Kalanka Devi Sansthan v. Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, Nagpur & Ors.

936 KALANKA DEVI SANSTIIAN _v._ MAHARASHTRA REVENUE TRIBUNAL, NAGPUR & ORS. _August_ 19, 1969 (J.C. SHAH, ACTISG C.J., V. RAMASWAM! AND A. N. GROVER, JJ.] B _Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands_ _(Vldarbha Region) Act,_ 195~. 2(12) _Explanation I, ss._ "36" _and_ _38-Expremon_ _"to cultivate•_ _ptrsorrolly"-Scope_ _of-I/ a_ _Sansthan_ _or private religious trust entitled_ _to_ _recol'er possession_ _of_ _agricu!tu .. al_ _land_ _f(lr_ _"personal cultivation"._ The appellant Sansthan. a private reli!lious tru<t. derived most ell ita _C_ incom1 from cndoY•cd agricultural land. The fourlh respondent was a tenant of a part of the land. A notice was served on him on behalf of the appellant in January 1961 under s. 38 of !he Bomhay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Vidarbha Region) Act, 19~S. to give up possession of the land as it was required bv the Sansthan for personal cultivation. As the notice was not complied with, the appellant made an application under s. 36 which was rejected by the Naib Tahsildar. The S.D.O. as well as the first respondent Revenue Tribunal, confirmed lhis ordc ... The appellant D rhere~fter filed a petilion in the High Coon under Art. 227 but rhis was dismissed. In appeal to !his Court it was contended on behalf of the appellant that under Explanation I in s. 2( 12) of the Act a person who is subject to any physical or mental disability shall be deemed to cultivate the land personally if it is cultivate\! by the servants or by hired labou'rers; as an idol or a Sansthan that would fall v.·ithin the meaning of the word "person· E can well be regarded to be subject to a physical or mental disability and land can be cullivated on irs behalf by servants or hired labourers, by virtue of Explanation I the idol would be in the same position Fl.i a minor and it can cul!ivate the land personally within the meaning of s. 2(12). HELD : Dismissing the appeal, (i) There wa.s no 'force in the contention that the case of the appellant fell within faplanalion I in s. 2(12). Physical or menial disability as d&fined by s. 2(22), Jays emphasis on the words "personal labour or super vision". In other words the intention is that the cultivation of the land concerned mu•t be by natural pmon• and not bv legal pmons. [939 E] _Shri Kesheoraj Deo_ _Sansthan._ _Karania_ v. _Bapuraa_ _Deoba_ &: _Ors._ [1964] :l.fah L.J. 589, 593, relied upon. (ii) Neither proyisions of Bcrar Regulation of Agricultural Leases Act, 1951 nor of the Bombay Public Trustc; Act could be of any assistance to the appellants. In the present case it 'A'as common ground that the Sansthan was a private trust and y..·as not governed by the provisions of the Bombay Public Trusts Act. The manager of the Wahiwatdar of the SanSlhan could not, therefore, fall within the definition of the word "trustee" as given in s. 2(18 l of the Act. [940 F-FJ _/1hwardas_ v. _Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal_ <l _Ors.,_ [19681 3 S.C.R. 441. refeinod to. F G H KALANXA _**v.**_ REVENUE TRIBUNAL _(Grover,_ J.) 937 **A** (iii) There **was** **no** fOrce in the contention that the provisions of the Act which had the effect of debarring the appellant from ciaiming possessioP. for personal cultivation were violative of Articles 14 and 19(1)(f) _di_ **the Constitution. The Act** **is** **rendered** **immune** **from** **attack** **on** **these** grounds in view of the provisions of Article 31(A) of the Constitution. 1941 A-Bl **B** ## c _Shri Mahadw Palkaji Kolhe Yavatmal_ v. _The State_ _of Bombay,_ [19621 1 S.C.R. 733 and _Sri_ _Ram_ _Ram Narain Medhi_ v. _The State_ _of Bombay,_ [1959] Supp. 1 $,C.R. 489, referred to. CIVIL APPELLj\TB JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 862 of 1966. Appeal by special foave from the order dated April 8, 1965 of the Bombay High Court, Nagpur Bench in Letters Patent Appeal No. 40 of 1965. _W._ S. _Bar/ingay,_ _R. Mahalingier_ and _Ganpat Rai,_ for the appellant. _M._ S. _K._ _Sastriand_ S. _P._ _Nayar,_ for respondents Nos. 2, 3 and **B** 5. _M. Veerappa,_ for respondent No. 4. **E** **F** G **H** The Judgment 6f the Court was delivered by **Grover,** **J.** This is an appeal by special leave from a judgment of the High Court of Bombay dismissing a petition under Art. 227 of the Constitution which had been filed by appellant Sans than. . The appellant is a private religious Tmst which is managed by Laxman Anant Mulay who is described as a Wahiwatdar (Manager). The main source of income for performing the several acts including the daily worship of the family deity ( Shri Kalanka Devi) is stated to be derived from endowed agricultural land. Respondent No. 4 is the tenant in field survey No. 94 with an area of 30 acres 8 gunthas in Mouza Malrajura, district Akola. On Jamuary 30, 1961 a notice was served on behalf of the appellant on respondent No. 4 under the provisions of s. 38 of the Bombay Tenancy and · Agricultural Lands (Vidarbha Region) Act, 1958, hereinafter called the Act. It was mentioned in the notice that an earlier notice under s. 9(i) of the Berar Regulation of Agricultural Leases Act had been served in the year 1955 that the Sansthan required the aforesaid field for personal cultivation and, therefore, he should give up possession. Those proceedings were Pending but a notice under s. 38 of the Act was given to tenninate the tenancy without prejudice to the previous proceedings; As the notice· was not complied with an application was filed on behalf of the appellant under s. 36 of the Act for possession which was opposed by respondent No. **4 .** ### ., \138 SUPREME COGRT REPORTS [19 70] I S.C.R. T)ie Naib Tehsildar rejected the application on the ground that the Sansthan was not a land-holder who could cultivate the land personally. His order was confirmed by the Sub-Divisional Officer and by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal to whom appeals were taken. The appellant ultimately tiled a petition under Art. 227 of the Constitution before the High Court which, as stated before, was dismissed. The only point which has to be determined is whether the Sansthan could take advantage of the provisions contained in the Act by which possession can be claimed from the tenant on the ground that it is required for personal cultivation. Section 2(12) of the Act defines the words "to cultivate personally" in the following manner : S. 2 ( 12) "to cultivate p.~rsonally" means to culti**vate** **on one's** **O\\'n** **account-** (i) by one's own labour, or (ii) by the labour of any member of one's family, or (iii) under the personal supervision of one-self or of any member of one's family by hired labour or by servants on wages payable in cash or i<ind but not in crop share; _Explanation_ /.-A widow or a minor or a person who is subject to any physical or mental disability, or a serving member of the armed forces shall be deemed to cultivate the land personally if it is cultivated by her or his servant> or by hired labourer; ### Explanation II . ........... " According to s. 2 _<_ 22) the "physinl or mental disability" means physical or mental disability by reason of which the person sub ject to such disability is incapable of cuitivating lan<l bv personal Jabour or supervision. The word "tenant .. is defined bys. 2(32) as meaning a person _"lw_ holds land on lea~' inclu<ling a person who is dccme<l to be a tenant un<ler ss. 6, 7 or 8 and a person who is a protected lessee or occupancy tenant. It is provided that the wor<l ":an<llord" shall he construed accordin~ly. Section 3R deals with termination of tenancv bv landlord for cultivatin.c land personally. It says that after ~iving notice to a tc· nant in writing at any time on or before February 15. 1961 and makine an :tpplication for possession under s. 36 on or before March- 31. 1961 the landlor<l may terminate the tenancy other tha;n an occupancy tenancy if the landlord _bona fidr_ requires the land for cultivating it personally. Sub-s. (3) gives the conditions subject to which the tenancy can be terminated. A ll ## c D F G H **A** **B** ## **c** **D** **E** **F** **G** **H** **KALANKA** _v._ REVENUE TRIBUNAL _(Grover,_ _J.)_ 939 Now it is **well** known that when property is given absolutely for the worship of an idol it vests in the idol itself as a juristic person. As pointed out in Mukherjee's Hindu Law of Reiigious and Charitable Trust at pp. 142-43, this view is in accordance with the Hindu ideas and has been uniformly accepted in a long series of judicial decisions. The idol is capable of holding property in the same way as a natural person. "It has a juridical status with the power of suing and being sued. Its interests are attended to· by the person who has the deity in his charge and who is in law its manager with all the powers which would, in such circumstances, 6n analogy, be given to the manager of the estate of an infant heir". The question, however, is whether the idol is capable of cultivating the land personally. The argument raised on behalf of the appellant is that under Explanation I ins. 2(12),of the Act a person who is subject to any physical or mental disability shall be deemed to cultivate the land personally if it is cultivated by the servants or by hired labourer. In other words an idol or a Sansthan that would fall within the meaning of the word "person" can well be regarded to be subject to a physical or mental disability and land can be cultivated - on its behalf by servants or hired labourers. It is urged that in Explanation **(I)** the idol would be in the same position as a minor and it .can · certainly cultivate the land persona!ly within the meaning. of s. 2(12). It is difficult to accept the suggestion that the case of th'e appellant would fall within Explanation **(I)** ins. 2(12). Physical or mental disability as defined bys. 2(22) lays emphasis on the words "personal labour or supervision". As has been rightly pointed out in _Shri Kesheora; Deo Sansthan,_ _Karan;;_ v. _Bapurao Deoba_ & _Ors.(')_ in which an identioally . similar point came up for consideration, the dominating idea of anything done personally or in person is that the thing must be done by the person himself and not by or through some one else. In our opinion the following passage is that judgment at p. 593 explains the whole l)osition correctly : "It should thus appear that the legislative intent clearly is that in order to claim a cultivation as a personal cultivation there must be established a direct nexus between the person who makes such a claim, and the agricultural processes or activities carried on the land. In other words, all the agricultural operations, though al!owed to be done through hired labour or workers mnst be under the direct supervision, control, or management of the landlord. It is in that sense fbat the words "personal supervision" must be understood. In other words, the requirement of personal supervision under the third category of personal cultivation provid (1) [1964] Mah. L.J. 589, 593. 940 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ( 1970] 1 S.C.R. cd for in the definition docs not admit of an intern¥- A diary between the landlord and the labourer,~ who can act as agent of the landlord for supervising the operations of the agricultural worker. If that is not possible in the case of one landlord, we do not sec how it is possible in the case of another landlord merely because the landlord in the latter case is a juristic person". B In other words the intention is that the cultivation of the land concerned must be by natural persons and not by legal persons. It has next been contended that in the provision of the Berar Regulation of Agricultural Leases Act, 1951 publiG trusts _ot_ charitab!.: nature were included among those who could claim possession from a tenant on the ground of petsonal cultivation. It is not possible to sec how the provisions of a repealed · statute which was no longer in force, after the enactment of the Act, could be of any avail to the appellant. The decision in _Jshwardas_ v. _Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal_ & _Ors.(')_ has also been referred to hy the counsel for the appellant. In that case it was said that under s. _2_ ( 18) of the Bombay Public Trusts Act a trustee has been defined as meaning a person in whom either alone or in association wi!ll other persons the trust property is vested and includes a manager. In view of this definition the properties of the trusts vest ·in the managing trustee and he is the landlord under cl. 32 of s. 2 of the Act. As he is the landlord, he can ask for a surrender from the tenant of the lands of the trust "to cultivate personality". In the present case it is common ground that th.~ Sansthan is a private trust and is not governed by the provisions of the Bombay Public Trusts Act. The manager of the Wahiwatdar of the Sansthan cannot, therefore, fall within the definition of the word "trustee" as given in s. 2(18) of that Act. It may be mentioned that in _lshwardas,_ case ( [1 ] ) the court refrained from expressing any opinion on the question whether a manager or a Shebait of the properties of an idol or the manager of the Sansthan can or cannot apply for surrender by a tenant of lands for personal cultivation. The distinction between a manager or a Shebait of an idol and a trustee where a trust has been created is well recognised. The properties of tho trust in law vest in the trustee whereas in the case of an idol or a Sansthan they do not vest in the manager or tl!e Shebait. It is the deity or the Sansthan which owns and holds the properties. It is only the possession and the management which vest in the manager. It has lastly been contended that the relevant provisions of the Act which have the effect of debarring the appellant from claiming possession for personal cultivation violate the provisions (I) [196813S.C.ll.441. ## c D E F G H # A B KALANKA _v._ REVENUE TRIBUNAL _(Grover,_ _J.)_ 941 of Arts. 14 and 19(l)(f) of the Constitution. It is urged that discrimination is writ large between animate and juristic persons who fall within the definition of the word "person". Such a con tention, however, cannot be entertained in view of Art. 3 lA of the Constitution. The Act had received the assent .of the President and is rendered immune from attack or challenge on the ground of violation of Articles 14 or 19 of the Constitution. In _Shri_ _Mahadeo Paikaji Ko/he Yavatmal_ v. _The State_ _of_ _Bom-_ _bay_ ( [1 ] ) the constitutional validity of the Act itself was canvassed but the challenge failed. Similarly the validity of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Amendment Act, 1956 as applied to Viqatbha Region and Kutch Area was upheld in _Sri_ _Ram Ram Narain Medhi_ _v._ _The State_ _of Bombay(')._ The appeal consequently fails and it is dismissed with costs. R.K.P.S. _Appeal dismissed._ (I) ~~[1962]~~ ~~I S.C.R.~~ ~~733.~~ (2) [1959] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 489. Ll~Sup./69-22-5-70-GIPF.