Jeeji A.V. v. State of Kerala

## **IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM** ## **PRESENT** ## **THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ALEXANDER THOMAS** **WEDNESDAY, THE 04TH DAY OF NOVEMBER 2020 / 13TH KARTHIKA, 1942** ## **Crl.MC.No.3590 OF 2020(G)** **CC 1360/2019 OF JUDICIAL MAGISTRATE OF FIRST CLASS -I, HOSDRUG CRIME NO.382/2019 OF CHANDERA POLICE STATION, KASARGOD** ## **PETITIONER/2ND ACCUSED:** **JEEJI.A.V AGED 38 YEARS** **W/O.PRASANDH KUMAR.K.K., RESIDING AT 'VAGADAS', WEAVERS COLONY, KADINHIMOOLA, THAIKADAPPURAM P.O., NEELESWARAM, KASARGOD-671 314.** **BY ADVS. SRI.SHIRAZ ABDULLA SRI.K.ABDUL NASSAR** ## **RESPONDENT:** - **1 STATE OF KERALA REPRESENTED BY STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT OF KERALA, ERNAKULAM.** - ***ADDL. P K ASOKAN, R2 ERAVIL, PILIKOD P.O, CHANDERA, KASARAGOD, KERALA-671310** - ***(IS IMPLEADED AS ADDITIONAL R2 AS PER THE ORDER DATED 20.08.2020 IN CRL.M.A.NO.2/2020 IN CRL.M.C NO.3590/2020)** **R2 BY ADV. SRI.M.SASINDRAN** **SRI.SAIGI JACOB PALATTY, PUBLIC PROSECUTOR** **THIS CRIMINAL MISC. CASE HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 04.11.2020, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY PASSED THE FOLLOWING:** Crl.M.C No.3590 of 2020 2 ## **ALEXANDER THOMAS, J.** ## **=========================== Crl.M.C No.3590 of 2020** **===========================** Dated this the 04[th] day of November, 2020 ## **ORDER** The prayer in the aforecaptioned Crl.Miscellaneous case filed under Sec.482 of the Cr.P.C is as follows : _“........... to quash all further proceedings pursuant to Annexure B in Crime No.382/19, Chandera Police Station, in C.C. No.1360/19 on the files of JFCM-I, Hosdurg pending before the Court, by allowing this Criminal Miscellaneous Case, so as to secure the ends of justice.”_ 2. Heard Sri.M.S.Shiraz Abdulla, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, Sri.Saigi Jacob Palatty, learned Public Prosecutor appearing for the 1[st] respondent and Sri.M.Sasindran (learned counsel appearing for the 2[nd] respondent/first informant). 3. The petitioner herein has been arrayed as the 2[nd] accused in the instant Annexure-B Crime No.382/2019 of Chandera Police Station, Kasargod, for offence punishable under Secs.75 of Juvenile Justice (Care & Protection of Children) Act, 2015, on the basis of Annexure-B First Information Statement given by the additional respondent No.2 herein (de facto complainant/first informant) in respect of the alleged Crl.M.C No.3590 of 2020 3 incidents, which happened on 30.09.2019 at 1.30 p.m. 3. The gist of the allegations in the impugned Annexures-A & B criminal proceedings are as follows : That the minor son (hereinafter referred to as the student) of the 2[nd] respondent, then aged about 17 years was studying in Standard.XI of the school in which accused No.1 is working as Laboratory Assistant and the petitioner herein was working as Physics teacher. That on 30.09.2019 at about 1.30 p.m., when the student had gone to the Physics laboratory in the school, the petitioner (A2) had examined the Physics practical records of the student and she found that the student had not completed the record work and had questioned him, as to why he did not do it and then the student had told the petitioner that his Physics record book was with the petitioner, who is his Physics teacher from 25.09.2019 to 30.09.2019 and that he had collected it only on 30.09.2019 and that is the reason why he could not complete the record works. That thereafter, the 1[st] accused, who is the Lab Assistant had also checked his Physics records and on finding that he has not completed his assignments in the records, he got enraged at him without any reason and had treated the student in an extremely cruel manner and that both the accused persons then instructed the student Crl.M.C No.3590 of 2020 4 to go out of the lab and complete the record works. That when the student was being caned by the 1[st] accused, the petitioner (A2) had not taken any steps to interfere in the matter. That the 1[st] accused had thus cruelly punished the student and that the abovesaid incidents happened in front of all the other students and it amounted not only to physical cruelty but also mental cruelty to the child and his family members and accordingly, it is stated by the 2[nd] respondent in Annexure-A First Information Statement given on 07.10.2019 that the police should take appropriate action against the Laboratory Assistant and the Physics Teacher, etc. It is on this basis that Annexure-B Crime No.382/2019 of Chandera Police Station was registered on 07.10.2019 at about 5.30 p.m., on the basis of Annexure-A FIS, for offences punishable under Sec.75 of the Juvenile Justice (Care & Protection of Children) Act, 2015, in which the Laboratory Assistant has been arrayed as accused No.1 and the petitioner herein (physics teacher) has been arrayed as accused No.2. Annexure-D1 dated 09.10.2019 is the accident cum wound certificate issued by the Medical Officer concerned, wherein it is endorsed that the alleged assault is on account of caning by the Laboratory Assistant on 30.09.2019 at about 1.30 p.m. in the school concerned and that linear abrasions and contusions on anterior aspect Crl.M.C No.3590 of 2020 5 of left thigh, back of left knee, medial aspect of the right knee and below the right knee are mildly seen and that and that the student has been treated as an outpatient. Annexure-D2 is a statement given by the doctor, who has examined the student in Annexure-D1. In AnnexureD2, it is stated by the doctor that the above student had come to see him in the community health care centre on 09.10.2019, when he was on duty and therein he has stated that initially the student had come to consult the doctor on 03.10.2019 as an outpatient (O.P No.79855) and the boy was thus treated as the outpatient and then he had told the doctor that the injury was caused on account of his falling down while coming to the school and that then the doctor had told the boy that it appears that it could have been mainly due to caning and then he had told the doctor that such marks on the body could have been due to caning and the student then reiterated that it was caused on account of his falling down. That later the student had come to consult the doctor in the community health centre on 09.10.2019, when the doctor was on duty. At that time the student told the doctor that the injury/marks were on account of the caning done by the Laboratory Assistant of the school and that the said incident happened on 30.09.2019 and that it was felt by the doctor that the marks noted in Annexure-D1 could have Crl.M.C No.3590 of 2020 6 been due to caning, etc. 4. The petitioner (A2) has already been granted anticipatory bail by this Court as per Annexure-C order dated 28.10.2019 in B.A.No.7586/2019. Both sides have been heard. The petitioner's counsel would urge that the impugned criminal proceedings are liable to be quashed as against the petitioner (A2), against whom the allegations made are quite distinct and different from that raised as against the 1[st] accused and that those allegations cannot be the basis for making a teacher like the petitioner to face criminal proceedings. The learned Public Prosecutor and the learned Advocate appearing for the de facto complainant has strongly opposed the plea for quashment. 5. This Court has held in various decisions as in _**Rajan v. Sub Inspector of Police** [2019 (1) KLT 119],_ _**Nirmala v. State of Kerala** [2020 (1) KLT 136]_ that it is a well settled common law position that a teacher is having disciplinary control over a pupil, which is for the betterment and future welfare of the student and the teacher has thus intrinsic and inherent power to enforce discipline to shape up the character and ordinary growth of the pupil and so long as the process of penal measure like caning the student is proportionate and reasonable, as is understood in the common state of affairs of that Crl.M.C No.3590 of 2020 7 nature, the same cannot be said to be a criminal offence. It has been held therein that it is in recognition of this well settled common law position that the Parliament, while engrafting the Juvenile Justice Act has clearly provided in Sec.82 of the Juvenile Justice (Care & Protection) Act, 2015 that the act of committing corporal punishment will become a punishable offence only if it is imposed on the juvenile by a person who is in-charge of or employed in a child care institution, as can be seen from Sec.82(1) of the JJ Act. Going by the definition contained in Sec.2(24) of corporal punishment, even the act of a teacher imposing discipline by taking appropriate penal measures like caning the pupil, would come within the scope and ambit of the definition of S.2(24) of the J.J. Act. But the Parliament being cognizant of the abovesaid common law position, has consciously decided as part of its legislative policy not to make any inroads into that common law position and has very carefully and guardedly provided in Sec.82(1) of the J.J. Act that the question of treating the act of corporal punishment as a criminal offence would come into play only if the corporal punishment as understood in Sec.2(24) is imposed on a juvenile by a person, who is in-charge of or employed in a child care institution as defined in Sec.2(21) of the J.J. Act. Hence, it has been held by this Court Crl.M.C No.3590 of 2020 8 that it is crystal clear from a mere reading of Sec.82 as well as Sec.2(24) and Sec.2(21) of the J.J. Act that the act of a teacher imposing discipline on a pupil by caning, though may otherwise fulfill the definition of corporal punishment, as understood in Sec.2(24), is not made a criminal offence in terms of Sec.82. However, this Court has clearly held that if under the guise of disciplining and punishing the pupil, if the teacher exceeds the limits of reasonable and proportionate penal measure, and causes extreme hurt to the pupil, then of course, subject to the facts and attendant circumstances of the each case, it may attract the offence as per the I.P.C. like 'hurt' as per Sec.319 of the IPC or grievous hurt as per Sec.320 of the IPC, as the case may be depending upon the facts of each case, etc. It has also been held by this Court that Sec.95 of the IPC clearly envisages situations of act causing slight harm and wherein it is stipulated that nothing is an offence by reason that it causes, or that it is intended to cause, or that it is known to be likely to cause, any harm, if that harm is so slight that no person of ordinary sense and temper would complain of such harm, etc. So it is by now well settled that if the teacher under the garb of power to enforce discipline, does an act which would clearly exceed all reasonable and proportionate forms of punishment and penal measure, then the same Crl.M.C No.3590 of 2020 9 ## might disclose an offence depending upon the factual scenario. 6. It will be profitable to refer to paragraph Nos.9 & 11 of the decisions of this Court in _**Rajan v. Sub Inspector of Police** [2019_ ## _(1) KLT 119], which reads as follows:_ _“9. In the case on hand, though the incident had allegedly taken place on 5.11.2015, the law was set in motion on 8.11.2015. Admittedly, the applicant herein is a school teacher and the victim is his student. Parents, teachers and other persons in loco parentis are entitled as a disciplinary measure to apply a reasonable degree of force to their children or pupil old enough to understand the purpose to which the act was done. S.79 and 80 of the IPC would come to his/her rescue, in those cases. However, if the punishment imposed is given out of spite or for some other non disciplinary reason or if the force is unreasonable or immoderate, it is unlawful. Hurt of a less serious crime is not forbidden when inflicted in the reasonable chastisement of a child by a parent or by a school teacher to whom the parent has delegated or is deemed to have delegated his authority._ |_XXXX_|_XXXX_|_XXXX_| |---|---|---| |_XXXX_|_XXXX_|_XXXX_| _11. The precedents cited by the petitioner were all rendered prior to the advent of the JJ Act, 2000. However, the principles laid down can be applied to the instant case as well. In the cited cases, their Lordships have taken a view that when a student is sent by his parent or guardian to a school, the parent or guardian must be deemed to have given an implied consent to the child being under the discipline and control of the school authorities and to the infliction of such reasonable punishment as may be necessary for the purposes of school discipline or for correcting him. The courts have taken the view that the school teacher, in view of his peculiar position, must in the nature of things, have authority to enforce discipline and correct a pupil, who is put in his charge. The courts have also taken the view that it can be assumed that when a parent entrust a child to a teacher, he on his behalf impliedly consents for the teacher to exercise over the student such authority. However, the nature and gravity of the_ Crl.M.C No.3590 of 2020 10 _corporal punishment inflicted by the teacher would determine as to whether he can be proceeded under the penal provisions. If the teacher, out of unbridled fury, excitement or rage, inflicts injuries which are of such a nature as to cause unreasonable physical suffering or harm to the child, the same cannot be condoned on any ground or on the principle of express or implied consent.”_ 7. In this regard, it may also be pertinent to refer to paragraph ## Nos.6 to 9 of the decision of this Court in _**Nirmala v. State of Kerala**_ [2020 (1) KLT 136] which reads as follows : _“6. Section 2 of the J.J Act provides definition clauses. Various terms covered therein are defined in the various clauses given thereunder. S.2(24) of the JJ Act defines “corporal punishment” to mean subjecting of a child by any person to physical punishment that involves the deliberate infliction of pain as retribution for an offence, or for the purpose of disciplining or reforming the child. S.2(21) of the J.J. Act defines “child care institution” to mean Children Home, open shelter, observation home, special home, place of safety, Specialised Adoption Agency and a fit facility recognised under this Act for providing care and protection to children, who are in need of such services. It is now well established by a serious rulings of the Apex Court and various High Courts including this Court, that a teacher of an educational institution like school or college, in view of his/her peculiar position must in the nature of things, have the intrinsic and inherent authority to enforce discipline and correct a pupil, who is put in his/her charge. The courts have also consistently taken the view that it can be assumed that when a parent entrusts a child to a teacher, he on his behalf impliedly consents for the teacher to exercise over the student such parental authority to discipline the child for its own better future and welfare. It is also thus well settled that the act of caning the child as a penal measure to correct and enforce discipline, cannot thus be said to be per seunlawful or without any legal authority. So long as the act of beating using a cane, etc., is proportionate and does not exceed the reasonable and proportionate use of such means of discipline, it cannot be said that the said act is per se illegal or it would amount to criminal offence. S.319 of the I.P.C. defines “hurt” as follows:_ _“Whoever causes bodily pain, disease or infirmity to any person is said to cause hurt.”_ _7. Section 321 of the I.P.C. deals with voluntarily causing hurt._ Crl.M.C No.3590 of 2020 11 _Section 323 deals with punishment for causing hurt._ _**Section 321: Voluntarily causing hurt** .-- Whoever does any act with the intention of thereby causing hurt to any person, or with the knowledge that he is likely thereby to cause hurt to any person, and does thereby cause hurt to any person, is said “voluntarily to cause hurt”._ _However, S.95 of the I.P.C. deals with act, causing slight harm, which provides as follows:_ _**“Section 95: Act causing slight harm** .-- Nothing is an offence by reason that it causes, or that it is intended to cause, or that it is known to be likely to cause, any harm, if that harm is so slight that no person of ordinary sense and temper would complain of such harm._ _8. It is in view of the well settled common law position an school teacher, who is having disciplinary control over a pupil, which is for his or her own betterment and future welfare, has thus intrinsic and inherent power to enforce discipline to shape up the character and ordinary growth of the pupil and so long as the process of penal measure like caning the student is proportionate and reasonable, as is understood in the common state of affairs of that nature, the same cannot be said to be an offence. It is in recognition of this common law position that the Parliament, while engrafting the Juvenile Justice Act has clearly provided in S.82 of the J.J. Act that the act of committing corporal punishment will come into play only if the person who is imposing such corporal punishment on the juvenile is a person in-charge of or employed in a child care institution as can be seen from a mere reading of S.82(1) of the JJ Act. Going by the definition clause of S.2(24), which deals with corporal punishment, even the act of a teacher imposing discipline by taking appropriate penal measures like caning the pupil, etc., would come within the scope and ambit of the definition clause of S.2(24) of the J.J. Act. But the Parliament being cognizant of the abovesaid common law position, has consciously decided as a legislative policy not to make any inroads into that common law position and has very carefully and guardedly provided in S.82(1) of the J.J. Act that the question of treating the act of corporal punishment as a criminal offence would come into play only if the corporal punishment as understood in S.2(24) is imposed on a juvenile by a person, who is in-charge of or employed in a child care institution as defined in S.2(21) of the J.J. Act. Thus it is crystal clear from a mere reading of S.82 as well as S.2(24) and S.2(21) of the J.J. Act that the act of a teacher imposing_ Crl.M.C No.3590 of 2020 12 _discipline on a pupil by caning etc., though may otherwise fulfill the definition of corporal punishment, as understood in S.2(24), is not made a criminal offence in terms of S.82. Of course, under the garb of disciplining and punishing the pupil, if the teacher exceeds the limits of reasonable and proportionate penal measure, and causes extreme hurt to the pupil, etc. then of course, subject to the facts and attendant circumstances of the each case, it may attract offence as per the I.P.C. like 'hurt' (S.223), grievous hurt (S.321) which is punishable by S.323 of the I.P.C. or grievous hurt as understood in S.320, as the case may be. In the instant case, the specific allegations of the prosecution in the impugned Anx. A-1 final report/charge sheet are only to the effect that the petitioner, as a teacher of the 2nd respondent, minor victim girl/juvenile, has imposed the penal measure of caning the student, and that too, in the class room. Therefore, the offence as per S.82(1) of the JJ Act is not attracted. The other offence alleged against the petitioner is the one as per S.324 of the I.P.C. which deals with voluntarily hurt by dangerous weapons or means. S.324 of the I.P.C. reads as follows:_ _**“Section 324: Voluntarily causing hurt by dangerous weapons or means.--** Whoever, except in the case provided for by Section 334, voluntarily causes hurt by means of any instrument for shooting, stabbing or cutting, or any instrument which, used as weapon of offence, is likely to cause death, or by means of fire or any heated substance, or by means of any poison or any corrosive substance, or by means of any explosive substance or by means of any substance which it is deleterious to the human body to inhale, to swallow, or to receive into the blood, or by means of any animal, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.”_ _9. Section 324 will come into play only if hurt is caused by dangerous weapon like any instrument for shooting, stabbing or cutting, or any instrument which, used as weapon of offence, is likely to cause death, or by means of fire or any heated substance, etc.”_ 8. It has also been held by this Court in certain cases that an act of caning, which may fulfil the definition of corporal punishment as understood in Sec.2(24) of the Juvenile Justice (Care & Protection) Act, Crl.M.C No.3590 of 2020 13 2015 and which is not liable for culpable punishment in terms of Sec.82 of the Juvenile Justice (Care & Protection) Act, cannot be made the subject matter of criminal culpability by taking resort to the provision contained in Sec.75 of the JJ Act, which deals with punishment for cruelty to child. 9. Sec. 75 of the Juvenile Justice Act, which reads as follows: “ _**75. Punishment for cruelty to child** .- Whoever, having the actual charge of, or control over, a child, assaults, abandons, abuses, exposes or wilfully neglects the child or causes or procures the child to be assaulted, abandoned, abused, exposed or neglected in a manner likely to cause such child unnecessary mental or physical suffering, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years or with fine of one lakh rupees or with both: Provided that in case it is found that such abandonment of the child by the biological parents is due to circumstances beyond their control, it shall be presumed that such abandonment is not wilful and the penal provisions of this section shall not apply in such cases: Provided further that if such offence is committed by any person employed by or managing an organisation, which is entrusted with the care and protection of the child, he shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment which may extend up to five years, and fine which may extend up to five lakhs rupees: Provided also that on account of the aforesaid cruelty, if the child is physically incapacitated or develops a mental illness or is rendered mentally unfit to perform regular tasks or has risk to life or limb, such person shall be punishable with rigorous imprisonment, not less than three years but which may be extended up to ten years and shall also be liable to fine of five lakhs rupees.”_ ## 10. Since the Parliament in its Legislative wisdom has consciously opted to ensure that the act of corporal punishment will become a punishable offence, only if it is imposed by the enumerated Crl.M.C No.3590 of 2020 14 caretakers of juvenile institutions, as mentioned in that section. The act of corporal punishment by the act of a teacher in caning a student, which may otherwise fulfil the definition of corporal punishment as per Sec.2(24) of the Juvenile Justice (Care & Protection of Children) Act will not make it a punishable offence in terms of Sec.82 of the said Act. Hence, the very same act of a teacher, which was excluded by the Parliament as a punishable offence in terms of Sec.82 of the JJ Act cannot be roped in, so as to allege criminal culpability on the teacher by roping in the provisions contained in Sec.75 of the JJ Act. A constructive and purposive interpretation would lead to the situation that if the act of proportionate and reasonable punishment that is imposed by a teacher on a student which cannot attract criminal culpability under Sec.82 of the Juvenile Justice (Care & Protection of Children) Act, 2015, cannot be roped in alleging criminal culpability by the circuitous method of invoking Sec.75 of the JJ Act. Of course, if the punishment imposed by the teacher on the student exceeds reasonable and proportionate norms of punishment, as is understood in the common state of affairs and causes serious injury to the student, then of course there is no question of any protection for such an act and therefore, it might invite culpable offences, as envisaged in the Indian Crl.M.C No.3590 of 2020 15 Penal Code. Then, _prima facie_ such an act may invite criminal culpability in terms of Sec.75 of the JJ Act as well. The allegations disclosed against the petitioner herein (A2) is distinct and separate from the allegations raised as against the 1[st] accused. The specific allegations made out in the prosecution materials as against the petitioner herein (A2) will not constitute the basis for criminal culpability, as understood in Sec.75. In the instant case, the prosecution has no case that the petitioner (A2), who is a Physics teacher, has imposed any caning or any other punishment on the student. The main allegation is that earlier, she had asked the student, as to why he had not completed the record works, to which he had replied that he could not do so since the record book was with the petitioner for the last five days and he could get it back only hardly before the lunch session. The allegations of caning are raised as against the 1[st] accused. In that regard, the main allegations raised as against the petitioner (A2) is contained in paragraph No.1 of Annexure-A FIS, wherein it is alleged that the act of caning done by the 1[st] accused on the student would have been with the tacit approval of the petitioner (A2). The main complaint voiced by the learned counsel appearing for the 2[nd] respondent (father of the student) is to the effect that the petitioner Crl.M.C No.3590 of 2020 16 (A2) had not effectively intervened, when the 1[st] accused was caning the student and further that the fact that the record book was with the teacher till half an hour before the lunch session and that is the reason why he could not complete the record book, for which he was found fault with by the 1[st] accused and this was not brought to the notice of the 1[st] accused by the petitioner (2[nd] accused). 11. The main allegations raised as against the petitioner (A2) are to the effect that the act of caning by the 1[st] accused on the student was done with the approval or rather the tacit approval of the petitioner (A2). There are no allegations that the petitioner had in any manner instigated the 1[st] accused to cane the student. It appears that the allegations is that the petitioner did not intervene, when the 1[st] accused had cane the student and that the alleged fault on the part of the student occurred only on account of the fact that the record book was returned back to him only about half an hour before the lunch session on the day in question and that this crucial fact has not been disclosed by the petitioner to the 1[st] accused, etc. and that the petitioner had not intervened when the 1[st] accused had caned the student, etc. 12. After hearing both sides, this Court is of the considered view that the abovesaid allegations made out as against the petitioner (A2), Crl.M.C No.3590 of 2020 17 as per Annexure-A1 FIS cannot be the basis for making a teacher like the petitioner to face the onerous process of facing proceedings alleging criminal culpability. Even though the allegations in Annexure-A FIS, it appears that the teacher was not aware that the record book was with her for the last five days, as per her case. Initially, the petitioner had also admonished the student for not completing the record work, to which he has allegedly clarified that he could not do so because the record book was with the petitioner for the last five years and that it was returned back to him only half an hour before the lunch session. The other allegations are that when the 1[st] accused, who is the Laboratory Assistant, found fault with the student for not completing the record works. He had thereupon caned the student severely. Assuming that these allegations are broadly correct, a teacher like the petitioner cannot be found fault with for not having immediately intervened in the matter, when the 1[st] accused was caning the student. It is well known that in the institutional scheme of working in such situations, ordinarily a teacher due to various reasons including delicacy may not intervene when a student is being caned or punished by another person, even if, the act is in the presence of the former. Mere silence on the part of the teacher like the petitioner when the student was being caned by the 1[st] Crl.M.C No.3590 of 2020 18 accused cannot be the basis for alleging criminal culpability on the petitioner. The learned counsel for the petitioner would point out that even going by the aspects borne out from Annexures-A & D, it can be seen that the alleged incident is said to have happened on 30.09.2019 at about 1.30 p.m. and even when the student had gone to the Doctor for consultation for the first time only on 03.10.2019 and he did not have any complaint regarding the alleged caning and even according to him, it was caused on account of his falling down while coming back from the school. It is only later on 09.10.2019, that he has given the version before the doctor about the alleged incident of caning. A reading of Annexure-D1 would make it clear about the nature of the injury/marks seen by the doctor, wherein it is mentioned that those marks/injuries are all mildly seen. 13. After hearing both sides and taking into account the totality of the facts and circumstances of this case, it cannot be held for a moment that any of the vital ingredients of Sec.75 of the Juvenile Justice (Care & Protection of Children) Act would be disclosed as against the petitioner to the extent the allegations are made against her. This Court is now concerned only with the issue, as to whether any offence is disclosed as against the petitioner (A2) and none of the Crl.M.C No.3590 of 2020 19 observations or findings can be construed as having any effect on the alleged acts of the 1[st] accused. The learned counsel for the 2[nd] respondent has a specific case that the 1[st] accused, who is the Laboratory Assistant is appointed in a non-teaching post and that the 1[st] accused cannot claim the immunity of being a teacher. 14. In the light of these aspects, this Court is of the considered view that the initiation and continuance of the impugned criminal proceedings to the limited extent it is directed as against the petitioner (A2) is liable for interdiction at the hands of the court, as otherwise it would amount to abuse of the process of this Court, as far as the petitioner is concerned. 15. In that view of the matter, it is ordered that the impugned Annexure-B FIR in Crime No.382/2019 of Chandera Police Station, Kasaragod to the limited extent it is directed as against the petitioner (A2) and all further proceedings emanating therefrom to the limited extent it is directed against the petitioner (A2), will stand quashed and set aside. It is ordered and make clear that the proceedings as against the 1[st] accused may continue, in accordance with law and untrammelled and uninfluenced in any manner by the observations and findings made by this Court, hereinabove. The petitioner may produce certified copy Crl.M.C No.3590 of 2020 20 of this order before the Investigating Officer concerned as well as the Judicial First Class Magistrate’s Court-I, Hosdurg, for necessary information. With these observations and directions, the above Crl.M.C will stand disposed of. **Sd/ALEXANDER THOMAS JUDGE** vgd Crl.M.C No.3590 of 2020 21 ## **APPENDIX** ## **PETITIONER'S/S EXHIBITS:** |**ANNEXURE A**|**TRUE COPY OF THE FIS DATED 07.10.2019.**| |---|---| |**ANNEXURE B**|**A COPY OF THE FIR IN CRIME NO.382/19**| ||**DATED 07.09.2019.**| |**ANNEXURE C**|**COPY OF ORDER IN BA NO.7586/2019 DATED**| ||**28.10.2019.**| |**ANNEXURE D**|**COPY OF THE ATTENDANCE REGISTER.**| |**ANNEXURE D1**|**COPY OF THE WOUND CERTIFICATE.**| |**ANNEXURE D2**|**COPY OF THE STATEMENT OF THE DOCTOR.**|