High Court of KeralaDivision BenchAppeal dismissed; liability and quantum upheld ...

KERALA STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD v. PREMADAS and others

Case / Petition Number:RFA No. 380 of 2008

Case Details & Bench

Court
High Court of Kerala
Hon'ble Judges
  • Kurian Joseph
  • K.T. Sankaran
Judgment Date
2008-10-13
Court Decision / Holding
Subject to the clarification that 12% interest should not be treated as a legal precedent, the appeal is dismissed. The court agrees with the trial court’s liability finding and its quantum of compensation (Rs. 2,42,000) and the structure of interest (12% from suit to decree and 6% thereafter), preserving the relief granted to the plaintiffs. The board is also directed to pay corresponding court fees as appropriate, and the decision reflects a final affirmation of liability and compensation with the caution about the rate of interest not becoming a precedent.
Final Disposition
Appeal dismissed; liability and quantum upheld with caveat on 12% interest as not setting a precedent.

Parties to the Case

Appellants / Petitioners

  • The Kerala State Electricity Board, represented by the Secretary, Vaidhyuthi Bhavan, Thiruvananthapuram - 695 001
  • The Executive Engineer, Kerala State Electricity Board, Divisional Office, Thoppumpady, Kochi - 5
  • The Assistant Executive Engineer, Kerala State Electricity Board, Njarakkal Division Njarakkal - 682 505

Respondents

  • Premadas
  • Master Premith (Minor)
  • Master Pranav (Minor)

Legal Representation & Advocates

Counsels for Petitioners

  • • Adv. Sri. ASOK M.CHERIAN, SC, KSEB

Case Synopsis & Summary

This Regular First Appeal arises from a suit for compensation for the electrocution death of Master Prajith, son of the first plaintiff and brother of the second and third plaintiffs. The suit (O.S.5/2005) sought Rs. 3,50,000 for loss of income (noted as Rs. 30,000 per year) and Rs. 50,000 for mental agony, on the premise that a live electric wire snapped from a main line and lay across a bylane, causing Prajith’s death on 28-04-2003. The defendants (KSEB) contended that the accident occurred due to heavy rain and wind, with the conductor snapping because branches fell outside the clearance, and that the supply should have been automatically cut off. They asserted they had taken due care and cautions and that the circumstances were beyond their control. The trial court applied principles from the Second Schedule to the Motor Vehicles Act for compensation in fatal accidents. The Supreme Court decision in M.P. Electricity Board v. Shail Kumari (SC) is cited to classify this as a strict liability case. The appellate court ultimately upholds liability on the Board and fixes compensation at Rs. 2,42,000, with 12% interest from suit to decree (subject to clarification that such rate should not be a precedent) and dismisses the appeal, preserving the trial court’s framework with these caveats.

Provisions of Law Cited

Second Schedule to the Motor Vehicles Act

Legal Doctrines & Maxims

  • Strict liability
  • Foreseeable risk inherent in hazardous activity
  • Look-out duty of managers of hazardous energy supply to prevent mishaps

Submissions & Arguments

Contentions of Appellants / Petitioners

The appellants/defendants contended that the accident occurred due to heavy rain and wind during the night of 27-4-2003, with a live wire snapping and falling on the bylane, and that the supply ought to have been automatically disconnected. They argued the line’s overhanging branches and outside-clearance tree contact were beyond their control and that the board had taken due care. They urged that the liability should consider the causative meteorological factors and that any contest of mischief or siphoning would not negate their duties, stressing that the local residents had previously complained of encroaching branches but no timely action was taken. They also challenged quantum calculations and the award of 12% interest. Respondents’ arguments are not fully listed in the text, but the court notes the respondents sought compensation for the electrocution and relied on strict liability principles to hold the board liable.

Contentions of Respondents

The respondents alleged that the deceased died due to the board’s failure to ensure safe supply; they pressed for compensation for loss of income and mental agony, arguing strict liability and the board’s statutory duty to prevent harm from dangerous electrical energy.

Cited Precedents (1)

Case NameCitationTreatmentExplanation
M.P. Electricity Board v. Shail Kumari2002 (1) KLT 480 (SC)PositiveCited to support the proposition that electricity suppliers imposing a potentially dangerous energy supply are subject to strict liability and must take safety measures to prevent harm.

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Extracted Judgment Text

Exact text extracted from official judgment records.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM PRESENT : THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE KURIAN JOSEPH & THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE K.T.SANKARAN MONDAY, THE 13TH OCTOBER 2008 / 21ST ASWINA 1930 RFA.No. 380 of 2008() --------------------OS.5/2005 of ADDL.SUB COURT, KOCHI .................... - (S): APPELLANTS/DEFENDANTS. ------------------------------------------ 1. THE KERALA STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD, REPRESENTED BY THE SECRETARY, "VAIDYUTHI BHAVAN", THIRUVANANTHAPURAM - 695 001. 2. THE EXECUTIVE ENGINEER, KERALA STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD, DIVISIONAL OFFICE, THOPPUMPADY, KOCHI - 5. 3. THE ASSISTANT EXECUTIVE ENGINEER, KERALA STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD, NJARAKKAL DIVISION NJARAKKAL - 682 505. BY ADV. SRI. ASOK M.CHERIYAN, SC, KSEB ## RESPONDENT(S): PLAINTIFFS/PETITIONERS. -------------------------------------- 1. PREMADAS, AGED 51 YEARS, S/O. VIJAYAN, PARAMBADI HOUSE, VELIYATHANPARAMBU, NAYARAMBALAM P.O. 2. MASTER PREMITH (MINOR), AGED 17 YEARS, S/O. PREMDAS, PARAMBADI HOUSE, VELIYATHANPARAMBU, NAYARAMBALAM P.O., REPRESENTED BY HIS FATHER AND NATURAL GUARDIAN THE 1ST RESP. PREMDAS, AGED 51 YEARS, S/O. VIJAYAN, PARAMBADI HOUSE,VELIYATHANPARAMBU,NAYARAMBALAM P.O 3. MASTER PRANAV(MINOR), AGED 15 YEARS, S/O. PREMDAS, PARAMBADI HOUSE, VELIYATHANPARAMBU, NAYARAMBALAM P.O. REPRESENTED BY HIS FATHER AND NATURAL GUARDIAN THE 1ST RESPONDENT PREMDAS, AGED 51 YEARS, S/O. VIJAYAN, PARAMBADI HOUSE, VELIYATHANPARAMBU,NAYARAMBALAM P.O. THIS REGULAR FIRST APPEAL HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 13/10/2008, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY PASSED THE FOLLOWING: ## **KURIAN JOSEPH & K.T.SANKARAN, JJ. ----------------------------------------R.F.A.No.380 of 2008** ## **----------------------------------------Dated this the 13[th] day of October, 2008** ## **JUDGMENT** ## **Kurian Joseph,J.** This is an appeal filed by the defendants in O.S.No.5/2005 on the file of the Sub Court, Kochi. The parties are referred to as the plaintiffs and defendants. The suit was filed claiming compensation to the tune of Rs.3,50,000/- on account of the death, caused by electrocution, of the son of the first plaintiff and brother of plaintiffs 2 and 3 - Master Prajith, aged around 17. His date of birth is 15-5-1986 and death due to electrocution was on 28-4-2003. He had completed Plus II course and he had also done a course in Computer Science. Deceased was also engaged in distributing milk. With his hardworking nature, educational background and aptitude to earning, the plaintiffs estimated an income of around Rs.30,000/per year and hence on account of the loss to the family due to the untimely death of Master Prajith an amount of Rs.3 lakhs and for the mental agony another Rs.50,000/- was claimed. ## **R.F.A.No.380 of 2008** -:2:- According to the plaintiffs, on 28-4-2003 early morning, while the deceased was passing through a bylane he came into contact with a live electric wire. The live electric wire got snapped and fell on the public road on account of the branches of trees standing on either side of the bylane coming into contact with the main line and yet the supply was not disrupted. Under the supply system, in the unlikely event of such a live wire getting snapped and falling on the public road, the supply through that main line should have been automatically cut off. 2. The defendants, however, contended that the accident occurred on account of heavy rain and wind throughout the night on 27-4-2003. The location was a coastal area and the conductor was snapped due to falling of branches of trees standing outside the clearance area on the line due to heavy wind and rain. However, the undisputed factual position is that the death was due to electrocution on account of the deceased coming into contact with a live wire lying on the road. Only after the feeder was switched off the body of Master Prajith could be removed from the accident spot. Yet it was contended that the ## **R.F.A.No.380 of 2008** -:3:- Electricity Board had taken all due care and caution and the accident occurred only owing to circumstances beyond their control. 3. As already referred above the undisputed factual position is that the death of Master Prajith was due to electrocution. He came into contact with a live wire which got snapped from the main line and which was lying on the bylane and yet the supply through the main line to the snapped wire was not cut off. Even if on account of any unfortunate circumstances, the branches of the trees had fallen on a wire and the line got snapped, the supply should have been cut off. In this context it is significant to note that the evidence discloses that the residents of the locality had registered complaints with the Electricity Board regarding the over-hanging branches of trees coming into contact with electric line and causing disturbances. Yet no steps were taken to cut and remove such over-hanging branches of trees near the electric line. Be that as it may, in view of the decision of the apex court in **M.P.Electricity Board v. Shail Kumari** , 2002 (1) KLT 480 (SC) the Board has no defence ## **R.F.A.No.380 of 2008** -:4:- ## since it is a case of strict liability. The Supreme Court has held ## as follows:- “It is an admitted fact that the responsibility to supply electric energy in the particular locality was statutorily conferred on the board. If the energy so transmitted causes injury or death of a human being, who gets unknowingly trapped into it, the primary liability to compensate the sufferer is that of the supplier of the electric energy. So long as the voltage of electricity transmitted through the wires is potentially of dangerous dimension, the managers of its supply have the added duty to take all safety measures to prevent escape of such energy or to see that the wire snapped would not remain live on the road as users of such road would be under peril. It is no defence on the part of the management of the board that somebody committed mischief by siphoning such energy to his private property and that the electrocution was from such diverted line. It is the look out of the managers of the supply system to prevent such pilferage by installing necessary devices. At any rate, if any live wire got snapped and fell on the public road, the electric current thereon should automatically have been disrupted. Authorities manning such dangerous commodities have extra duty to chalk out measures to prevent such mishaps. Even assuming that all such measures have been adopted, a person undertaking an activity involving hazardous or risky exposure to human life, is liable under law of torts to compensate for the injury suffered by any other person, irrespective of any negligence or carelessness on the part of the managers of such undertakings. The basis of such liability is the foreseeable risk inherent in the very nature of such activity. The liability cast on such person is known, in law, as “strict liability”. It differs from the liability which arises on account of the negligence or fault in this way ie., the concept of negligence comprehends that the foreseeable harm could be avoided by taking reasonable precautions. If the defendant did all that which could be done for avoiding the harm, he cannot be held liable when the action is based on any negligence attributed. But such consideration is not relevant in cases of strict liability where the defendant is held liable irrespective of whether he could have avoided the particular harm by taking precautions.” ## **R.F.A.No.380 of 2008** -:5:- Then comes the question of quantum. Admittedly, the deceased was aged only 17. Though the appellants had a contention regarding the income to be around Rs.3,000/- per month, the trial court has gone by the principles in the matter of computation of income as set out in the Second Schedule to the Motor Vehicles Act, for the purpose of computation of compensation in the case of fatal accidents. The multiplier is 16. The notional income for compensation to those who had no income prior to accident is Rs.15,000/- per annum. We find that after taking 1/3[rd] , only Rs.12,000/- has been taken as annual income. The conventional figure of Rs.50,000/- has been added in respect of other heads towards mental agony etc. and thus only a reasonable compensation to the tune of Rs.2,42,000/-has been fixed. 4. Yet another contention raised is regarding the rate of interest. True there is some substance in the contention that 12% interest should not have been awarded. But it has to be seen that the interest is claimed and granted only from the date of the suit and not from the date of cause of action and that ## **R.F.A.No.380 of 2008** -:6:- interest at 12% is granted only from the date of suit till the date of decree and thereafter interest is granted only at 6%. In compensation cases, the interest normally granted at the relevant time is around 9%. Therefore, we do not think that any interference is called for even in that regard. Not only that, for such interference, the appeal has to be admitted and notice will have to be issued to the parties, in which case the Board will have to pay the balance court fee to the tune of Rs.18,245/-. Therefore, it is only in the interests of the Board itself not to pursue the matter any further. 5. Thus we agree with the reasoning and finding with regard to the liability, quantum of compensation and the relief by way of interest granted to the plaintiffs. However, we make it clear that the interest at 12% shall not be taken as a precedent. Subject to the above clarification, the appeal is dismissed. (KURIAN JOSEPH, JUDGE) (K.T.SANKARAN, JUDGE) ahg. **KURIAN JOSEPH & K.T.SANKARAN, JJ. --------------------------R.F.A.No.380 of 2008 ----------------------------** ## **JUDGMENT** **13[th] October 2008**