity of service and awarded back wages for the entire period. 5. The said Award came to be questioned by the appellant herein in a C Writ Petition filed before the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad. By reason of the impugned Judgment, the High Court modified the Award directing reinstatement of the respondent with 50% of back wages. 6. At the outset, we may notice that the judgment of the High Court is D not a reasoned one. Why the Award was upheld with modification in the quantum of back wages has not been stated. · 7. The High Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India upon issuance of a rule nisi is expected to apply its mind to the contentions raised by the parties and arrive at E findings thereupon. K We may notice that the learned Labour Court also committed the sarile error. 9. It, in its Award merely stated:- F G H "The workman has filed written statement with an affidavit which has not been controverted by the employers by filing rejoinder on affidavit., Therefore, in these circumstances the written statement of workman is Iiabl~ to be accepted according to Rule 12(9) of U.P. Industrial Dispute Rule 1957. It has been clearly provided under Rule 12(9) of U.P. Ind.ustrial Disputes Rules 1957 that if the workman files his written statement alongwith an affidavit, then the employers have to file their rejoinder with the affidavit. If the employers.do not file their rejoinder alongwith affidavit, then considering the facts oOhe written statement filed with affidavit as correct, award will be made in favour of workman. ,.; KRISHI UTPADANMANDI SAMITY, MANGALOREv. PAHALSINGH [S.B. SINHA,J.)l 089 In the present case employers have not controverted the written A statement (affidavit) of workman by filing the rejoinder alongwith affidavit and the facts regarding termination of services pleaded by the workman were also not controverted by employers either in arguments or in evidence. In these circumstances the order terminating the services of workman will be held illegal and invalid." B 10. The Labour Court, thus, also did not advert itself to the questions which were required to be gone into. The workman in the said proceedings was required to show that the termination was illegal. Only because it filed an affidavit and the respondent did not file any rejoinder affidavit thereto, the same by itself would not mean that an Award would automatically follow. c 11. The Labour Court was also under an obligation to consider as to whether any relief, if at all could be granted in favour of the workman in view of the fact that the industrial dispute had been raised after 18 years. It was obligatory on the part of the Labour Court to consider that the respondent was in employment for very short period. It had also not arrived at a finding D that the respondent was in continuous service within the meaning of Section 2(g) of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act or for that matter in terminating the services of the respondent, the appellant did not comply with the requirements oflaw particularly Section 6-N thereof. In absence of such a finding, the High Court in our opinion should have interfered with the Award. E 12. It is now well-settled principle of law that "delay defeats equity". 13. The Labour Court exercises its wide jurisdiction under Section l lA of the Industrial Disputes Act, but such jurisdiction must be exercised judiciously. A relief of re-instatement with all back wages is not to be given without considering the relevant factors therefor, only because it would be F lawful to do so. As noticed hereinbefore, in this case, even the basic requirements for grant of any relief had not been found by the Labour Court. 14. In _Haryana State Co-operative Land Development Bank_ v. _Nee/am,_ [2005] _5_ SCC 91 this Court opined:- G "18. It is trite that the courts and tribunals having plenary jurisdiction have discretionary power to grant an appropriate relief to the parties. The aim and object of the Industrial Disputes Act may be to impart social justice to the workman but the same by itself would not mean that irrespective of his conduct a workman would automatically be H - 1090 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 4 S.C.R~ - A entitled to relief. The procedural laws like estoppel, waiver and acquiescence are equally applicable to the industrial proceedings. A person in certain situation may even be held to be bound by the doctrine of acceptance sub silentio. The respondent her~in did not raise any industrial dispute questioning the termination of her services within a reasonable time. She even accepted an alternative employment - B and has been continuing therein from 10-8-1988. In her replication filed before the Presiding Officer of the Labour Court while traversing the plea raised by the appellant herein that she is gainfully employed in HUDA with effect from 10-8-1988 and her services had been regularised therein, it was averred: - c "6. The applicant workman had already given replication to the ALC-cum-Conciliation Officer, stating therein that she was engaged by HUDA from 10-8-1988 as clerk-cum-typist cm daily-wage basis. The applicant workman has the right to come to the service of the management and she is interested to join them." - D 19. She, therefore, did not deny or dispute that she had been-regularly employed or her services had been regularised. She merely exercised her right to join the service of the appellant." 15. Yet again in _U.P. State Electricity Boardv. Rajesh Kumar,_ [2003) 12 SCC 548, this Court held that although a period of limitation is prescribed for . E making a reference, but facts and circumstances of each case is required to be considered in dealing with stale claims. 16. Recently in _Assistant Engineer, C.A.D., Kata_ v. _Dhan Kunwar,_ AIR (2006) SC 2670, it was held; - "6. It may be noted that so far as delay in seeking the reference is - F concerned, no formula of universal application can be laid down. It would depend on facts of each individual case." 17. See also _Uttranchal Forest Development Corporation_ v. _MC. Joshi,_ (2007) 3 SCALE 545. G 18. For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained which is set aside accordingly. The Appeal is allowed. 19. However, in the facts and circumstances of this case, there shall be no order as to costs. H D.G. Appeal allowed.