High CourtDivision BenchSpecial Leave Petition dismissed; S.R. Petition...

KHA TKI AHMED MUSHABHAI v. LIMDI MUNICIPALITY

Case / Petition Number:Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 2939 of 1978
Neutral Citation:[1979] 2 SCR 339

Case Details & Bench

Court
High Court
Hon'ble Judges
  • V. R. Krishna Iyer
  • P. N. Shinghal
  • A. P. Sen
Judgment Date
1978-11-20
Court Decision / Holding
The Special Leave Petition is dismissed. The Court confirms the municipality’s discretionary power to grant or refuse licenses and declines to interfere with the licensing decision given the rational, context-aware considerations cited by the municipality.
Final Disposition
Special Leave Petition dismissed; S.R. Petition dismissed.

Parties to the Case

Appellants / Petitioners

  • KHA TKI AHMED MUSHABHAI

Respondents

  • Limdi Municipality

Legal Representation & Advocates

Counsels for Petitioners

  • • M. V. Goswami

Counsels for Respondents

  • • P. M. Raval
  • • P. H. Parekh
  • • C. B. Singh
  • • M. Mudgal

Case Synopsis & Summary

This Special Leave Petition (Civil) concerns the Limdi Municipality's refusal to issue a meat-shop license to the petitioner. The petitioner argues that the municipality’s decision infringes his fundamental rights under Article 19(1)(a) and (g) and relies on this Court’s decision in Mohd. Faruk v. M.P. State to contend that the licensing authority must grant a license upon a rational assessment of circumstances. The Court, however, notes there is no statute or byelaw banning meat licenses; instead the licensing byelaws confer discretionary power to grant or refuse licenses, to be exercised after considering all relevant factors. The Bench emphasizes that there is no unconditional right to a license merely on application, and stresses that the licensing council must evaluate factors such as proximity to schools, public institutions and residents, and the potential peace-and-welfare impact on the locality. It cautions against decisions shaped by religious susceptibilities, fanatic sentiments, or base considerations like donations influencing leases, but holds that none of these render the ground of refusal irrelevant or unreasonable under Art. 19(6). The Court concludes that the local body's discretion, when grounded in rational factors, should not be overridden. The Special Leave Petition is dismissed, with the Court underscoring that local authorities are best suited to assess local conditions and interests. A broader principle is reaffirmed that judicial intervention should respect administrative autonomy in licensing decisions.

Provisions of Law Cited

Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India, 1950Article 19(1)(g)Article 19(6)

Legal Doctrines & Maxims

  • Local bodies are the best judges of local conditions.
  • Discretion must be exercised rationally, not religiously nor ritually.
  • Judicial intervention should guard the rule of law and not allow small tyrannies to trample on rights.
  • No irrelevancy or perverse application should vitiate a decision; courts may protect rights while respecting statutory discretion.
  • Public order and welfare considerations can legitimately influence licensing decisions, without negating fundamental rights.

Submissions & Arguments

Contentions of Appellants / Petitioners

Counsel for the petitioner contends that the applicant’s fundamental right to carry on the trade of selling meat is infringed by Limdi Municipality’s refusal to grant a licence. He relies on Mohd. Faruk v. M.P. State to challenge the licensing framework, arguing that the licensing authority is obliged to grant a licence when circumstances are reasonable, and that byelaws should not impede legitimate trade. He asserts that Article 19 rights are engaged and seeks a forced grant of licence if the local authority has not given due consideration to relevant factors.

Contentions of Respondents

The respondents submit that licensing is a discretionary function conferred by byelaws, and decisions must be grounded in relevant factual considerations such as proximity to schools, public institutions, and residents, as well as peace and welfare concerns. They emphasize that local authorities are best suited to judge local conditions and that there is no ban on meat licences in the byelaws. They warn against basing licensing decisions on religious sentiment or factional pressure, and acknowledge the need to avoid preferential leases (e.g., for donations). They argue that a license should not be granted simply because someone seeks to obtain it; the decision should reflect a balanced exercise of administrative discretion.

Cited Precedents (1)

Case NameCitationTreatmentExplanation
Mohd. Faruk v. M. P. State[1970] 1 SCR 156DistinguishedThe Court notes Mohd. Faruk is inapplicable to the present case since there is no byelaw banning meat licenses; the decision relies on different statutory context and facts.

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Extracted Judgment Text

Exact text extracted from official judgment records.

A B 338 KHA TKI AHMED MUSHABHAI _v._ LIMDI MUNICIPALITY _November_ 20, 1978 (V. R. KRISHNA IYER, P. N. SHINGHAL AND A. P. SEN, JJ.] _Right_ _to a_ _licence-When_ _the bye laws permit the_ lic~ncing _authority to_ _grant or to refuse licences, whether said to offend Art._ 19'(1)(a) _of_ th~ _Constitu-_ _tion_ _of_ _India,_ 1950. Dismissing the special leave petition, the Court, **C** HELD : 1. No butcher, baker or circus manager can say that he has the· unqua.lified right to get a licence on mere application. It is open to the Ik:encing C-Ouncil-Indeed, is obligatory on its part-to take note of all relevant circumstances and then decide whether, in the particular spot chosen by the particular applicant, a licence should be granted or not. (339C-D] D E 2. Various factors enter the verdict and the local authorities are the best judge of the factual factors, not the Courti especially, the Supreme Court at the third tier. The factual factors may be many, like the proximity to schools, public institutions and also residents of the locality plus the reaction or irnpact on those IDstitutions and residents, the unren.sonableness to grant licence to the same person or one for the father and another for the son, the need for an extra shop, other considerations which are germane from peace-keeping and welfare-oriented view-points etc. Certainly granting a lease solely because· some·Onc offers a_ large donation to the Municipality may not be ccrrect. [339D, F·G, 340B] 3. No doubt Municipal discretion should be exercised rationally, not religi· ou~ly nor ritually and judicial discretion should go into anxiously, not impetuously nor. in disregard of the pragmatic guideline that local authorities are **the·** best judges of local conditions. Of course, if irrelevant criteria or perverse application Vitiate the decision, courts will guardian the rule of Jaw againat **F** little tyran~ trampling over people's rights or local factions fouling **the** council's verdict. [340C-DJ G Tn the instant cooe, the ground on w·hich the Municipal _body_ has refuseti: licence is not irrelevant and cannot be described 3.S un1easonablc within the meaning of Art. 19(6) of the Constitution. [339C] _Mohd. Faruk_ v. _M._ _P._ _State,_ [1970] 1 SCR 156; inapplicable. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 2939 of 1978. Appeal from the Judgment and Order dated 4-10-1978 of the Gujarat High Caurt in Special Civil Application No. 1174 of 1977. II _M. V. Goswami_ for the Petitioner. _P._ _M. Raval,_ _P._ _H._ _Parekh,_ C. _B._ _Singh_ and _M. Mudgal_ for tke R~pondent. ..1., # .. - _**1.**_ **KHATICT** **AHMED** _v._ L!MDI MUNICIPALITY _(Krishna_ _Iyer,!.)_ 339 The Order of the Court was delivered by **A** KitlSHNA IYER, J. The petitioner's counsel, in his fighting submission, argues that his client's fundamentaJ right to a licence for a meat shop has been flouted by the little Limdi Municipality, founding himself on a decision of this Court in _Mohd. Faruk_ v. _M._ _P._ _State(_ _[1]_ _)._ That decision hardly helps. There a byelaw was challenged as violative of **B** Art. 19 ( 1) (g) . Here there is no law whatever which bans the grant of meat licences. Indeed, thern are three other licensed meat stalls and the petitioner himself had a meat licence in a shop leased to him by the same Municipality earlier which by efllux of time had expired. The law vests a discretion to be reasonably exercised in the context of citi## zen's fundamental right. The ground on which the Municipal body c has refused licence here is not irrelevant and cannot be described as unreasonable within the meaning of Art. 19 ( 6) of the Constitution. The bye-laws permit the municipality, as the licensing authority, to grant or to refuse licences. No butcher, baker or circus manager can say that he has the. unqualified right to get a licence on mere application. It is **D** open to the licensing council-indeed, is obligatory on its part-to take note. of aJl _relevant_ circumi;tances and then decide whether, in the particular spot chosen by the particular applicallt,, a licence should be granted. Various factors enter the verdict and the locaJ authorities are the best judge of these factual factors, not the court, especially this Court sitting at the third tier. ## **c** **D** The, Limdi Municipality is stated to be a small one with a population _of_ around 25000. It is admitted that there are three licensed meat vendors including one who iS the father of the petitioner. The claim of the petitioner is for a fourth licence. It is quite conceivable that the fourth may be supernumerary. It is quite understandable that the municipality may think that it is not reasonable to grant licence to the iame person or one for the father and another for the son. Moreover, we cannot dismiss as irrelevant or obnoxious the consideration the strong feelings of the local people resulting in law and order problems. The proximity to schools, public institutions and also residents of the locality plus the reaction or impact on those institutions and residents maybe getmanc from peace-keeping and welfare-oriented view-points. We agree that local bodies should not succumb to religious susceptibilities or fanatical sentiments in secular India and refuse licences where fundamental rights have to be respected. Even so, in the, totality of circun1stances present in the present case, it is not possible for us to postulate that there has been an abuse of discretion or a perverse use of power. In this view, we decline to interfere. Certainly, the munici (1) [197 ] I SCR _1'.G •_ **E** **F** **G** **H** 340 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1979] 2 S.C.R. A pal authority will take care to be alert lllld aliTe to the tundame,ntal righ II; of citizens and not refuse licence!; merely scared by BJ.ob sentiment or panicked by relijlious reaction. In the instant case there is a composite lease-cum-licence-lease of a 111eat shop and licence for carrying on trade in mutton. There is no B obligation on the part of the municipality to grant a lease of its property to any one who asks for it merely for the asking. Granting a lease solely because some one offers a large donation to the municipality. as nearly happened here, may not be correct, which this local body will note. If the refusal of the lease or its renewal cannot be faulted, the question of graut of the licence does not arise. In this view also we C find it diftlcult to accede to the argument of the petitioner. We agree that municipal discretion should be exercised rationally, not religiously nor ritually, but we also realize that judicial discretion should go into anxiously, not impetuously nor in disregard of the pragmatic guideline that local authorities are the best judges of local condiD tions. Of course, if irrelevant criteria or perverse application vitiate the decision courts will guardian the rule of law against little tyrants trampling over people's righfs or local factions fouling the councirs verdict The Special Leave Petition is, therefore, dismissed. S.R. _Petition_ _dismissed._ ~ '