JAGDISH v. NATHI MAL KEJRIWAL

JAGDISH & ORS. A _v._ NA THI MAL KEJRIW AL & ORS. OCTOBER 24, 1986 B [E.S. VENKATARAMIAH AND M.M. DUTI, JJ.] c _Punjab Pre-emption Act,_ _1913,_ _s.15(l)(b)_ _clause_ _'Fourthly'-_ _'Other Co-sharers'-lnterpretation_ _of-Land_ _belonging_ _to_ _joint_ _family-Sold-Non-alienating co-sharers-Whether entitled_ _to_ _claim_ _right of pre-emption._ Respondent Nos. S to 7 were joint owners of the suit land. They sold it to respondent nos. I to 4 on 25.10.71. The petitioners, som and nephews of the vendors, instituted a suit before the sub-lodge, Palwal . for ~on of the snit land on payment of the sale comideratlon on the ground that they were entitled to the right of the pre-emption in _D_ respect of the snit land either under clause "First", or Secondly, of s.JS(l)(a) or under clause 'First' or 'Secondly' ofs.lS(l)(b) ofthe Punjab Pre-emption Act 1913 as in force in the State of Haryana. The Sub-Judge decreed the snit for possession. The appeal of Respondent Nos. I to 4 against the aforesaid order having been dismissed by the District Judge, Ibey filed a second appeal before the High Court. E During the pendency of the second appeal, the Supreme Court delivered its judgment in _Alam Prakash_ v. _State_ _of Haryana_ & _Ors.,_ .. _._ \ ### - [1986] 2 SCC 249. The High Court allowed the second appeal and dismissed the snit since the provisions under which the petitioners claimed the right· of pre-emption had been declared void by the F Supreme Court in _Atam Prakash's_ case. Being aggrieved by the judgment of the High Court, the petition· ers in the special leave petition contended that since the suit land belonged to the joint family and it had not been sold by all the sharers, they were entitled to claim the right of pre-emption under clause G 'Fourthly' of s.IS(l)(b) of the Act because they happened to be the non-alienating co-sharers. Dismis..uig the petition, HELD: The expression 'other co-sharers' in clause 'Fourthly' of H s.15( l)(b) of the Act refers to only those co-sharers who do not fllll 68 JAGDISH _v._ NATH! MAL KEJRIWAL [VENKATARAMIAH, J.J 69 under clause 'First' or 'Secondly' or 'Thirdly' ofs.IS(l)(b) of the Act .. A Since the petitioners admittedly fall either under clause 'First' or under clause 'Secondly' of s.IS(l)(b) of the Act, they are clearly out<ide the scope of clause 'Fourthly'. Therefore, the petitioners canoot claim the right of pre-emption under clause 'Fourthly'. [71D-E] CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Special Leave Petition B (Civil) No. 11015 of 1986. From the Judgment and Order dated 2.5.86 of the High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in Regular Second Appeal No. 1504 of 1977. R.K. Jain, D.S. Mehra and Ms. AbhaJain for the Petitioners. K.K. Jain, P. Dayal, Shiv Kumar and A.O. Sanger for Respondent No. l The Judgment of the Court was delivered by ###### c D ,L ## VENKATARAMIAH, J. Respondents 5 to 7-Aji Ram, Tota Ram and Hari Chand are sons of one Kesaria. The suit land belonged jointly to Respondents 5 to 7. They sold it to Respondents l to 4Nathi Mal Kejriwal, Radhey Shayam Kejriwal, Smt. Daropdi Devi and Nagar Mal Kejriwal, who were strangers to their fam~y for a E consideration of Rs.33,000 under a sale deed registered on 25.10. 1971.. The petitioners, who claimed themselves to be the sons and nephews of the vendors, instituted a suit in Civil Suit No. 466 of 1972 on the file of the Sub-Judge, !st Class, Palwal for possession of the suit land on payment of Rs.33,000 Claiming that they were entitled to the right of pre-emption in respect of the suit land either under clause 'First' or F 'Secondly' of Section 15(i)(a) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') as in force in the State of Haryana or under clause 'First' or 'Secondly' of Section 15( i)(b) of the Act. The learned Sub-Judge upheld the plea of the petitioners and decreed the suit for possession of the suit land against Respondents 1 to 4 who had purchased the suit land as well as against Respondents 5 to 7 who had G sold it subject to the petitioners paying a sum of Rs.36,642. which included the consideration of Rs.33,000 and interest thereon at 8 per cent per annum. The learned Sub-Judge further directed the petitioners to deposit the sum of Rs.36,642 minus the _zare punjam_ amount on or before 3rd May, 197.6 and that on their failure to deposit the said H amount, he directed that the suit should be deemed to have been 70 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1987] 1 S. C.R. A dismissed with costs. Aggrieved by the judgment of the learned Sub- ._ Judge, Respondents l to 4 filed an appeal before the District Judge, Gurgaon in Civil Appeal No. 69 of 1976. The appeal .was dismissed. Against the judgment of the learned District Judge, Respondents 1 to 4 filed a second appeal before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Regular Second Appeal No. 1504 of 1977. That second appeal was B taken up for hearing on 2nd May, 1986. By that time this Court had delivered its judgment in _Atam Prakash_ v. _State of Haryana and Others,_ [ 1986] 2 S.C.C. 249 declaring clauses 'First', 'Secondly' and 'Thirdly' of Section 15( l)(a), clauses 'First', 'Secondly' and 'Thirdly' of Section 15( l)(b ), clauses 'First, 'Secondly' and 'Thirdly' of Section 15( l)(c) and _(_ the whole of Section 15(2) of the Act .as _ultra_ _vires_ the Constitution. ~.;:.m C Following the said decision the High Court allowed the second appeal and dismissed the suit since the provisions under which the petitioners claimed the right of pre-emption had been declared void by this Court. _)I·_ This petition is filed praying for special leave to prefer an appeal againsi the judgment of the High Court in the second appeal. D E F G H At the hearing of this Special Leave Petition the learned counsel for the petitioners contended that even though the petitioners were not able to claim the right of pre-emption under clauses 'First', and 'Secondly' of Section 15{1)(a) or clauses 'First' and 'Secondly' of Section 15( l)(b) by reason of the decision in the _Atam Prakash's_ case (supra) they were entitled to claim the right of pre-emption under clause 'Fourthly' in Section 15( l)(b) of the Act. Section 15( l)(b) reads thus> "15. _Persons in whom right of pre-emption vests in respect_ _of sales_ _of agricultziral land· and village immovable pro-_ _perty-(_ 1 )The right of pre-emption in respect of agricultural land and village immovable property shall vest (a) (b) where the sale is of a share out of joint land or property and is not made by all the co-sharers jointly First, in the sons or daughters or sons or daughters' sons of the vendor or vendors; Secondly, in the brothers or brother's sons of the vendor or **vendors;-** ## \ JAGDISH _v._ NATH! MAL KEJRIWAL [YENKATARAMIAH, J.] 71 Thirdly, in the father's brother or father's brother's sons of A the vendor or vendor_s; Fourthly, in the other co-sharers; Fifthly, in the tenants who hold under tenancy of the vendor or vendors the land or property sold or a part thereof; " B ###### c D E ' It is argued by the learned counsel for the petitioners that since \. the suit land belonged to the joint family and it had not been sold by all #### -- ~the co-sharers they were entitled to claim the right of pre-emption under clause 'Fourthly' of Section 15(l)(b) of the Act because they happened to be the non-alienating co-sharers. Although there is no specific finding that the property is the joint property in this case, we ##### ... # specific finding that the property is the joint property in this case, we shall assume for purposes of this judgment that the suit land was joint property. In order to understand the meaning of the· words 'other oo-sharers' in Section 15(1)(b) we have to read the Act as it stood before the decision in _Atam nakash's_ case (supra). It is seen that the expression _'other co-sharers'_ in clause 'Fourthly' of Section 15(1)(b) of the Act refers to only those oo-sharers ·who do not fall under clause 'First' or 'Seoondly' or 'Thirdly' of Section 15(1)(b) of the Act .. Since the petitioners adrnittetlly fall either under clause 'First' or under clause 'Secontlly' of.Section 15(1)(b) of the Act they are clearly outside the scope of clause 'Fourthly'. Therefore, the petitioners cannot claim the right of pre-emption under clause 'Fourthly'. We do not, therefore, find any substance in this contention which was urged for the first time before the High Court. The suit was, therefore, rightly dismissed by the High Court holding that the petitioners were no longer entitled to any relief under the Act. This· petition, therefore, fails and it is dismissed. F M.L.A. Petition dismissed. _J_ +