Kishanchand Narsinghdas Bhatia v. State Transport Appellate Authority & Ors.

A B KISHANCHAND NARSINGHDAS BHATIA _v._ STATE TRANSPORT APPELLA1E AUTIIORITY & ORS. _March_ 28, 1968 [M. HlDAYATULLAH C.J., R. S. BACHAWAT, C. A. VAIDIALJNGAM, K. S. HEGDE AND A. N. GROVER, JJ.] _Constitution_ _of_ _India,_ 1950, _Art._ 13&- _Decision on question_ _of_ _fact_ _by_ _State Transport Authorities-Interference by Supreme_ _Court_ _in_ _appeal_ _by_ _**special leave.**_ The Regional Transport Authority renewed a stage carriage permit in C favour of the appellant. The State Transport Appellate Authority set aside the order in apl""'I, and granted the permit to the 3rd respondent. One of the considerallons that prevailed with the Appellate Authority was that the 3rd :respondent bad offered to put into service an air cooled 1965-model vehicle. The order of the Appellate Authority was confirmed by the High Court in a writ petition. In appeal to this Court under Art. 136, it was contended that after the renewal of the permit in his favour by the R.T.A. the appellant acD quired a 1966-i11odel bus whicli would have been equally serviceable; but this fact of acquisition of a new bus was not relied upon by the appellant before the Appellate Authority. It was also contended that the appellant was entitled to preference in the matter of renewal on the facts establish· **ed** **in** **the present case.** HELD : This Court would be reluctant to interfere with or disturb the decision of specially constituted authorities or tribunals under the E Motor Vehicles Act, especially when the legislature has - entrusted the task of granting cir renewing the stage carriage permits to such authorities which are expected to be fully conversant with the procedure and practice and the matters relevant under the provisions of the Act. This Court will not decide a matter brought before it by special leave, under Art. 136, as if it we're an appellate court. It will not examine or review findings of fact unless it can be shown that they are perverse or shocking to the judicial conscience. Tho power being of an exceptional and over· F riding nature has to be exercised sparingly and with caution and only in special and extraordinary situations when justice so requires. [608 F·H; 609 A-BJ. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 740 of 19~. . Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated G December 19, 1967 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Misc. Petition No. 225 of 1967. H _M._ C. _Chagla,_ _G._ _L._ _Sanghi_ and _A._ _G._ _Ratnaparkhi,_ for the appellant. _S._ _V. Gupte_ and _S._ _K. Gambhir,_ for respondeD,t No. 3. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Grover, J.. This appeal by special leave is from the judgment of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh dismissing a petition filed under Arts. 226 & 227 of the Constitution challenging an # I 606 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1968] 3 S.C. R. order made by the State Transport Appellate Authority in res· A pect of a stage carriage permit for the route, Digthan· Indore _via_ Ghata Billod. The appellant had· applied for renewal of his stage carriage permit for that route. Respondent No. 3 and another person of the name of Balwantrao Gaikwad and the Madhya Pradesh Road Transport Corporation filed applications for grant of a fresh permit for the same route. As the application of Balwantrao Gaikwad was not ripe for hearing and the Corporation withdrew its appli· cation, the Regional Transport Authority considered the rival claims of !)le appellant and respondent No. 3. The latter made an offer at the hearing that he would run an air-cooled 1965 model vehicle. The Transport Authority, however, took the view that the offer had been made by way of a competitive bid. In its opinion both the applicants were at par in the matter of coverage and adverse remarks, but the appellant was superior in experience and provision of facilities for passengers. The permit of the ap· pellant was renewed for·a period of three years from the date of its expiry on (he existing terms. Respondent No. 3 preferred an appeal under s. 64 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 193 9 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) which was disposed of by the State Trans· port Appellate Authority. The Appellate Authority gave weight to the fact that whereas respondent No. 3 had offered to run an air-cooled vehicle of 196;> mooel, 110 such offer had been made by the appellant who was operating the route with a vehicle of 1957 mooel. It further found that the appellant had not been running the bus on the kachha portion of the-road during the rainy season in the years 1962 and 1963. This was taken to an1ount to "adverse record of considerable significance" against the appellant. The Appellate Authority therefore decided that respon· dent No. 3 was entitled to the grant of the permit as against the renewal of the perinit in favour of the appellant. It made a direction that a permit be issued to respondent No. 3 for a period of three years provided he put into service an air-cooled vehicle within four months. The appellant moved the High Court by means of a writ peti· ti on. It appears ff"lll the order of the Division' Bench that the following points were pre~sed on behalf of the appellant: (!) Res· pondent No. 3 had not applied for the grant of a fresh permit for the same route for which renewal had been applied for by the appellant. (2) The Appellate Authority had taken into account an extraneous consideration when it regarded respondent No. 3's offer of operating an air-cooled bus as giving material snperiority. (3) The finding that the appellant had been guilty of non-main· tenance having not operated service on the kachha section of the route during the rainy season for two years was not well-founded. B ### c D E F G H A K. N. BHATIA _v._ S.T.A. _(Grover,_ J.) 607 ( 4) The Appellate Authority did not give due weight to all the relevant considerations. The High Court found that the Appellate Authority had rightly regarded the application of respondent No. 3 as one made for the same route aud that the offer of operating an air-cooled bus was a perfectly relevant consideration and cou14 not be regarded B as extraneous _vide_ : _Samrathmal_ v. _State_ _Transport_ _Appellate Au-_ _thority_ & _Ors(')._ It was further of the opinion that the Appellate Authority had rightly not accepted the. explanation of the appellant that the kachha section of the route was not operable during the rainy season, because respondent No. 3, who held a permit for Indore-Digthan route (which was the same as the Digthan### c Indore route), had maintained the service even during the rainy season without finding it risky to do so. The High Court repelled the last contention raised before it by relying on _Sri_ _Rama Vilas_ _Service_ (P) _Ltd. v._ _C._ _Chandrasekaran_ &: _Otherl(')_ according to which it was for the Transport Authority to appreciate how public interest would be best served and in doing so it was entitled to D take the view that one consideration was more likely to effectuate it than the other. B ### c Mr. S. V. Gupte for respondent No. 3 sought to ask for revocation of the special leave on the ground that it had been obtained by a mis-statement of material facts, but it is altogether unnecessary to go into that matter as this appeal cannot succeed for other E reasons. Mr. M. C. Chagla for the appellant laid a great deal of emphasis on the acquisition of a vehicle of 1966 model by the appellant after the renewal of his permlt had been ordered by the Regional Transport Authority. It was pointed out that respondent No. 3 had been. hitherto running a vehicle of 1957 model. and F had only made an offer to put into service an air-cooled 1965 model vehicle at the time of hearing. According to Mr. Chagla the 1966 model vehicle would have been equally, if not more, convenient and serviceable and jt was wholly unjust to deprive the appellant of the permit which he had held for the past several years. He further sought to attack the finding of the Appellate G Authority about the adverse record of the appellant and the route for which the application for the permit had been made by the contending parties. Finally, he forcefully raised the question whe H ther under the second proviso to sub-s. (2) of s. 58 of the Act, the appellant was entitled to preference in the matter of renewal ·on the facts established in the present case. According to him the appellant's permit should have been renewed, although it was open to the Authority concerned to impose a condition under cl. (ix) (I). C.A. 503 of 1965 decided on 2Sth August 1965. (2) t1964J _5_ S.C.R. 869. 608 SUPREME COURT llBPORTS (1968] 3 S.C.R. of sub-s. (3) of s. 48 of the Act that the appellant should acquire an air-cooled bus within a specified-period. It was maintained that the High Court failed to approach a consideration of the case by keeping in view the aforesaid provisions of the Act which were of material consequence. It may be mentioned that the second proviso to sub-s. (2) of s. 58 of the Act is to the effect that other conditions being equal an application for renewal shall be given preference over new applications for permilS. According to sub-s. (3)(ix) of s. 48 of the Act the Regional Transport Authority while granting the permit may attach the condition, among other conditions, that vehicles of specified types fitted with bodies conforming to approved specifications shall be used. It is significant that the acquisition of a 1966 model bus by the appellant found no mention in the order of the Appellate Authority which would show that either that fact was· not brought to its notice or was not stressed before it. The findings or conclusions on questions of fact could hardly be re-examined or disturbed by the High Court since the decision rendered by the ap· propriate authority under the Act could not be interfered with under Art. 226 unless the well recognised tests in that behalf were satisfied _vide_ : _Sri Ram Vilas Service(')._ The other question which according to Mr. Chagla is of wide importance and relates to the scope and ambit of the second proviso to s. _5_ 8(2) of the Act does not appear to have been canvassed before the High Court and has not been raised in an appropriate manner in the petition for special leave and even in the additional grounds sought to be introduced by means of Civil Misc., Petition No. 934 of 1968. We did not permit Mr. Chagla to address us at any length on the point. In cases of the present kind this Court would be naturally reluctant to interfere with or disturb the decision of specially constituted authorities or tribunals under the Act, especially when the legislature bas entrusted the task of granting or renewing the stage carriage permits to the aforesaid authorities or tribunals which are expected to be fully conversant with the procedure and practice anii the relevant matters which should engage their attention tmder the provisions contained in the Act. The present case has not been shown to contain any such infirmity as would justify interference under Art. 136 of the Constitution. The limitation on the exercise of power under that Article cannot be defined with any precision; but as observed in _Dhakes-_ _wari_ _Cotton Mills Ltd._ v. _Commissioner_ _of_ _Income tax, West_ _Bengal(")_ the power being of an exceptional and overriding natnre it has to be exercised sparingly and with caution and only in special ## (j) (1964] S S.C.R. 869. (2) [19SSJ I S.C.R. 941. A B ### c D E F G H K. N. BHATIA _v._ S.T.A. _(Grover,_ /.) 609 A and extraordinary situations. It is well known by now that this Court will not decide a matter brought before it by special leave as if it were an appeal court and examine or review findings of fact unless it can be shown that they are perverse or are such as are shocking to judicial C!>nseience or the like, the paramount consideration always being the perpetuation of justice. B For all these reasons, this appeal must fail and is dismissed with costs. V.P.S. _Appeal dismissed._