Kalyani and Others v. A. Narayana

## **IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM** ## **PRESENT:** **THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE K.RAMAKRISHNAN** **WEDNESDAY, THE 5TH DAY OF JULY 2017/14TH ASHADHA, 1939** ## **SA.No. 91 of 2000 (C)** **----------------------** **AGAINST THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED 07-09-1999 IN AS 34/1997 of SUB COURT, KASARAGOD** **AGAINST THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED 14-11-1996 IN OS 1/1995 of MUNSIFF COURT, KASARAGOD** ## **APPELLANTS/APPELLANTS/DEFENDANTS 2 TO 6:** **--------------------------------------------------------------** **1. KALYANI, AGED ABOUT 55 YEARS (DEAD) WIDOW OF V.BABU** **2. KESHAVA, AGED 35 YEARS, S/O BABU** **3. DAMODARA, AGED 38 YEARS, S/O V.BABU** **4. BHASKARA, AGED 26 YEARS, S/O V.BABU** **5. JANARDHANA , AGED 20 YEARS, S/O V.BABU.** **ALL ARE RESIDING AT AYYARKATTE IN UDAYAUAR VILLAGE, KASARAGOD TALUK, P.O.MANJESHWARA.** ## **BY ADV. SRI.KODOTH SREEDHARAN** ## **RESPONDENT/RESPONDENT/PLAINTIFF:** **----------------------------------------------------------** **A.NARAYANA, AGED ABOUT 57 YEARS, S/O ABBU HENGSU AND NEEHUALIAS NARASIMHA, RESIDING AT AYYAREKETTE IN HOSABETTA VILLAGE, KASARAGOD TALUK, P.O.MANJESHWARA.** **R, BY ADVS. SRI.K.SHRIHARI RAO SRI.P.M.CHITRA SMT.N.SHOBHA** **THIS SECOND APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 05-07-2017, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:** **rmm** ## **K.RAMAKRISHNAN, J. -------------------------------** ## **S.A. No.91 of 2000** ## **-----------------------------Dated this the 5[th] day of July, 2017** ## **J U D G M E N T -----------------** Defendants 2 to 6 in O.S.No.1/1995 on the file of the Munsiff court, Kasaragod are the appellants herein. The suit was one filed by the plaintiff for recovery of possession of plaint A schedule building with the following allegations: The property having an extent of 18 cents with buildings therein comprised in R.S.No.135/12 of Udyavara Village originally belonged to the mother of plaintiff Abbu Hengsu as mooly right as per the sale deed and registered release deed. Subsequently she executed a registered settlement deed in favour of the plaintiff in respect of 13 cents of land in R.S.No.135/12 on southern portion of Udyavara Village and also executed another sale deed in respect of remaining 5 cents in R.S.No.135/12 on the northern portion of the Udyavara Village as per documents dated 21.11.1985 and 19.10.1994 respectively. Thus he became the absolute owner of the property having 18 cents in R.S No.135/12 with buildings therein. There is a tiled shop building with door No.IX-12 of Manjeswar Panchayat situated in R.S.No.135/12 part measuring 13 cents which is included in the registered sale dated 19.10.1994. On 01.08.1959, the mother of the plaintiff permitted the original defendant to occupy the above said shop room, which is shown 2 as plaint schedule on free of rent. He has been thus in permissive occupation of the building. Plaintiff's mother cancelled the permission granted to the original defendant by sending a registered notice dated 05.09.1994. When plaintiff became the owner of the property, he had also revoked the permission granted to the original defendant to occupy the shop room by sending registered lawyer notice dated 25.11.1994. Instead of vacating the premises, the original defendant sent reply notices raising false and frivolous allegations and claims. Since the original defendant did not vacate the premises, the plaintiff had no other option except to file a suit for recovery of possession of the building from the original defendant, and hence the suit. 2. The original defendant entered appearance and filed written statement contending as follows: The suit as brought is not maintainable. The sale deed dated 19.10.1994 is not true and genuine and it has not come into effect. He denied the allegations that the mother of the plaintiff had permitted him to occupy the plaint schedule building on free of rent. But according to him, he had obtained the building on lease from one Lakshmi w/o Thukra Sapalya on a monthly rent of Rs.12/- in the year 1959 and thereafter he has been in possession of the building by paying rent to said Lakshmi. He had sent proper and correct reply to 3 the notices sent by the mother of the plaintiff and the plaintiff dated 05.9.1994 and 25.11.1994 respectively. Since he has been in occupation of the building as a building tenant under one Lakshmi, the suit as brought by the plaintiff is not maintainable. Further, the building in Manjeswar Panchayat is coming under the purview of the Kerala Building (Lease and Rent Control) Act (Act 2 of 1965) and the civil court has no jurisdiction entertain the suit. There is no cause of action for the plaintiff to file the suit. He also denied that the building is situated in the property purchased by the plaintiff. He prayed for dismissal of the suit. 3. During the pendency of the proceedings in the trial court, the original defendant died and his legal heirs were impleaded as additional defendants 2 to 6 who are the appellants herein as per order in I.A.No.2256/95 and the plaint was amended consequential to the impleadment seeking the relief against the supplemental defendants as well, as per order in I.A.No.2257/95. 4. The supplemental 4[th] defendant filed written statement reiterating the contentions raised by his father, the original defendant, in his written statement denying the right of the plaintiff to file the suit and also denying the relationship claimed by plaintiff with the original defendant and also reiterating the contention that the building was 4 taken by his father from one Lakshmi as a building tenant in the year 1959, on a monthly rent of Rs.12/- and as such the suit is not maintainable and prayed for dismissal of the suit. 5. Additional defendants 2,3,5 and 6 filed a memo adopting the written statement filed by the additional 4[th] defendant. 6. On the basis of the pleadings following issues were framed by the trial court for consideration. - “ _1. Whether the plaintiff has title to the plaint schedule_ - _building?_ _2. Whether plaintiff is entitled to recover possession of the plaint A schedule building?_ _3. Reliefs and costs?”._ 7. In order to prove the case of the plaintiff, PWs 1 to 3 were examined and Exts.A1 to A14 were marked on his side. In order to prove the case of the defendants, 4[th] defendant was examined as DW1 and Exts.B1 to B13 were marked on their side. 8. After considering the evidence on record, the trial court found that the plaintiff is the owner of the plaint schedule building and since it is not an area covered by the Act 2 of 1965, the suit is maintainable and the plaintiff has proved his case and the defendants had failed to prove their case and plaintiff is having title over the plaint schedule property and decreed the suit as prayed for. 5 9. Dissatisfied with the decree and judgment passed by the trial court, the appellants filed appeal before the District Court, Kasaragod and the same was made over to Sub Court, Kasaragod for disposal where it was renumbered as A.S.No.34/97 and the Sub Judge by the impugned judgment dismissed the appeal confirming the decree and judgment passed by the court below. Aggrieved by the same, the present second appeal has been filed by the appellants-dissatisfied additional defendants before the courts below. 10. While admitting the second appeal, the following substantial questions of law have been formulated by this court. _(A) In the absence of the legal heirs of Koraga who is admittedly a co-owner of the properties and in derogation of whose rights the plaintiff is suing and in the absence of any of the legal heirs in the party array; should not have the courts below dismissed the suit in the light of the decision reported in 1993(2) KLT 67._ _(B) In the instant suit filed paying court fee on the basis of the annual rental value for recovery of possession of a shop by terminating the license of permissive occupation and where that relationship is denied by the defendant, have not the courts below erred in decreeing the suit in the absence of proof of relationship claimed by the plaintiff and which is denied by the defendants, and on an assumption by the courts that the plaintiffs have derived title to the suit building without proof of the same and on the contrary when the evidence shows that the title vests in a third party and the derivative title set up by_ 6 _the plaintiff is not clear._ 11. While hearing both sides, this court felt that following substantial questions of law also arise for consideration and accordingly the same were formulated and heard on that aspect as well. _i. Whether the courts below were justified in holding that the suit for recovery possession of the building alone is maintainable without any prayer for declaration of title and recovery of land as well?_ _ii. Whether the courts below were justified in holding that the plaintiff has absolute title to the plaint schedule property without considering the question as to how the right of koragu has been extinguished and without impleading the legal heirs of koragu, whether the suit as brought by the plaintiff is maintainable?_ _iii. Whether the courts below were justified in holding that the civil court has got jurisdiction to entertain the suit?_ _iv. Whether the courts below were justified in decreeing the suit without proving the identity of the plaint schedule property by taking out a commission especially when the same was disputed by the defendants?_ _v. Whether the courts below were justified in holding that the defendants had failed to prove their case, and as such, the plaintiff is entitled to get the relief without proving the case put forward by the plaintiff independently?_ 12. Heard the counsel for the appellants and the counsel for the respondent. 7 13. Counsel for the appellants submitted that when the title to the property is disputed by the defendants, the suit for recovery of building alone without seeking a declaration of title and recovery of possession of land is not maintainable. Further it was admitted by PW1 that one of the owners, who purchased the property along with Aitha Saplya and Ammu Hengsu, had wife and children and without impleading them, the plaintiff cannot be said to have acquired absolute title over the property and without the junction of the other co-owner, the suit for recovery of possession filed by the plaintiff is not maintainable and the decision relied on by the courts below is not, in fact, applicable to the facts of this case. Further, the evidence of PW3 will go to show that the ownership of the building was entered in the records of the municipality in her name and there is no acceptable evidence adduced on the side of the plaintiff to prove as to how that ownership has been changed in the name of the plaintiff and even assuming that the municipal records show that the name of the plaintiff as the owner of the building, that will not confer title on him which he has to prove independently. The courts cannot rely on the weakness of the defence case to grant the relief to the plaintiff. So according to him, the courts below ought to have dismissed the suit. He had relied on the decision reported in _**Anathula Sudhakar v. P.**_ 8 _**Buchi Reddy (Dead) By LRs and Others**_ (2008 KHC 6249=2008 (4) SCC 594) in support of his case. 14. On the other hand, the counsel for the respondent submitted that the parties are governed by Aliyasanthana Law and as such, the right of the member will devolve upon the surviving members prior to the amendment of the Aliyasanthana Act. Further, no such plea was raised in the written statement and the title of the plaintiff as such has not challenged. That was raised only at the time of hearing and that was considered by the courts below as well. Further the evidence adduced on the side of the plaintiff proved his right over the property and also the entrustment and as such, the courts below were perfectly justified in decreeing the suit. 15. There is no substantial question of law arise for consideration. He had relied on the decisions reported in _**Om Prakash and Another v. Mishri Lal (Dead) Rep. by his LR Savitri Devi** [2017 (2) KHC (SN) 17 (P.No.30)(SC)],_ _**Vijayabhushanammal and two others v. C.N. Evalappa Mudaliar and Another** (ILR 39 Madras 17)_ , _**Vidyawati v. Man Mohan and Others** (1995) 5 SCC 431)_ , _**Antamma and Others v. Kaveri and Others** (ILR (1884) 7 Madras 575)_ , _**Pattakkal Kunhikoya v. Thoopiyakkal Koya** (2000) 2 SCC 185),_ _**Tmt.Kasthuri Radhakrishan and Others v.**_ 9 ## _**M.Chinniyan and Another** (AIR 2016 SC 609) = (2016 (3) SCC 296)_ , _**Sanjiva Shetty v. Kumme Mahabala Bhat** (1997 (2) KLT_ _(SN) 38, case No.41),_ in support of his case. 16. The case of the plaintiff in the plaint was that, the property having an extent of 18 cents of which plaint schedule is a part originally belonged to his mother Abbu Hengsu and she had by two documents, Ext.A1 sale deed dated 19.10.94 and Ext.A9 settlement deed dated 21.11.1985 transferred her right in favour of the plaintiff and he has become the absolute owner of the property. The plaint schedule building was permitted to be occupied by the predecessor of the present appellants orally on 01.08.1959 by his mother and he has been in permissive occupation of the building. When she assigned the property, Ext.A3 notice was sent, terminating the licence and asking him to vacate the premises which was received by him evidenced by Ext.A4 postal acknowledgment. He sent Ext.A10 reply notice wherein he did not deny the title of the landlord, but he had only stated that he obtained the building from one Lakshmi and not from Abbu Hengsu and as such, he is not liable to vacate the premises. He did not mention anything about the assignment deed in her favour or subsequent transfer in favour of the plaintiff. After the plaintiff became the owner of the property, he sent Ext.A5 notice dated 25.11.1994, 10 terminating its licence and asking him to vacate the premises, which was received by him evidenced by Ext.A6 postal acknowledgment, for which he sent Ext.A11 reply dated 08.12.94 reiterating the same contentions. It is thereafter that the present suit was filed. The defendant produced Ext.B12 document dated 31.08.1909, by which one Madana, S/o.Kunhi Hengsu, executed in favour of Aitha, Koraga and Ammu Hengsu as document No.601/1909 of S.R.O. Manjeshwar, by which 18 cents of land with buildings therein of which plaint schedule property is a part was sold. Though defendant produced Ext.B13 assignment deed dated 26.04.1913 as document No.263/1913 of S.R.O. Manjeshwar executed by Mandatha Belehappada in favour of Basappa, but it does not relate to the plaint schedule property and no evidence was adduced on the side of the defendant to connect the document with the plaint schedule property as well. Ext.B12 was produced by the defendant himself to prove that plaintiff's predecessor purchased the property and it was obtained by three persons namely Aitha, Koraga and Ammu Hengsu. It is true that, in these documents the building number was not mentioned. It is also in away admitted that Aitha and Ammu Hengsu mentioned in Ext.B12 document had sold their right in favour of Abbu Hengsu, mother of the plaintiff as per Ext.A7 and Ext.A8. In Ext.A7 and Ext.A8 it was mentioned that Koraga 11 died and his right devolved on the remaining owners and they became the absolute owners of the property and they assigned the property in favour of Abbu Hengsu, the mother of the plaintiff, who in turn assigned her right in favour of the plaintiff as per Ext.A1 and Ext.A9. In Ext.A1 and Ext.A9 the plaint schedule building number was specifically mentioned. 17. Further plaintiff produced Exts.A2 and A14 certified copies of the building tax assessment register in respect of building with No.M.P.9/12 which shows the plaintiff as the owner of the building and the original defendant as the occupier of the building. He had also produced Ext.A12 series and Ext.A13 series to show that, he is the owner of the land covered by the building and the owner of the building as such he is paying the tax for the same. It is true that defendants produced Exts.B2 to B4 to show that the building with No.9/5, 6 and 7 in the name of one Lakshmi showing her as the owner of the property and also produced Exts.B4 to B8 to show that the building tax was paid by him in the name of Lakshmi till 1993. 18. But the said Lakshmi was examined as PW3 and she had categorically stated that she was not the owner of the building and she resided in the building for some years and thereafter vacated the same and she went to the municipal office once in connection with the 12 correction of the owner ship of this building. So it is clear from her evidence that the name of PW3 was wrongly shown in the building tax assessment register and later it was corrected by the authorities and it was changed in the name of the plaintiff. PW3 had categorically stated that, she never entrusted the building to the original defendant and no rent was paid to her. Though defendant produced Ext.B1 as a receipt said to have been given for payment of rent by PW3, she did not admit the same. There is no other evidence adduced on the side of the defendant to prove that the original defendant had taken the building from PW3 and he was a tenant under her as contended by him. DW1 had no direct knowledge about the transaction and his evidence is not helpful to prove the case of the original defendant as well. 19. Further the original defendant in his written statement did not deny the right of the plaintiff or his predecessor regarding the ownership of the building, but according to him, there was no entrustment by plaintiff's mother as claimed in the plaint but he had taken the building from one Lakshmi. Further there is no plea in the written statement that the plaintiff's mother did not obtain the entire right and the suit is bad for non-jointer of necessary parties on account of non-impleadment of the legal heirs of Koraga, which contention was raised by him only at the time of arguments on the basis of the 13 admission made by PW1 that Koraga had wife and children and except one son by name Babu others died. He had also deposed that the said Babu was in possession of one of the rooms as tenant under PW1 and this aspect was not further challenged by the defendant. So the defendant is not entitled to raise the contention that the is suit is bad for non-jointer of necessary parties without raising such a plea in the written statement either before the trial court or by filing an additional written statement before the first appellate court. 20. The trial court relied on decisions reported in _**Antamma and Others v. Kaveri and Others**_ (ILR 8 Madras 575, _**Manjappa Ajri and Others v. Marudevi Hengsu and others**_ ( _ILR 32 Madras 12)_ ; and came to the conclusion that prior to Aliyasanthanam Act 1949, the inheritance was governed by customary law and the self acquired property of a member of the Aliyasanthana kavaru on his death will not devolve on his personal heirs, but to the nearest branch and as such the right of Koraga, who died prior to coming into force of the Aliyasanthanam Act, 1949, devolved on his brother and sister who were the nearest branch and thereby the plaintiff has become the absolute owner of the property. This view was in away supported by the recent decision of this court in _**Sankara Rai v. Thimmanna Rai** (2011 (4) KLT 507)_ , which was considered in para 9 and 10 of the 14 ## decision, which reads as follows: _“_ _**9** . Like in the case of Marumakkathayam Law, Aliyasanthana is a system of inheritance through female line which gives property right to the lady and the rights are centralized around her. So also in Aliyasanthana system more importance is given to the mother's side of the family. It would appear that more respect is given to maternal uncles than to paternal uncles. In this system of law the eldest member is known as Ejaman and the eldest female member is known as Ejamanthi. The senior-most member, whether male or female, is entitled to carry on the family management. No member of the tarwad had a right to claim partition or separate possession of his share without the concurrence of other members. Just as statutory intervention in the Marumakkathayam law brought about some healthy changes in the Marumakkathayam law, the same happened in the case of Aliyasanthana law also with the coming into force of the Madras Aliyasanthana Act of 1949. A member was given a right to separate himself or herself from the joint family and claim partition. The ascertainment of share at the time of partition is per capita and not per stirpes. The vital difference between Aliayasanthana system and Marumakkathayam law is that while in Aliyasanthana system the senior most member, whether male or female is entitled to carry of family arrangement, in Marumakkathayam system the senior most male member has the right and power to carry on the family management and in the absence of male adult members, the senior most female member has the power to carry on family management. Moreover, as per the precedents, the_ 15 _self acquired property of a female member in Marumakkathayam system descended to her tavazhi. In the case of male member, if the property has not been disposed during his life time, it lapses to the tarwad. However, in the Aliyasanthana system there is no distinction as to the devolution of property of a male or female member. The self acquired property of a member goes to the nearest branch.”_ _“_ _**10** . The two words by which arumakkathayam and Aliyasanthanam law are known to literally mean inheritance through the nephews or sister's sons. A kutumbam under the Aliyasanthanam customary law was a family corpus. Any person born into the family had equal rights to the property owned by it. On the death of a member of the kutumba survived by him. The limited estate of Hindu female, which is similar in the Mithakshashara law was unknown to Aliyasanthanam system. In the Aliyasanthanam system every male and female member had an equal right in the kutumba property. In Aliyasanthanam law partition could be effected only at the instance of all the adult members of the family. It may be noticed that since the basis of the system is matriarchal, the children of the female members alone were co-parcenaries in the kutumba and the wife and children of the male members were not co-parcenaries in the kutumba.”_ 21. So from this, it is clear that Koraga's right devolved on his nearest branch namely his brother and sister on the death of Koraga and they became the owners of the property and by virtue of 16 subsequent transfer, the plaintiff has become the absolute owner of the property. Further the evidence of PW1 will go to show that their right was accepted by the legal heirs of Koraga as his only son Babu is now occupying one of the buildings as a tenant under the plaintiff admitting his title to the property. So under such circumstances, the courts below were perfectly justified in coming to the conclusion that plaintiff has title to the property and entitled to maintain the action for recovery of the building. 22. On the basis of the materials available on record, the courts below also rightly came to the conclusion that defendant had failed to prove his case that he obtained the building on lease from PW3 Lakshmi. It is true that weakness of the defendants case will not entitle the plaintiff to get a relief unless he independently proves his case. The evidence of Plaintiff as PW1 along with PW2 will go to show that the original defendant was a relative of the plaintiff and plaintiff's mother had entursted the building to the original defendant on free of rent as a permissive occupier and accordingly he was in possession of the same as a licensee. PW2 also deposed that, he is also a relative of the defendants as well. So there is nothing to disbelieve his evidence on this aspect. So plaintiff has proved that the original defendant was in permissive occupation of the building as a licensee under his mother 17 and after he becoming the owner, the license was terminated and he is entitled to file the suit for recovery of possession of the building alone as there is no dispute regarding the ownership of the land. 23. The defendant had no case that the building claimed by the plaintiff and the building in his possession are different. So the dictum laid down in the decision reported in _**Ananthula Sudhakar v. P. Buchi Reddy (dead) By LRs and Others**_ (2008 KHC 6249)= (2008 (4) SCC 594) is not applicable to the facts of this case. That was a case where the plaintiff's title was in doubt and that was denied by the other side, claiming title in themselves, then in such cases, it was held that mere suit for injunction simplicitor without a declaration of title is not maintainable. That is not the case here. 24. Further the plaintiff is only claiming recovery of the building which according to him was entursted on a license arrangement with the original defendant and as such there is no necessity for the plaintiff to file a suit for recovery of possession of the land also as contended by the counsel for the appellants. Further since it is not a rent control area and the defendant was disputing the jural relationship, the remedy of the plaintiff is only to file a suit for recovery of possession of the building on the strength of title in a civil court and as such the contention of the counsel for the appellants that 18 the suit is not maintainable has no substance. 25. Both the trial court as well as the appellate court, on the basis of evidence rightly came to the conclusion and concurrently found that the plaintiff is the owner of the building and the predecessor in interest of the appellants had been in permissive occupation as a licensee under the mother of the plaintiff and plaintiff is entitled to get recovery of the building from the possession the defendants and rightly decreed the suit. 26. Further in the decision reported in _**Pattakkal kunhikoya (Dead) by LRs v.Thoopiyakkal Koya and Another**_ (2000) 2 SCC 185), it has been held that, as the appeal arises under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, judgment of the learned sub judge as also the High Court wherein concurrent findings of fact had been reached by both the courts on appreciation of evidence cannot be assailed by making an effort to get the entire evidence re-appreciated as if this is a third appeal on facts. It is not the practice of the Supreme Court to re-appreciate the evidence for the purpose of examining whether the finding of fact arrived at by the High Court and the Sub Court is correct or not. Exception can be taken only in the event of serious miscarriage of justice or manifest illegality, but not otherwise. The Supreme Court is not a regular court of appeal to which every judgment of the High 19 Court may be brought for further scrutiny in regard to its correctness. 27. The same principle will apply to the High Court while considering the second appeal filed against concurrent findings of the courts below on appreciation of facts. Unless there is a substantial question of law arises for consideration, normally the High Court in second appeal under section 100 of Code of Civil Procedure, will not re-appreciate the evidence on facts again and upset the concurrent findings of the courts below. 28. There is no dispute regarding the dictum laid down in _**Kasthuri Radhakrishan and Others v. M.Chinniyan and Another**_ (2016 KHC 6070), _**Valsala v. Sundaram Nadar**_ (1993 (2) KLT 67) and _**Sanjiva Shetty v. Kumme Mahabala Bhat**_ (1997 (2) KLT (SN) 38, Case No.41), regarding the proposition that one of the co-owners can maintain an action for recovery of possession of the property without the junction of other co-owners. Even assuming that the plaintiff is only a co-owner, in view of the dictum laid down in the above decisions, he can maintain an action for recovery of possession of the building on the strength of title, whether he can claim exclusive possession or not which can be considered in the proceedings between them and that need not be gone into this case. In view of the latest decisions on this aspect, the dictum laid down in the decision reported 20 in _**Valsala v. Sundaram Nadar**_ (1993 (2) KLT 67) cannot be said to be good law on this aspect. 29. In view of the discussions made above, this court is of the opinion that there is no error committed by the courts below and there is no mis-appreciation of evidence and there is no perversity in the concurrent finding on facts and law arrived at by the court below and there is no substantial question of law arises for consideration in this case warranting interference of concurrent findings of the courts below. The appeal lacks merit and the same is liable to be dismissed. In the result, the second appeal fails and the same is hereby dismissed. The decree and judgment passed by the trial court and confirmed by the lower appellate court are hereby confirmed. This court do not find any reason to disallow the cost of the second appeal to the respondent. So the second appeal is dismissed with cost of the respondent. The interim order of stay granted by this court is hereby vacated. The registry is directed to communicate this judgment to the court below at the earliest. ## _Sd/-_ ## **K. RAMAKRISHNAN, JUDGE.** //True Copy// rmm/cl/ss _P.A. to Judge_