High Court of KeralaSingle JudgeAppeal dismissed; acquittal upheld

Joseph, S/o. Joseph v. K.C. Mathew @ Mathai and State of Kerala

Case / Petition Number:CRL.A.1858 of 2004 (E)

Case Details & Bench

Court
High Court of Kerala
Hon'ble Judges
  • V.K. Mohanan
Judgment Date
2012-09-24
Court Decision / Holding
Appeal dismissed; the trial court's order of acquittal under Section 255(1) Cr.P.C. is upheld.
Final Disposition
Appeal dismissed; acquittal upheld

Parties to the Case

Appellants / Petitioners

  • Joseph, S/o. Joseph

Respondents

  • K.C. Mathew @ Mathai
  • State of Kerala

Legal Representation & Advocates

Counsels for Petitioners

  • • Pauly Mathew Muricken

Counsels for Respondents

  • • Grashious Kuriakose
  • • Smt. S. Hyma

Case Synopsis & Summary

This is a criminal appeal under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, filed by the complainant Joseph challenging an acquittal recorded by the Judicial Magistrate of the First Class, Nedumkandom, under Section 255(1) Cr.P.C. The prosecution contends that on 01 May 2000 the complainant advanced Rs. 1,50,000 to the accused at his residence and the accused issued Ext. P1, a cheque dated 28 July 2000, in discharge of that liability. When presented for encashment, the cheque was dishonoured for "not arranged for" and a statutory notice was served; the complainant examined himself (PW1) and produced Exts. P1–P6, while the defence examined DW1 and produced Exts. D1–D4. The trial court found Ext. P1 was not issued by the accused to discharge a legally enforceable debt and acquitted under Section 255(1) Cr.P.C. The appellate court analysed the evidence, noting irregularities in the complainant’s case, including the absence of corroborative records and the defence evidence that a portion of the loan was of Rs. 50,000 with other cheques and security. It held that the presumption under Sections 118(a) and 139 NI Act was rebutted by the defence and affirmed the trial court’s order. Relying on a Supreme Court decision, the court clarified that extraordinary circumstances are needed to interfere with acquittal, and concluded there is no ground to reverse the acquittal. The appeal is thus dismissed, and the acquittal stands.

Provisions of Law Cited

Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881Section 255(1) of Cr.P.C.Section 118(a) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881

Legal Doctrines & Maxims

  • Presumption of innocence
  • Presumption under Sections 118(a) and 139 of the NI Act

Submissions & Arguments

Contentions of Appellants / Petitioners

The appellant contends that Ext. P1 was issued by the accused to discharge a legally enforceable debt of Rs. 1,50,000 and that the signature and the cheque are admitted; therefore the statutory presumptions under Sections 118(a) and 139 NI Act apply. The trial court erred in not acting on this presumption and in acquitting the accused under Section 255(1) Cr.P.C. The complainant produced Exts. P1–P6; the defence could not establish a contrary nexus with credible corroboration, and the defence theory of additional beneficiaries and prior transactions is not supported by reliable evidence. The appellate court should reverse the acquittal and convict for an offence under Section 138 NI Act, directing payment of the debt.

Contentions of Respondents

The respondents argue that Ext. P1 was not issued towards discharge of any legally enforceable debt; the accused borrowed only Rs. 50,000 and signed blank cheques; the complainant failed to prove the alleged transaction with credible records; Exts. D2–D4 and related evidence show a separate loan of Rs. 50,000 in 1998 and other discrepancies, undermining the prosecution’s case. The presumption under Sections 118(a) and 139 NI Act is rebutted by the defence, and the trial court’s acquittal is lawful. The cited Supreme Court decision in State of Rajasthan v. Darshan Singh is authority for interference only in exceptional, perverse circumstances, which do not exist here.

Cited Precedents (1)

Case NameCitationTreatmentExplanation
State of Rajasthan v. Darshan Singh @ Darshan Lal2012(4) Supreme 72Mentioned OnlyCited to illustrate the principle that appellate courts can interfere in exceptional cases where the judgment under appeal is perverse; the present court cites the principle but does not apply it to interfere.

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Extracted Judgment Text

Exact text extracted from official judgment records.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM PRESENT: ## THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE V.K.MOHANAN MONDAY, THE 24TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER 2012/2ND ASWINA 1934 ## CRL.A.No. 1858 of 2004 (E) -------------------------- CRLP.675/2004 DATED 03-11-2004 AGAINST THE ORDER/JUDGMENT IN CC.473/2000 of J.M.F.C.,NEDUMKANDOM ## APPELLANT/COMPLAINANT:: ------------------------- JOSEPH, S/O. JOSEPH, MOOTHEDATHU VEEDU, PUTTADI KARA, ANAKKARA VILLAGE, UDUMBANCHOLA TALUK. BY ADV. SRI.PAULY MATHEW MURICKEN ## RESPONDENTS/ACCUSED: ---------------------- 1. K.C. MATHEW @ MATHAI, PEON, - SERVICE CO-OPERATIVE BANK, KATTAPANA BRANCH. 2. STATE OF KERALA, REPRESENTED BY THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT OF KERALA, ERNAKULAM. - BY ADV. SRI.GRASHIOUS KURIAKOSE - FOR R1 PUBLIC PROSECUTOR SMT.S.HYMA- FOR R2 THIS CRIMINAL APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 24-09-2012, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: ## **V.K.MOHANAN, J. --------------------------------------------Crl.A.No.1858 of 2004** ## **---------------------------------------------Dated this the 24[th] day of September, 2012** ## **JUDGMENT** The complainant in a prosecution for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (for short 'the N.I.Act') is the appellant as he is aggrieved by the order dated 22/12/2003 in C.C.No.473 of 2000 of the court of the Judicial Magistrate of the First Class, Nedumkandom by which the learned Magistrate acquitted the accused under Section 255(1) of the Cr.P.C. 2. The case of the complainant is that, on demand of the accused, on 01/05/2000 the complainant paid an amount of `1,50,000/- to the accused from the house of the complainant and in discharge of that liability the accused issued a cheque for `1,50,000/- putting date thereon as 28/07/2000 and when the said cheque presented for encashment, dishonoured for the reason Crl.A.No.1858/2004 : 2 : 'not arranged for' and accused has not paid the amount in spite of the statutory notice served on him and therefore the accused has committed the offence punishable under Section 138 of the N.I. Act. During the trial of the case the complainant himself was mounted to the box and adduced evidence as PW.1 and also produced Exts.P1 to P6. From the side of the defence besides the accused DW.1 was also examined and produced Exts.D1 to D4. The trial court after considering the entire evidence and materials on record found that Ext.P1 cheque was not issued by the accused in favour of the complainant to discharge of a legally enforceable debt of `1,50,000/- and accordingly the accused is acquitted under Section 255 (1) of Cr.P.C. It is the above finding and order of acquittal are challenged in this appeal. 3. I have heard Sri.Pauly Mathew Muricken, learned counsel for the appellant and Sri.Grashious Kuriakose, learned Senior counsel for the first respondent. Crl.A.No.1858/2004 : 3 : 4. The learned counsel for the appellant vehemently submits that the accused has admitted his signature and execution of Ext.P1 cheque and also the transaction and therefore the trial court is wrong in its finding and acquitting the accused. It is the further submission of the learned counsel that as the transaction is admitted especially the signature and execution of the cheque, the complainant is entitled to get presumption as envisaged under Sections 118(a) and 139 of the N.I. Act. According to the learned counsel, the Magistrate of the trial court without considering the above legal aspect and the factual input came into an erroneous conclusion and accordingly acquitted the accused and therefore the findings and order of acquittal are liable to be set aside. 5. I have carefully considered the above contention of the learned counsel for the appellant and also perused the judgment and the evidence and materials on record. Crl.A.No.1858/2004 : 4 : 6. In the light of the contention advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant and the evidence and materials on record, the question that emerges for consideration is whether the trial court is justified in its finding and acquitting the accused and whether the appellant had succeeded in making out a case so as to interfere with the order of acquittal recorded by the trial court. The crux of the case of the complainant is that the accused borrowed an amount of `1,50,000/- from the complainant on 01/05/2000 from his house and at that time itself the accused issued Ext.P1 cheque dated 28/07/2000. Whereas the case of the defence is that he had availed a loan of `50,000/- from the complainant and at the time of availing the loan as insisted by the complainant he had entrusted two blank signed cheques and also signed a stamp paper in favour of the complainant. According to the defence two other cheques of one K.M.Scaria and Molly Joseph were also entrusted with the complainant. It is the further case of Crl.A.No.1858/2004 : 5 : the defence that out of `50,000/- so borrowed an amount of `40,000/- was paid by the accused to the complainant. Thereafter an amount of `25,000/- was due to the complainant and accordingly the complainant had presented the cheque entrusted by the said Molly Joseph and encashed the same and thereafter the complainant has also presented the cheque which was entrusted by K.M.Scaria and the said cheque dishonoured and hence the complainant filed a case against K.M.Scaria as C.C.No.144 of 2000. The defence case, supported by the evidence further shows that the accused has received only `50,000/- from the complainant by way of demand draft and the same credited to the account of the accused. 7. The learned Magistrate after considering the entire evidence and materials preferred to accept the case of the defence and came to a conclusion that Ext.P1 cheque was not issued as claimed by the complainant towards the discharge of any legally enforceable debt due Crl.A.No.1858/2004 : 6 : to the complainant. From the complaint itself it is crystal clear that the complainant is a person who is conducting finance institution. According to the complainant no other security or record has been obtained from the accused. But his claim is that, towards the discharge of the liability the accused issued Ext.P1 cheque on the date of the borrowal of the amount itself. Though it is stated in the complaint and in the evidence of PW.1 that he knows the accused, no reason is forthcoming for not obtaining any records or security or getting Ext.P1 cheque only for an amount of `1,50,000/-, though such a huge amount was given as loan for two months. The complainant has not produced any evidence, other than Ext.P1 and the interested version of the complainant, to prove the transaction and granting of loan of `1,50,000/-. It is in the above factual background the case of the defence becomes relevant and therefore the case of the complainant has to be examined in the light of the evidence and materials of the defence as well. It is Crl.A.No.1858/2004 : 7 : beyond dispute that the complainant has encashed the cheque entrusted with him which belongs to one Molly Joseph. It is also beyond dispute that the very same complainant has filed C.C.No.144 of 2000 in the very same court against K.M.Scaria. The said Scaria examined in the present case as DW.1 and had also deposed that the circumstances under which he was implicated in the C.C.No.144 of 2000 and also deposed the circumstances under which he issued his cheque connected with loan affairs between the complainant and the accused. There is no serious challenge against the above evidence of DW.1. To prove the case of the defence he had produced Ext.D1 the judgment in C.C.No.144 of 2000 and Exts.D2 to D4. The learned Magistrate has specifically found that, though the accused sent a reply notice to the complainant denying the claim and allegation of the complainant with respect to the alleged borrowal of `1,50,000/-, the complainant has suppressed the said fact. Even though the accused Crl.A.No.1858/2004 : 8 : conveyed his defence in advance through his reply, no evidence is adduced by the complainant to prove the transaction as claimed by him. It is in the terms of the defence the accused tried to substantiate his defence which found recognized by the learned Magistrate. Exts.D2 to D4 show that the accused borrowed an amount of `50,000/- from the complainant by way of demand draft which was encashed by him on 01/06/1998. The complainant has no case that the accused borrowed such an amount during the year 1998. Therefore the said fact and the evidence positively proves that there was only one transaction between the complainant and the accused and the accused has borrowed only an amount of `50,000/- and no other amount received or obtained from the complainant. In this respect it is relevant to note that either in the complaint or in the evidence of the complainant, he has no case that he had other transaction with the accused. The accused offered an explanation as to how Ext.P1 cheque reached in the hands of the Crl.A.No.1858/2004 : 9 : complainant which appears to be correct and probable in the light of the evidence adduced by the defence. Therefore, even if the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is taken for granted, without any hesitation, it can be safely concluded that the accused has succeeded in rebutting the presumption available in favour of the complainant under Section 118(a) and 139 of the N.I. Act. Thus going by the judgment it can be seen that the trial court refused to act upon the evidence and averments of the complainant and opted the case of the defence by assigning appropriate and cogent reasons. Therefore it cannot be said that the finding of the court below is illegal and the judgment challenged in this appeal is a perverse one. 8. In a recent decision of the Apex Court reported in **State of Rajasthan** v. **Darshan Singh @ Darshan Lal** (2012(4) Supreme 72), the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that, Crl.A.No.1858/2004 : 10 : “In exceptional cases where there are compelling circumstances and the judgment under appeal is found to be perverse, the appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal. The appellate court should bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and further that the trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption of his innocence.” Thus, on examination of the facts and circumstances involved in the present case, in the light of the dictum laid down by the Apex Court in the decision cited supra, I find no ground to interfere with the order of acquittal recorded by the trial court. Therefore, the appeal fails. In the result, this appeal is dismissed accordingly. ## **V.K.MOHANAN, JUDGE** skj