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Kanubhai Brahmbhatt v. State of Gujarat

Case / Petition Number:Writ Petition No. 1669 of 1986
Neutral Citation:(1987) 2 SCR 316

Case Details & Bench

Court
High Court
Hon'ble Judges
  • M. P. Thakkar
  • B. C. Ray
Judgment Date
1987-02-18
Court Decision / Holding
Writ petition directed to approach the High Court in the first instance; the Supreme Court will not entertain the petition directly and directs the petitioner to pursue relief in the competent High Court.
Final Disposition
Petition disposed of by directing the petitioner to approach the High Court in the first instance; no direct relief granted by Supreme Court.

Parties to the Case

Appellants / Petitioners

  • Kanubhai Brahmbhatt

Respondents

  • State of Gujarat

Case Synopsis & Summary

Kanubhai Brahmbhatt v. State of Gujarat concerns whether a writ petitioner under Article 32 should be allowed direct access to the Supreme Court or be directed to approach the High Court first. The Supreme Court, faced with the petition, held that good and substantial reasons exist to direct the petitioner to pursue relief in the appropriate High Court in the first instance rather than treating this Court as the first port of call. The judgment uses a practical illustration—an exclusive National Hospital for open-heart surgery serving many patients—to show that directing all matters to the Supreme Court would undermine the High Courts’ capacity to handle others efficiently and would aggravate existing arrears in constitutional and appellate matters. It stresses that the maintenance of faith in the hierarchy of courts is essential to justice and to public confidence in the system. The Court cautions that if this Court directly entertains petitions in place of the High Courts, tens of thousands of writ petitions could flood this Court, delaying relief for those with genuine exclusive jurisdiction concerns. Accordingly, the Court directs the petitioner to adopt the High Court route and provides procedural suggestions, including possible aid through the Legal Aid Board and a referral to the high court to frame a writ petition, thereby decentralising access to justice and preserving the integrity of Article 136-based exclusivity.

Provisions of Law Cited

Constitution of India, Article 32Constitution of India, Article 136

Legal Doctrines & Maxims

  • Doctrine of hierarchy of courts
  • Faith in the hierarchy of Courts
  • Decentralisation of justice
  • Exclusive jurisdiction of this Court under the Constitution

Cited Precedents (2)

Case NameCitationTreatmentExplanation
Kishinath Dikshita v. Union of India and othersSCC 1986 Vol. 3 p. 229Mentioned OnlyCited in the judgment as authority for the general principle of directing access to the appropriate forum; not expressly adopted or distinguished in the core reasoning.
Shankarrao v. ChandrasenkunwarCivil Appeal No. 1355 (N) of 1973Mentioned OnlyCited as related precedent; not shown as being distinguished, followed, or overruled in the current decision.

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Extracted Judgment Text

Exact text extracted from official judgment records.

I ## ~ # • A B #### c KANUBHAIBRAHMBHA1T _v._ STATE OF GUJARAT FEBRUARY 18, 1987 [M.P. THAKKAR AND B.C. RAY, JJ.] _Constitution_ _of India,_ _1950,_ _Article_ _32-Writ_ _Petition-Filing_ _of-Sometimes_ _reasons good and substantial exist_ _to_ _direct writ peti-_ _tioner to approach High Court in First instance-Faith to be inspired in_ _the hierarchy of courts._ _Practice_ _&_ _Procedure, Supreme_ _Court-W"it_ _petition-Filing_ _of-Litigant to be directed to approach High Court if good and substan-_ _tial reasons exist-Faith to be inspired in the hierarchy of courts._ In a writ petition filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of D India, the Court found that good and substantial reasons existed for directing the petitioner to approach the concerned High Court in the first instance instead of knocking at the doors of this Court straightaway. While directing so, this Court, HELD: 1. If Supreme Court takes upon itself to do everything E which even the High Court can do, this Court will not be able to do what this Court alone can do under Art. 136 of the Constitution of India, and other provisions conferring exclusive jurisdiction on this Court. There is no reason to assume !hall the concerned High Court will not do justice. Or that this Court alone can do justice. If this Court entertains Writ Petitions at the instance of parties who approach this Court directly F instead of appraoching the ·concerned High Court in the first instance, tens of thousands of Writ Petitions would in course of time be instituted in this Court directly. The inevitable result will be that the arrears pertaining to matters in respect of which this Court exercises exclusive jurisdiction under the Constitution will assume more alarming proportions. [3168-D] G 2. It is as important to clo justice at this level, as to inspire confidence in the litigants that justice will be meted out to them at the High Court level, and other levels. Faith must be inspired in the hierarchy of Courts and the institution as a whole. Not only in this Court alone. And this objective can be achieved only by this Court showing trust in the H High Courts by directing the litigants to approach the High Courts in 314 K. BRAHMBNATT _v._ STATE OF GUJARAT _[THAKKAR._ J.] 315 the first instance. Besides, as a matter of fact, if matters like the present one are instituted in the High Courts, there is a likelihood of the same A being disposed of much more quickly, and equally effectively, on account of the decentralisation of the process of administering justice. [316E-G I ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition No. 1669 of 1986. B (Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India). By post. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by THAKKAR, J. Reasons, good and substantial, exist for direct- C ~ ing the petitioner to approach the concerned High Court in the first instance instead of knocking at the doors of this Court straightaway. And these need to be spelled out. An illustration may tell more effectively, what otherwise may not be told as effectively, and perhaps, only with some embarrassment. Suppose there is only one National Hospital established especially for performing open-heart surgery which cannot be performed elsewhere in any of the eighteen Regional Hospitals. What will happen to the patients needing such surgery, if the National Hospital which alone is specially equipped for this type of surgery, throws its doors wide open also for patients suffering from other ailments who can be treated by any and every one of the eighteen Regional Hospitals? More particularly when the patients already admitted for such surgery by the National Hospital are already lying unattended to on its floors, and in D E 1 its corridors, for an unconscionably long time? Showing sympathy for a patient with other than a heart problem who can also be treated # -t F equally effectively, and perhaps much more quickly, may well constitute cruelty to the heart patients who can be treated only by the National Hospital established especially and exclusively for the treatment of such patients. Will it not be more merciful to all concerned (by being firm enough) to tell those suffering from other than heart problems to go to Regional Hospitals, instead of insisting on being treated G at the National Hospital, which also can of course treat them, but only F at the cost of neglecting the heart patients who have nowhere else to go? More so as the patients going to the Regional Hospital may well benefit much more by securing more personalized and urgent attention thereat. On the other hand. not to do so many well amount to being engaged in trying to relieve the distress of those whose distress can be H A B #### c D E F G **H** 316 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1987] 2 S.C.R. removed by any one else at the cost of refusing to treat those who cannot be treated by any one else. If this Court takes upon itself to do everything which even the High Courts can do, this Court will not be able to do what this Court alone can do under Art. 136 of the Constitution of India, and other provisions conferring exclusive jurisdiction on this Court. There is no reason to assume that th1~ concerned High Court will not do justice. Or that this Court alone can do justice. If this Court entertains Writ Petitions at the instance of parties who approach this Court directly instead of approaching the concerned High Court in the first instance, tens of thousands of Writ Petitions would in course of time be instituted in this Court directly.* The inevitable result will be that the arrears pertaining to matters in respect of which this Court exercises exclusive jurisdiction under the Constitution will assume more alarming proportions. As it is, more than ten years old Civil Appeals and Criminal Appeals are sobbing for attention. It will occasion great misery and immense hardship to tens of thousands of litigants if the seriousness of this aspect is not sufficiently realized. And this is no imaginary phobia. A dismissed government servant has to wait for . nearly ten years for redress in this Court. [1 ] A litigant whose appeal has been dismissed by wrongly refusing to condone delay has to wait for 14 years before his wrong is righted by this Court. [2 ] The time for imposing self-discipline has already come, even if it involves shedding of some amount of institutional-ego, or raising of some eye-brows. Again, it is as important to do justice at this level, as to inspire confidence in the litigants that justice will be meted out to them at the High Court level, and other levels. Faith must be inspired in the hierarchy of Courts and the institution as a whole. Not only in this Court alone. And this objective can be achieved only by this Court showing trust in the High Court by directing the litigants to approach the High Court in the first instance. Besides, as a matter of fact, if matters like the present one are instituted in the High Court, there is a likelihood of the same being disposed of much more quickly, and equally effectively, on account of the decentralisation of the process of administering justice. We are of the opinion that the petitioner should be directed to adopt this course and approach the High Court. - **More than 9000 are already pending now.** _**1.**_ **K8shinath Dikshita v.** **Union of India and others (SCC** **1986 Vol. 3** **p.** **229)** **2. Shankarrao** **v.** **Chandrasenkunwar (Civil Appeal No. 1355{N)** **of** **1973** **decided on** **January29, 1987.** ### + K. BRAHMBNATI _v._ STATE OF GUJARAT [THAKKAR,· J.] 317 It needs to be clarified that it will be open to the High Court to call upon the petitioner to present a properly framed Writ Petition without obliging him to incur the legal and other incidental expenditure if the petitioner cannot afford the same. The matter may in such an event be assigned to a learned Advocate practising in the High Court through the State Legal Aid and Assistance Board, or through the High Court Legal Aid Committee which can provide him with the requisite funds to enable him to do the needful. It will also be open to the High Court to request the learned District Judge of Vadodara to look into the matter from the point of view of the complaints made in the letter in question, and make an appropriate report to enable the High Court to pass such suitable orders as may be called for in the facts and circumstances of the case in order to secure ends of justice. ~ These are the reasons which we 'now' articulate in support of the order we passed 'then'. M.L.A. ' A B #### c