High CourtDivision BenchAppeals disposed of.

Jawala Singh (D) by LRs. and Ors. v. Jagat Singh (D) by LRs. and Ors.

Case / Petition Number:Civil Appeal No. 1004 of 2003; Civil Appeal No. 3938 of 2006
Neutral Citation:2006 (5) SCC 776

Case Details & Bench

Court
High Court
Hon'ble Judges
  • Arijit Pasayat
  • S. H. Kapadia
Judgment Date
2006-09-06
Court Decision / Holding
Under the circumstances, the impugned judgment is set aside. The matter is remitted to the High Court to dispose of Second Appeal No. 1832-G of 1979 in accordance with law. The appeals are disposed of with no order as to costs. The Court also requests the High Court to expedite the proceedings and dispose of the appeal as early as practicable.
Final Disposition
Appeals disposed of.

Parties to the Case

Appellants / Petitioners

  • Jawala Singh (D) by LRs. and Ors.
  • Jagat Singh (D) by LRs. and Ors.

Legal Representation & Advocates

Counsels for Petitioners

  • • Dr. Kailash Chand
  • • Keshav Kaushik
  • • Asha Gopalan Nair

Counsels for Respondents

  • • M.H. Humayunisa
  • • R. Nedumaran

Case Synopsis & Summary

These appeals challenge a Punjab and Haryana High Court judgment that allowed the Second Appeal under Section 100 CPC, partially setting aside a trial court’s decree in a suit for possession of land. The essential question is whether the High Court erred in allowing the second appeal without framing a substantial question of law for adjudication. The respondents contend that even in the absence of a specifically formulated question, the High Court undertook an analysis of the evidence and reached a correct conclusion. The Supreme Court recalls the governing framework post-1976 amendment: a memorandum of appeal must precisely state the substantial question of law involved; where a substantial question is involved, the High Court must formulate it and the second appeal must be heard on that question; the respondent may argue against the formulated question. The Court emphasizes that the jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC is confined to appeals involving substantial questions of law, and cannot inter fere with pure questions of fact. It cites several precedents, including Ishwar Dass Jain v. Sohan Lal, Roop Singh v. Ram Singh, Chadat Singh v. Bahadur Ram, Kanhaiyalal v. Anupkumar, Joseph Severane v. Benny Mathew, Sasikumar v. Kunnath Chellappan Nair, and Gian Dass v. Gram Panchayat Village Sunner Kalan, to underscore that formulation is mandatory and that mere analysis of evidence is not sufficient to sustain a second appeal. The impugned judgment is set aside and the matter remitted to the High Court for disposal in accordance with law, with appeals disposed of and no order as to costs, urging expeditious finalisation.

Provisions of Law Cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Section 100(3)Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Section 100(4)Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Section 100(5)

Legal Doctrines & Maxims

  • Under Section 100 CPC, High Court’s jurisdiction is confined to appeals involving a substantial question of law.
  • The memorandum of appeal shall precisely state the substantial question involved; if a substantial question is involved, the High Court must formulate that question.
  • The second appeal must be heard on the question so formulated (and the respondent may argue that the case does not involve such a question).
  • Mere possession for a long time does not convert permissive possession into adverse possession.
  • Interference by the High Court under Section 100 CPC is not permissible on pure questions of fact; formulation of substantial questions of law is essential.

Submissions & Arguments

Contentions of Appellants / Petitioners

The applicants contend that the High Court allowed the second appeal without formulating any substantial question of law for adjudication, which is mandatory under Section 100 CPC after the 1976 Amendment. They rely on the statutory framework that requires precise identification of the substantial question of law in the memorandum of appeal and formulation by the High Court if such a question exists, failing which the judgment cannot stand. The appellants argue that the decision to remit or set aside cannot be done without proper formulation, and that the High Court’s approach effectively reopens questions of fact or law beyond the permissible scope of second appeals.

Contentions of Respondents

The respondents submit that even absent a formally formulated question, the High Court conducted a thorough analysis of the evidence and arrived at the correct conclusion. They rely on prior precedents to argue that the Court can adjudicate the appeal based on its analysis and that a formal question is not always indispensable if the reasoning and outcome align with the law and evidence. They defend the High Court’s jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC and its capacity to dispose of the matter appropriately.

Cited Precedents (8)

Case NameCitationTreatmentExplanation
Ishwar Dass Jain v. Sohan Lal2000 SCC 434PositiveCited to support the proposition that under the 1976 Amendment, the High Court must formulate a substantial question of law and cannot reverse a first appellate court's decision without doing so.
Kanhaiyalal v. Anupkumar2003 SCC 430PositiveReiterates the mandatory formulation of substantial questions under Section 100 CPC.
Chadat Singh v. Bahadur Ram2004 SCC 359PositiveCited to reinforce the requirement that second appeals must be heard on formulated questions of law.
Joseph Severane and Ors. v. Benny Mathew and Ors.2005 SCC 667PositiveCited as part of the line of authorities emphasizing proper formulation and scope of Section 100 CPC appeals.
Sasikumar and Ors. v. Kunnath Chellappan Nair and Ors.2005 SCC 588PositiveCited to support the jurisdictional limitation of second appeals to substantial questions of law.
Gian Dass v. The Gram Panchayat Village Sunner Kalan and Ors.2006 SCC 776PositiveCited among authorities underscoring the mandatory formulation principle in second appeals.
Roop Singh v. Ram SinghSCC 713PositiveAffirms that High Court’s jurisdiction under Section 100 is confined to substantial questions of law.
Ishwar Kishan Singh? Thakur Kishan Singh v. Arvind Kumar(1994) 6 SCC 591PositiveCited for the proposition that mere possession over time does not convert permissive possession into adverse possession; supports factual considerations in such contexts.

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Extracted Judgment Text

Exact text extracted from official judgment records.

A JA WALA SINGH (D) BY LRS. AND ORS. JAGAT SINGH (D) BY LRS. AND ORS. SEPTEMBER 6, 2006 ## B [ARIJIT PASA YAT AND S.H. KAPADIA, JJ.] _Code of Civil Procedure, 1908-Section JOO-Second appea/Maintainabi/ity of, when substantial question of law not formulated-Held:_ C _Not maintainable._ The question which has arisen for consideration in these appeals is whether High Court erred in allowing the second appeal without formulating any question of law for adjudication. Respondent contended that though specific que~tion of law was not D formulated, the High Court had analyzed the evidence and kept to the correct conclusion. Disposing of the appeals and remitting the matter to High Court so far as it relates to Second Appeal No.1832of1979, the Court E HELD: I. The memorandum of appeal shall precisely state substantial question or questions involved in the appeal as required under sub-section (3) of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Where the High Court is satisfied that in any case any substantial question of law is involved, it shall formulate that question under sub-section (4) and the second appeal has to be heard on the question so formulated as stated in sub-section (5) of Section F 100. J757-EJ 2. A perusal of the impugned judgment passed by the High Court does not show that ariy substantial question of law has been formulated or that the second appeal was heard on a question, if any, so formulated. That being so, the judgment cannot be maintained. 1756-D I •• G _lshwar Dass Jain_ v. _Sohan Lal,_ 120001 l SCC 434; _Kanhaiyala/_ v. _Anupkumar,_ 1200311SCC430; _Chadat Singh_ v. _Bahadur Ram,_ 1200416 SCC 359; _Joseph Severane and Ors._ v. _Benny Mathew and Ors.,_ 12005) 7 SCC 667; _Sasikumar and Ors._ v. _Kunnath Che//appan Nair and Ors.,_ 120051 12 SCC 588 and _Gian Dass_ v. _The Gram Panchayat Village Sunner Kalan and Ors.,_ H 754 JAWALASINGH(D) BYLRS. v. JAGATSINGH (D) BY LRS. [PASAYAT.J.] 755 ""' J (2006) 5 Supreme 776, relied on. CIVIL APPELL LATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. I 004 of 2003. From the Judgment and Order dated 16.5.2002 of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in R.S.A. No. 1832/1979. ## WITH B Civil Appeal No. 3938 of2006. Dr. Kailash Chand, Keshav Kaushik and Asha Gopalan Nair for the Appella:its. c M.H. Humayunisa and R. Nedumaran for the Respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by **ARIJIT** PASAYAT, **J.** In these appeals challenge is to the judgment rendered by a learned Single Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court D allowing the Second Appeal filed under Section I 00 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (in shoJ"! the 'CPC'). The Second appeal was partially allowed by setting aside the judgment and decree of the First appellate Court in the plaintiffs suit for possession to the extent of land measuring 36 kanals comprised in Khasra Nos. 646, 647 and 648. E Though many points were urged basically itwas urged that the Second appeal was allowed without formulating any question of law for adjudication. This according to appellants rendered the judgment vulnerable. Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that though specific question of law was not formulated, the' High Court analysed the evidence[F ] and kept to the correct conclusion. Section I 00 of the Code deals with "second appeal". The provision reads as follows: "I 00( I). Save as otherwise expressly provided in the body of this G Code or by any other law for the time being in force, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from every decree passed in appeal by any court subordinate to the High Court, if the High Court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law. > ( • (2) An appeal may lie under this section from an appellate decree[H ] 756 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. 5 S.C.R. • _r_ A passed _ex parte._ (3) In an appeal under this section, the memorandum of appeal shall precisely state the substantial question of law involved in the appeal. B (4) Where the High Court is satisfied that a substantial question of law is involved in any case, it shall formulate that question. (5) The appeal shall be heard on the question so formulated and the respondent shall, at the hearing of the appeal, be allowed to argue that the case does not involve such question: c Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall be deemed to take away or abridge the power of the court to hear, for reasons to be recorded, the appeal on any other substantial question of law, not formulated by it, if it is satisfied that the case involves such question." A perusal of the impugned judgment passed by the High Court does D[not ][show ][that ][any ][substantial ][question ][of ][law ][has ][been ][fonnulated or ][that ] the second appeal was heard on a question, if any, so formulated. That being· so, the judgment cannot be maintained. In _lshwar Dass Jain_ v. _Sohan Lal,_ this Court in para I 0 has stated E "IO. Now under Section 100 CPC, after the 1976 Amendment, it is essential for the High Court to fonnulate a substantial question of law it is not pennissible to reverse the judgment of the first appellate court without doing so." Yet again in _Roop Singh_ v. _Ram Singh_ this Court has expressed that F[jurisdiction ][of ][a ][High ][Court ][is ][confined ][to ][appeals ][involving substantial ] question of law. Para 7 of the said judgment reads: (SCC p. 713, para 7) G H "7. It is to be reiterated that under Section I 00 CPC jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain a second appeal is confined only to such appeals which involve a substantial question of law and it does not confer any jurisdiction on the High Court to interfere with pure questions of fact while exercising its jurisdiction under Section I 00 CPC. That apart, at the time of disposing of the matter, the High Court did not even notice the question of law fonnulated by it at the time of admission of the second appeal as there is no reference of it in the impugned judgment. Further, the fact-finding courts after appreciating the evidence held that the defendant entered into the 'possession of ., JAW ALA SINGH (D)BY LRS. _v._ JAGATSINGH(D) BY LRS. [PASA YAT.J.] 757 the premises as a batai, that is to say, as a tenant and his possession A was pennissive and there was no pleading or proof as to when it became adverse and hostile. These findings recorded ·by the two courts below were based on proper appreciation of evidence and the material on record and there was no perversity, illegality or irregularity in those findings. If the defendant got the possession of suit land as B a lessee or under a batai agreement then from the permissive possession it is for him to establish by cogent and convincing evidence to show hostile animus and possession adverse to the knowledge of the real owner. Mere possession for a long time does not result in converting permissive possession into adverse possession. _Thakur Kishan Singh_ v. _Arvind Kumar,_ [1994] 6 SCC 591 Hence, the High Court ought not C to have interfered with the findings of fact recorded by both the courts below." The position has been reiterated in _Kanhaiyalal_ v. _Anupkumar,_ [2003] I SCC430. In _Chadat Singh_ v. _Bahadur Ram,_ [2004] 6 SCC 359 it was observed thus: (SCC p. 360) D "6. In view of Section 100 of the Code the memorandum of appeal shall precisely state substantial question or questions involved in the appeal as required under sub-section (3) of Section JOO. Where the High E Court is satisfied that in any case any substantial question of law is involved, it shall fonnulate that question under sub-section ( 4) and the second appeal has to be heard on the question so formulated as stated in sub-section (5) of Section I 00." The Position was highlighted by this Court in _Joseph Severane and_ F , _Ors._ v. _Benny Mathew and Ors.,_ [2005) 7 SCC 667, _Sasikumar and Ors._ v. _Kunnath Chellappan Nair and Ors.,_ [2005] 12 SCC 588 and _Gian Dass_ v. _The Gram Panchayat, Village Sunner Kalan & Ors._ (2006) 5 Supreme 776 . Under the circumstances, the impugned judgment is set aside. We remit the matter to the High Court so far as it relates to Second Appeal No. 1832 G of 1979 for disposal in accordance with law. The appeals are disposed of on the aforesaid tenns with no order as to costs. Since the matter is pending since long, we request the High Court to dispose of the appeal as early as practicable. Appeals disposed of. H D.G.