K. Premraj s/o Kunhikannan v. M.K. Raveendran and State

## **IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM** ## **PRESENT** **THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A. BADHARUDEEN** **FRIDAY, THE 21[ST] DAY OF JULY 2023 / 30TH ASHADHA, 1945** **CRL.REV.PET NO. 269 OF 2018** **AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 21.11.2017 IN CRL.A.NO.313/2008 ON THE FILE OF THE ADDITIONAL SESSIONS JUDGE-II, THALASSERY AND AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 18.07.2008 IN S.T.C.NO.215/2007 ON THE FILE OF THE ADDITIONAL CHIEF JUDICIAL MAGISTRATE, THALASSERY** ## **REVISION PETITIONER/ACCUSED:** **K.PREMRAJ S/O. KUNHIKKANNAN, AGED 57 YEARS, BUSINESS, RESIDING AT PATHAYAKKUNNU, PATTIAM AMSOM DESOM. BY ADV SRI.K.P.HAREENDRAN** ## **RESPONDENTS/COMPLAINANT AND STATE:** |**1**|**M.K. RAVEENDRAN**| |---|---| ||**S/O. NANU, 57 YEARS, BUSINESS,**| ||**RESIDING AT MEETHALAE KATTIAL, KIZHAKKAE KADIROOR,**| ||**PATTIAM AMSOM.**| |**2**|**STATE**| ||**REPRESENTED BY THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR,**| ||**HIGH COURT OF KERALA, ERNAKULAM.**| ||**BY ADV SRI.SATHEESHAN ALAKKADAN**| ||**PP – M.P. PRASANTH**| **THIS CRIMINAL REVISION PETITION HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 21.07.2023, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:** Crl.R.P No. 269 of 2018 2 ## **ORDER** ## **Dated this the 21st day of January, 2023** This revision petition has been filed under Sections 397 and 401 of Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred as Cr.P.C. for convenience). The revision petitioner is the sole accused in S.T.C.No.215/2007 on the files of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate Court, Thalassery and the appellant in Crl.A.No.313/2008 on the files of the Additional District and Sessions Judge-II, Thalassery. The respondents herein are the original complainant as well as State of Kerala. 2. I would like to refer the parties in this revision petition as 'accused' and 'complainant', for convenience. 3. Heard the learned counsel for the accused as well as the learned Public Prosecutor, representing State and the learned counsel appearing for the complainant (1[st] respondent). 4. In this matter, the complainant launched prosecution against the accused alleging commission of offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Crl.R.P No. 269 of 2018 3 Instruments Act (hereinafter referred as N.I.Act for convenience), when cheque for Rs.1,00,000/- dated 12.11.2003 was dishonored due to insufficiency of funds. Since the accused failed to make the payment on demand, the complainant lodged complaint under Section 142 of the N.I.Act. 5. The trial court secured the presence of accused and complainant for trial and finally tried the matter. During trial, PWs 1 and 2 were examined and Exts.P1 to P7(a) marked on the side of the complainant. After questioning the accused under Section 313(1)(b) of the Cr.P.C., when opportunity was given, DW1 was examined and no exhibits marked on the side of the defence. 6. Thereafter, the trial court appraised the evidence and finally convicted the accused for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the N.I.Act and sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for three months and to pay fine of Rs.1,00,000/- and the fine was ordered to be paid as compensation to the complainant and in default of payment of fine, simple imprisonment for one month also was imposed. Crl.R.P No. 269 of 2018 4 7. Although, the accused challenged the conviction and sentence imposed by the trial court, before the Additional District and Sessions Judge-II, Thalassery, the learned Additional Sessions Judge also confirmed the conviction and sentence imposed by the trial court while modifying the substantive sentence as simple imprisonment for seven days. 8. While challenging the concurrent findings of conviction and modified sentence imposed by the Appellate Court, the learned counsel for the accused/petitioner argued that the court below ought to have held that the account in which Ext.P1 cheque is drawn was closed in the year 2002 and there was no transaction in the said account from 1990 onwards. The complainant's case is that the accused issued Ext.P1 cheque on 12.11.2003. But, it is brought out in evidence that long before 12.11.2003 the account was closed. 9. The learned counsel for the accused/petitioner further submitted that the accused specifically deposed before the court below that he had not opened an account with State Bank of India, Thalassery Branch. The Sessions Crl.R.P No. 269 of 2018 5 Judge went wrong in holding that the evidence of PW2 – the Bank Manager negatives the case of the accused with regard to the bank account. PW2 was not the Manager at the relevant time of opening the account. PW2 deposed before the court on the basis of Exts.P6 and P7 documents. He had no direct knowledge about the opening of the account. It is also submitted that at the time of opening the bank account, the accused was abroad and in the account opening form there is no photograph of the accused. The signature in the account opening form and signature of the accused shall be compared and proved is the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner. 10. While addressing these contentions, it has to be born in mind that issuance of cheque from an account which was closed also would attract an offence under Section 138 of the N.I. Act. In fact, the courts below negatived this contention relying on the evidence of PW2 and the same found to be convincing. Thus this challenge could not succeed. 11. In this matter, on perusal of the judgments under challenge, it could be gathered that, the courts below given emphasis to the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 and Exts.P1 to P7 Crl.R.P No. 269 of 2018 6 to hold that the complainant succeeded in establishing the transaction led to execution of Ext.P1 cheque. Therefore, the courts below given benefit of twin presumptions in favour of the complainant under Sections 118 and 139 of the N.I.Act. 12. Law regarding presumption is well settled. In this connection, I would like to refer a 3 Bench decision of the Apex Court in [2010 (2) KLT 682 (SC)], _**Rangappa v. Sri.Mohan**_ . In the above decision, the Apex Court considered the presumption available to a complainant in a prosecution punishable under Section 138 of the N.I Act and held as under: _“The presumption mandated by S.139 of the Act does indeed include the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability. To that extent, the impugned observations in Krishna Janardhan Bhat [2008 (1) KLT 425 (SC)] may not be correct. This is of course in the nature of a rebuttable presumption and it is open to the accused to raise a defence wherein the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability can be contested. However, there can be no doubt that there is an initial presumption which favours the complainant. S.139 of the Act is an example of a reverse onus clause that has been included in furtherance of the legislative objective of improving the credibility of negotiable instruments._ Crl.R.P No. 269 of 2018 7 _While S.138 of the Act specified a strong criminal remedy in relation to the dishonour of cheques, the rebuttable presumption under S.139 is a device to prevent undue delay in the course of litigation. However, it must be remembered that the offence made punishable by S.138 can be better described as a regulatory offence since the bouncing of a cheque is largely in the nature of a civil wrong whose impact is usually confined to the private parties involved in commercial transactions. In such a scenario, the test of proportionality should guide the construction and interpretation of reverse onus clauses and the accused/defendant cannot be expected to discharge an unduly high standard or proof. In the absence of compelling justifications, reverse onus clauses usually impose an evidentiary burden and not a persuasive burden. Keeping this in view, it is a settled position that when an accused has to rebut the presumption under S.139, the standard of proof for doing so is that of `preponderance of probabilities'. Therefore, if the accused is able to raise a probable defence which creates doubts about the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail. Accused can rely on the materials submitted by the complainant in order to raise such a defence and it is conceivable that in some cases the accused may not need to adduce evidence of his/her own.”_ 13. In the decision reported in [2019 (1) KLT 598 Crl.R.P No. 269 of 2018 8 (SC) : 2019 (1) KHC 774 : (2019) 4 SCC 197 : 2019 (1) KLD 420 : 2019 (2) KLJ 205 : AIR 2019 SC 2446 : 2019 CriLJ 3227], _**Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar**_ , the Apex Court while dealing with a case where the accused has a contention that the cheque issued was a blank cheque, it was held as under: _“A meaningful reading of the provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Act including, in particular, Sections 20, 87 and 139, makes it amply clear that a person who signs a cheque and makes it over to the payee remains liable unless he adduces evidence to rebut the presumption that the cheque had been issued for payment of a debt or in discharge of a liability. It is immaterial that the cheque may have been filled in by any person other than the drawer, if the cheque is duly signed by the drawer. If the cheque is otherwise valid, the penal provisions of S.138 would be attracted. If a signed blank cheque is voluntarily presented to a payee, towards some payment, the payee may fill up the amount and other particulars. This in itself would not invalidate the cheque. The onus would still be on the accused to prove that the cheque was not in discharge of a debt or liability by adducing evidence.”_ 14. In a latest 3 Bench decision of the Apex Court reported in [2021 (2) KHC 517 : 2021 KHC OnLine 6063 : Crl.R.P No. 269 of 2018 9 2021 (1) KLD 527 : 2021 (2) SCALE 434 : ILR 2021 (1) Ker. 855 : 2021 (5) SCC 283 : 2021 (1) KLT OnLine 1132], _**M/s.Kalamani Tex & anr. v. P.Balasubramanian**_ the Apex Court considered the amplitude of presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the N.I Act it was held as under: _“Adverting to the case in hand, we find on a plain reading of its judgment that the Trial Court completely overlooked the provisions and failed to appreciate the statutory presumption drawn under S.118 and S.139 of NIA. The Statute mandates that once the signature(s) of an accused on the cheque/negotiable instrument are established, then these `reverse onus' clauses become operative. In such a situation, the obligation shifts upon the accused to discharge the presumption imposed upon him. Once the 2[nd] Appellant had admitted his signatures on the cheque and the Deed, the Trial Court ought to have presumed that the cheque was issued as consideration for a legally enforceable debt. The Trial Court fell in error when it called upon the Complainant-Respondent to explain the circumstances under which the appellants were liable to pay._ _…................_ _18. Even if we take the arguments raised by the appellants at face value that only a blank cheque and_ Crl.R.P No. 269 of 2018 10 _signed blank stamp papers were given to the respondent, yet the statutory presumption cannot be obliterated. It is useful to cite Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar (2019 (1) KHC 774 : (2019) 4 SCC 197 : 2019 (1) KLD 420 : 2019 (1) KLT 598 : 2019 (2) KLJ 205 : AIR 2019 SC 2446 : 2019 CriLJ 3227], P.36., where this Court held that:_ _“Even a blank cheque leaf, voluntarily signed and handed over by the accused, which is towards some payment, would attract presumption under S.139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, in the absence of any cogent evidence to show that the cheque was not issued in discharge of a debt.”_ 15. The learned counsel for the accused/petitioner argued that the accused had not opened an account with State Bank of India, Thalassery Branch and at the time of opening the account he was abroad. But the said contention cannot be appreciated ignoring the evidence of PW2 to the contrary. Though, this contention was raised before the Courts below, the Courts below negatived the same. In fact, nothing substantiated to revisit the concurrent findings, by exercising the limited power of revision available to this Court. Crl.R.P No. 269 of 2018 11 16. In this context, I am inclined to refer the power of revision available to this Court under Section 401 of Cr.P.C. r/w Section 397, which is not wide and exhaustive to re-appreciate the evidence to have a contra finding. In the decision reported in [(1999) 2 SCC 452 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 275], **State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri** , the Apex Court, while considering the scope of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, laid down the following principles (SCC pp. 454-55, para 5): _“5. …... In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court_ Crl.R.P No. 269 of 2018 12 _which would otherwise tantamount to gross miscarriage of justice. On scrutinising the impugned judgment of the High Court from the aforesaid standpoint, we have no hesitation to come to the conclusion that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the conviction of the respondent by reappreciating the oral evidence. ...”_ 17. In another decision reported in [(2015) 3 SCC 123 : (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 19], _**Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan v.**_ _**Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke**_ , the Apex Court held that the High Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction shall not interfere with the order of the Magistrate unless it is perverse or wholly unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any relevant material, the order cannot be set aside merely on the ground that another view is possible. Following has been laid down in para.14 (SCC p.135) : _“14. …... Unless the order passed by the Magistrate is perverse or the view taken by the court is wholly unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any relevant material or there is palpable misreading of records, the Revisional Court is not justified in setting aside the order, merely because another view is possible. The Revisional Court is not meant to act as an appellate court. The whole purpose of the_ Crl.R.P No. 269 of 2018 13 _revisional jurisdiction is to preserve the power in the court to do justice in accordance with the principles of criminal jurisprudence. The revisional power of the court under Sections 397 to 401 Cr.P.C is not to be equated with that of an appeal. Unless the finding of the court, whose decision is sought to be revised, is shown to be perverse or untenable in law or is grossly erroneous or glaring unreasonable or where the decision is based on no material or where the material facts are wholly ignored or where the judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or capriciously, the courts may not interfere with decision in exercise of their revisional jurisdiction.”_ 18. The said ratio has been followed in a latest decision of the Supreme Court reported in [(2018) 8 SCC 165], _**Kishan Rao v. Shankargouda**_ . Thus the law is clear on the point that the whole purpose of the revisional jurisdiction is to preserve power in the court to do justice in accordance with the principles of criminal jurisprudence and, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to re-appreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion on the same when the evidence had already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice Crl.R.P No. 269 of 2018 14 of the court which would otherwise tantamount to gross miscarriage of justice. To put it otherwise, if there is nonconsideration of any relevant materials, which would go to the root of the matter or any fundamental violation of the principle of law, then only the power of revision would be made available. 19. In fact, nothing substantiated in this revision petition to interfere with the concurrent findings of conviction. But the sentence requires modification so as to meet the ends of justice. Hence, the sentence stands modified as under. 20. In the result, this revision petition succeeds in part and is accordingly allowed in part. Therefore, the accused is sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a day till raising of the Court and to pay fine of Rs.1,00,000/-. Fine shall be given as compensation to the complainant under Section 357(1)(b) of Cr.P.C. In default of payment of fine, the accused shall undergo default imprisonment for a period of three months. 21. Faced with the situation, the learned counsel for the petitioner sought for three months time to pay the Crl.R.P No. 269 of 2018 15 compensation. Considering the fact that, the cheque is of the year 2003 and the amount as Rs.1,00,000/-, I am inclined to grant one month time to the accused from today to pay the fine/compensation and to undergo the sentence. 22. Therefore, the revision petitioner/accused is directed to surrender before the trial court on 21.08.2023 to undergo the modified sentence and to pay the fine. If the revision petitioner/accused fails to surrender, as directed, the trial court shall execute the sentence as per law without fail. The execution of sentence stands deferred till 20.08.2023. Registry is directed to forward a copy of this order to the trial court for information and compliance within seven days. ## **Sd/-** ## **A. BADHARUDEEN JUDGE** SK