Joy Padikkala and others v. T.P. Gopalakrishnan and others

## **IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM PRESENT** **THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE P.B.SURESH KUMAR** **&** **THE HONOURABLE MRS. JUSTICE C.S. SUDHA** **TUESDAY, THE 17[TH] DAY OF JANUARY 2023 / 27TH POUSHA, 1944** **RCREV. NO. 145 OF 2016** **AGAINST THE ORDER/JUDGMENT IN RCP 78/1994 OF RENT CONTROL COURT,THRISSUR RCA 47/2003 OF RENT CONTROL APPELLATE AUTHORITY, THRISSUR** ## **REVISION PETITIONERS:** - **1 JOY PADIKKALA, AGED 66 YEARS, S/O.ANTHAPPAN, EAST FORT, THRISSUR VILLAGE TALUK.** - **2 GEORGE PADIKKALA, AGED 64 YEARS, S/O.ANTHAPPAN, EAST FORT, THRISSUR VILLAGE TALUK.** - **3 DR.YACOOB @ JACOB, AGED 62 YEARS, S/O.ANTHAPPAN, EAST FORT, THRISSUR VILLAGE TALUK.** - **4 JOHNY PADIKKALA, AGED 60 YEARS, S/O.ANTHAPPAN, EAST FORT, THRISSUR VILLAGE TALUK. BY ADVS. SMT.SUMATHY DANDAPANI (SR.) SRI.MILLU DANDAPANI** ## **RESPONDENTS:** - **1 T.P.GOPALAKRISHNAN, AGED 48 YEARS, S/O.LATE PETHRU, SARASWATHY FLOWER STORES, SWARAJ ROUND WEST, THRISSUR DISTRICT-680020.** - **2 T.P.SUBHADRA, AGED 60 YEARS, D/O.LATE PETHRU, THEKKEKANAYATH HOUSE, KULUKKOLLUR DESOM, MULAYANKAVU P.O, PATTAMBI 679337.** - **3 T.P.PADMAVATHY, AGED 57 YEARS, D/O.LATE PETHRU, THEKKEKANAYATH HOUSE, KULUKKOLLUR DESOM, MULAYANKAVU P.O, PATTAMBI 679337.** - **4 T.P.KARTHIAYANI, AGED 53 YEARS, D/O.LATE PETHRU, THEKKEKANAYATH HOUSE, KULUKKOLLUR DESOM, MULAYANKAVU P.O, PATTAMBI 679337.** **R.C.R.No.145 of 2016 and connected cases** **2** - **5 T.P.SARASWATHY, AGED 46 YEARS, D/O.LATE PETHRU, THEKKEKANAYATH HOUSE, KULUKKOLLUR DESOM, MULAYANKAVU P.O, PATTAMBI 679337.** - **6 VALSALA, AGED 37 YEARS, W/O.LATE RADHAKRISHNAN, THEKKEKANAYATH HOUSE, KULUKKOLLUR DESOM, MULAYANKAVU P.O, PATTAMBI 679337** - **7 VASANTHI, AGED 34 YEARS, D/O.LATE RADHAKRISHNAN, THEKKEKANAYATH HOUSE, KULUKKOLLUR DESOM, MULAYANKAVU P.O, PATTAMBI 679337** - **8 BEENA, AGED 30 YEARS, D/O.LATE RADHAKRISHNAN, THEKKEKANAYATH HOUSE, KULUKKOLLUR DESOM, MULAYANKAVU P.O, PATTAMBI 679337** - **9 KRISHNA DAS @ MANI, AGED 30 YEARS, S/O.LATE RADHAKRISHNAN, THEKKEKANAYATH HOUSE, KULUKKOLLUR DESOM, MULAYANKAVU P.O, PATTAMBI 679337** - **10 PRASANNA W/O.T.P.GOPALAKRISHNAN, THEKKEKANAYATH HOUSE, KULUKKOLLUR DESOM, MULAYANKAVU P.O, PATTAMBI 679337** - **11 PRABEENA D/O.T.P.GOPALAKRISHNAN, THEKKEKANAYATH HOUSE, KULUKKOLLUR DESOM, MULAYANKAVU P.O, PATTAMBI 679337** - **12 PRASEENA D/O.T.P.GOPALAKRISHNAN, THEKKEKANAYATH HOUSE, KULUKKOLLUR DESOM, MULAYANKAVU P.O, PATTAMBI 679337 .** - **13 PREETHA D/O.T.P.GOPALAKRISHNAN, THEKKEKANAYATH HOUSE, KULUKKOLLUR DESOM, MULAYANKAVU P.O, PATTAMBI 679337** - **14 PREENA D/O.T.P.GOPALAKRISHNAN, THEKKEKANAYATH HOUSE, KULUKKOLLUR DESOM, MULAYANKAVU P.O, PATTAMBI 679337** **BY ADVS. SRI.P.P.HARRIS SRI.N.M.MADHU** **THIS RENT CONTROL REVISION HAVING COME UP FOR FINAL HEARING ON 17.01.2023, ALONG WITH RCRev..152/2016, 187/2016 AND CONNECTED CASES, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:** **R.C.R.No.145 of 2016 and connected cases** **3** # **IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM** **PRESENT** **THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE P.B.SURESH KUMAR** ## **&** **THE HONOURABLE MRS. JUSTICE C.S. SUDHA** **TUESDAY, THE 17[TH] DAY OF JANUARY 2023 / 27TH POUSHA, 1944** **RCREV. NO. 152 OF 2016 AGAINST THE ORDER/JUDGMENT IN RCP 68/1994 OF RENT CONTROL COURT,THRISSUR RCA 41/2003 OF RENT CONTROL APPELLATE AUTHORITY, THRISSUR** ## **REVISION PETITIONERS:** - **1 JOY PADIKKALA, AGED 66 YEARS, S/O. ANTHAPPAN, EAST FORT, THRISSUR VILLAGE.** - **2 GEORGE PADIKKALA, AGED 64 YEARS, S/O. ANTHAPPAN, EAST FORT, THRISSUR VILLAGE.** - **3 DR. YACOOB @ JACOB, AGED 62 YEARS, S/O. ANTHAPPAN, EAST FORT, THRISSUR VILLAGE.** - **4 JOHNY PADIKKALA AGED 60 YEARS, S/O. ANTHAPPAN, EAST FORT, THRISSUR VILLAGE.** **BY ADVS. SMT.SUMATHY DANDAPANI (SR.) SRI.MILLU DANDAPANI** ## **RESPONDENTS:** - **1 C.N.NAMBOODIRI, AGED 74, S/O. LATE C.N.NAMBOODIRI, DHANWANTHARI VAIDYASALA, THODUPUZHA, IDUKKI DISTRICT-685 584.** - **2 ANOOP NARAYANAN, AGED 48, S/O. LATE C.N.NAMBOODIRI, DHANWANTHARI VAIDYASALA, THODUPUZHA,IDUKKI DISTRICT-685 584.** - **3 SARASWATHY ANTHARJANAM, AGED 91, W/O. LATE C.N.NAMBOODIRI,DHANWANTHARI VAIDYASALA, THODUPUZHA,IDUKKI DISTRICT-685 584.** **4** ## **R.C.R.No.145 of 2016 and connected cases** **4 BINDU C.N., AGED 57, D/O. LATE C.N.NAMBOODIRI, DHANWANTHARI VAIDYASALA, THODUPUZHA,IDUKKI DISTRICT-685 584.** **BY ADVS. V.RAJENDRAN (PERUMBAVOOR) S.SATHYAN N.RAJESH(K/1717/1999) GOPAKUMAR P.(K/1116-C/2011)** **THIS RENT CONTROL REVISION HAVING COME UP FOR FINAL HEARING ON 17.01.2023, ALONG WITH RCRev..145/2016 AND CONNECTED CASES, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:** **R.C.R.No.145 of 2016 and connected cases** **5** **IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM** ## **PRESENT** **THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE P.B.SURESH KUMAR** ## **&** **THE HONOURABLE MRS. JUSTICE C.S. SUDHA** **TUESDAY, THE 17[TH] DAY OF JANUARY 2023 / 27TH POUSHA, 1944** **RCREV. NO. 187 OF 2016** **AGAINST THE ORDER/JUDGMENT IN RCP 69/1994 OF RENT CONTROL** ## **COURT,THRISSUR** **RCA 40/2003 OF RENT CONTROL APPELLATE AUTHORITY, THRISSUR** ## **REVISION PETITIONERS:** |**1**|**JOY PADIKKALA,**| |---|---| ||**AGED 66 YEARS,S/O. ANTHAPPAN, EAST FORT,THRISSUR**| ||**VILLAGE- TALUK**| |**2**|**GEORGE PADIKKALA,**| ||**AGED 64 YEARS, S/O ANTHAPPAN,EAST FORT, THRISSUR**| ||**VILLAGE TALUK.**| |**3**|**DR. YACOOB @ JACOB,**| ||**AGED 62 YEARS, S/O ANTHAPPAN,EAST FORT, THRISSUR**| ||**VILLAGE-TALUK**| |**4**|**JOHNY PADIKKALA,**| ||**AGED 60 YEARS, S/O. ANTHAPPAN,EAST FORT, THRISSUR**| ||**VILLAGE-TALUK.**| ||**BY ADVS.**| ||**SMT.SUMATHY DANDAPANI (SR.)**| ||**SRI.MILLU DANDAPANI**| ## **RESPONDENTS:** |**1**|**P.V. BHASKARAN,**| |---|---| ||**AGED 72 YEARS, S/O VELAYUDHAN,DOOR NO. 25/444,**| ||**NEW KERALA TIME HOUSE, SWARAJ ROUND WEST,**| ||**THRISSUR-680 020.(Died)**| |**2**|**ADDL.R.2 N.A.THANKAM,**| ||**AGED 75 YEARS, W/O.LATE P.V. BHASKARAN, POOSSERY**| ||**HOUSE, CHEROOR P.O., THRISSUR TALUK, PIN -680 008.**| |**3**|**ADDL.R.3 P.B.PRADEEP,**| ||**AGED 49 YEARS, S/O. LATE P.V. BHASKARAN, POOSSERY**| **R.C.R.No.145 of 2016 and connected cases** **6** **HOUSE, CHEROOR P.O., THRISSUR TALUK, PIN -680 008.** **4 ADDL.R.4 PRASEETHA SAIKRISHNAN, AGED 50 YEARS,D/O.LATE P.V. BHASKARAN, POOSSERY HOUSE, CHEROOR P.O., THRISSUR TALUK, PIN -680 008.** - **5 ADDL.R.5 PRIYA HARI, AGED 45 YEARS, D/O.LATE P.V. BHASKARAN, POOSSERY HOUSE, CHEROOR P.O., THRISSUR TALUK, PIN -680 008.** _**(Additional Respondents R2 to R5 are impleaded as the legal heirs of sole respondent(deceased)vide order dated 17.01.2023 in I.A.No.3022/2017.)**_ **BY ADVS. ADV.P.VISWANATHAN(NO MEMO)(B/O) AJITH VISWANATHAN SRI.P.VISWANATHAN** **THIS RENT CONTROL REVISION HAVING COME UP FOR FINAL HEARING ON 17.01.2023, ALONG WITH RCRev..145/2016 AND CONNECTED CASES, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:** **R.C.R.No.145 of 2016 and connected cases** **7** # **IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM** **PRESENT** **THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE P.B.SURESH KUMAR** **&** **THE HONOURABLE MRS. JUSTICE C.S. SUDHA** **TUESDAY, THE 17[TH] DAY OF JANUARY 2023 / 27TH POUSHA, 1944** **RCREV. NO. 19 OF 2017** **AGAINST THE ORDER/JUDGMENT IN RCP 69/1994 OF RENT CONTROL COURT,THRISSUR RCA 38/2003 OF RENT CONTROL APPELLATE AUTHORITY, THRISSUR** ## **REVISION PETITIONERS:** - **1 P.V.BHASKARAN, AGED 77 YEARS, S/O.POOSSERY VELAYUDHAN, CHEROOR DESOM, VIYYUR VILLAGE, THRISSUR TALUK, PIN-680001.(DIED,LRS IMPLEADED)** - **2 ADDL.P2-N.A.THANKAM, AGED 75 YEARS, W/O.LATE P.V.BHASKARAN, POOSSERY HOUSE, CHEROOR P.O., THRISSUR TALUK,PIN CODE-680008** - **3 ADDL.P3-P.B.PRADEEP, AGED 49 YEARS, S/O.LATE P.V.BHASKARAN, POOSSERY HOUSE, CHEROOR P.O., THRISSUR TALUK,PIN CODE-680008** - **4 ADDL.P4-PRASEETHA SAIKRISHNAN, AGED 50 YEARS, D/O.LATE P.V.BHASKARAN, POOSSERY HOUSE, CHEROOR P.O., THRISSUR TALUK,PIN CODE-680008** - **5 ADDL.P5- PRIYA HARI, AGED 45 YEARS, D/O.LATE P.V.BHASKARAN, POOSSERY HOUSE, CHEROOR P.O., THRISSUR TALUK,PIN CODE-680008-** _**(ADDL.P2 TO P5 ARE IMPLEADED AS THE LEGAL HEIRS OF THE DECEASED 1ST PETITIONER VIDE ORDER DTD 29/11/2017 IN IA 3063/2017)**_ **BY ADVS. SRI.P.VISWANATHAN SMT.LAKSHMI SREEDHAR SMT.M.R.MINI SRI.SUNIL N.SHENOI** **R.C.R.No.145 of 2016 and connected cases** **8** ## **RESPONDENTS:** |**1**|**JOY PADIKKALA,**| |---|---| ||**AGED 66 YEARS, S/O.ANTHAPPAN, EAST FORT,**| ||**THRISSUR VILLAGE, PIN-680001.**| |**2**|**GEORGE PADIKKALA,**| ||**AGED 64 YEARS, S/O.ANTHAPPAN, EAST FORT,**| ||**THRISSUR VILLAGE, PIN-680001**| |**3**|**DR YACOB @ JACOB,**| ||**AGED 62 YEARS, S/O.ANTHAPPAN, EAST FORT,**| ||**THRISSUR VILLAGE, PIN-680001.**| |**4**|**JOHNY PADIKKALA,**| ||**AGED 60 YEARS, S/O.ANTHAPPAN, EAST FORT,**| ||**THRISSUR VILLAGE, PIN-680001**| ||**BY ADV SRI.MILLU DANDAPANI**| **THIS RENT CONTROL REVISION HAVING COME UP FOR FINAL HEARING ON 17.01.2023, ALONG WITH RCRev..145/2016 AND CONNECTED CASES, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:** **R.C.R.No.145 of 2016 and connected cases** **9** ## **P.B.SURESH KUMAR & C.S.SUDHA, JJ.** **-------------------------------------------------R.C.R.Nos. 145/2016, 152/2016, 187/2016, & 19/2017** **------------------------------------------Dated this the 17[th] day of January, 2023** ## **O R D E R** ## **C.S.Sudha, J.** The three R.C.Ps. from which these revisions arise, were initiated by the landlords in the year 1994. 29 long years have elapsed. The 3rd petitioner for whom the need was put forward was a young man aged 40 years when the R.C.P.s were filed. Now he must be around 70 years. The lis is yet to reach a finality. Here it would be apposite to refer and quote a paragraph from the decision of the Apex court in **Shakuntala Bai v. Narayan Das, AIR 2004 SC 3484** which reads- _“1. It is a shocking case. A suit for eviction of a tenant was instituted more than 42 years back in March, 1962 for the bona fide need of carrying on business by the owner landlord but his widow and sons are still knocking the doors of Court of justice. During the pendency of the appeal filed by the tenant the landlord died leaving a widow and minor sons but this, the High Court thought, came to the advantage of the tenant, rendering the suit liable for dismissal, little realizing that they also needed some place to carry on business for survival. Such extreme views erode the faith of_ ## **R.C.R.No.145 of 2016 and connected cases** **10** _people in the judicial system prompting them to take recourse to extra judicial methods to recover possession of their property.” (Emphasis supplied)_ If litigations meander on like this, can we find fault with the litigants who, fed up with by the long wait for justice, are prompted to take law into their own hands? We doubt. 2. These Rent control revisions under Section 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (the Act) have been filed against the common judgment dated 23/12/2015 in R.C.A.No.38/2003, 40/2003, 41/2003 & 47/2003 which in turn are appeals arising from the common order dated 11/04/2003 in RCP Nos.68/1994, 69/1994 and 78/1994. The parties and the documents will be referred to as described in the R.C.Ps. 3. R.C.P.No.68/1994, 69/1994 and 78/1994 were filed by the petitioners-landlords seeking eviction of the respondents under Sections 11(3) and 11(4)(iii) of the Act. In R.C.P.No.68/1994 it is alleged that the petition schedule room bearing No.25/445 of Thrissur Municipality is one among the three rooms situated in the ground floor of a three storied building owned by the petitioners. The room was let out to the respondent for a monthly rent of ₹27 by the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners. When the petitioners became the owners of the building, the respondent attorned to them. The 3 rd petitioner is an orthopeadic surgeon employed in a hospital at Kunnamkulam. He wants to start a clinic of his own and so he _bona fide_ needs the petition ## **R.C.R.No.145 of 2016 and connected cases** **11** schedule room as well as the other two rooms in the ground floor and the first floor for the conduct of the clinic. The petitioners intend to conveniently modify the rooms so as to run a clinic with the required facilities. The remaining petitioners will provide necessary aid and help to the 3rd petitioner to start the clinic. A lawyer notice was issued to the respondent requesting surrender of the building for the aforesaid need. However, the respondent has not obliged and hence the R.C.P. seeking eviction under Section 11(3) of the Act. 3.1. The original respondent-tenant filed counter denying the allegations in the petition. The need alleged was disputed and it was contended that it is a mere ruse for eviction and that the petitioners have no intention to start a clinic as alleged in the petition. They also claimed the benefit of the second proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act. The original respondent died during the pendency of the R.C.P and hence additional respondents 2 to 5 were impleaded as his legal heirs. They filed additional counter reiterating the contentions of the 1st respondent. 3.2. R.C.P.No.69/1994 was filed seeking eviction under Section 11(3) as well as Section 11(4)(iii) of the Act. The petition schedule room is in the first floor of a larger building owned by the petitioners. This room, according to the petitioners, has been let out to the respondent on 06.09.1992 for a monthly rent of ₹250 on the basis of a rent chit executed in favour of the petitioners. The **R.C.R.No.145 of 2016 and connected cases** **12** _bona fide_ need alleged is the same as in R.C.P.No.68/1994. In addition to the said ground, the petitioners also alleged that the respondent has put up a building adjacent to the building housing the petition schedule room, which is reasonably sufficient for his requirement. Hence eviction was sought under Section 11(4) (iii) of the Act also. The petitioners also alleged that the respondent is not entitled to the benefit of the second proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act. 3.3. The respondent filed counter denying the need alleged and contended that it is a mere ruse for eviction. The building housing the petition schedule room is unsuitable for the proposed need and it cannot not be made suitable or convenient to start a clinic as alleged by the petitioners. The location of the building is also not conducive or suitable to run a clinic. The petitioners have other suitable buildings and properties to start the clinic. The respondent also claimed the benefit of the second proviso to Section 11(3). He also denied the allegation that he is in possession of another building or room sufficient to conduct the business being conducted in the tenanted premises. 3.4. R.C.P.No.78/1994 has been filed claiming eviction under Sections 11(2)(b) and 11(3) of the Act. According to the petitioners, the petition schedule room bearing door No.25/447 is one among the three rooms in the ground floor of the larger building owned by the petitioners. The room was let out to the father of the respondents for a monthly rent of ₹38/-. The 1 st **R.C.R.No.145 of 2016 and connected cases** **13** respondent is continuing in occupation of the premises after the death of the original tenant. The respondent has failed to pay rent from April 1982. Though registered notice was sent requiring the respondents to pay the rent arrears with interest and notice charges, so far, the same has not been cleared. The need alleged under Section 11(3) is the same as alleged in earlier two R.C.Ps. 3.5. The 1st respondent alone filed counter denying the need alleged. He contended that the need put forward is a mere ruse for eviction and that the building is not suitable for the proposed need. He also claimed the benefit of the second proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act. 4. Joint trial of the three R.C.Ps. was conducted and R.C.P.No.68/1994 was taken as the main case in which evidence was recorded. PWs 1 and 2 were examined and Exts. A1 to A15 were marked on the side of the petitioners. RWs 1 to 5 were examined and Exts. B1 to B13 series were marked on the side of the respondents. The RCC, on an appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence and also after hearing both sides, rejected the claim for eviction under Section 11(3) of the Act. R.C.P.No.69/1994 was partly allowed and eviction was ordered under Section 11(4)(iii) of the Act. R.C.P.No.68/1994 and 78/1994 were dismissed. The tenant in R.C.P. 69/1994 filed R.C.A.No.38/2003. The landlords filed R.C.A.40/2003, 41/2002 and 47/2003, against the order of the RCC rejecting their claim for eviction under Section 11(3) of the Act. The RCAA by the impugned common judgment ## **R.C.R.No.145 of 2016 and connected cases** **14** confirmed the order of the RCC. Aggrieved, both the landlords and the tenants have come up in revision. The revision filed by the tenant in RCP.69/1994 is RCR 19/2017 and the remaining revisions have been filed by the landlords. 5. Heard Ms. Sumathi Dandapani, the learned senior counsel for the petitioners-landlords and Sri. N.M. Madhu, Sri V. Rajendran Perumbavoor and Sri. Ajith Viswanathan, the learned counsel for the respondents. 6. The only point that arises for consideration is, whether the findings of the RCC or the RCAA suffer from any illegality, irregularity or impropriety. 7. It was argued by the learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners that the findings in the impugned judgment are incorrect and contrary to law. The appellate authority has committed a serious error in holding that the need projected by the landlords is not _bona fide._ The findings of the appellate authority are against settled position of law and therefore an interference into the same is called for, goes the argument. _Per contra,_ it was argued by the learned counsel appearing for the respondents-tenants that this Court in exercise of its powers under Section 20, cannot reappraise the evidence on record. The argument is that, Section 20 of the Act does not entitle this Court to interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the Appellate Authority because on a re-appreciation of evidence, its view is different from the view of the RCC or the RCAA. The consideration or examination of the evidence by the High Court in revisional jurisdiction under the Act is confined **R.C.R.No.145 of 2016 and connected cases** **15** to find out whether the findings of facts recorded by the RCC or RCAA are according to law and that it does not suffer from any error of law. The High Court is entitled to satisfy itself of the correctness or legality or propriety of any decision or order impugned. However, to satisfy itself of the regularity, correctness, legality or propriety of the impugned judgment or order, the High Court shall not exercise its power as an appellate power to re-appreciate or reasses the evidence for coming to a different finding on facts. In short, the argument advanced by the tenants is that this Court shall not in revision interfere with the concurrent findings of the RCC as well as the RCAA, which are findings on facts. 8. It is no doubt true that this Court sitting in revision, cannot convert itself into evidence collecting or fact-finding court. The scope of interference by the revisional court is restricted to cases where the RCC or RCAA have relied on irrelevant consideration, ignored valuable items of evidence or applied wrong principles of law. As held by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in **Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Dilbahar Singh, (2014) 9 SCC 78** , a finding of fact recorded by the RCC or the RCAA if perverse, or has been arrived at without consideration of the material evidence or such finding is based on no evidence or misreading of the evidence or is grossly erroneous that, if allowed to stand, would result in gross miscarriage of justice, then it is open to correction, because it is not treated as a finding according to **R.C.R.No.145 of 2016 and connected cases** **16** law. In that event, the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under the Act is entitled to set aside the impugned order as being not legal or proper. The High Court is entitled to satisfy itself of the correctness or legality or propriety of any decision or order impugned before it. (See also **Adissery Raghavan v. Cheruvalath Krishnadas, AIR 2020 SC 2854** ) 9. Further, this Court under Section 20 is duty bound to test the order of the RCC and the RCAA on the touchstone of “whether it is according to law” and for that limited purpose it may reappraise the evidence and ascertain whether the conclusion arrived at is wholly unreasonable or is one that no reasonable person acting with objectivity could have reached on the material available. Ignoring the weight of evidence, proceeding on a wrong premise of law or deriving such conclusion from the established facts as to betray a lack of reason and/or objectivity would render the findings of the authorities not according to law calling for an interference under Section 20 of the Act. A judgment leading to miscarriage of justice cannot be said to be a judgment according to law **[Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta, (1999) 6 SCC 222].** 10. We also refer to the Apex Court decision in **Nalakath Sainuddin v. Koorikadan Sulaiman, 2002 KHC 762: 2002(6) SCC 1** in which it has been held that when the aid of the High Court is invoked on the revisional side, it is done because it is a superior Court and it can interfere for the purpose of ## **R.C.R.No.145 of 2016 and connected cases** **17** rectifying the error of the Court below. Subject to limitations placed on the exercise of revisional jurisdiction, it remains a part of the general appellate jurisdiction of a superior Court in a wider and larger sense. It has been further held that, a jurisdiciton to examine the propriety of the order or decision carries with it the same jurisdiciton as the original authority to come to a different conclusion on the said set of facts. If any other view is taken, the expression "propriety" would lose its significance. It was further held that- i) There is no reason to read and interpret Section 20 of the Act narrowly and limit the scope of revisional jurisdiction conferred on the High Court thereby. (ii) Once a revision petition is entertained by the High Court, whichever be the party invoking the revisional jurisdiction, the High Court acquires jurisdiction to call for and examine the records of the authority subordinate to it. The records relating to "any order" and/or any proceedings, are available to be examined by the High Court for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the (a) legality, (b) regularity, or (c) propriety of the impugned order, including any part of the order, or proceedings. The only limitation on the scope of High Court's jurisdiction is that the order or proceedings sought to be scrutinized must be of the subordinate authority. Any illegality, irregularity or impropriety coming to its notice is capable of being corrected by the High Court by passing such appropriate order or direction as the law requires and justice demands. The Court can examine whether the findings rendered by the appellate authority are ## **R.C.R.No.145 of 2016 and connected cases** **18** plausible and to consider the aspect, the Court can refer to the pleadings and evidence adduced by the parties. A pedantic approach cannot be made while examining the issue in the light of the requirement of the Act ( **Simon v. Rappai, 2008 (2) KHC 863** ). 11. Having thus reminded ourselves of the scope of jurisdiction under Section 20 of the Act, we proceed to consider the findings of both the courts. The need projected by the petitioners has been rejected by both the courts mainly on the finding that the building housing the petition schedule rooms is wholly/totally unsuitable for the need projected, that is, to run a clinic to attend to orthopedic cases. The 3rd petitioner when examined as PW1 deposed that the rooms in the ground floor and the first floor can be conveniently used as a clinic by effecting necessary modifications. He admitted that he does not own any appurtenant land. According to PW1, he intends to have an observation room with at least three beds to admit patients and observe them. According to the RCC, in the light of the need alleged, provision for a toilet is a must because the intention of the petitioner is to have an observation room with at least three beds, to admit patients and observe them. However, the building is situated in a property having an extent of one cent only and hence it would be impossible to construct a toilet in the property. Further, the building housing the petition schedule room is situated in a commercially important locality, by the side of a main road. There is no parking facility for the building. There is **R.C.R.No.145 of 2016 and connected cases** **19** also level difference between the foot path and the road. There is no provision for driving vehicles into the building housing the tenanted premises. The road situated in front of the building is a one-way traffic road. In such circumstances, the RCC opines that it would be difficult to bring patients to the clinic. The stair case leading to the upper floors is quite narrow. Therefore, it is next to impossible to take patients either by a stretcher or a wheel chair to the upper floors of the building. There are no windows and hence there is no sufficient ventilation to the rooms in the building. PW1 deposed that he requires all the rooms in the ground floor and the first floor to run the clinic, which should have a reception-cum-consultation room, waiting room, X-ray room, treatment room, physiotherapy room and an observation room. This again, according to the RCC would be impossible to provide in the petition schedule building. Taking into account all the aforesaid factors, the RCC held that it would not be possible to run a clinic without bringing forth material structural alterations to the building, which also was not possible due to scarcity of space and prohibitions contained under the Building Rules. 11.1. Further, the RCC also took note of the fact that PW1, had a reasonably good private practice. He was working as an orthopedic consultant in two well-known hospitals in the district. It also came out in evidence that his monthly salary was not less than ₹23,000/-. PW1 also admitted that the income from his profession is not the main source of his income. It was found **R.C.R.No.145 of 2016 and connected cases** **20** that he has considerable assets and wealth and that he has buildings and land in a place called Kokkala, situated about 2-3 Kms away from his residence. PW1's testimony showed that he had the capacity to start a hospital of his own. He admitted in the box that he had already initiated steps for getting permit and license from the local authority to start a hospital. Therefore, the RCC taking into account all these aspects held that when PW1 himself has admitted that he can start a hospital of his own and when he in fact intends to start a hospital of his own also, the need alleged in the R.C.P. to run a clinic in the petition schedule building with limited facilities could only be considered to be preposterous. Hence it concluded that the need alleged to be not bona fide. These findings of the RCC have been confirmed by the RCAA also. 11.2. It was submitted on behalf of the tenants that the tenanted premises is situated quite near the Vadakkumnatha temple in Thrissur and therefore during the Thrissur Pooram, traffic through the road in front of the building would be closed. In such circumstances, it would be impossible for the patients to access the clinic. In short, the argument is that the need put forward is a mere ruse for eviction and not a sincere or honest desire. 12. We do not think that the grounds cited by the RCC and the RCAA are valid grounds to reject the need alleged. It is not for the RCC to decide whether the building is suited to the requirement of the landlord or not. If the _bona fide_ requirement is established, the absence of facilities or lack of ## **R.C.R.No.145 of 2016 and connected cases** **21** ventilation, air etc. is not very material as it is for the landlord to use his building with all its defects and faults and the Authorities under the Act cannot say that merely because the premises is not airy or well ventilated, the landlord’s requirement for personal use or occupation is not _bona fide._ The courts have no business to dictate how and in what manner the landlord shall use his premises. It is for the landlord to decide what modifications has to be made in the building and the tenants cannot say that it is not suitable for the proposed need. As far as the requirement of the landlords of the building sought to be evicted, his subjective satisfaction is material. When they have asserted that the building is required for the _bona fide_ need, the tenant cannot dictate that the landlord can have the proposed business in another building. The landlord himself is the best judge and the tenant cannot dictate as to how the landlord will have to adjust. The contention of the tenant that the building is more than 75 years old and so a clinic cannot be conducted by the landlord is also no ground to reject the need. 13. It is well known that rent restriction Acts were passed in view of the shortage of houses and the high rent which were being demanded by the landlords. The Act is a piece of social legislation and is meant mainly to protect the tenants from frivolous evictions. At the same time, in order to do justice to the landlords and to avoid placing such restrictions on their right to evict the tenant as to destroy their legal right to property, certain statutory provisions ## **R.C.R.No.145 of 2016 and connected cases** ## **22** have been made by the legislature which have given relief to the landlord. In so far as the social legislation, like the Act is concerned, the law must strike a balance between rival interests and it should try to be just to all. The law ought not to be unjust to one and give a disproportionate benefit or protection to another section of the society. Tenants and landlords are to be given equal treatment. The courts have to adopt a reasonable and balanced approach while interpreting rent control legislations and assume that equal treatment has to be meted out to both the tenants and the landlords. Although Rent control statutes lean in favour of tenants, courts must lean in favour of landlords while interpreting those provisions that take care of landlord's interest **(Joginder Pal v. Naval Kishore Behal, AIR 2002 SC 2256).** 13.1. Rent control legislation is to balance the interests of two interest groups, i.e., the landlords and the tenants and it shall be interpreted in such a way as to achieve the object of enabling the landlord to evict tenant where the statute so provides ( **Bega Begum v. Abdul Ahad Khan, AIR 1979 SC 272).** It is not a sound principle of statutory construction to place more restriction on the rights of the parties than what is provided for, in the statute itself ( **Muhammed v. Abdul Rahiman, 1983 KHC 197** ). While construing the provision of a social legislation, the law must strike a balance between rival interests and it should try to be just to all ( **Francis v. Sreedevi Varassiar, 2003 KHC 397** ). It is also pertinent to note that the Act is a welfare legislation and **R.C.R.No.145 of 2016 and connected cases** **23** not entirely a beneficial enactment for the tenant but also for the benefit landlord. In that view of the matter, balance has to be struck while interpreting the provisions of the Act **(Nasiruddin v. Sita Ram Agarwal, AIR 2003 SC 1543)** . 13.2. Therefore, the provisions of the Act cannot be interpreted in such a manner as to deprive the landlord the right of evicting his tenant(s) on the grounds referred to in Section 11 of the Act. If a claim is made by the landlord for possession of the building for his own need, the RCC is not entitled to say that the landlord need not have for reasons of its own. All that the RCC is entitled to do is to enquire whether the need is bona fide, or whether it is only a pretext to evict only the tenant. The right to reconstruct a building or to have it for the landlord's own purpose is a very valid right attached to the property. **(Church of South India Trust Association v. State of Kerala, 1972 KHC 76)** . 14. Further, PW1 may be extremely rich or he may have the means to start a full-fledged hospital also. However, that is also no ground unless it is shown that the need projected is a mere pretext to evict the tenants. The tenants in this case have no case that the attempt to evict them is with an ulterior intention, like to evict them and then lease it out to others for a higher rent or to sell the building. Admittedly the building is situated in a very important commercial locality and it is decades since the rent of the tenanted premises **R.C.R.No.145 of 2016 and connected cases** **24** has been fixed. Till date, the landlords have not moved for fixation of fair rent under Section 5 of the Act. Though the tenants contend that the need projected is a mere pretext for eviction, they do not have a definite case as to what exactly is the ulterior intention of the petitioners. When no such ulterior motive or intention has been shown to exist, it can only be held that the need put forward is _bona fide_ . 15. The courts have also found the first proviso to Section 11(3) in favour of the tenants. The first proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act says that, the RCC shall not give any direction to evict the tenant if the landlord has another building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village except if the court is satisfied that for special reasons that it would be just and proper to do so. It is true that the petitioners have a property situated in the place by name Kokkala, wherein some buildings and sheds are situated. If only the tenants show that the landlords are in possession of an alternate building, the burden shifts to the latter to establish that the same is not sufficient for the proposed need. In this case there is absolutely no evidence let in by the tenants to show that the landlords are in possession of any building suitable for their proposed need. As held by the Apex court in **Sarala Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., (1998) 8 SCC 119** when the landlord asserts that he requires his building for his own occupation the RCC shall not proceed on the presumption that the requirement is not _bona fide._ When other conditions **R.C.R.No.145 of 2016 and connected cases** **25** required are satisfied and when the landlord shows a _prima facie_ case, it is open to the RCC to draw a presumption that the requirement of the landlord is _bona fide._ While deciding the question of _bona fide_ of the requirement of the landlord, it is quite unnecessary to make an endeavor as to how else the landlord could have adjusted himself. In the case on hand, in the first place, there is no evidence to show that the petitioners are in possession of any other building(s). It has also not been shown or materials brought in to show that it is a mere pretext for eviction and that the landlords have some other intention in attempting to get the tenants evicted from the property. That being so, we find that the finding regarding the first proviso to Section 11(3) is also completely incorrect. 16. Both the courts have concurrently found that the tenants are not entitled to the benefit of the second proviso to Section 11(3). We do not find any infirmity, illegality or irregularity in the said findings and hence no interference to the same is called for. 17. It is true, as pointed one on behalf of the tenants. that the finding under Section 11(3) is concurrent. However, since the courts are seen to have gone wrong in applying the settled principles of law applicable when a claim for eviction is made under Section 11(3) and is also seen to have wrongly appreciated and misread the evidence on record, we are constrained to interfere with the findings of the courts regarding the need under Section 11(3) of the **R.C.R.No.145 of 2016 and connected cases** **26** Act. 18. In R.C.P.No.69/1994, the petitioner has also claimed eviction under Section 11(4) (iii) of the Act. On going through the findings of the RCC and RCAA, we do not find any reasons to interfere with the same. The fact that the tenant has acquired another building has come out in evidence. He has not brought in any evidence to show that the same is not sufficient or suitable for his requirements. That being the position we find no ground to interfere with the said finding of the RCC or RCAA. In the result, R.C.R.No.145/2016, 152/2016 and 187/2016 are allowed. R.C.R.No.19/2017 filed by the tenant in R.C.P.No.69/1994 is dismissed. Eviction sought under Section 11(3) in all the three R.C.Ps., namely, R.C.P.No.68/1994, 69/1994 and 78/1994 is allowed. In R.C.P.No.69/1994, eviction sought under Section 11(4)(iii) is also allowed. The tenants are to vacate the tenanted premises within a period of one month from the date of this order. Interlocutory applications, if any pending, shall stand closed. **JUDGE** ak