High Court of KeralaDivision BenchRevisions dismissed; six months’ time to vacate...

Kallil Thodukayil Faizal v. K.P. Nafeesa and others (R.C.R. Nos. 82 & 83 of 2021)

Case / Petition Number:R.C.R.No.82 & 83 of 2021

Case Details & Bench

Court
High Court of Kerala
Hon'ble Judges
  • Anil K. Narendran
  • G. Girish
Judgment Date
2024-02-14
Court Decision / Holding
Rent Control Revisions dismissed; however, six months’ time is granted to the petitioner-tenant to surrender vacant possession of the petition schedule shop rooms, on conditions: (i) affidavit of unconditional undertaking to surrender within six months; (ii) deposit of entire arrears within two weeks and continued payment of rent; (iii) tenant to conduct business only under valid licences; failure to comply cancels the time limit automatically and allows eviction execution.
Final Disposition
Revisions dismissed; six months’ time to vacate with conditions.

Parties to the Case

Appellants / Petitioners

  • Kallil Thodukayil Faizal

Respondents

  • K.P. Nafeesa
  • K.P. Mubeena
  • K.P. Muneera
  • K.P. Mufsil
  • K.P. Mubas

Legal Representation & Advocates

Counsels for Petitioners

  • • Adv. K.M. Firoz
  • • Smt. M. Shajna

Counsels for Respondents

  • • Adv. V.V. Surendran
  • • P.A. Harish
  • • Dona Paul

Case Synopsis & Summary

The present are Rent Control Revision petitions arising from a common eviction dispute in Kozhikode. The landlords filed petitions seeking eviction of tenant Faizal from shop rooms 27/312 and 27/311B on grounds of bona fide need to start an electrical business and related occupancies, invoking Section 11(3) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act along with the first and second provisos. The Rent Control Court granted eviction under Section 11(3), and the Rent Control Appellate Authority upheld that order in both RCA Nos. 121 and 122 of 2018 dated 31.01.2020. The tenant challenged the orders in Revision under Section 20 of the Act before this High Court. The petitioner contends that the first proviso to Section 11(3) should apply because the landlords possess other premises, a fact supported by evidence such as Exts.A5–A8 and related license details. The landlords argue that the first proviso has no application and the need is bona fide. In addressing the challenge, the High Court surveys a series of precedents on revisional powers and the interpretation of the provisos: M.L. Prabhakar, Ram Narain Arora, Vasantha Mallan, Dineshan Pillai, and other decisions, to elucidate the scope of provisos and the evidentiary burden. Ultimately, the Court dismisses the revisions but grants six months to vacate with conditions, balancing the bona fide need with the tenant’s right to time and safeguards.

Provisions of Law Cited

Section 11(3) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) ActFirst proviso to Section 11(3)Second proviso to Section 11(3)Section 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965

Legal Doctrines & Maxims

  • bona fide need
  • special reasons
  • revisional jurisdiction limited to legality, regularity and propriety
  • burden of proof as between landlord and tenant

Submissions & Arguments

Contentions of Appellants / Petitioners

The revision petitioner contends that the first proviso to Section 11(3) should apply in view of the landlord’s possession of other premises and the licencing arrangements indicating that the landlords are in possession of alternative spaces. The petitioners rely on decisions such as M.L. Prabhakar v. Rajiv Singal and Ram Narain Arora v. Asha Rani to argue that availability of other reasonably suitable premises is a relevant consideration, and that the burden and evidentiary burden lie in the context of bona fide need; they assert that the absence of explicit pleading about vacant buildings by the landlord should not bar scrutinizing the special reasons in the facts. They urge the Court to apply the proviso and give due consideration to perverse or improper conclusions, seeking preservation of the tenant’s rights with time for transition.

Contentions of Respondents

The landlords submit that the first proviso to Section 11(3) does not apply since the landlord’s need is bona fide and the evidence fails to show any other vacant or suitable building within their possession; they argue the tenant’s burden is to disprove bona fide need, and the court should maintain the eviction order. They contend there is no compelling reason to grant extended time and urge dismissal of the revision while endorsing a reasonable time for the tenant to vacate with safeguards, including payment of arrears and compliance with licensing requirements.

Cited Precedents (11)

Case NameCitationTreatmentExplanation
M.L. Prabhakar v. Rajiv Singal2001 (2) SCC 355PositiveUsed to discuss the relationship between bona fide need and availability of other reasonably suitable accommodation; supports the tenant’s and landlord’s positions in nuanced ways.
Ram Narain Arora v. Asha Rani1999 (1) SCC 141PositiveCited for the intermixture of bona fide need with availability of other housing; informs the approach to provisos.
Vasantha Mallan v. N.S. Aboobacker Siddique2020 (1) KHC 21PositiveDiv. Bench held landlord need not plead availability of vacant buildings; burden initially on tenant; supports non-obligation of landlord pleadings.
Dineshan Pillai P.B. v. Joseph @ Jose2019 (3) KHC 206PositiveFound that landlord must plead identity of vacant building; lack of specific pleadings undermines proviso applicability.
Rukmini Amma Saradamma v. Kallyani Sulochana1993 (1) SCC 499PositiveRevisional scope limited to legality, regularity, propriety; not a second appeal; heavily relied upon for revisional limits.
T. Sivasubramaniam v. Kasinath Pujari1999 (7) SCC 275Positive’To satisfy itself’ is supervisory, not a reappraisal of evidence; supports limited revisional interference.
Ubaiba v. Damodaran1999 (5) SCC 645PositiveRevisional power is not equivalent to appellate; cannot reappreciate evidence to reverse findings, except under narrow circumstances.
Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Dilbahar Singh2014 (9) SCC 78PositiveConstitution Bench clarifies revisional limits; reappraisal of evidence is not permitted to arrive at a different conclusion.
Thankamony Amma v. Omana AmmaAIR 2019 SC 3803; 2019 (4) KHC 412PositiveFindings by courts below well supported by evidence; high court should not reappreciate concurrent findings.
Abdul Salam v. Sebastian2013 (4) KLT 592PositiveDiscusses perverse conclusions and correction by reappraisal; limited scope for revisional correction.
Regy V. Edthil v. Hubert Leslie D'Cruz2016 (2) KLJ 164PositiveHigh Court may test legality and, in limited cases, reappraise to determine unreasonableness of conclusions.

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Extracted Judgment Text

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## **`IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM`** ## **`PRESENT`** ## **`THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL K. NARENDRAN`** ## **`&`** ``` THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE G. GIRISH ``` ``` WEDNESDAY, THE 14[TH] DAY OF FEBRUARY 2024 / 25TH MAGHA, 1945 RCREV. NO. 82 OF 2021 ``` ``` AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 31.01.2020 IN RCA NO.121 OF 2018 OF RENT CONTROL APPELLATE AUTHORITY (ADDITIONAL DISTRICT COURT-III), KOZHIKODE ARISING OUT OF THE ORDER DATED 05.07.2018 IN RCP NO.175 OF 2015 OF THE RENT CONTROL COURT (PRINCIPAL MUNSIFF-I), KOZHIKODE ``` ## **`REVISION PETITIONER/APPELLANT/RESPONDENT:`** ``` KALLIL THODUKAYIL FAIZAL, AGED 47 YEARS S/O.MOOSA KOYA, UNIVERSAL ALUMINIUM, V.K.COMPLEX, ARAYIDATHUPALAM, POST PUTHIYARA, KOTTOOLI AMSOM, PARAYANCHERI DESOM, KOZHIKODE TALUK - 673 004. ``` ``` BY ADVS.K.M.FIROZ SMT.M.SHAJNA ``` ## **`RESPONDENTS/RESPONDENTS/PETITIONERS:`** - **`1 K.P.NAFEESA, AGED 57 YEARS, W/O.KIZHAKKEPARAMBIL LATE MUHAMMED, KIZHAKKEPARAMBIL HOUSE, CHEEKILODU AMSOM DESOM, POST CHEEKILODU, KOZHIKODE TALUK-673 315.`** - **`2 K.P.MUBEENA, AGED 34, D/O.KIZHAKKEPARAMBIL MUHAMMED, KIZHAKKEPARAMBIL HOUSE, CHEEKILODU AMSOM DESOM, POST CHEEKILODU, KOZHIKODE TALUK-673 315.`** - **`3 K.P.MUNEERA, AGED 32, D/O.KIZHAKKEPARAMBIL MUHAMMED, KIZHAKKEPARAMBIL HOUSE, CHEEKILODU AMSOM DESOM, POST CHEEKILODU, KOZHIKODE TALUK-673 315.`** - **`4 K.P.MUFSIL, AGED 29 YEARS, D/O.KIZHAKKEPARAMBIL MUHAMMED, KIZHAKKEPARAMBIL HOUSE, CHEEKILODU AMSOM DESOM, POST CHEEKILODU, KOZHIKODE TALUK-673 315.`** 2 R.C.R.No.82 & 83 of 2021 ``` 5 K.P.MUBAS, AGED 27 YEARS, S/O.KIZHAKKEPARAMBIL MUHAMMED, KIZHAKKEPARAMBIL HOUSE, CHEEKILODU AMSOM DESOM, POST CHEEKILODU, KOZHIKODE TALUK - 673 315. ``` ``` BY ADVS.V.V.SURENDRAN P.A.HARISH DONA PAUL ``` ``` THIS RENT CONTROL REVISION HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 14.02.2024, ALONG WITH RCRev.NO.83/2021, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: ``` 3 R.C.R.No.82 & 83 of 2021 ## **`IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM`** ## **`PRESENT`** ## **`THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL K.NARENDRAN`** ``` & ``` ## **`THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE G.GIRISH`** ``` WEDNESDAY, THE 14[TH] DAY OF FEBRUARY 2024 / 25TH MAGHA, 1945 ``` ``` RCREV. NO. 83 OF 2021 ``` ``` AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 31.01.2020 IN RCA NO.122 OF 2018 OF RENT CONTROL APPELLATE AUTHORITY (ADDITIONAL DISTRICT COURT-III), KOZHIKODE ARISING OUT OF THE ORDER DATED 05.07.2018 IN RCP NO.173 OF 2015 OF THE RENT CONTROL COURT ``` ``` (PRINCIPAL MUNSIFF-I), KOZHIKODE AND ``` ## **`REVISION PETITIONER/APPELLANT/RESPONDENT:`** ``` KALLIL THODUKAYIL FAIZAL, AGED 47 YEARS S/O.MOOSA KOYA, UNIVERSAL ALUMINIUM, V.K.COMPLEX, ARAYIDATHUPALAM, POST PUTHIYARA, KOTTOOLI AMSOM, PARAYANCHERI DESOM, KOZHIKODE TALUK-673004. ``` ``` BY ADVS.K.M.FIROZ SMT.M.SHAJNA ``` ## **`RESPONDENTS/RESPONDENTS/PETITIONERS:`** - **`1 K.P.NAFEESA, AGED 57 YEARS, W/O.KIZHAKKEPARAMBIL LATE MUHAMMED, KIZHAKKEPARAMBIL HOUSE, CHEEKILODU AMSOM DESOM, POST CHEEKILODU, KOZHIKODE TALUK673315.`** - **`2 K.P.MUBEENA, AGED 34 YEARS, D/O KIZHAKKEPARAMBIL MUHAMMED, KIZHAKKEPARAMBIL HOUSE, CHEEKILODU AMSOM DESOM, POST CHEEKILODU, KOZHIKODE TALUK-673315.`** - **`3 K.P.MUNEERA, AGED 32 YEARS, D/O KIZHAKKEPARAMBIL MUHAMMED, KIZHAKKEPARAMBIL HOUSE, CHEKKILODU AMSOM DESOM, POST CHEEKILODU, KOZHIKODE TALUK-673315.`** - **`4 K.P.MUFSIL, AGED 29 YEARS, S/O KIZHAKKEPARAMBIL MUHAMMED, KIZHAKKEPARAMBIL HOUSE,CHEEKILODU AMSOM DESOM, POST CHEEKILODU, KOZHIKODE TALUK-673315.`** 4 R.C.R.No.82 & 83 of 2021 ``` 5 K.P.MUBAS, AGED 27 YEARS, S/O KIZHAKKEPARAMBIL MUHAMMED, KIZHAKKEPARAMBIL HOUSE, CHEEKILODU AMSOM DESOM, POST CHEEKILODU, KOZHIKODE TALUK-673315. ``` ``` BY ADVS.V.V.SURENDRAN P.A.HARISH DONA PAUL ``` ``` THIS RENT CONTROL REVISION HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 14.02.2024, ALONG WITH RCRev.NO.82/2021, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: ``` 5 R.C.R.No.82 & 83 of 2021 ## **ORDER** Anil K. Narendran, J. These Rent Control Revisions arise out of the common judgment dated 31.01.2020 of the Rent Control Appellate Authority (Additional District Judge-III), Kozhikode in R.C.A.Nos.121 and 122 of 2018 and the common order dated 05.07.2018 of the Rent Control Court (Principal Munsiff-I), Kozhikode in R.C.P.Nos.175 and 173 of 2015. The respondents herein-landlords filed Rent Control Petitions seeking eviction of the tenant from the petition schedule shop rooms, i.e., Room Nos.27/312 and 27/311B. The need projected in the Rent Control Petition for seeking an order of eviction under Section 11(3) of the Act is that of the 5[th] respondent herein to start an electrical shop in the petition schedule shop rooms and also a room on the upstairs. An order of eviction was also sought for under Section 11(2)(b) on the ground of arrears of rent. Before the Rent Control Court, the tenant entered appearance and filed counter opposing the order of eviction sought for. Both Rent Control Petitions were tried together. On the side of the landlords, the 5[th] respondent herein was examined as PW1 and Exts.A1 to A8 were marked. On the side of the tenant, he was examined as RW1 and Exts.B1 to B6 were marked. Ext.X1 D&O 6 R.C.R.No.82 & 83 of 2021 licence application was marked as court exhibit. During the pendency of the Rent Control Petitions, the tenant paid the arrears of rent. Accordingly, the relief sought for under Section 11(2)(b) of the Act was not pressed. After considering the pleadings and evidence on record, the Rent Control Court arrived at a conclusion that the need projected by the landlords for seeking an order of eviction under Section 11(3) of the Act is bona fide, that the first proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act has no application to the facts and circumstances of the case and that, the tenant is not entitled to the protection under the second proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act. Accordingly, an order of eviction was granted under Section 11(3) of the Act, whereby the tenant is directed to put the landlords in vacant possession of the petition schedule shop rooms within one month from the date of that order. 2. Challenging the order of eviction granted by the Rent Control Court in R.C.P.Nos.173 and 175 of 2015, the tenant filed R.C.A.Nos.121 and 122 of 2018 before the Rent Control Appellate Authority (Additional District Judge-III), Kozhikode. Those appeals were dismissed by the common judgment dated 31.01.2020 of the Appellate Authority, whereby the order of eviction granted by the Rent Control Court under Section 11(3) 7 R.C.R.No.82 & 83 of 2021 of the Act stands confirmed. 3. Feeling aggrieved by the order dated 05.07.2018 of the Rent Control Court in R.C.P.Nos.175 and 173 of 2015 and the judgment dated 31.01.2020 of the Appellate Authority in R.C.A.Nos.121 and 122 of 2018, grating an order of eviction under Section 11(3) of the Act, the tenant is before this Court in these Rent Control Revisions, invoking the provisions under Section 20 of the Act. 4. On 09.04.2021, when these Rent Control Revisions came up for admission, this Court admitted the matter on file and issued notice to the respondents by speed post. In I.A.No.1 of 2021 filed in both Rent Control Revisions, this Court granted an interim stay as prayed for, for a period of three months. 5. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant and also the learned counsel for the respondents-landlords. 6. During the course of arguments, the learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant would confine the challenge made in these Rent Control Revisions against the finding of the Rent Control Court and the Appellate Authority on the applicability of the first proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act. 7. Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent 8 R.C.R.No.82 & 83 of 2021 Control) Act deals with eviction of tenants. As per Section 11(3) of the Act, a landlord may apply to the Rent Control Court, for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building if he bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him. As per the first proviso to Section 11(3), the Rent Control Court shall not give any such direction if the landlord has another building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village except where the Rent Control Court is satisfied that for special reasons, in any particular case it will be just and proper to do so. As per the second proviso to Section 11(3), the Rent Control Court shall not give any direction to a tenant to put the landlord in possession, if such tenant is depending for his livelihood mainly on the income derived from any trade or business carried on in such building and there is no other suitable building available in the locality for such person to carry on such trade or business. 8. As per the first proviso to Section 11(3), the Rent Control Court shall not give any such direction if the landlord has another building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village except where the Rent Control Court is satisfied that for special reasons, in any particular case it will be just and 9 R.C.R.No.82 & 83 of 2021 proper to do so. 9. In **M.L. Prabhakar v. Rajiv Singal [(2001) 2 SCC 355]** the Apex Court was dealing with a case in which eviction on the ground of _bona fide_ requirement was sought for under Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. In the said decision, the Apex Court relied on the law laid down in **Ram Narain Arora v. Asha Rani [(1999) 1 SCC 141]** , wherein it was held that the question whether the landlord has any other reasonably suitable residential accommodation is a question which is intermixed with the question regarding _bona fide_ requirement. Whether the landlord has any other reasonably suitable residential accommodation is a defence for the tenant. Whether the other accommodation is more suitable than the suit premises would not solely depend upon pleadings and nondisclosure by the landlord. The landlord having another accommodation would not be fatal to the eviction proceedings if both the parties understood the case and placed materials before the court and case of neither party was prejudiced. On the facts of the case on hand, the Apex Court found that, even though the landlord has not mentioned about the other two premises, the material in respect of the other two premises was placed before the Rent Controller as well as before the High Court, thus no 10 R.C.R.No.82 & 83 of 2021 prejudice has been caused, and the parties have squarely dealt with this question. ## 10. In **Vasantha Mallan v. N.S. Aboobacker Siddique** **[2020 (1) KHC 21]** the question that arose before a Division Bench of this Court was whether a landlord is bound to plead under first proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act, the availability of vacant building in his possession and seek to explain special reason for non-occupation of such premises, in a proceeding initiated for eviction of the tenant under Section 11(3) of the Act. The Division Bench held that the initial burden to prove that landlord is in possession of the vacant building, if any, is only upon the tenant unless the landlord himself admits any such vacant building to be in his possession. Only when the primary burden of proof in this behalf is discharged by the tenant, the burden shifts to the landlord to show otherwise or that the vacant premises are not suited to his needs. He can successfully discharge his part of the burden by adducing evidence either through his own testimony or others or in any other legal manner. Law does not require the landlord to plead that he is in possession of any vacant building and has special reasons for its non-occupation. It is up to the tenant alone to take up the contention and prove that landlord is in vacant possession of 11 R.C.R.No.82 & 83 of 2021 ## premises. 11. In **Vasantha Mallan** , relying on the law laid down by the Apex Court in **M.L. Prabhakar [(2001) 2 SCC 355]** the Division Bench held that, it is not incumbent on the landlord to disclose in his pleading availability of vacant building in his possession. The non-disclosure of vacant premises cannot be picked up as a reason or circumstance to doubt the bona fides of the claim of the landlord put forward under Section 11(3) of the Act. The Division Bench made it clear that it is not obligatory for the landlord to disclose in his pleadings the details of the vacant buildings available in his possession. Nor does first proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act insist the landlord to plead that the buildings available in his possession are not sufficient to meet his requirements. These are matters of evidence rather than pleadings. Failure of the landlord to disclose availability of buildings in his possession and plead special reasons for not occupying them, cannot be taken as a valid and legal ground for rejecting the claim of the landlord as not _bona fide_ . What could at the most be said is that it might be a fair and reasonable conduct if the landlord disclosed in his pleadings the details of buildings in his possession and simultaneously explained the reason for non-occupation of the premises for his alleged needs. 12 R.C.R.No.82 & 83 of 2021 ## 12. In **Dineshan Pillai P.B. v. Joseph @ Jose [2019** **(3) KHC 206]** a Division Bench of this Court was dealing with a case in which one of the contentions of the tenant was that the landlord has several other vacant buildings of his own in his possession to start the proposed business. The Division Bench noticed that, the pleadings are very vague with respect to the first proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act. It is stated that the landlord has several other buildings. No particular vacant room has been identified or pointed out in the pleadings. The Division Bench opined that it is obligatory on the part of the tenant to plead and prove the identity of the vacant building in the possession of the landlord. In the absence of specific pleadings, disclosing the identity of the vacant building in the possession of the landlord, it can be said that the tenant has not discharged the initial burden of proof under the first Proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act. 13. The need projected in the Rent Control Petition for seeking an order of eviction under Section 11(3) of the Act is that of the 5[th] respondent herein to start an electrical shop utilizing the petition schedule shop rooms and also the room on the first floor of the building. That need was substantiated by the oral testimony of the said respondent as PW1. Insofar as the 13 R.C.R.No.82 & 83 of 2021 applicability of the first proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act is concerned, the reasoning of the Appellate Authority in paragraph ## 15 of the impugned judgment reads thus; “15. Another contention raised by the appellant/ respondent is that the landlord is having another building in their possession and so going by first proviso to Section 11(3) the petitioners are not entitled to get an order under Section 11(3) in favour of them. Ext.X1 is the attested copy of D&O license application on the file of the Kozhikode Corporation pertaining to room No.27/310. Ext.X1 was called for by the respondent/tenant in the RCP from Municipal Corporation to show that, that room was given for license to one Hashim. Ext.A5 is the license agreement pertaining to the same. Appellant/tenant relied upon Exts.A5 to A8 to show that the petitioner is having another room in their possession. Ext.A5 and Ext.A6 are pertaining to room bearing No.27/310. Ext.A5 is seen executed on 07.04.2015 which is much before the filing of the RCP on 10.09.2015. It is contended on behalf of the appellant that Ext.A3 notice dated 19.06.2015 was issued 2 months after the execution of Ext.A5. Apparently even before the issuance of Ext.A3 notice that room was given to the licensee. So as on the date of filing of the RCP the room covered under Ext.A5 and A6 is not in possession of the petitioner. As per Ext.A7, room bearing No.27/309A was given on licence from 01.11.2014 and it was renewed continuously. Ext.A8 is the renewal agreement executed on 01.12.2016. So it is clear that, that room was also not in the possession of the petitioner as on the date of filing of the RCP. It is the contention of the appellant/respondent 14 R.C.R.No.82 & 83 of 2021 that the petitioner is having another building in his possession during the course of pendency of RCP and after that and so if at all genuinely he requires a room for starting an electrical shop he could have taken possession of the same. It is pertinent to note here that all those rooms stated by the appellant are not lying vacant, instead, they are given to the licensees for using the same. On expiry of the licence granted it is seen that it is renewed. So Ext.A5 to A8 is not sufficient enough to prove that the petitioner had vacant possession of the shop rooms at the time of filing of the rent control petition or subsequently. Apart from this there is nothing on record to show that the petitioner was having any other building in his possession at the time of filing of the petition. So the respondent/tenant has failed to discharge his initial burden to prove the first proviso to Section 11(3). Only when the tenant discharges his initial burden, the landlord need to show the special reasons as to why such building cannot be used.” 14. It is after properly appreciating the pleadings and evidence on record that the Rent Control Court as well as the Appellate Authority concurrently found that the first proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act has no application in the facts and circumstances of the case. Viewed in the light of the law laid down in the decisions referred to supra, it cannot be contended that the reasoning of the Rent Control Court and the Appellate Authority on the above aspect is either perverse or patently illegal, warranting interference by this Court in this Rent Control 15 R.C.R.No.82 & 83 of 2021 Revision. 15. Section 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act deals with revision. As per sub-section (1) of Section 20, in cases, where the appellate authority empowered under Section 18 is a Subordinate Judge, the District Court, and in other cases the High Court, may, at any time, on the application of any aggrieved party, call for and examine the records relating to any order passed or proceedings taken under this Act by such authority for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality, regularity or propriety of such order or proceedings, and may pass such order in reference thereto as it thinks fit. As per sub-section (2) of Section 20 of the Act, the costs of and incident to all proceedings before the High Court or District Court under sub-section (1) shall be in its discretion. 16. In **Rukmini Amma Saradamma v. Kallyani Sulochana [(1993) 1 SCC 499]** , the scope of revisional powers of the High Court under Section 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 came up for consideration before the Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court. While considering whether the High Court could have reappreciated entire evidence, the Apex Court held that, even the wider language of Section 20 of the Act cannot enable the High 16 R.C.R.No.82 & 83 of 2021 Court to act as a first or a second court of appeal. Otherwise, the distinction between appellate and revisional jurisdiction will get obliterated. Hence, the High Court was not right in reappreciating the entire evidence both oral or documentary in the light of the Commissioner's report. The High Court had travelled far beyond the revisional jurisdiction. Even by the presence of ‘ ’ - the word propriety it cannot mean that there could be a re appreciation of evidence. Of course, the revisional court can come to a different conclusion but not on a re-appreciation of evidence; on the contrary, by confining itself to legality, regularity and propriety of the order impugned before it. ## 17. In **T. Sivasubramaniam v. Kasinath Pujari** **[(1999) 7 SCC 275]** the Apex Court held that, the words ‘to satisfy itself’ employed in Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 no doubt is a power of superintendence, and the High Court is not required to interfere with the finding of fact merely because the High Court is not in agreement with the findings of the courts below. It is also true that the power exercisable by the High Court under Section 25 of the Act is not an appellate power to reappraise or reassess the evidence for coming to a different finding contrary to the finding recorded by the courts below. But where a finding arrived at by 17 R.C.R.No.82 & 83 of 2021 the courts below is based on no evidence, the High Court would be justified in interfering with such a finding recorded by the courts below. 18. In **Ubaiba v. Damodaran [(1999) 5 SCC 645]** the Apex Court considered the exercise of revisional power by the High Court, under Section 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, in the context of an issue as to whether the relationship of landlord-tenant existed or not. It was urged that whether such relationship existed would be a jurisdictional fact. Relying on the decision in **Rukmini Amma Saradamma** it was contended that, however wide the jurisdiction of the revisional court under Section 20 of the Act may be, it cannot have jurisdiction to re-appreciate the evidence and substitute its own finding upsetting the finding arrived at by the appellate authority. The Apex Court held that, though the revisional power under Section 20 of the Act may be wider than Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 it cannot be equated even with the second appellate power conferred on the civil court under the Code. Therefore, notwithstanding the use of the expression ‘propriety’ in Section 20 of the Act, the revisional - court will not be entitled to re appreciate the evidence and substitute its own conclusion in place of the conclusion of the 18 R.C.R.No.82 & 83 of 2021 appellate authority. On examining the impugned judgment of the High Court, in the light of the aforesaid ratio, the Apex Court held that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction by reappreciating the evidence and in coming to the conclusion that the relationship of landlord-tenant did not exist. 19. In **Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Dilbahar Singh [(2014) 9 SCC 78]** a Five-Judge Bench of the Apex Court considered the revisional powers of the High Court under Rent Acts operating in different States. After referring to the law laid down in **Rukmini Amma Saradamma** the Apex Court reiterated that even the wider language of Section 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 does not enable the High Court to act as a first or a second court of appeal. The Constitution Bench agreed with the view of the Three-Judge Bench in **Rukmini Amma Saradamma** that the word ‘propriety’ does not confer power upon the High Court to re-appreciate evidence to come to a different conclusion, but its consideration of evidence is confined to find out legality, regularity and propriety of the order impugned before it. 20. In **Thankamony Amma v. Omana Amma [AIR 2019 SC 3803 : 2019 (4) KHC 412]** considering the matter in the backdrop of law laid down in **Rukmini Amma Saradamma** , 19 R.C.R.No.82 & 83 of 2021 **Ubaiba** and **Dilbahar Singh** the Apex Court held that the findings rendered by the courts below were well supported by evidence on record and could not even be said to be perverse in any way. The High Court could not have re-appreciated the evidence and the concurrent findings rendered by the courts below ought not to have been interfered with by the High Court while exercising revisional jurisdiction. 21. In **Abdul Salam v. Sebastian [2013 (4) KLT 592]** , a Division Bench of this Court held that, even though in the decisions of the Apex Court and this Court, it has been held that, in revisional jurisdiction there cannot be a re-appreciation of evidence in order to come to a different conclusion on the same set of facts, it has been held in those decisions itself that, if the view taken is perverse and the statutory scheme has not been kept in mind and if it requires correction, then Court can reappreciate the evidence. When the argument is that, the approach made by the authorities are perverse, it cannot be said that this Court cannot look into the pleadings and scan through the evidence to find out whether the conclusions have been arrived at properly on the pleadings and evidence. ## 22. In **Regy V. Edthil v. Hubert Leslie D'Cruz [2016** **(2) KLJ 164]** , a Division Bench of this Court held that, the High 20 R.C.R.No.82 & 83 of 2021 Court (in revision) is obliged to test the order of the Rent Control Court on the touch stone of whether it is according to law. For that limited purpose, it may enter into reappraisal of evidence for the purpose of ascertaining whether the conclusion arrived at by the Rent Control Court is wholly unreasonable or is one that no reasonable person acting with objectivity could have reached on the material available. 23. Viewed in the light of the law laid down in the decisions referred to supra, conclusion is irresistible that the reasoning of the Rent Control Court and the Appellate Authority in the impugned order/judgment that the first proviso to Section 11(3) has no application in the facts and circumstances of the case, is neither perverse nor patently illegal, warranting interference in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction of this Court under Section 20 of the Act. In such circumstances, these Rent Control Revisions fail and the same are accordingly dismissed. 24. The learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant would submit that the tenant is conducting business in the petition schedule shop rooms and he may be granted at least eight months’ time to vacate the premises. 25. On the above request made by the learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant, the learned counsel for the respondents- 21 R.C.R.No.82 & 83 of 2021 landlords would submit that six months’ time for surrendering vacant possession of the petition schedule shop rooms can be granted, on condition that the tenant shall continue to pay the monthly rent for the remaining period, without any default. 26. In such circumstances, this Rent Control Revision is dismissed declining interference on the impugned judgment of the Rent Control Appellate Authority and also the order of the Rent Control Court; however by granting six months' time to the petitioner-tenant, to surrender vacant possession of the petition schedule shop rooms to the respondents-landlords, subject to the following conditions: - (i) The respondent-tenant in the Rent Control Petition shall file an affidavit before the Rent Control Court or the Execution Court, as the case may be, within two weeks from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order, expressing an unconditional undertaking that he will surrender vacant possession of the petition schedule shop rooms to the petitionerslandlords within six months from the date of this order and that, he shall not induct third parties into possession of the petition schedule shop room and further he shall conduct any business in the petition schedule shop rooms only on the strength of a valid licence/permission/consent issued by the local authority/statutory authorities; - (ii) The respondent-tenant in the Rent Control Petition 22 R.C.R.No.82 & 83 of 2021 shall deposit the entire arrears of rent as on date, if any, before the Rent Control Court or the Execution Court, as the case may be, within two weeks from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order, and shall continue to pay rent for every succeeding months, without any default; - (iii) Needless to say, in the event of the respondenttenant in the Rent Control Petition failing to comply with any one of the conditions stated above, the time limit granted by this order to surrender vacant possession of the petition schedule shop rooms will stand cancelled automatically and the petitionerslandlords will be at liberty to proceed with the execution of the order of eviction. Sd/- ## **ANIL K. NARENDRAN, JUDGE** Sd/- ## **G. GIRISH, JUDGE** AV/20/2