K. M. Ashraf v. M. Ramaswamy Pillai

## **IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM** ## **PRESENT** ## **THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL K.NARENDRAN** ## **&** **THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE P.G. AJITHKUMAR MONDAY, THE 7[TH] DAY OF FEBRUARY 2022 / 18TH MAGHA, 1943 R.C.REV.NO.176 OF 2019** **AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 08.11.2017 OF THE RENT CONTROL APPELLATE AUTHORITY-IV (ADDL.DISTRICT COURT-IV), THIRUVANANTHAPURAM IN R.C.A.NO.36 OF 2016, ARISING FROM ORDER DATED 02.06.2016 OF THE RENT CONTROL COURT (ADDL.MUNSIFF), THIRUVANANTHAPURAM IN R.C.P.NO.25 OF 2015** **REVISION PETITIONER:** **K.M.ASHRAF, AGED 48 YEARS, S/O.M.M.KASSIM, T.C.38/204, POWER HOUSE ROAD, CHENITHITTA, CHALA P.O., THIRUVANANTHAPURAM - 695 036. BY ADVS. AYYAPPAN SANKAR SRI.JAYAN JOHN SMT.S.HRIDYA** ## **RESPONDENT:** **M.RAMASWAMY PILLAI, S/O.R.MANICKAM PILLAI, T.C.16/784, MAHEYIRAM, JAGATHY, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, PRESENTLY RESIDING AT DHANASREE, ST.BENEDICT CROSS ROAD, ERNAKULAM - 682 018. BY ADV SRI.L.MOHANAN** **THIS RENT CONTROL REVISION HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 07.02.2022, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:** R.C.REV.NO.176 OF 2019 -2- ## **ORDER** ## **Anil K. Narendran, J.** The petitioner is the respondent-tenant in R.C.P.No.25 of 2015 on the file of the Rent Control Court (Additional Munsiff), Thiruvananthapuram, a petition filed by the respondent herein-landlord, under Section 11(2)(b) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, seeking eviction of the tenant from the petition schedule building on the ground that the tenant has kept the rent payable in respect of the said building in arrears from June, 2010. Before the Rent Control Court, the tenant filed counter, opposing the order of eviction sought for. Exts.A1 to A3 were marked on the side of the landlord and Exts.B1 to B3 were marked on the side of the tenant. After considering the pleadings and evidence on record, the Rent Control Court arrived at a conclusion that the tenant has kept the monthly rent of Rs.6,000/- payable in respect of the petition schedule building in arrears from June, 2010. The case of the landlord that he is entitled to further enhancement of rent by 15% over Rs.6,000/- on expiry of a period of 20 months was not accepted by the Rent Control R.C.REV.NO.176 OF 2019 -3- Court. By the order dated 02.06.2016, the Rent Control Court allowed R.C.P.No.25 of 2015 and the landlord is granted an order of eviction under Section 11(2)(b) of the Act, by directing the tenant to give vacant possession of the petition schedule building to the landlord within one week. 2. Challenging the order of eviction granted by the Rent Control Court in R.C.P.No.25 of 2015, the tenant filed R.C.A.No.36 of 2016 before the Rent Control Appellate Authority (Additional District Judge-IV), Thiruvananthapuram, under Section 18(1)(b) of the Act. In that appeal, the landlord filed cross objection challenging the finding of the Rent Control Court on his claim for enhancement of rent by 15% over Rs.6,000/- on expiry of 20 months. By the judgment dated 08.11.2017, the Rent Control Appellate Authority dismissed R.C.A.No.36 of 2016 filed by the tenant as well as the cross objection filed by the landlord. 3. Challenging the order of eviction granted by the Rent Control Court under Section 11(2)(b) of the Act in the order dated 02.06.2016 in R.C.P.No.25 of 2015 and the judgment dated 08.11.2017 in R.C.A.No.36 of 2016 of the R.C.REV.NO.176 OF 2019 -4- Rent Control Appellate Authority, the tenant is before this Court in this revision, invoking the revisional jurisdiction of this Court under Section 20 of the Act. 4. On 09.04.2019, when this Rent Control Revision came up for admission, this Court issued notice to the respondent-landlord through speed post. In I.A.No.2 of 2019, this Court granted an interim stay against the eviction of the tenant from the tenanted premises in R.C.P.No.25 of 2015 on the file of the Rent Control Court, Thiruvananthapuram, if not already evicted, subject to the condition of the tenant remitting or paying an amount of Rs.2,00,000/-, within a period of two weeks from the date of that order. Thereafter, the tenant filed I.A.No.3 of 2019, seeking enlargement of time to deposit the said amount. That application was allowed, by the order of this Court dated 30.05.2019, extending the time limit upto 05.06.2019, on condition that no further time will be granted. Within the extended time limit, the tenant deposited Rs.2,00,000/-, by way of a demand draft, which is lying in court deposit. The landlord filed I.A.No.4 of 2019, seeking an order to accept a photograph of the petition schedule building R.C.REV.NO.176 OF 2019 -5- exhibiting the name board “Modern Tyre”, as additional document. 5. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner–tenant and also the learned counsel for the respondent–landlord. 6. The issue that arises for consideration in this Rent Control Revision is as to whether any interference is warranted on the judgment dated 08.11.2017 of the Rent Control Appellate Authority in R.C.A.No.36 of 2016, whereby the order of eviction granted by the Rent Control Court under Section 11(2)(b) of the Act in R.C.P.No.25 of 2015 stands confirmed. 7. Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act deals with eviction of tenants. As per Section 11(2)(a) of the Act, a landlord who seeks to evict his tenant shall apply to the Rent Control Court for a direction in that behalf. As per Section 11(2)(b), if the Rent Control Court, after giving the tenant a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the application, is satisfied that the tenant has not paid or tendered the rent due by him in respect of the building within fifteen days after the expiry of the time fixed in the agreement of tenancy with his landlord or in the absence R.C.REV.NO.176 OF 2019 -6- of any such agreement by the last day of the month next following that for which the rent is payable, it shall make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building, and if it is not satisfied it shall make an order rejecting the application thereof by him. As per the first proviso to Section 11(2)(b), an application under this subsection shall be made only if the landlord has sent a registered notice to the tenant intimating the default and the tenant has failed to pay or tender the rent together with interest at six per cent per annum and postal charges incurred in sending the notice within fifteen days of the receipt of the notice or of the refusal thereof. As per Section 11(2)(c), the order of the Rent Control Court directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building shall not be executed before the expiry of one month from the date of such order or such further period as the Rent Control Court may in its discretion allow; and if the tenant deposits the arrears of rent with interest and cost of proceedings within the said period of one month or such further period, as the case may be, it shall vacate that order. R.C.REV.NO.176 OF 2019 -7- 8. Section 9 of the Act deals with right of tenant paying rent or advance to receipt. As per Section 9(2) of the Act, where a landlord refuses to accept or evades the receipt of any rent lawfully payable to him by a tenant in respect of any building the tenant may either remit the rent to the landlord by money order after deducting the money order commission and continue to remit any rent which may subsequently become due in respect of the building in the same manner until the landlord signifies by a written notice to the tenant his willingness to accept the rent or may by notice in writing, require the landlord to specify within ten days from the date of receipt of the notice by him, a bank into which the rent may be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. As per the proviso to Section 9(2), such bank, if specified as aforesaid, shall be one situated in the city, town or village in which the building is situated or if there is no such bank in such city, town or village, within three miles of the limits thereof. As per Explanation to Section 9(2), it shall be open to the landlord to specify, from time to time, by a written notice to the tenant and subject to the proviso aforesaid, a R.C.REV.NO.176 OF 2019 -8- bank different from the one already specified by him under this sub-section. As per Section 9(3), if the landlord specifies a bank as aforesaid the tenant shall deposit the rent in the bank and shall continue to deposit in it any rent which may subsequently become due in respect of the building. As per Section 9(4), if the landlord does not specify a bank as aforesaid, the tenant shall remit the rent to the landlord by money order, after deducting the money order commission and continue to remit any rent which may subsequently become due in respect of the building in the same manner until the landlord signifies by a written notice to the tenant his willingness to accept the rent or specifies a bank in which the rent shall be deposited in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (2). 9. In **Bhaskaran Assan v. Ammukutty Amma [1992 (2) KLT 565 : AIR 1993 Ker. 144]** this Court held that, any prudent tenant would and should, resort to Section 9 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act in cases where the landlord refuses to issue receipt to him on his paying the rent due. If he is not prudent enough to resort to R.C.REV.NO.176 OF 2019 -9- that course it will require very strong evidence on his side to substantiate a plea that he has paid the rent without obtaining receipts for the same. 10. In **Sukumaran P. v. K.A. Hamza Haji [2014 (3) KHC 833 : ILR 2015 (2) Ker. 166]** a Division Bench of this Court, in which one among us [Anil K. Narendran, J] was a party, held that, when the tenancy in respect of the petition schedule building and the rate of rent are not in dispute, the burden is upon the tenant to prove the plea of discharge of rent set up by him. If the landlord was in the habit of not issuing receipts on payment of rent, the tenant could have chosen any one of the modes prescribed under Section 9 of the Act. 11. In **Ouseph Mathai v. Abdul Khader [(2002) 1 SCC 319]** the Apex Court noticed that the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act is a social welfare legislation meant to protect and safeguard the interests of the tenants but it does not confer unfettered powers on the tenants to remain in possession of the leased premises notwithstanding the compliance with directions of the court or the provisions of R.C.REV.NO.176 OF 2019 -10- the statute. The Act is intended to protect the interests of bona fide tenants in possession. The Act has put restrictions on the right of the landlord to seek eviction of the tenant on the ground of defaults in the payment of rent which are regulated by Section 11(2). A tenant is under an obligation to pay or tender the rent in respect of the building under his occupation within 15 days after the expiry of time fixed in the agreement of tenancy or in the absence of such agreement by the last day of next month falling for which the rent is payable. Non-payment of rent, as per contract and statutory provisions, entitles the landlord to seek possession only after compliance of sending a registered notice to tenants intimating the default. If after the receipt of such a notice a genuine tenant pays or tenders the rent together with interest at 6% per annum and postal charges, the right accrued to the landlord to get possession on this ground is defeated. Even after passing of the eviction order, a further right is conferred upon tenant in terms of Section 11(2)(c) of the Act. It is only such tenant who defaults to pay the rent at all the three relevant times, the law requires him to be dispossessed. R.C.REV.NO.176 OF 2019 -11- 12. In the instant case, the landlord filed R.C.P.No.25 of 2015 seeking eviction of the tenant under Section 11(2)(b) of the Act, with an allegation that the tenant has kept in arrears the monthly rent in respect of the petition scheduled building from June, 2010. Ext.A1 is the lawyer notice dated 08.12.2014 demanding payment of arrears of rent and Ext.A3 is the reply notice dated 27.03.2015 of the tenant. The landlord raised a contention that the monthly rent of the petition schedule building originally fixed as Rs.4,000/- was enhanced to Rs.6,000/-, after 11 months, which was further enhanced to Rs.10,493/-, after the expiry of 20 months, as per the rental agreement, the Rent Control Court as well as the Appellate Authority did not accept the case of the landlord regarding enhancement of rent from Rs.6,000/-. After considering the rival contentions, both the authorities concurrently found that the tenant is liable to pay monthly rent at the rate of Rs.6,000/- to the landlord for the petition schedule building. 13. Relying on Ext.B1 receipt dated 01.06.2014 and Ext.B2 receipt dated 01.03.2014, the tenant raised a R.C.REV.NO.176 OF 2019 -12- contention that the rent payable in respect of the petition schedule building is not in arrears from June, 2010, as claimed by the landlord. The Rent Control Court as well as the Appellate Authority did not accept the case of the tenant brushed aside Exts.B1 and B2 receipts for the reasons stated in the impugned order and judgment. The reasoning of the Appellate Authority in paragraph 10 of the judgment in R.C.A.No.36 of 2016 while confirming the order of eviction granted by the Rent Control Court in R.C.P.No.25 of 2015 reads thus; “10. Now, the court below has found that the rent available to the landlord is only Rs.6,000/- and then the question is as to the period during which the appellant committed default in paying the rent for that the appellant relied on Exts.B1 to B2 documents which are rent receipts. Ext.B1 dated 01.06.2014 is signed by the landlord showing receipt of rent of Rs.6,000/-. It was received from the landlord with respect to the scheduled building. But the period for which the rent has been paid is scored out. But even then it is possible to read year and months as May 2010. The same correction was made in Ext.B2 receipt which was issued on 01.03.2014 and as per the said receipt the rent of Rs.6,000/- was for the month of April 2010 and the said year and month were seen scored out. Here the R.C.REV.NO.176 OF 2019 -13- explanation offered by CPW1 is that which were received in that condition and even at the time of issue of the said receipt the month and year were scored out. In that connection the landlord/respondent produced counter foil of Exts.B1 and B2 receipts but unfortunately which were not marked. But the court below has perused the same for finding that the rent was paid only up to May 2010. Even without perusing the counter foil it is possible to read from Ext.B1 that the rent was paid for the month of May 2010. Now, it is necessary to consider the explanation offered for the scoring out period of rent. If the tenant/appellant had paid rent up to 01.06.2014 definitely he would have claimed receipts by endorsing the said fact in Ext.B1 and B2. Especially there is a specific column in the receipt for entering the month and year for which the rent is being paid. The interesting fact is that the said column is seen filled but subsequently it is seen scored out. So at any stretch of imagination it is not possible to find that the landlord/respondent had issued Exts.B1 and B2 receipt aft scoring out the months for which the rent was paid. So the case of the appellant that he paid rent upto 01.06.2014 is not correct and if he had paid rent upto 01.06.2014 he could have produced rent receipt. He has no case that the landlord/respondent did not issue receipt properly for the month of June 2014 on the contrary the document produced by the appellant is manipulated to show that he paid rent upto June 2014. So the appellant's case is that he paid R.C.REV.NO.176 OF 2019 -14- rent upto 2014 is not established. The case of the landlord/respondent that the appellant paid rent only upto May 2010 substantiated by Exts.B1 and B2 documents. In that connection the appellant could not produce any further document for payment of rent after May 2010. So the landlord/respondent's case that the appellant/tenant paid rent only upto May 2010 can be accepted. Now, the learned counsel for the appellant would contend that he had paid a sum of Rs.5 lakhs as advance and thereafter, he did maintenance work at a cost of Rs.2.5 lakhs and said amount has to be adjusted towards the rent. For that is is to be considered that the appellant himself would admit that in the rent augment Rs.2 lakhs alone is shown as advance amount though he paid Rs.5 lakhs. So, when the agreement shows the receipt of Rs.2 lakhs as advance it is not possible to accept the case of appellant that he paid Rs.5 lakhs as advance. The next contention is as to the explanation made by him for doing the maintenance work in the scheduled building. It is submitted and some portion of the scheduled building has been acquired for public purpose and hence had had to do maintenance works at a cost of Rs.2.5 lakhs with permission of landlord. During evidence CPW1 would admit that the permission granted by the landlord was oral permission. Here it is to be noted that the counter petitioner/appellant did not adduced any evidence to find that he spent a sum of Rs.2.5 lakhs towards maintenance of the building. If R.C.REV.NO.176 OF 2019 -15- he had made any maintenance work in the building he should have obtained the permission from the landlord and further he should have been done under the supervision of the landlord. More so the appellant should have kept all the bills and vouchers showing the amount he spent for the maintenance and that should be convinced to the landlord. Here there is no evidence the find that the appellant/tenant made maintenance to the tune of Rs.2.5 lakhs.” 14. The reasoning of the Rent Control Appellate Authority in paragraph 10 of its judgment, while confirming the order of eviction granted by the Rent Control Court under Section 11(2)(b) of the Act cannot be said to be either perverse or patently illegal. It cannot also be said that while arriving at such a conclusion, the Appellate Authority committed any material irregularity. 15. Before the Appellate Authority, the tenant contended that he had paid an advance of Rs.5,00,000/- and spent an amount of Rs.2,50,000/- towards maintenance work of the petition schedule building and the said amount has to be adjusted towards arrears of rent. The Appellate Authority, after analysing the pleadings and evidence on record, rejected the said case of the tenant on a finding that there is no R.C.REV.NO.176 OF 2019 -16- evidence to show that the tenant carried out maintenance of the petition schedule building spending Rs.2,50,000/-. 16. In **Abdul Gafoor M.C. v. K. Abdurahiman and another [(2015) 3 KHC 775]** the Division Bench of this Court was dealing with a case in which the learned counsel for the tenant raised an alternative contention that the tenant has already paid an advance of Rs.7,50,000/- and that, in the light of the principles laid down by the Apex Court in **Modern Hotel, Gudur v. K. Radhakrishnaiah [(1989) 2 SCC 686]** and **Reghunathan v. Varghese [(2005) 7 SCC 317]** the landlord cannot retain such huge amount and that this amount being repayable to the tenant is liable to be adjusted towards rent arrears, if any. The Division Bench noticed that, **Modern Hotel (supra)** was a case arising under the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960. Section 7(2) of the said Act provided that where the fair rent of a building has not been fixed, the landlord shall not, after the commencement of the Act, claim, receive or stipulate for the payment of any premium or other like sum in addition to the agreed rent. However, as per the proviso to this section, the R.C.REV.NO.176 OF 2019 -17- landlord could receive or stipulate for the payment of an amount not exceeding one month's rent by way of advance. It was taking note of this statutory provision that the Apex Court took the view that money received as advance by the landlord from the tenant, in excess of what was provided under Section 7(2), becomes payable to the tenant immediately and that amount of arrears of rent being smaller than the advance amount held by the landlord on account of the tenant, there was no default in payment of rent and eviction order is not justified. It is this judgment which is followed in **Reghunathan (supra)** . Insofar as Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act is concerned, similar provision is contained in Section 8 of the Act and in the light of the judgment of this Court in **Isac Ninan v. State of Kerala [1995 (2) KLT 848]** this section no longer survives in the Statute. This, therefore, means that the Kerala Act does not contain any provision similar to Section 7 of the Andhra Pradesh Act in the context of which judgment in **Modern Hotel (supra)** was rendered by the Apex Court. If that be so, the aforesaid argument raised by the learned counsel tenant R.C.REV.NO.176 OF 2019 -18- ## cannot be accepted. 17. After analysing the pleadings and evidence on record, the Appellate Authority found that, though the appellant contended that a sum of Rs.5,00,000/- was paid as advance, the tenant himself has admitted that, in the rental agreement an amount of Rs.2,00,000/- alone is shown as advance. In view of the law laid down by the Division Bench of this Court in **Abdul Gafoor M.C. (supra)** , the contention of the tenant that, the amount already paid towards advance is liable to be adjusted towards arrears of rent, can only be rejected. 18. It is after analysing the pleadings and evidence on record that the Rent Control Court and the Appellate Authority arrived at a conclusion that the landlord is entitled for an order of eviction under Section 11(2)(b) of the Act. The reasoning of the Rent Control Court and the Appellate Authority in the impugned order/judgment cannot be said to be either perverse or patently illegal. It cannot also be said that, while granting an order of eviction, either the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority has committed any manifest error. R.C.REV.NO.176 OF 2019 -19- 19. Along with I.A.No.4 of 2019 filed by the respondent-landlord, a photograph of the petition schedule building exhibiting a name board 'Modern Tyre' is produced. Since the ground of eviction sought for in R.C.P.No.25 of 2015 is only under Section 11(2)(b) of the Act, we do not propose to express anything on the submission made by the learned counsel for the respondent-landlord relying on the aforesaid photograph. 20. Section 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act deals with revision. As per sub-section (1) of Section 20, in cases, where the appellate authority empowered under Section 18 is a Subordinate Judge, the District Court, and in other cases the High Court, may, at any time, on the application of any aggrieved party, call for and examine the records relating to any order passed or proceedings taken under this Act by such authority for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality, regularity or propriety of such order or proceedings, and may pass such order in reference thereto as it thinks fit. As per sub-section (2) of Section 20 of the Act, the costs of and incident to all R.C.REV.NO.176 OF 2019 -20- proceedings before the High Court or District Court under subsection (1) shall be in its discretion. 21. In **Rukmini Amma Saradamma v. Kallyani Sulochana [(1993) 1 SCC 499]** , the scope of revisional powers of the High Court under Section 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 came up for consideration before the Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court. While considering whether the High Court could have re-appreciated entire evidence, the Apex Court held that, even the wider language of Section 20 of the Act cannot enable the High Court to act as a first or a second court of appeal. Otherwise, the distinction between appellate and revisional jurisdiction will get obliterated. Hence, the High Court was not right in re-appreciating the entire evidence both oral or documentary in the light of the Commissioner's report. The High Court had travelled far beyond the revisional jurisdiction. Even by the presence of the word ‘propriety’ it cannot mean - that there could be a re appreciation of evidence. Of course, the revisional court can come to a different conclusion but not on a re-appreciation of evidence; on the contrary, by confining R.C.REV.NO.176 OF 2019 **==> picture [23 x 8] intentionally omitted <==** itself to legality, regularity and propriety of the order impugned before it. 22. In **T. Sivasubramaniam v. Kasinath Pujari [(1999) 7 SCC 275]** the Apex Court held that, the words ‘to satisfy itself’ employed in Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 no doubt is a power of superintendence, and the High Court is not required to interfere with the finding of fact merely because the High Court is not in agreement with the findings of the courts below. It is also true that the power exercisable by the High Court under Section 25 of the Act is not an appellate power to reappraise or reassess the evidence for coming to a different finding contrary to the finding recorded by the courts below. But where a finding arrived at by the courts below is based on no evidence, the High Court would be justified in interfering with such a finding recorded by the courts below. 23. In **Ubaiba v. Damodaran [(1999) 5 SCC 645]** the Apex Court considered the exercise of revisional power by the High Court, under Section 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, in the context of an issue R.C.REV.NO.176 OF 2019 -22- as to whether the relationship of landlord-tenant existed or not. It was urged that whether such relationship existed would be a jurisdictional fact. Relying on the decision in **Rukmini Amma Saradamma** it was contended that, however wide the jurisdiction of the revisional court under Section 20 of the Act may be, it cannot have jurisdiction to re-appreciate the evidence and substitute its own finding upsetting the finding arrived at by the appellate authority. The Apex Court held that, though the revisional power under Section 20 of the Act may be wider than Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 it cannot be equated even with the second appellate power conferred on the civil court under the Code. Therefore, notwithstanding the use of the expression ‘propriety’ in Section 20 of the Act, the revisional court will not be entitled to re-appreciate the evidence and substitute its own conclusion in place of the conclusion of the appellate authority. On examining the impugned judgment of the High Court, in the light of the aforesaid ratio, the Apex Court held that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction by re-appreciating the evidence and in coming to the conclusion that the relationship R.C.REV.NO.176 OF 2019 -23- ## of landlord-tenant did not exist. 24. In **Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Dilbahar Singh [(2014) 9 SCC 78]** a Five-Judge Bench of the Apex Court considered the revisional powers of the High Court under Rent Acts operating in different States. After referring to the law laid down in **Rukmini Amma Saradamma** the Apex Court reiterated that even the wider language of Section 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 does not enable the High Court to act as a first or a second court of appeal. The Constitution Bench agreed with the view of the Three-Judge Bench in **Rukmini Amma Saradamma** that the word ‘propriety’ does not confer power upon the High Court to re-appreciate evidence to come to a different conclusion, but its consideration of evidence is confined to find out legality, regularity and propriety of the order impugned before it. 25. In **Thankamony Amma v. Omana Amma [AIR 2019 SC 3803 : 2019 (4) KHC 412]** considering the matter in the backdrop of law laid down in **Rukmini Amma Saradamma** , **Ubaiba** and **Dilbahar Singh** the Apex Court R.C.REV.NO.176 OF 2019 -24- held that the findings rendered by the courts below were well supported by evidence on record and could not even be said to - be perverse in any way. The High Court could not have re appreciated the evidence and the concurrent findings rendered by the courts below ought not to have been interfered with by the High Court while exercising revisional jurisdiction. 26. Viewed in the light of the law laid down in the decisions referred to supra, conclusion is irresistible that the reasoning of the Rent Control Court and the Rent Control Appellate Authority while ordering eviction of the tenant under Section 11(2)(b) of the Act is neither perverse nor patently illegal. It cannot also be said that, while ordering eviction of the tenant under Section 11(2)(b) of the Act, the Rent Control Court or the Rent Control Appellate Authority has committed a manifest error, warranting interference in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction of this Court under Section 20 of the Act. Therefore, we find no reason to interfere with the order of eviction passed by the Rent Control Court and the Appellate Authority under Section 11(2)(b) of the Act. In the result, this Rent Control Revision fails and the R.C.REV.NO.176 OF 2019 -25- same is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs. **Sd/-** **ANIL K. NARENDRAN JUDGE** **Sd/-** **P.G. AJITHKUMAR JUDGE** uu