High Court of KeralaSingle JudgeCrl.M.C. dismissed; the trial proceedings conti...

K. P. Hameed and T. P. Rajeevan v. State of Kerala and M. Nambi

Case / Petition Number:Crl.MC.No. 3634 of 2007
Neutral Citation:/

Case Details & Bench

Court
High Court of Kerala
Hon'ble Judges
  • V. Ramkumar
Judgment Date
2008-01-17
Court Decision / Holding
Crl.M.C. dismissed. The petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. challenging the cognizance and proceedings was refused, upholding the continuation of the trial.
Final Disposition
Crl.M.C. dismissed; the trial proceedings continue against the accused.

Parties to the Case

Appellants / Petitioners

  • K.P. Hameed
  • T.P. Rajeevan

Respondents

  • The State of Kerala, represented by the Public Prosecutor, High Court of Kerala, Ernakulam
  • M. Nambi, S/o. Madappally, Dinesh Bhavan, Pulikkal P.O., Eranadu, Malappuram District

Legal Representation & Advocates

Counsels for Petitioners

  • • Sri. Sunil V. Mohammed

Counsels for Respondents

  • • Public Prosecutor Sri. K.S. Sivakumar

Case Synopsis & Summary

This is a Criminal M.C. filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. by accused Nos. 1 and 2 challenging the legality of proceedings in C.C. No.119/2004 before the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Malappuram, for offences under Sections 323, 341 and 506(1) read with Section 34 IPC. The petition argues that cognizance was taken on 11-02-2004, well beyond the period of limitation prescribed by Section 468 Cr.P.C. (three years for offences punishable with imprisonment exceeding one year). The alleged offence occurred on 17-11-2000; the refer report was filed on 18-02-2001 and the protest complaint on 03-03-2001. The petition contends that filing of a complaint is not identical to taking cognizance and that cognizance must be judged within the time limits, citing Krishna Pillai v. T.A. Rajendran and Another and other precedents; it also invokes the principle that an act of court should not prejudice a party (actus curiae neminem gravabit). The respondents counter that cognizance must be calculated with reference to the more severe punishment and that the period ends by 17-11-2003, hence cognizance on 11-02-2004 would be time-barred. The judge reviews competing precedents, highlights the later decisions (Rashmi Kumar and Bharat Kale) as binding over Krishna Pillai, and dismisses the petition. The court ultimately declines to quash the proceedings, upholding the State’s case on limitation.

Provisions of Law Cited

Section 482 Cr.P.C.Section 468 Cr.P.C.Section 200 Cr.P.C.Section 323 IPCSection 341 IPCSection 506(1) IPC read with Section 34 IPCSection 9 of the Act (referenced)

Legal Doctrines & Maxims

  • actus curiae neminem gravabit

Submissions & Arguments

Contentions of Appellants / Petitioners

The accused contended that cognizance was taken after the expiry of the period of limitation under Section 468 Cr.P.C. They argued that cognizance is distinct from filing and that the date of filing the complaint should be treated as the relevant date only where appropriate per earlier precedents. They relied on Krishna Pillai and Antulay’s principles to contend for quashing if cognizance is time-barred, and invoked the maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit to emphasize that inaction by the court should not prejudice the complainant.

Contentions of Respondents

The State defended the validity of cognizance beyond the three-year limit, arguing that the period must be calculated with reference to the most severe punishment (3 years) for the offences charged. They asserted that the complaint was within the permissible period and that cognizance on 11-02-2004 was not barred by Section 468 Cr.P.C., after considering the relevant case law on taking cognizance and the distinction between filing and cognizance.

Cited Precedents (7)

Case NameCitationTreatmentExplanation
Krishna Pillai v. T.A. Rajendran and Another1990 (Supp.) SCC 121OverruledThe Judge noted that later decisions (Rashmi Kumar, Bharat Kale) should prevail over Krishna Pillai’s, and Krishna Pillai’s view on cognizance timing was not to be treated as binding in light of subsequent authority.
A.R. Antulay v. Ramdas Srinivas NayakConstitution Bench (paras referenced)Mentioned OnlyCited for the conceptual definition of taking cognizance; used as a background principle rather than a binding directive in the present outcome.
Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community and Another v. State of Maharashtra2005 (2) SCC 673Mentioned OnlyCited to emphasize that a larger bench may be required to resolve conflicting precedents; not applied to overrule the current decision but acknowledged as controlling principle for binding guidance.
Babu Parasu Lai Kadi by LRs. v. Babu (dead) through LRs.2004 (1) SCC 681PositiveCited to support the proposition that later 2:1 decisions cannot override earlier unanimous 3-judge decisions; used to frame the principle that co-ordinate bench conflicts should be treated with caution.
Rashmi Kumar v. Mahesh Kumar Bhada1997 (2) SCC 397PositiveFollowed as binding on the issue of limitation when conflicting precedents exist; used to prefer Rashmi Kumar over Krishna Pillai’s case.
Bharat Damodar Kale v. State of A.P.2004 SCC (CrI.) 39PositiveCited as part of the line of cases followed after Rashmi Kumar to determine limitation principles; supportive of the present order.
Japani Sahoo v. Chandrasekhar Mohanti2007 Crl. L.J. 4068 (S.C.)Mentioned OnlyCited to reference constitutional/Cr.P.C. principles; used as a supporting citation rather than binding authority for the decision.

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Extracted Judgment Text

Exact text extracted from official judgment records.

CR IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM PRESENT : THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE V.RAMKUMAR THURSDAY, THE 17TH JANUARY 2008 / 27TH POUSHA 1929 Crl.MC.No. 3634 of 2007() ------------------------CC.119/2004 of JUDL. MAGISTRATE OF FIRST CLASS, MALAPPURAM .................... PETITIONER: ACCUSED NOS.1 & 2: ------------------------------ 1. K.P. HAMEED, S/O. KODUNDUKKARAN VEERAN HAJI, COMMUNITY HOME, PETTA, FEROKE, KOZHIKODE. 2. T.P. RAJEEVAN, PUBLIC RELATIONS OFFICER, UNIVERSITY OF CALICUT, THENHIPALAM, MALAPPURAM. BY ADV. SRI.SUNIL V.MOHAMMED RESPONDENTS: STATE/COMPLAINANT: ------------------------------- 1. THE STATE OF KERALA, REPRESENTED BY THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT OF KERALA, ERNAKULAM. 2. M. NAMBI, S/O. MADAPPALLY, DINESH BHAVAN, PULIKKAL P.O., ERANADU, MALAPPURAM DISTRICT. BY PUBLIC PROSECUTOR SRI.K.S. SIVAKUMAR THIS CRIMINAL MISC. CASE HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 14/01/2008, THE COURT ON 17/01/2008 PASSED THE FOLLOWING: ## **V. RAMKUMAR, J.** ## *** * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * Crl. M.C. NO. 3634 of 2007 * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * Dated, this the 17[th] day of January 2008** ## **ORDER** In this petition filed under Sec. 482 Crl.P.C. the petitioners who are accused Nos. 1 and 2 in C.C. No. 119 of 2004 on the file of the J.f.C.M. Malappuram for offences punishable under Sections 323, 341 and 506 (1) read with Sec. 34 I.P.C., seek to quash the aforesaid proceedings before the Magistrate. 2. Adv. Sri.Sunil V. Mohammed, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners/accused made the following submissions before me in support of his contentions:- The alleged occurrence in this case took place on 17-112000 The refer report was filed on 18-2-2001. The protest complaint was filed on 3-3-2001. The cognizance was taken by the Magistrate on 11-2-2004. The cognizance so taken was clearly beyond the period of three years prescribed for the offence under Section 468 Cr.P.C. which reads as follows:- ## **“468. Bar to taking cognizance after lapse of the period of limitation** ## 1) Except as otherwise provided elsewhere in -:2:- **Crl. M.C. NO. 3634 of 2007** this Code, no court shall take cognizance of an offence of the category specified in sub-section (2), after the expiry of the period of limitation. - 2) The period of limitation shall be - - a) six months, if the offence is punishable with fine only; - b) one year, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year; - c) three years, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding one year but not exceeding three years. - 3) For the purposes of this section the period of limitation, in relation to offence which may be tried together , shall be determined with reference to the offence which is punishable with the more severe punishment or, as the case may be, the most severe punishment”. The date of filing of the complaint cannot be treated as the date of taking cognizance. Taking cognizance is different from filing the complaint. In **Krishna Pillai v. T.A. Rajendran and Another - 1990 (Suppl.) SCC 121,** the Apex Court held as follows:- “3. It is not disputed that cognizance has been taken by the court more than a year after the offence was committed. The counsel for the respondents has stated that since the complaint had been filed within a year from the commission of the -:3:- **Crl. M.C. NO. 3634 of 2007** offence it must be taken that the court has taken cognizance on the date when the complaint was filed. In that view of the matter there would be no limitation. 4. Taking cognizance has assumed a special meaning in our criminal jurisprudence. We may refer to the view taken by a five Judge bench of this Court in A.R. Antulay v. Ramdas Srinivas Nayak, at p. 530 (para 31) of the reports this Court indicated: “When a private complaint is filed, the Court has to examine the complainant on oath save in the cases set out in the proviso to Section 200 Cr.P.C. After examining the complainant on oath and examining the witnesses present, if any, meaning thereby that the witnesses not present need not be examined, it would be open to the court to judicially determine whether a case is made out for issuing process. When it is said that court issued process, it means the court has taken cognizance of the offence and has decided to initiate the proceedings and a visible manifestation of taking cognizance process is issued which means that the accused is called upon to appear before the court”. The extract from the Constitution Bench judgment clearly indicates that filing of a complaint in court is not taking cognizance and what exactly constitutes taking cognizance is different from filing of a complaint. Since the magisterial action in this case was beyond the period of one year from the date of the commission of the offence the Magistrate was not competent to take cognizance when he did in view of the bar under Sec. 9 of the Act. We accordingly allow the appeal and quash the prosecution”. This is a decision rendered by a three Judge Bench of the -:4:- **Crl. M.C. NO. 3634 of 2007** Supreme Court and decisions of the Supreme Court with lesser coram strength holding otherwise cannot prevail over **Krishna Pillai's** case. Going by the decision of a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in **Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community and Another v. State of Maharashtra - 2005 (2) SCC 673** the decision by the 3 Judge Bench in **Krishna Pillai's** case can be considered only by a larger Bench of the Supreme Court and until then the verdict in **Krishna Pillai's** case will be binding on all the Courts. In **Babu Parasu KLai Kadi by LRs. v. Babu (dead) through LRs. - 2004 (1) SCC 681** it has been held by the Apex court that where an earlier decision has been unanimously rendered by a 3 Judge Bench of the Supreme Court a later decision rendered only by a majority of 2 : 1 and that too without noticing the earlier binding precedent of a co-ordinate Bench will be treated as per in curium. Hence, decisions rendered by the Apex court with 2 Judges taking a view contrary to the one taken in **Krishna Pillay's** case cannot be treated as binding. **3.** I am afraid that I cannot agree with the above submissions. The filing of a complaint or the initiation of criminal proceedings before a court and the taking cognizance of the offence or issuing process are distinct and different. So -:5:- **Crl. M.C. NO. 3634 of 2007** far as the complainant is concerned, as soon as he has filed a complaint before a competent court of law, he has done everything which is required to be done by him at that stage. Thereafter it is for the Magistrate to consider the matter, apply his mind and to take the appropriate decision of taking cognizance, issuing process or any other action which the law contemplates. The complainant has no control over the proceedings of the Magistrate. Due to various reasons it may not be possible for the court or the Magistrate to issue process or take cognizance. But the complainant cannot be penalised for such delay on the part of the court nor can he be non - suited for the failure or omission by the Magistrate in taking the appropriate action under the code. In a case where the complainant has approached the Court well within the time prescribed by law the proceedings cannot be abruptly terminated for the failure or omission on the part of the court in taking the above action prescribed by law. If the court were to penalise the complainant for no fault of his but for the delay or inaction on the part of the court itself, the court would be injuring the suitor for no fault of his, thereby attracting the **Crl. M.C. NO. 3634 of 2007** -:6:- maxim **“actus curiae neminem gravabit”** - (an act of Court shall not prejudice any party) . If section 468 were to be interpreted otherwise it may not survive the test of constitutionality when matched on the touchstone of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. **(Vide Japani Sahoo v. Chandrasekhar Mohanti - 2007 Crl. L.J. 4068 S.C. )** 4. In **Rashmi Kumar v. Mahesh Kumar Bhada - 1997 (2) SCC 397** another three Judge Bench of the Apex court observed as follows:- “15. The next question that needs to be answered is whether the complaint filed by the appellant in September 1990 is time barred. Section 468 of the Code prescribes period of limitation. Under subsection (3) thereof, the period of limitation shall be three years if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding one year but not exceeding three years. Since the offence alleged to have been committed by the respondent is punishable under Section 406, viz. criminal breach of trust, and the punishment of imprisonment which may extend to three years or with fine or with both, the complaint is required to be filed within three years from date of the commission of the offence.” The said decision of the 3 Judges Bench has been followed in **Bharat Damodar Kale v. State of A.P. - 2004 SCC (Crl.) 39** . The law is equally well settled that when there are -:7:- **Crl. M.C. NO. 3634 of 2007** conflicting decisions by Benches of co-ordinate strength, the last one will prevail, if so, **Rashmi Kumar's** case should receive precedence over **Krishna Pillai's** case. Moreover, in **Krishna Pillai's Case** the passage extracted from the decision of the Constitution Bench in **A.R. Antulay's Case** , does not lay down the proposition that the date of filing the complaint is not the date which is relevant for reckoning the period of limitation. Hence, I am not inclined to uphold the contention raised by the petitioner for quashing the proceedings before the Magistrate on the ground of limitation. This Crl. M.C. is accordingly, dismissed. Sd/- **V. RAMKUMAR, JUDGE** ani /true copy/