Karunakaran A v. E.K. Sulekha (R.C.Rev. No. 68 of 2021)

## **IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM** ## **PRESENT** **THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL K.NARENDRAN** ## **&** **THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE K. BABU** **THURSDAY, THE 23[RD] DAY OF DECEMBER 2021 / 2ND POUSHA, 1943 RCREV. NO. 68 OF 2021** **AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 27.08.2016 IN R.C.A.NO.110 OF 2015 OF THE RENT CONTROL APPELLATE AUTHORITY, KOZHIKODE EMANATING FROM THE ORDER DATED 29.06.2015 IN R.C.P.NO.186 OF 2014 OF THE** **RENT CONTROL COURT-I, KOZHIKODE** ## **REVISION PETITIONER:** **KARUNAKARAN.A, AGED 80 YEARS S/O.ANDY, SREE KRISHNA, ANAMIKA STREET, CIVIL STATION P.O., VENGERI AMSOM, NEDUNGOTTUR DESOM, KOZHIKODE-673020.** **BY ADVS. R.SUDHISH SMT.M.MANJU** ## **RESPONDENT:** **E.K.SULEKHA, AGED 65 YEARS W/O.LATE KUNHIPPERI HAJI, KHADEEJA MANZIL, PATTERPALAM, KANNANKARA P.O, CHELANNUR, KOZHIKODE DISTRICT-673616.** **BY ADVS. K.M.FIROZ M.SHAJNA** **THIS RENT CONTROL REVISION HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 13.09.2021, THE COURT ON 23.12.2021 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:** R.C.Rev.No.68 of 2021 -2- ## **O R D E R** ## **Anil K. Narendran, J.** The petitioner is the respondent-tenant in R.C.P.No.186 of 2014 on the file of the Rent Control Court (Additional Munsiff-I), Kozhikode, a petition filed by the respondent herein-landlord under Section 11(4)(v) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, seeking eviction of the tenant from the petition schedule shop room on the ground that the tenant has kept the building closed without any reason. Going by the averments in the Rent Control Petition, the petition schedule shop room was taken on lease by the tenant from the predecessor-in-interest of the landlord. The tenant had paid rent at the rate of Rs.2,250/- inclusive of December, 2012 and thereafter the rent is in arrears. For the last more than one year, the petition schedule shop room has been kept closed without any reason. Therefore, the landlord sought an order of eviction under Section 11(4)(v) of the Act. Before the Rent Control Court, the tenant entered appearance and filed counter statement contending that the rate of rent is only Rs.1000/- and that he has not kept the rent in arrears. The petition schedule shop room is R.C.Rev.No.68 of 2021 -3- being used for furniture business and the tenant never closed the shop room as alleged. The tenant is regularly entertaining customers who came to purchase furniture. The fact that the tenant is paying electricity bill regularly will also prove that the landlord's case is incorrect. 2. Before the Rent Control Court the landlord was examined as PW1. The tenant was examined as RW1 and Exts.B1 to B10 were marked on his side. The Advocate Commissioner was examined as CW1 and marked Ext.C1 commission report and Ext.C1(a) sketch. After considering the pleadings and evidence on record, the Rent Control Court arrived at a conclusion that the landlord's case that there has been cessation of occupation of the petition schedule shop room by the tenant for one year before the institution of the rent control proceedings is more probable. Therefore, the landlord is entitled for an order of eviction under Section 11(4)(v) of the Act. Accordingly, by the order dated 29.06.2015 in R.C.P.No.186 of 2014, the tenant was directed to put the landlord in vacant possession of the petition schedule shop room within one month. R.C.Rev.No.68 of 2021 -4- 3. Challenging the order of eviction granted by the Rent Control Court in R.C.P.No.186 of 2014, the tenant filed R.C.A.No.110 of 2015 before the Rent Control Appellate Authority (Additional District Judge-I), Kozhikode, invoking the provisions under Section 18(1)(b) of the Act. The Appellate Authority by the judgment dated 27.08.2016 dismissed that appeal, thereby confirming the order of eviction granted by the Rent Control Court under Section 11(4)(v) of the Act. Challenging the judgment dated 27.08.2016 of the Appellate Authority in R.C.A.No.110 of 2015 and also the order of the Rent Control Court dated 29.06.2015 in R.C.P.No.186 of 2014, the tenant is before this Court in this Rent Control Revision, invoking the provisions under Section 20 of the Act. The tenant has filed an affidavit dated 20.03.2021, in order to explain the delay of 1579 days in filing this Rent Control Revision, after a reasonable period from the date of the judgment dated 27.08.2016 of the Appellate Authority in R.C.A.No.110 of 2015. 4. On 30.03.2021 when this Rent Control Revision came up for admission, this Court issued notice on admission to the R.C.Rev.No.68 of 2021 -5- respondent, returnable by 17.05.2021. 5. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant and also the learned counsel for the respondent-landlord. 6. The issue that arises for consideration in this Rent Control Revision is as to whether any interference is warranted on the judgment dated 27.08.2016 of the Appellate Authority in R.C.A.No.110 of 2015 and also the order of the Rent Control Court dated 29.06.2015 in R.C.P.No.186 of 2014, ordering eviction of the tenant under Section 11(4)(v) of the Act. 7. Section 11 of the Act deals with eviction of tenants. As per Section 11(1), notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract a tenant shall not be evicted, whether in execution of a decree or otherwise, except in accordance with the provisions of this Act. As per Section 11(4) (v) of the Act, a landlord may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building, if the tenant ceases to occupy the building continuously for six months without reasonable cause. 8. In so far as the ground of eviction under Section 11(4) R.C.Rev.No.68 of 2021 -6- (v) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act is concerned, it is well settled by various decisions of this Court that if the landlord has discharged the initial burden it is upto the tenant to lead evidence in the matter to show that he has been conducting business in the premises. 9. In **Abbas v. Sankaran Namboodiri [1993 (1) KLT 76** ] a learned Single Judge of this Court held that, the word 'occupation' is used to denote the tenant's actual physical use of the building either by himself or through his agents or employees and legal possession is not sufficient. However, if a landlord succeeds in proving that his tenant did not occupy the building almost near the period fixed in Section 11(4)(v) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, it may help the court to presume that there could have been cessation of occupation for the statutory period. Such background presumption is not anathematic to the law of evidence. Be that as it may, burden is on the landlord to prove that the tenant ceased to occupy the building for six months. But it is hard to expect a landlord to prove the precise period during which his tenant ceased to R.C.Rev.No.68 of 2021 -7- occupy the building. However, if the court is satisfied on the evidence and/or with the aid of presumptions that the tenant did not occupy the building for such length of time as would cover the statutory period, then the burden would shift to the tenant to show that he had reasonable cause for such non occupation. But, possession must combine with something more to make it occupation. Legal possession does not by itself constitute occupation. 10. In **Kayikattil Rajagopalan v. Gopalan [ILR 2004 (2) Ker. 102]** a Division Bench of this Court held that, ‘occupation' in the context of Section 11(4)(v) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act means only physical occupation. When it pertains to a residential building, it means occupation through residence and when it pertains to a commercial building, it means occupation by conduct of business. Certainly it is not obligatory that the tenant of a residential building should be present physically in the building all the 24 hours of the day and tenant of a commercial building should be present all the business hours of the day. But in cases pertaining R.C.Rev.No.68 of 2021 -8- to commercial building like the one let out for business purpose, if it is seen that no business is being carried on in the premises and that the premises are remaining closed, there will be justification to presume that there has been cessation of occupation. On the facts of the case on hand, the Division Bench noticed that, the premises were let out originally for the conduct of grocery business. Admittedly grocery business is no longer being conducted by the tenant. Reasonableness or otherwise of the cause due to which the tenant ceased to occupy the premises is a matter especially within the tenant's knowledge. Once cessation is shown, it is for the tenant to prove that the same has been due to a reasonable cause if he needs to avert eviction. Reasonable cause can never be a cause within the control of the tenant himself. ## 11. In **Mathai Antony v. Abraham [2004 (3) KLT 169]** it was contended by the landlord that intermittent opening of the shop or the presence of the tenant in the premises would not show that the tenant is using the premises. The Division bench held that, the word ‘occupy’ occurring in Section 11(4)(v) of the R.C.Rev.No.68 of 2021 -9- Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act has got different meaning in different context. The meaning of the word ‘occupy’ in the context of Section 11(4)(v) has to be understood in the light of the object and purpose of the Rent Control Act in mind. The rent control legislation is intended to give protection to the tenant, so that there will not be interference with the user of the tenanted premises during the currency of the tenancy. Landlord cannot disturb the possession and enjoyment of the tenanted premises. Legislature has guardedly used the expression ‘occupy’ in Section 11(4)(v) instead of ‘possession’. Occupy in certain context indicates mere physical presence, but in other context actual enjoyment. Occupation includes possession as its primary element, and also includes ‘enjoyment’. The word ‘occupy’ sometimes indicates legal possession in the technical sense; at other times mere physical presence. 12. In **Mathai Antony** the Division bench examined the question as to whether mere ‘physical possession’ would satisfy the word ‘occupy’ within the meaning of Section 11(4)(v) of the Act. The Division Bench held that, mere physical possession of R.C.Rev.No.68 of 2021 -10- premises would not satisfy the meaning of ‘occupation’ under Section 11(4)(v) of the Act. The word ‘possession’ means holding of such possession, animus possidendi, means, the intention to exclude other persons. The word ‘occupy’ has to be given a meaning so as to hold that the tenant is actually using the premises and not mere physical presence or possession. If the landlord could establish that, in a given case, even if the tenant is in physical possession of the premises, the premises is not being used, that is a good ground for eviction under Section 11(4)(v) of the Act. Section 11(4) uses the words ‘put the landlord in possession’ and not ‘occupation’, but Section 11(4)(v) uses the words ‘the tenant ceases to occupy’. In Section 11(4)(v) in the case of landlord the emphasis is on ‘possession’ but in the case of tenant the emphasis is on ‘occupation’. The word ‘occupy’ has a distinct meaning so far as the Rent Act is concerned when pertains to tenant, that is, possession with user. 13. In **Simon v. Rappai [2008 (2) KHC 863 : 2008 (3) KLT 121]** a Division Bench of this Court held that, the word 'occupation' is used in Section 11(4)(v) of the Kerala Buildings R.C.Rev.No.68 of 2021 -11- (Lease and Rent Control) Act to denote the tenant's actual physical use of the building either by himself or through his agents or employees and legal possession is not sufficient. However, if a landlord succeeds in proving that his tenant did not occupy the building almost near the period fixed in Section 11(4) (v) of the Act, it may help the court to presume that there could have been cessation of occupation for the statutory period. Such background presumption is not anathematic to the law of evidence. Be that as it may, burden is on the landlord to prove that the tenant ceased to occupy the building for six months. But it is hard to expect a landlord to prove the precise period during which his tenant ceased to occupy the building. However, if the court is satisfied on the evidence and/or with the aid of presumptions that the tenant did not occupy the building for such length of time as would cover the statutory period, then the burden would shift to the tenant to show that he had reasonable cause for such non-occupation. But, possession must combine with something more to make it occupation. Legal possession does not by itself constitute occupation. The Division bench R.C.Rev.No.68 of 2021 -12- observed that, merely because of the fact that there was a telephone in the room and that the room remained open when the Commissioner visited, it cannot be held that the tenant was doing business therein for the statutory period. The burden had clearly been shifted to the tenant in the light of the situation of non-user that is available in relation to the room as reported by the Commissioner. The tenant has failed to adduce any cogent evidence to substantiate his contention that he was conducting business in the schedule room. 14. In **Dunlop India Limited v. Rahna [2011 (5) SCC 778]** a Two-Judge Bench of the Apex Court held that, the word ‘occupy’ used in Section 11(4)(v) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act is not synonymous with legal possession in technical sense. It means actual possession of the tenanted building or use thereof for the purpose for which it is let out. If the building is let out for residential purpose and the tenant is shown to be continuously absent from the building for six months, the court may presume that he has ceased to occupy the building or abandoned it. If the building is let out for business R.C.Rev.No.68 of 2021 -13- or commercial purpose, complete cessation of the business/ commercial activity may give rise to a presumption that the tenant has ceased to occupy the premises. In either case, legal possession of the building by the tenant will, by itself, be not sufficient for refusing an order of eviction unless the tenant proves that there was reasonable cause for his having ceased to occupy the building. 15. In **Mukreerakath Khadeeja and others v. Krishna Janaki [2011 (3) KHC 753]** a Division Bench of this Court held that, in a case filed under Section 11(4)(v) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, the best mode of proof of cessation of occupation is to conduct surprise inspection of the petition schedule building by the commissioner. The salient features noted by the Advocate Commissioner would be of much help to the court to come to a conclusion as to whether the plea of cessation of occupation put forward by the landlord is true. The effect of that report cannot be nullified by adopting a stultifying strategy of getting a report after several months. Paragraphs 8 and 9 of the said decision read thus; R.C.Rev.No.68 of 2021 -14- “8. It was admitted by PW1 that the petition schedule building was leased out for using it as a godown. But it is important to note that the tenants did not produce any document to show that the fancy Article or other items sold in Mahima Fancy were actually stocked in the petition schedule building. The learned counsel for the revision petitioners has very much stressed on Ext.C2, the second report filed by the Commissioner. But the inspection for second report was conducted about ten months after the first inspection. Since the inspection was had about ten months after the appearance of the revision petitioner before the court below Ext.C2 cannot be of much assistance, for, it is easy for any tenant to stage manage things and to get a report regarding the then state of affairs which would nullify the effect of the report obtained first in point of time which alone would reflect on the real state of affairs as on the date of the first inspection by the Advocate Commissioner. In a case filed under Section 11(4)(v), the best mode of proof of cessation of occupation is to conduct surprise inspection of the petition schedule building by the commissioner. The salient features noted by the Advocate Commissioner would be of much help to the court to come to a conclusion as to whether the plea of cessation of occupation put forward by the landlady is true. The effect of that report cannot be nullified by adopting a stultifying strategy of getting a report after several months. Therefore, Ext.C2 is not of any help for the tenants to say that there was no cessation of occupation. R.C.Rev.No.68 of 2021 -15- 9. It was observed by the learned Appellate Authority that the Registration Certificate issued under the Shops and Commercial Establishments Act does not show the petition schedule building as the one used by the tenant as his go down or store room. Referring to the provisions of that Act, the learned Appellate Authority found that 'go down' also would come within the definition of Shop mentioned therein. That apart if actually the petition schedule building was used as a go down there would certainly be a register showing the stock of the Articles. Whenever new items are taken into the go down it must find a place in the stock register. Similarly whenever items are taken out for sale to be conducted in Mahima Fancy that must also find a place in the register. Simply because some items were sold to Mahima Fancy by some wholesaler it cannot be said that all those items were taken to the petition schedule building. The learned Appellate Authority has thoroughly scanned the evidence and come to the conclusion that the plea of cessation of occupation put forward by the landladies is true. On a re-appraisal of the evidence we could not find anything wrong in the conclusion arrived at by the learned Appellate Authority so as to upset that finding. There is no illegality, irregularity or impropriety in the finding of the learned Appellate Authority which is the final fact finding authority under the statutory scheme. The revision, therefore, must fail. It is hence, dismissed." 16. In **Mathai Antony [2004 (3) KLT 169]** it was held R.C.Rev.No.68 of 2021 -16- that the word 'occupy' in the context of Section 11(4)(v) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act has to be understood in the light of object and purpose of the Rent Control Act in mind. Further it was held that, the word 'occupy' in certain context indicates mere physical presence but in other context, actual enjoyment. In **Liji Agencies v. Raghunath [2012 (1) KHC 604]** it was held that occupation in the context of Section 11(4)(v) of the Act with respect to a commercial building means occupation by conducting of business and not a mere physical presence in the shop. In **Mahesh Babu v. Kuttiyil Meethal Moidu [2017 (4) KLT 884]** a Division Bench of this Court reiterated the law laid down in **Mathai Antony** and **Liji Agencies** . 17. In **Sabeer v. Sabreena [2019 (2) KLT OnLine 2108]** a Division Bench of this Court held that, when it is proved by the landlord that the tenant ceased to occupy the building continuously for six months, the burden of proving that there was 'reasonable cause for such cessation' is on the tenant. Reasonable cause is also a question of fact to be decided in the R.C.Rev.No.68 of 2021 -17- light of the facts proved in the case. No rigid formula can be evolved for proof of 'reasonable cause'. The facts and circumstances of the case, the particular facts with reference to the business activities of the tenant, the nature of the business, the magnitude of the business, the circumstance which led to the cessation of occupation are all relevant in considering whether there was 'reasonable cause'. If the cessation of occupation was due to circumstances beyond the control of the tenant, certainly the c ourts would be inclined to accept the case of the tenant that cessation of occupation was not without reasonable cause. Financial constraint of the tenant by itself may not be a sufficient reason to hold that there was reasonable cause. 18. In the instant case, the landlord filed the R.C.P.No.186 of 2014 seeking an order of eviction under Section 11(4)(v) of the Act alleging that the tenant has kept closed the petition schedule shop room for more than one year without any valid reasons. In the counter statement, the tenant contended that he is conducting furniture business in the petition schedule shop room. In view of the provisions under Section 11(4)(v) of the Act R.C.Rev.No.68 of 2021 -18- and also the law laid down in the decisions referred to supra, the burden is on the landlord to show that there has been cessation of occupation by the tenant for a continuous period of six months prior to the date of presentation of the Rent Control Petition. Upon proof, the burden shifts to the tenant to show that there has been reasonable cause for cessation of occupation. 19. In order to discharge the burden of proof under Section 11(4)(v) of the Act, the landlord has taken out a commission. The Advocate Commissioner submitted Ext.C1 report and Ext.C1(a) sketch. He inspected the property on two occasions, i.e., on 08.08.2014, the date of filing of the Rent Control Petition, and thereafter on 21.08.2014. On both occasions, the shop was found closed. In the counter statement, the tenant has stated that he is regularly using the petition schedule shop room for furniture business and entertaining customers, who come there to purchase furniture. The tenant, who was examined as RW1, has not offered a proper explanation for the closure of the petition schedule shop room on two occasions, when the Advocate Commissioner inspected the shop R.C.Rev.No.68 of 2021 -19- room. During re-examination, the explanation offered by the tenant was that, when the Advocate Commissioner inspected the petition schedule shop room he had gone out for having tea. The tenant has not even filed any objection to the report of the Advocate Commissioner. After considering the oral testimony of RW1 the Rent Control Court found that such an explanation offered by the tenant is not at all acceptable. In Ext.C1 report, the Advocate Commissioner noted dust all over the shop room. The commissioner found a hunting wasp nest on the shutter. The Rent Control Court noted that, the said facts prima facie corroborate the case of the landlord that the shop is not functioning. The tenant, who was examined as RW1, had admitted that if a shop room is regularly functioning, the nest of a hunting wasp will not be seen on the shutter. 20. The Advocate Commissioner was examined as CW1 and Exts.C1 report and C1(a) sketch were marked. During crossexamination, the Advocate Commissioner could not correctly say the direction of the road in front of the petition schedule shop room and the exact direction in which that shop is situated. R.C.Rev.No.68 of 2021 -20- Therefore, before the Rent Control Court it was argued that the Advocate Commissioner has not carried out the inspection properly. The Rent Control Court noticed that the tenant has not chosen to file any objection to the commission report. Moreover, RW1 has deposed that he was aware about Advocate Commissioner's inspection and that, the shop room was closed on both the occasions when the commissioner inspected the shop room. Before the Rent Control Court, the tenant has no case that the Advocate Commissioner did not inspect the shop room. As per the petition schedule, the shop room in question is situated in the first floor of the building and it is the 4[th] room from the south. The room shown in Ext.C1(a) sketch submitted by the Advocate Commissioner is the very same shop room. The number of the shop room mentioned in the petition schedule is 2/2075 J. In the report of the Advocate Commissioner also the very same number is shown. The boundaries of the petition schedule shop room shown in the report of the Advocate Commissioner also tallies with the petition schedule. Therefore, the Rent Control Court found that there cannot be any dispute R.C.Rev.No.68 of 2021 -21- regarding the identity of the shop room inspected by the Advocate Commissioner. After analysing the evidence on record, the Rent Control Court arrived at a conclusion that the landlord had discharged the initial burden as to cessation of occupation of the petition schedule shop room by the tenant in order to seek an order of eviction under Section 11(4)(v) of the Act and thereafter the tenant had failed to discharge the burden that he is still in occupation of the petition schedule shop room. 21. As already noticed hereinbefore, in the counter statement the case of the tenant was that he is carrying out furniture business in the petition schedule shop room. The tenant as RW1 deposed that the manufacture of furniture takes place at his house and those furniture are then displayed in the petition schedule shop room. Such a case has not been pleaded in the counter statement filed by the tenant. That apart, though RW1 deposed during cross-examination that documents are available to show that furniture business is still carried on in the petition schedule shop room, no such documents were produced before the Rent Control Court. The Rent Control Court noticed that R.C.Rev.No.68 of 2021 -22- Exts.B1 to B10 documents produced by the tenant are in relation to payment of rent, which are not relevant in the adjudication on the ground of eviction sought for under Section 11(4)(v) of the Act. The tenant has not chosen to produce any materials to show that he is in occupation of the petition schedule shop room, by conducting furniture business, as stated in the counter statement. It was in such circumstances that the Rent Control Court arrived at a conclusion that the case of the landlord that the tenant has ceased to occupy the petition schedule shop room without reasonable cause for more than one year before the institution of the Rent Control Petition is more probable. 22. Before the Appellate Authority, the appellant contended that the Advocate Commissioner did not inspect the petition schedule shop room. The Appellate Authority noticed that when a specific question was put to the tenant, while he was examined as RW1, he had conceded the fact that the Advocate Commissioner inspected the petition schedule shop room as stated in the report. After considering the oral testimony of RW1, the Appellate Authority found that the explanation offered by the R.C.Rev.No.68 of 2021 -23- tenant for his absence when the petition schedule shop room was inspected by the Advocate Commissioner cannot be accepted. The Appellate Authority has also noticed that the tenant has not chosen to file any objection to Ext.C1 report of the Advocate Commissioner. 23. As held in **Mukreerakath Khadeeja [2011 (3) KHC 753]** , in a Rent Control Petition for eviction filed under Section 11(4)(v) of the Act, the best mode of proof of cessation of occupation is to conduct surprise inspection of the petition schedule building by the commissioner. The salient features noted by the Advocate Commissioner would be of much help to the court to come to a conclusion as to whether the plea of cessation of occupation put forward by the landlord is true. 24. Before the Appellate Authority, the tenant reiterated the contention that there are documents to show that he is conducting business in the petition schedule shop room. However, no documents were produced. The Appellate Authority found that the failure on the part of the tenant to produce any documents to show that he is conducting furniture business in R.C.Rev.No.68 of 2021 -24- the petition schedule shop room would speak very much against his case. As held by the Division Bench in **Simon v. Rappai [2008 (3) KLT 121]** , once the closure of the shop room is proved, then it is for the tenant to prove that there was sufficient reason for non-occupation. In the instant case, no such explanation is forthcoming from the tenant. In such circumstances, the Appellate Authority found that the reasoning of the Rent Control Court that the landlord is entitled for an order of eviction under Section 11(4)(v) of the Act warrants no interference. 25. As reiterated by the Division Bench in **Mahesh Babu [2017 (4) KLT 884]** the word 'occupy' in the context of Section 11(4)(v) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act has to be understood in the light of object and purpose of the Rent Control Act in mind. T he word 'occupy' in certain context indicates mere physical presence but in other context, actual enjoyment. Occupation in the context of Section 11(4)(v) of the Act with respect to a commercial building means occupation by conducting of business and not a mere physical presence in the R.C.Rev.No.68 of 2021 -25- shop. In view of the law laid down in the decisions referred to supra, the Rent Control Court and the Appellate Authority cannot be found fault with in ordering eviction of the tenant under Section 11(4)(v) of the Act, with pleadings and evidence on record. 26. Section 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act deals with revision. As per sub-section (1) of Section 20, in cases, where the appellate authority empowered under Section 18 is a Subordinate Judge, the District Court, and in other cases the High Court, may, at any time, on the application of any aggrieved party, call for and examine the records relating to any order passed or proceedings taken under this Act by such authority for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality, regularity or propriety of such order or proceedings, and may pass such order in reference thereto as it thinks fit. As per subsection (2) of Section 20 of the Act, the costs of and incident to all proceedings before the High Court or District Court under subsection (1) shall be in its discretion. 27. In **Rukmini Amma Saradamma v. Kallyani** R.C.Rev.No.68 of 2021 -26- **Sulochana [(1993) 1 SCC 499]** , the scope of revisional powers of the High Court under Section 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 came up for consideration before the Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court. While considering whether the High Court could have re-appreciated entire evidence, the Apex Court held that, even the wider language of Section 20 of the Act cannot enable the High Court to act as a first or a second court of appeal. Otherwise, the distinction between appellate and revisional jurisdiction will get obliterated. Hence, the High Court was not right in reappreciating the entire evidence both oral or documentary in the light of the Commissioner's report. The High Court had travelled far beyond the revisional jurisdiction. Even by the presence of ‘ ’ - the word propriety it cannot mean that there could be a re appreciation of evidence. Of course, the revisional court can come to a different conclusion but not on a re-appreciation of evidence; on the contrary, by confining itself to legality, regularity and propriety of the order impugned before it. 28. In **T. Sivasubramaniam v. Kasinath Pujari** R.C.Rev.No.68 of 2021 -27- **[(1999) 7 SCC 275]** the Apex Court held that, the words ‘to satisfy itself’ employed in Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 no doubt is a power of superintendence, and the High Court is not required to interfere with the finding of fact merely because the High Court is not in agreement with the findings of the courts below. It is also true that the power exercisable by the High Court under Section 25 of the Act is not an appellate power to reappraise or reassess the evidence for coming to a different finding contrary to the finding recorded by the courts below. But where a finding arrived at by the courts below is based on no evidence, the High Court would be justified in interfering with such a finding recorded by the courts below. 29. In **Ubaiba v. Damodaran [(1999) 5 SCC 645]** the Apex Court considered the exercise of revisional power by the High Court, under Section 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, in the context of an issue as to whether the relationship of landlord-tenant existed or not. It was urged that whether such relationship existed would be a jurisdictional R.C.Rev.No.68 of 2021 -28- fact. Relying on the decision in **Rukmini Amma Saradamma** it was contended that, however wide the jurisdiction of the revisional court under Section 20 of the Act may be, it cannot have jurisdiction to re-appreciate the evidence and substitute its own finding upsetting the finding arrived at by the appellate authority. The Apex Court held that, though the revisional power under Section 20 of the Act may be wider than Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 it cannot be equated even with the second appellate power conferred on the civil court under the Code. Therefore, notwithstanding the use of the expression ‘propriety’ in Section 20 of the Act, the revisional court will not - be entitled to re appreciate the evidence and substitute its own conclusion in place of the conclusion of the appellate authority. On examining the impugned judgment of the High Court, in the light of the aforesaid ratio, the Apex Court held that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction by re-appreciating the evidence and in coming to the conclusion that the relationship of landlordtenant did not exist. 30. In **Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited v.** R.C.Rev.No.68 of 2021 -29- **Dilbahar Singh [(2014) 9 SCC 78]** a Five-Judge Bench of the Apex Court considered the revisional powers of the High Court under Rent Acts operating in different States. After referring to the law laid down in **Rukmini Amma Saradamma** the Apex Court reiterated that even the wider language of Section 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 does not enable the High Court to act as a first or a second court of appeal. The Constitution Bench agreed with the view of the Three-Judge Bench in **Rukmini Amma Saradamma** that the word ‘propriety’ does not confer power upon the High Court to re-appreciate evidence to come to a different conclusion, but its consideration of evidence is confined to find out legality, regularity and propriety of the order impugned before it. 31. In **Thankamony Amma v. Omana Amma [AIR 2019 SC 3803 : 2019 (4) KHC 412]** considering the matter in the backdrop of law laid down in **Rukmini Amma Saradamma** , **Ubaiba** and **Dilbahar Singh** the Apex Court held that the findings rendered by the courts below were well supported by evidence on record and could not even be said to be perverse in R.C.Rev.No.68 of 2021 -30- any way. The High Court could not have re-appreciated the evidence and the concurrent findings rendered by the courts below ought not to have been interfered with by the High Court while exercising revisional jurisdiction. 32. Viewed in the light of the law laid down in the decisions referred to supra, it cannot be said that the order of eviction passed by the Rent Control Court under Section 11(4)(v) of the Act, which now stands confirmed by the Appellate Authority, is either perverse or patently illegal or it suffers from any legal infirmity warranting interference under Section 20 of the Act. Therefore, we find no reason to interfere with the order of eviction concurrently passed by the authorities below. In the result, this Rent Control Revision fails and the same is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs. **Sd/-** **ANIL K. NARENDRAN, Judge Sd/K. BABU, Judge** bkn/-