K.J. Mathai v. M/S Raja Enterprise

# **THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM** **PRESENT THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR.S.MANIKUMAR** **&** **THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE C.T.RAVIKUMAR WEDNESDAY, THE 30[TH] DAY OF OCTOBER 2019 / 8TH KARTHIKA, 1941** **ARB.A NO. 59 OF 2013** **AGAINST THE ORDER DATED 10-08-2012 IN OP 176/2008 OF THE COURT OF IIND ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE, KOZHIKODE APPELLANT/PETITIONER:** **K.J.MATHAI, AGED 68 YEARS S/O.LATE K.C.JOSEPH, HON.SECRETARY, KOZHIKODE DISTRICT SPORTS COUNCIL, MANANCHIRA MAIDAN, KOZHIKODE-673 001.** **BY ADV.SRI.T.R.HARIKUMAR SRI.ARJUN RAGHAVAN** ## **RESPONDENT/RESPONDENT:** **M/S.RAJA ENTERPRISE, NO.9, 6TH CROSS, KUMARA KURUPA PART WEST, BANGLORE-560 020, REPRESENTED BY ITS MANAGING PARTNER SRI.K.R.PRABHU.** **BY ADVS.SRI.A.DINESH RAO SRI.L.GOPALAKRISHNAN POTTI** **THIS ARBITRATION APPEAL HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON** **30.10.2019, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:** ARB.A.No.59 of 2013 2 ## **JUDGMENT** ## **Ravikumar,J.** This appeal under Section 37(1) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for brevity `the Act') is filed against the order dated 10.8.2012 of the Court of II[nd] Additional District Judge, Kozhikode whereby O.P.No.176 of 2008 filed by the appellant under Section 34 of the Act challenging the award passed by the sole Arbitrator in Arbitration Reference No.3/06 dated 24.4.2008 was dismissed. The respondent herein was the claimant before the Arbitral Tribunal and the appellant herein was the respondent therein. In fact, before the Arbitral Tribunal the Kozhikode District Sports Council (in short 'KDSC') represented by its Secretary was the respondent. However, on suffering the award the appellant being the Honorary Secretary of the Kozhikode District Sports Council took up the matter before the District Court unsuccessfully. Hereafter, in this appeal the parties are referred to in accordance with their status in this appeal and the documents are referred to in the order they were marked before the Arbitrator. 2. The respondent is a Bangalore based firm, having expertise in design, supply, erection, testing and commissioning of swimming pools and it responded to a tender floated by KDSC on 30.4.2001, for supply, erection, testing and commissioning of filtration ARB.A.No.59 of 2013 3 and re-circulation plant for an aquatic complex of international standard at Kozhikode. Admittedly, the respondent/claimant who quoted the lowest amount viz., Rs.48,55,500/- became the successful bidder and consequently, an agreement was executed on 8.6.2001 between the KDSC and the respondent. Later, the respondent demanded an amount of Rs.35,51,843/- from KDSC towards the cost of materials. Since the work could not be executed due to the non-clearance of the site only part-payment was made despite repeated demands and that constrained the respondent to file A.R.No.11/2006 before this Court and thereupon this Court appointed a sole Arbitrator. The respondent filed claim statement and KDSC resisted the claim raising various contentions. On the side of the respondent/claimant the proprietor was examined as PW1 and Exts.A1 to A21 were marked. On the side of the appellant one Sri.M.Harris who was a former Honorary Secretary of KDSC was examined as RW1 and Exts.R1 to R11 were marked. On consideration of the rival contentions and evidence on record the Arbitral Tribunal passed an award in Arbitration Reference No.3/2006 on 24.4.2008 on the following lines:- “In the result an award is passed directing that the respondent shall pay and the claimant can realize from the respondent and their assets Rs.23,92,437/(Rupees twenty lakhs ninety two thousand four hundred and thirty seven only). The respondent shall pay within three months from the date of this award. ARB.A.No.59 of 2013 4 If the direction is complied with no interest is payable. If not the respondent will be liable to pay future interest @ 18% per year from the date of expiry of three months till realisation. The parties will bear their respective costs.” It is feeling aggrieved by the same that the appellant herein who was the respondent therein filed O.P.No.176/2008 under Section 34 of the Act and as noted earlier, the same was dismissed as per the impugned order. Hence, this appeal. 3. Heard learned counsel Sri.Arjun Raghavan appearing for the appellant and learned counsel Sri.Dinesh Rao appearing for the respondent. 4. A scanning of the impugned order would reveal that before the District Court the appellant had mainly raised three contentions specifically mentioned in paragraph 10 thereunder. They read thus:- - “i) Ext.A2 contract has been entered into between the petitioner and a firm by name M/s.Raja Enterprises in which PW1 is a partner, whereas Exts.A4, A5, A6 and A7 bills are issued by M/s.Raja Enterprises, a proprietary concern of PW1 with whom the respondent has no contractual obligation and therefore the dispute between the proprietary concern M/s.Raj Enterprises and the respondent is not one coming under the arbitration clause of Ext.A2. - ii) As per the terms of Ext.A2, the respondent is not liable to pay any advance amount or any part payments towards any part of the work done by the claimant and the respondent is contractually and legally liable to pay ARB.A.No.59 of 2013 5 the amount to the claimant only after completing the entire work and since the work has not been even started by the claimant, the claim made is premature and so non-payment of any part payment does not fall within the arbitration clause. - iii) The respondent had never accepted delivery of any goods covered by Ext.A7 and no title cover passed to the respondent and hence they are under no legal, contractual or moral obligations to make payment to the respondent until the work is fully completed and finally verified by the architect for payment.” 5. Realising rightly that the jurisdiction under Section 34 of the Act does not permit the District Court to consider the challenge against an arbitral award as in the case of an appeal and that the permissible grounds for challenging of an arbitral award are available under Section 34(2) of the Act, the District Court considered the rival contentions. Taking note of the authorities on the subject of scope of power under Section 34 of the Act and the contentions actually raised by the appellant herein before it the District Court considered the question whether the arbitral award invites interference. Obviously, in that exercise the District Court relied on the decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court in **K.V.Mohd. Zakir** v. **Regional Sports Centre (AIR 2009 SC suppl. 2517)** , **Oil and Natural Gases Corporation** v. **SAW Pipes Ltd. (AIR 2003 SC 2629)** , **M/s.Markfed Vanaspathi and Allied Industries** v. **Union of India (AIR 2007 (SC) Suppl. 880)** and **Pathros O.P.** v. **State of Kerala and Ors. (2010 (3) ILR Kerala** ARB.A.No.59 of 2013 6 **87 (SC))** and held that the appellant herein viz., the petitioner therein, did not make out a case falling within the scope of Section 34 of the Act, to set aside the award. Consequently, the original petition was dismissed. 6. Before adverting to the grounds raised in the captioned appeal against the order of the District Court dismissing the challenge against the arbitral award it is only appropriate to consider the scope of power under Section 34 of the Act to interfere with an arbitral award and also the scope of power under Section 37 of the Act. Sections 34 & 37 of the Act read thus:- ## “ _**34. Application for setting aside arbitral**_ - _**award.**_ (1) Recourse to a Court against an arbitral award may be made only by an application for setting aside such award in accordance with subsection (2) and sub-section (3). (2) An arbitral award may be set aside by the Court only if- - (a) the party making the application furnishes - proof that- - (i) a party was under some incapacity, or - (ii) the arbitration agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law for the time being in force, or - (iii) the party making the application was not given proper notice of the appointment of ARB.A.No.59 of 2013 7 an arbitrator or of the arbitral proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case, or - (iv) the arbitral award deals with a dispute not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration: Provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted to arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted, only that part of the arbitral award which contains decisions on matters not submitted to arbitration may be set aside, or - (v) the composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties, unless such agreement was in conflict with a provision of this Part from which the parties cannot derogate, or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance with this Part, or ## (b) the Court finds that- - (i) the subject-matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law for the time being in force, or - (ii) the arbitral award is in conflict with the public policy of India. _[Explanation 1_ : For the avoidance of any doubt, it is clarified that an award is in conflict with the public policy of India, only if,- - (i) the making of the award was induced or affected by fraud or corruption or was in violation of section 75 or section 81; or ARB.A.No.59 of 2013 8 - (ii) it is in contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian law; or - (iii) it is in conflict with the most basic notions of morality or justice. _Explanation 2_ : For the avoidance of doubt, the test as to whether there is a contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian law shall not entail a review on the merits of the dispute.] [(2A) An arbitral award arising out of arbitrations other than international commercial arbitrations, may also be set aside by the Court, if the Court finds that the award is vitiated by patent illegality appearing on the face of the award: PROVIDED that an award shall not be set aside merely on the ground of an erroneous application of the law or by re-appreciation of evidence.] (3) An application for setting aside may not be made after three months have elapsed from the date on which the party making that application had received the arbitral award or, if a request had been made under section 33, from the date on which that request had been disposed of by the arbitral tribunal: PROVIDED that if the Court is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application within the said period of three months it may entertain the application within a further period of thirty days, but not thereafter. (4) On receipt of an application under subsection (1), the Court may, where it is appropriate and it is so requested by a party, adjourn the proceedings for a period of time determined by it in order to give the arbitral tribunal an opportunity to resume the arbitral proceedings or to take such ARB.A.No.59 of 2013 9 other action as in the opinion of arbitral tribunal will eliminate the grounds for setting aside the arbitral award. (5) An application under this section shall be filed by a party only after issuing a prior notice to the other party and such application shall be accompanied by an affidavit by the applicant endorsing compliance with the said requirement. (6) An application under this section shall be disposed of expeditiously, and in any event, within a period of one year from the date on which the notice referred to in sub-section (5) is served upon the other party. _**37. Appealable orders**_ **.** -(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, an appeal shall lie from the following orders (and from no others) to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decrees of the Court passing the order, namely:- - (a) refusing to refer the parties to arbitration under section 8; - (b) granting or refusing to grant any measure under section 9; - (c) setting aside or refusing to set aside an arbitral award under section 34. (2) An appeal shall also lie to a Court from an order of the arbitral tribunal.- (a) accepting the plea referred in sub-section (2) or sub-section (3) of section 16; or (b) granting or refusing to grant an interim measure under section 17. - (3) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed ARB.A.No.59 of 2013 10 in appeal under this section, but nothing in this section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.” 7. It is only proper and profitable to refer to certain decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court, for the aforesaid purpose. In ## **Associate Builders** v. **Delhi Development Authority** reported in **(2015) 3 SCC 49** the Apex Court held in paragraph 17 thus:- “It will be seen that none of the grounds contained in sub-section (2)(a) of Section 34(2) deal with merits of the decision rendered by an arbitral ward and. It is only when it is in conflict with public policy of India that merits of an arbitral award are to be looked into under certain specified circumstances.” While dealing with the question as to when interference with finding(s) of fact in an arbitral award is permissible it was held in paragraph 33 thus: “It must clearly be understood that when a court is applying the “public policy” test to an arbitral award, it does not act as court of appeal and consequently errors of fact cannot be corrected. A possible view by the arbitrator has necessary to pass muster as the arbitrator is the ultimate master of the quantity and quality of evidence to be relied on when he delivers his arbitral award. Thus, an award based on little evidence or on evidence which does not measure up in quality to a trained legal mind would not be held to be invalid on this score. Once it is found that arbitrator's approach is not arbitrary or capricious, then he is the last word on facts.” As relates interpretation of terms of a contract, after observing about ARB.A.No.59 of 2013 11 the third subhead, patent illegality that it is really a contravention of Section 28(3) of the Arbitration Act and extracting Section 28(3), it was further held in paragraph 42.3 of the decision in **Associate Builders** case thus:- "This last contravention must be understood with a caveat. An Arbitral Tribunal must decide in accordance with the terms of the contract, but if an arbitrator contrues a term of the contract in a reasonable manner, it will not mean that the award can be set aside on this ground. Construction of the terms of a contract is primarily for an arbitrator to decide unless the arbitrator construes the contract in such a way that it could be said to be something that no fair-minded or reasonable person could do." 8. **Associate Builders** case was decided on 25[th] November, 2014 when Section 28(3) of the Act stood thus:- "In all cases, the Arbitral Tribunal shall decide in accordance with the terms of the contract and shall take into account the usages of the trade applicable to the transaction." (underline supplied) Subsequently, as per Amendment Act, 2015 Section 28(3) was amended as hereunder:- "While deciding and making an award, the Arbitral Tribunal shall, in all cases, take into account the terms of the contract and trade usages applicable to the transaction." (underline supplied) ARB.A.No.59 of 2013 12 ## 9. In the decision in **Ssangyong Engineering & Construction Co.Ltd.** v. **National Highways Authority of India** **(NHAI)** reported in **AIR 2019 SC 5041** the Hon'ble Apex Court considered paragraphs 42.3 to 45 in **Associate Builders c** ase(supra) with reference to the change made in Section 28(3) of the Act by the Amendment Act, 2015. It reads thus:- "29. The change made in Section 28(3) by the Amendment Act really follows what is stated in paragraphs 42.3 to 45 in Associate Builders (AIR 2015 SC 620), namely, that the construction of the terms of a contract is primarily for an arbitrator to decide, unless the arbitrator construes the contract in a manner that no fair-minded or reasonable person would; in short, that the arbitrator's view is not even a possible view to take. Also, if the arbitrator wanders outside the contract and deals with matters not allotted to him, he committs an error of jurisdiction. This ground of challenge will now fall within the new ground added under Section 34(2A). 30.What is important to note is that a decision which is perverse, as understood in paragraphs 31 and 32 of Associate Builders (AIR 2015 SC 620)(supra), while no longer being a ground for challenge under "public policy of India", would certainly amount to a patent illegality appearing on the face of the award. Thus, a finding based on no evidence at all or an award which ignores vital evidence in arriving at its decision would be perverse and liable to be set aside on the ground of patent illegality. Additionally, a finding based on documents taken behind the back of the parties by the arbitrator would also qualify as a decision based on no evidence inasmuch as such decision is not based on evidence led by the parties, and therefore, would also have to be characterised as perverse." ARB.A.No.59 of 2013 13 ## In **Navodaya Mass Entertainment Limited** v. **J.M. Combines** reported in **(2015) 5 SCC 698** the Apex Court held:- “In our opinion, the scope of interference of the court is very limited. The court would not be justified in reappraising the material on record by Court and substituting its own view in place of arbitrator's view. When there is an error apparent on the face of the record or the arbitrator has not followed the statutory legal position , then and then only it would be justified in interfering with the award published by the arbitrator. Once the arbitrator has applied his mind to the matter before him, the court cannot reappraise the matter as if it were an appeal and even if two views are possible, the view taken by arbitrator would prevail. [See Bharat Coking Coal Ltd.v. L.K.Ahuja [(2004) 5 SCC 109], Ravindra & Associates v.Union of India [(2010)1 SCC 80, Madnani Construction Corpn.(P) Ltd. v.Union of India [(2010)1 SCC 549, Associated Construction v. Pawanhans Helicopters Ltd. [(2008)16 SCC 128 and Satna Stone & Lime Co. Ltd. v. Union of India [(2008)14 SCC 785.]. ## In **P.R.Shah, Shares and Stock Brokers Private Limited** v. **B.H.H.Securities Private Limited and Others** reported in **(2012) 1** ## **SCC 594** the Apex Court held: “A court does not sit in appeal over the award of an Arbitral Tribunal by reassessing or reappreciating the evidence. An award can be challenged only under the grounds mentioned in Section 34 of the Act.” ## In **Ravindra Kumar Gupta and Company** v. **Union of India** reported in **(2010) 1 SCC 409** the Apex Court held that the High Court had committed a serious error in appreciating the evidence led by the ARB.A.No.59 of 2013 14 parties before the Arbitrator. This evidence was duly scrutinised and evaluated by the Arbitrator. This conclusion has been erroneously substituted by the High Court with its own opinion on appreciation of the evidence. Such a course was not permissible to the High Court while examining objections to the award under Section 30 of the Arbitration Act, 1940. The court went on to hold that the law with regard to scope and ambit of the jurisdiction of the courts to interfere with an arbitral award has been settled in a catena of judgments of this Court. After holding so, the Apex Court made reference there, of some of the judgments including the decision in **State of Rajasthan** v. **Puri Construction Co.Ltd. [(1994) 6 SCC 485]** wherein the Apex Court observed as follows:- “26. The arbitrator is the final arbiter for the dispute between the parties and it is not open to challenge the award on the ground that the arbitrator has drawn his own conclusion or has failed to appreciate the facts. In **Sudarsan Trading Co.** v. **Govt. of Kerala [(1989)2 SCC 38** it has been held by this Court that there is distinction between disputes as to the jurisdiction of the arbitrator and the disputes as to in what way that jurisdiction should be exercised. There may be a conflict as to the power of the arbitrator to grant a particular remedy. One has to determine the distinction between an error within the jurisdiction and error in excess of the jurisdiction. _Court cannot substitute its own evaluation of the conclusion of law or fact to come to the conclusion that the arbitrator had acted contrary to the bargain between the parties._ (emphasis in original) Whether a particular amount was liable to be paid is a decision within the competency of ARB.A.No.59 of 2013 15 the arbitrator. By purporting to construe the contract the court cannot take upon itself the burden of saying that this was contrary to the contract and as such beyond jurisdiction. If on a view taken of a contract, the decision of the arbitrator on certain amounts awarded is a possible view though perhaps not the only correct view, the award cannot be examined by the court. Where the reasons have been given by the arbitrator in making the award the court cannot examine the reasonableness of the reasons. If the parties have selected their own forum, the deciding forum must be conceded the power of appraisement of evidence. The arbitrator is the sole judge of the quality as well as the quantity of evidence and it will not be for the court to take upon itself the task of being a Judge on the evidence before the arbitrator.” Findings recorded by arbitrator on evidence giving elaborate reasons, held, could not be said to be either perverse or based on no evidence - Hence, could not be set aside on reappreciation of the evidence led by the parties before Arbitrator.” ## In **State of U.P** . v. **Allied Constructions (2003) 7 SCC 396** the Apex ## Court held:- “The power of the court to interfere is restricted by virtue of S.30 – Court cannot reappraise the evidence – Interpreting a contract is matter within the jurisdiction of the arbitrator – Unless one or the other condition under S.30 of the Act is satisfied, the award cannot be set aside.” ## In **Madhya Pradesh Housing Board** v. **Progressive Writers and** ## **Publishers** reported in **(2009) 5 SCC 678** the Apex Court held:- “Courts hearing applications under S.30 do not exercise any appellate jurisdiction and cannot reappraise evidence – Interpreting a contract is a matter within the jurisdiction of arbitrator – Award passed by arbitrator is ARB.A.No.59 of 2013 16 ordinarily final – It cannot be interfered with unless the reasons/findings contained therein are totally perverse or award is based on wrong proposition of law.” ## In **Kuldeep Singh** v. **Commr. of Police** reported in **(1992) 2 SCC** **10,** in paragraph 10, the Apex Court held:- “A broad distinction has, therefore, to be maintained between the decisions which are perverse and those which are not. If a decision is arrived at on no evidence or evidence which is thoroughly unreliable and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. But if there is some evidence is on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, however compenditious it may be, the conclusion would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be ” interfered with. (underline supplied) The aforesaid survey of authorities would undoubtedly go to show that under Section 30 of the Old Act and the corresponding section viz., Section 34 of the Act, the consistent stand is that the scope of interference with an arbitral award is very limited. If a decision is arrived at without any evidence or the evidence which was thoroughly unreliable and no prudent man would have acted upon it, the order would be perverse. It is only when the findings of an Arbitrator is arbitrary, capricious or perverse or when the conscious of the Court is short or when illegality is not trivial but would go to the root of the matter an interference is possible. They would also reveal the position that merely because another view is possible and the appellate ARB.A.No.59 of 2013 17 authority is entitled to appreciate the evidence, the appellate authority is not entitled to substitute the view of the Arbitrator if it is a plausible one. It is to be noted that the scope of an appeal under Section 37 of the Act is even more restricted. Bearing in mind the aforesaid position of law settled the contentions raised in this appeal have to be appreciated to decide whether interference with the impugned order passed under Section 34 dismissing the challenge against the arbitral award is required. As noticed hereinbefore, both sides adduced evidence before the Arbitrator. The proprietor of the claimant firm/the respondent herein was examined as PW1 and Exts.A1 to A21 were marked and on the side of KDSC, its former honorary Secretary was examined as RW1 and Exts.R1 to R11 were marked. We have already taken note of the fact that though KDSC represented by its Secretary was the respondent before the Arbitrator the impugned order as also the captioned appeal would reveal that they were not filed by KDSC but, by K.J.Mathai, the honorary Secretary of KDSC. We do not think it necessary to go into the said aspect in detail. A scanning of the arbitral award would reveal that the Arbitrator had arrived at conclusions on the points formulated for consideration based on evidence and they were elaborately dealt with. The District Court in exercise of the power under Section 34 of the Act considered the ARB.A.No.59 of 2013 18 question whether the appellant herein could establish any ground under Section 34(2) of the Act so as to compel interference with the arbitral award. On such consideration, obviously, the District Court, as per the impugned order, found that the appellant herein could not make out any case to set aside an award under any of the grounds mentioned under Section 34 of the Act. When that be the position, no interference with the impugned order and consequential setting aside of the arbitral award is possible in exercise of power under Section 37 of the Act, unless the appellant could establish that the arbitral award was perverse and based on no evidence or that the same was passed relying on evidence which no prudent man would have acted upon and if such contentions raised were not appropriately dealt with by the District Court. We have carefully gone through the grounds 'A' to 'F' raised in this appeal. Strictly saying, the appellant cannot be heard to contend that KDSC got no liability to effect payment as ground 'B' itself would reveal that for the materials brought to the site for carrying out the construction based on the bills produced by the respondent part payment was admittedly effected. That apart, the fact that the tender was also for supply is not disputed and the appeal itself would reveal that the invitation of tender on 3.4.2001, which was awarded to the respondent, was for supply, erection, testing and commissioning of ARB.A.No.59 of 2013 19 filtration and re-circulation plant for an aquatic complex of international standard at Kozhikode. The discussion of evidence and the contentions now raised would reveal that the arbitrability of the dispute was raised and considered by the Arbitrator and taking into account the arbitral agreement the District Court did not find any reason to interfere with the findings on such issue. Having honoured the bills submitted for supply of materials without any reservation the appellant cannot now contend that KDSC got no liability to effect payment for the materials supplied. One of the contentions is that this Court as per an interim order stopped the civil works at the site and hence, the respondent/the claimant who was fully aware of the said position should not have brought materials to the site. The arbitral award as also the impugned order passed by the District Court would reveal that the said contention was also considered based on materials on record by the Arbitrator and then by the District Court. They found that referred interim order of this Court was a conditional one. Both the claimant and the respondent before the Arbitral Tribunal had produced certified copies of the interim order. On the side of the claimant/respondent it was produced as Ext.A21 and on the side of KDSC it was produced as Ext.R9. It is taking note of the same that both the Arbitrator and the District Court held that it was a conditional one and that it is only thereafter that the ARB.A.No.59 of 2013 20 civil work was stopped. Above all, it was found that by that time 20% of the work of the swimming pool was completed. On a scanning of the arbitral award we find that at no stretch of imagination it can be said that the conclusions based on which the award was passed are not rested on any evidence or evidence which no prudent man would have acted upon. As noticed hereinbefore, KDSC itself effected partpayment for the supply of materials. The nature of the grounds raised in this appeal would reveal that the appellant virtually calls upon this Court to re-appreciate the evidence and to enter into our own conclusions with respect to the dispute. In the appeal it is stated that the architect who was deputed by the appellant verified the stocked materials for ascertaining the value of goods and he fixed the maximum value that could be paid as Rs.20,55,343.78. The impugned award would reveal that as per the same the KDSC was directed to pay only an amount of Rs.23,92,437/- within the time stipulated therein. True that in case of failure the claimant was given the right to realise the same from the respondent. It was further ordered that if the direction was complied with no interest would be payable and in case of failure to pay the same within the stipulated time future interest on the amount awarded at the rate of 18% per annum from the date of expiry of three months till realisation would be payable. In view of the fact that the ARB.A.No.59 of 2013 21 award was passed as above based on some evidence on record which is acceptable and could be relied upon we cannot undertake an exercise as if in an appeal and substitute our conclusion to that of the conclusions arrived at by the Arbitrator. It is the said position which was accepted by the District Court which ultimately resulted in dismissal of the appeal, in the light of the failure on the part of the appellant herein to bring out any ground which would fall within Section 34(2) of the Act. We cannot find any illegality or perversity in the impugned order passed by the District Court as its order of dismissal was pursuant to the failure of the appellant to make out any case to set aside the award falling within the scope of Section 34 of the Act. Based on the grounds raised in this appeal in exercise of the power under Section 37 of the Act this Court cannot re-appreciate the evidence and upturn the order passed by the District Court dismissing the challenge against the arbitral award whereunder the Arbitrator, based on evidence awarded an amount of Rs.23,92,437/- as admissible amount under Ext.A7 part final bill as against a claim of Rs.29,01,843/-. As relates the contentions in the appeal regarding mulcting of the interest for the aforesaid amount we are of the view that it also calls for no interference. There is no case for the appellant that there is express bar for claim of interest in the agreement. In such circumstances, the ARB.A.No.59 of 2013 22 decision of the Apex Court **M/s.Jagdish Rai and Brothers** v. **Union of India** reported in **AIR 1999 SC 1258** assumes relevance. It was held therein that interest ought to be awarded in all cases when there is a decree of money unless there are strong reasons to decline the same. We do not find any reason to hold that the award in question invites interference under any of the grounds in Section 34(2) of the Act and consequently, the impugned order passed by the District Court dismissing the Original Petition also calls for no interference, in exercise of the power under Section 37 of the Act. In the result, the Arbitration Appeal stands dismissed but without costs. Sd/- **S.MANIKUMAR** **Chief Justice** Sd/- **C.T.RAVIKUMAR** **Judge** TKS