High CourtDivision BenchAppeal dismissed.

Indu Bhushan Gupta v. State of U.P. & Ors.

Case / Petition Number:Civil Appeal No. 2371 of 1969
Neutral Citation:(1980) 1 SCR 180

Case Details & Bench

Court
High Court
Hon'ble Judges
  • N. L. Untwalia
  • A. P. Sen
Judgment Date
1979-08-01
Court Decision / Holding
Appeal dismissed with costs.
Final Disposition
Appeal dismissed.

Parties to the Case

Appellants / Petitioners

  • Indu Bhushan Gupta

Respondents

  • State of Uttar Pradesh
  • Shashi Bhushan Gupta

Legal Representation & Advocates

Counsels for Petitioners

  • • G. L. Sanghi
  • • Mrs. S. Bagga

Counsels for Respondents

  • • G. N. Dikshit
  • • O. P. Rana
  • • S. Bagga

Case Synopsis & Summary

Indu Bhushan Gupta v. State of Uttar Pradesh and ors concerns recovery of a taccavi loan advanced for improvement of the Mukundpur Farm, a zamindari holding in Azmatgarh. Gupta, the karta of a joint Hindu family that owned vast zamindari properties, offered his half share as security. After default, the Collector attached the hypothecated property. Gupta claimed that due to a partition his brother, the sixth respondent, had inherited the property and undertook to discharge the loan; thus Gupta should not be personally liable. The State Government was not a party to the 1952 compromise decree between the brothers, and therefore could not be bound by it, Gupta argued that the loan was incurred by him personally or as karta and that the Government could not recover from compensation money only; he also questioned the applicability of s.289 and s.291 and the three-year and ten-year limitations. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined: whether the loan was taken by Gupta in his individual capacity or as karta; whether recovery was permissible under s.7(1) of the Land Improvement Loans Act, 1883, or by resort to s.289 of the Zamindari Abolition Act; whether s.6(e) allowed recovery solely from compensation; and whether s.291(3) or s.289 prevented recovery. The Court held that the loan was made by Gupta in his individual capacity, and liability attached to him personally even if taken as karta; it affirmed recovery from both the hypothecated property and Gupta personally, and dismissed the appeal with costs.

Provisions of Law Cited

Zamindari & Land Reforms Act, 1950 - Ss. 6, 289(1), 291(3)U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 - Ss. 243(1), 243(2), 289(1), 289(2), 291(3), 6(e)Land Improvement Loans Act, 1883 - S. 7(1); S. 6(c); S. 6(e)U.P. Encumbered Estates Act, 1934 - Ss. 27, 28, 272(2)U.P. Land Revenue Act, 1901 - S. 150Zamindari Abolition and Land Reform Act, 1950 - S. 290

Submissions & Arguments

Contentions of Appellants / Petitioners

The applicants argued that the taccavi loan was taken by Gupta in his capacity as karta, binding him personally to repay; even if taken in his capacity as karta, the liability attached to him individually and severally. The Government was not bound by the 1952 compromise decree, since it was not a party to that suit. The partition between Gupta and Shashi Bhushan Gupta does not defeat the personal liability or the collectability of the loan; the recovery could be pursued under the Land Improvement Loans Act, as well as under the Zamindari Acts. The Government’s reliance on s.6(e) as the exclusive remedy was questioned; the claim that s.243(2) notifications were not issued and that s.289(1)–(2) were not applicable is argued; the appellant asked for account of rents and profits and asserted that the collection from compensation was not the only remedy.

Contentions of Respondents

The respondents contended that the loan was incurred in Gupta’s individual capacity, not as karta, and that the compromise decree did not bind the Government. They argued that the Collector had authority to recover under s.7(1) from both the land and the security. They cited that s.289(1) could attach and sale of property; that s.289(2) would operate after three years; they argued that s.6(e) provides an optional mechanism to recover from compensation, but not the exclusive remedy; the Government is not bound to render accounts; the partition does not relieve Gupta of liability; The Government’s recovery action could proceed notwithstanding partition, and the Government’s own resort to various recoveries cannot be barred by the mere fact that compensation is at stake.

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Extracted Judgment Text

Exact text extracted from official judgment records.

INDU BHUSHAN GUPTA _v._ STATE OF U.P. & ORS. _August_ 1, 1979 [N. L. UNTWALIA AND A. P. SEN, JJ.] _UP._ _Zamindari_ & _Land Reforms Act,_ 1950 _Ss._ 6, 289(1), _291(3)-Scope_ _of-Taccavi_ _loan taken_ _by_ _agriculturist-If could_ _be_ _deducted from_ compensa~ _lion payable to him for abolition of Zamindaris._ A B The appellant and the sixth respondent, who were brothers, constituted a joint Hindu family. Though younger in age than the sixth respondent, the C appellant by virtue of a settlen1ent, became Karfit of the joint family. The family o\vnc<l vast Zamindari properties, one of which was a• Farn1 known as Mukundpur Farm. For the improve1nent of the Farm the appellant took _taccaiii_ loan by offering his half share in the joint family property as security. On his failure to repay the loan the Collector of the District ordered attach· rnent of the hypothecated property under s. 150 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act, 190i'. The appellant ·alleged that as a result of the partition of properties D between him and his brother the hypothecated property fell to the share of his brother, that under the compromise decree his brother undertook to dis· charge the loan and that therefore it was he who was responsible for repayment of the loan. (The Government, however was not impleaded as a party to the suit in \\'hich compromise was arrived at between the brothers.) Sometime later the sixth respondent resiled from the compromise decree E and stated that he was not liable to repay the loan because it was not taken by the .appellant in his capacity as Karta of the joint family but that it was taken only in his (appellant's) personal capacity and that, therefore, he alone was liable to repay it. The Collector made enquiries and held that the loan was taken by the appellant in his individual capacity and not as Karta of the joint family and held that he was personally liable to repay the loan. EventuaHy it was decided that the realisation of the dues should be made from the hypo- F thecated property as well as from his person and accordingly proceedings for realisation of the principal and interest on the loan were started. The High Court rejected the appellant's writ petition. In appeal the following three questions Vt'ere raised. (I) whether the _taccavi_ loan was taken by the appellant as Karta of the joint family, and, therefore, had to be recovered from the sixth respondent to _whose_ share the hypothecated property had fallen in the partition ·of. the property; (2) Whether the Collector was precluded from taking resort to any one or other i:nodes prescribed by s. 7 (1) of the land Im· provement Loans Act, 1883 for recovery of the sum remaining unrealised towards the _taccavi_ loan; (3) Whether the Government had no right to recover the outstanding amount due except from the compensation amount in terms of s.6(e) thereof? HELD : I. The loan in question was taken by the appellant in his individual ctlpacity and not as Karta of the joirit family .. By the terms of the _taccavi_ bond the appellant had bound him.elf to discharge the liability from his property. Even G H A B c D E F G 180 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] l S.C.K. assuming that he took the loan as Karta, he was personally and severally liable to pay. In the compromise suit the Government was not made a party and, therefore, was not bound by the terms of the compromise decree; nor ~'as the Government bound by the ·alleged partition effected between the appellant and the sixth respondent. [185-D-E; 186C] 2. (a) Section 7(1) of the Land Improvement Loans Act empowers the Collector to recover _taccavi_ dues from the defaulter as UTrears of land revenue and the Collector could have taken resort to s. 289(1) of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950, for the recovery of the unrealised amount of _raccavi_ loan by attacb1nent and sales of properties belonging to the appellant. Section 289 applies only to those cases in which the provision of s. 243(1) have been made applicable and it is nobody's case that a notification couten1plated by s. 243 (2) was ever issued. The question of s. 289 (2) operating as a bar to the recovery proceedings upon expiry of period of three years, therefore, does not arise. Ifs. 289(2) is read in the context of sub-s. (1) it \Vill be clear that upon the expiry of the period of three years the village bas to be restored free of claim on the part of the Government for any arrear of land revenue due in respect thereof. The consequence that ensures is that liability for payment of land revenue in respect of the village or any area therein in respect of which arrears are due stand~ discharged. But in regard to other sums of money recoverable as arrears of land revenue the liability continues. [186D; G, 187E-Fl (b) As s. 291(3) contemplates that upon expiry of the period of lease, the holding shall be restored to the tenure·holder concerned free of any claim on the part of the State Government for any arrears in resp_ect of such holding. In this case the period of the lease had not expired when the recovery pro· ceedings were initiated. [188A-B] 3. Section 6(c) provides that all amounts due under the Land JJnprove· ment Loans Act shall becon1e due forthwith upon the vesting of the Zamindari rights. It also provides that such dues may, without prejudice to any other mode of recovery provided therefor, be realised by deducting the amount from the compensatiori n1oney paya-ble to such intermediary. What it provides is an additional mode of recovery for roolisation of the dues. Under the scheme the Government has the option and the mode indicated in the sectiori is not the one and the only mode available. The recovery proceedings pending before the Collector were for the remainder of the loan after such adjustment together with interest. [!88F-G] CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2371 of 1969. From the Judgment and Order dated 23-5-1968 of the Allahabad High Court in Special Appeal No. 247 /66. _G._ _L._ _Sanghi, Mrs._ S. _Bagga_ for the Appellant. _G._ _N._ _Dikshit_ and _0._ _P._ _Rana_ for Respondents 1-5. T' l ' j. . H S. _K. Bagga_ for Respondent No. 6 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by _J_ I. B. GUPTA _v._ STATE _(Sen,_ _!.)_ 181 SEN J .-This appeal, by certificate, is directed against a judgment· A of the Allahabad High Court dated May 23, 1968, whereby it upheld a judgment of a Single Judge of that Court dated March 16, 1966, dis missing the appellant's writ petition to quash recovery proceedings initiated by the Collector, Azamgarh for realisation of the sum remaining due on account of a _taccavi_ loan under s.7 (!) of the Land Im- B provement Loans Act, 1883. ¥ ~ The; facts leading to this appeal, in brief, are as follows: The appellant and his brother Shashi Bhushan Gupta the sixth respondent, constituted a joint Hindu fumily owning extensive zamindari properties, over several districts in United Provinces including Azmatgarh C zamindari comprising of 34 villages. They owned an agricultural farm known as Mukundpur Farm situated in Azmatgarh zamindari. It is alleged that by virtue of a family settlement in 1940, the appellant even though younger in age, became the karta of the joint family. D E F ### #### • + ·\ By his application dated February 25, 1947 the appellant applied for a uiccavi loan of Rs. 1,22,000 in the prescribed form for improvement of Mukundpur Farm, to the Director of Agriculture, United Provinces through· the Collector, Azamgarh. The property offered as se.curity for advance or the loan was the zarnindari rights in Azmatgarh zamindari comprising of the aforesaid 34 villages bearing a ]and revenue of Rs. 11,000/-. During the verifioation proceedings, the appellant by his application dated February 22, 1948, offered a security of his half share in Azmatgarh zamindari, which on enquiry by the Collector for the grant of sanction for the loan, was evaluated av Rs. l,43,869.66p. The _taccavi_ loan was duly sanctioned by the Gov. ernment on September 23, 1948. The appellant having defaulted in payment of the loan, the Collector, Azamgarh by his order dated March 24, 1952 directed that the entire ilaqa lying in Tahsil Sagri, district Azamgarh forming part of the hypothecated property be attached under s. 150 of the U.P. Land G Revenue Act, 1901. It, however, seems that no attachment of wy land situated in Tahsil Sagri forming part of the hypothecated property had, in facf, been effected either under s.150 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act ors. 289 (1) of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950. It appears that some plots at the Mukundpur Farm lying in two villages, Mahnajpur and Ghaibipur, were later taken under the H management of the Collector under s. 290 of that Act and half share thereof let out to tenants, and the proceeds were adjusted towards the 182 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] l S.C.R. A ·outstanding _taccavi_ _dues._ It also appears that a sum of Rs. 38,951.~P representing the appellant's half share of the compensation money dne und payable to him: were adjusted under s.6 (e) of the Act towards the loan. "'· " ~ .. "- _e_ ':r~c.' ~,-, B c D E F G B It is the appellant's case that there was a partition between the appellant and his brother, the sixth respondent in 1951, and the hypothecated property was allocated to the shure of the sixth respondent. This resulted in,i compromise decree between the appellant and his brother, the sixth respondent, in Civil Suit No. 72 of 1952 under the terms of which, the sixth respondent undertook upon himself the liability to discharge the loan as the property offered in security had fallen to his share. In compliance thereof, the sixth respondent u~tually paid Rs. 16,012.SOP. The Government was admittedly not impkaded as a party to the suit. On Jnly 15, 1952, the sixth respondent resiled from the terms of compromise and objected to the recovery proceedings being taken against him on the ground that the loan in question had noi been taken by him nor bud the appellant borrowed it in the capacity as karta of the joint family. He, indeed, denied the _factum_ of partition. These objections were, however, over-ruled by the Sales Officer, Azamgarh on October 22, 1952. . On May 15, 1953, the appellant applied to the State Government for expunging his name from the debtor-sheet. The application was forwarded by the Government to the Collector, Azamgarh for enquiry and report. The appellant raised an objection alleging _biter_ _alia_ that the loan had been incurred by him in his capacity as kar~a of the joint Hindu family and that since the hypothecated property had fallen to to the share of the sixth respondent, he was not personally liable to repay the loan. The Collector by his order dated January 18, 1955, after holding an enquiry held that the appellant had taken the _taccavi_ loan in his individual capacity and not as kart>a of the joint family and accordingly h€ was personally liable to repay the loan. He, however, directed the Sales Officer that the recovery be made, in the first instance, from the hypothecated property before proceeding against the appellant! personally. The actiou taken by the Collector was duly endorsed by the Land Reforms Commissioner by his letter dated April 7, 1955, and approved of the State Government by its order dated July 22, 1955. The recovery proceedings were accordingly initiated against the -appellant. It appears that the appellant was a Member of the Legislative Assembly and apparently wielded considerable influence. He appears ,. I. B. GUPTA _v._ STATE _(Sen,_ J.) 183 to have addressed a representation to the Chief Minister on April lU, 1956. The State G-Ovemment referred the matter to the Commissioner, Gorakhpur Division, Gorakhpur who by his letter dated October 19, 1956 stated that he was fully in agreement with the Collector that the appellant must be treated as having taken the loan in his individual capacity and proceedings for its recovery had to be taken against the hypothecated property as well as against him personally. The latter also mentioned that the Collector had been asked, if necessary, to explain the case personally to the Chief Minister. Evidently, the State Government after reviewing the matter 'at all levels, by its order dated August 13, 1957 directed that the realisation of the _taccavi_ dues outstanding against the appellant should be made from the hypothecated property >as well as from his person immediately. It further directed that 'all the modes for recovery legally permissible should be adopted against him simultaneously and pursued vigorously'. Despite all this, the appellant has not paid a pie towards the outstanding debt except through coercive process. On December 17, 1957, the appellant addressed a representation to the Board of Revenue although under the _taccavi_ rules no appeal or revision lay to the Board. It is somewhat strange that the Addi. Lwd Reforms Commissioner, contrary to the Government's orders in that behalf, submitted a report, on his own, upholding the appellant's contention that he had borrowed the loan in his capacity as kmta of the joint family, and recommending that the loan in question should be recovered from the hypothecated property. The State Government naturally did not act upon this gratuitous advice. On June 19, 1959, the appellant woas informed of the Government's decision. Thereafter, the Collector started proceedings for realisation of Rs. 72,152.50P as principal and Rs. 23,689.81P as interest. Thereupon, the appellant on August 4, 1959 moved the Al!ahaVad High Court under. Art. 226. The appellant's writ petition was dismissed by a learned Single Judge. It appears that the contention that the loan was incurred by him as karta of the joint Hindu family was not raised before the learned Single Judge, as he observes "It appears that recovery proceedings were taken against the Mukundpur Farm, which, it is not disputed, belongs exclusively to the petitioner''. He negatived the contention that the Collector had let out a part of the Mukundpur Farm in 1952 and therefore, a.fter expiry of a period of ten years, the Government was precluded by reason of s.291 (3) of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act from further continuing the recovery proceedings. He held that this involved a _1_ l-475 SCI/79 A B c D E F G H ' " ... ... - • A B c D E F G fl 184 SUPKEME COURT REPORTS, (1980] 1 S.C.R. disputed question of fact as according to the Government certain plots of Munkundpur Farm were first let out iu 1959-60 and not in 1952, and therefore, the bar of s.291 (3) was not applicable. _As_ regards the contention based on s.6 (e) of the Act that the Government had no power to make the recovery except frorn out of the compensation . amount, .he held that the provision did not debar the Government from proceeding otherwise. On the question of accounting he held that the submission calls for an accounting of the amount received by such Jetting out and there was no material upon which the decision of the Court could rest. On appeal, the appellant for the first time raised an objection as to his personal liability alleging that the loan in question was incurred by him in the capacity of karta, and, therefore, recoverable from the hypothecated property alone. There was a difference of opinion on the question between the learned Judges constituting the Bench as to whether he had taken the loan •as karta of the joint family or in his individual capacity, but nonetheless the appeal failed because they repelled all other contention$. Four questions arise in this appeal : 1. Whether the _taocavi_ Joan was incnrred by the appellant as a Jmrta of the joint Hindn family au! not in his individual capacity and, therefoce, the loan in queition bas to be recovered frorn the sixth respondent, inasmuch as the hypothecated property had fallen to his share in a family partition ? 2. Is the Collector precluded from taking resort to any one or other modes prescribed by s.7 (1) of the Land Improvement Loans Act, 1883, for recovery of the sum remaining unrealised towards the _taccavi_ loan, by reason of s.289 (2) or s.291 (3) of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950? 3. Have the Government no right to recover the outstanding amount due except from the compensation amount in terms of s.6 (e) thereof? 4. Was the Government. bound to render an account of the rents and profits derived from Jetting ovt of the plots of Mukundpur Farm? "7 (1) Subject to· such rules as may be made under section ten, all loans granted under this Act, all interest (if any) chargeable thereon, and costs (if any) incurred in making the same, shall, when they become due, be recoverable by the Collector in all or any of the following modes, namely :(a) from the borrower--as if they were arrears of land Section 7 ( 1) of the Land Improvement Loans Act, 1883, roods as follows: revenue due by him; !. B. GUPTA _v._ STATE (Sm, _J.)_ 185 B ##### -· # (b) from his surety (if any)-as if they were arrears of land- A revenue due by him; ( c) out of the land for the benefit of which the loan lras been granted-as if they were arrears of land-revenue due in. respect of that land; ( d) out of the property comprised in the collate.ral security B (if any )-according to the procedure for the realization of land-revenue by the sale of immovable property other than the land on which that revenue is due." On the first point, we agree with one of the learned Judges (Uniyal J .) . The conclusion reached by the learned Judge that 'the _taccavi_ loan was taken by the appellant in his individual capacity' is the only c conclusion possible. The appellant maintained that the loan was incurred for family purposes i.e., for improvement of Munkundpur Farm by the appellant in his capacity as the karta and it having fallen to the share of the sixth respondent in the family partition, the recovery proceedings against the appellant under s. 7 were not maintainable. We D fail to see how can the appellant escape liability on this account. The Government was not a party fo Civil Suit No. 72 of 1952 and was, therefore, not bound by the terms of the compromise decree. Nor was the Government bound by the alleged partition effected between the appellant and the sixth respondent. It matters little whether there was a partition or not in 1951; and E if so, whether the hypothecated property had fallen to the share of the sixth respondent. The appellant had bound himself by the terms of the _taccavi bond_ to discharge the liability from his property. The instrument is not on record. The document was, however, before the High Court. Uniyal J. in the course of his judgment, with regard to "He pledged _his half share_ in 34 villages of Tahsil Sagri. After verification of the _proprietary rights_ _of the appellant in_ _the hypothecated property,_ the Collector issued a certificate decfaring that _the same_ wus sufficient to cover the amount of taccavi loan. Thereupon _a formal document_ _in_ _the nature_ _of taccavi bond was executed by the appellam of the one part_ _and the Collector of the other part evidencing the transaction_ _of loan._ A list containing particulars of the immovable property was annexed to the bond, and _it was stated therein that_ _a half share_ _of_ _the appellant in the said zamindari property_ _had been pledged by way_ _of security."_ (Emphasis supplied) c D E ~ppellant's personal liability, observes: F The correctness of this observation is not open to question. The learned Judge then goes on to say: G B B c D E 11 G 186 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] l S.C.R. "The _naqsha_ _maliyat_ aftached to the tacoavi bond clearly mentioned the details of the hypothecated property in tahsil Sagri consisting of one half share of the appellant." He then rightly concludes, saying: "It is of no consequence if the creditor proceeds against the share of the Karta alone in the joint family property hypothecated as security for the loan, or from his person, or both." We concur in the conclusion reached by the learned Judge that the loan in question was taken by the appellant in his individual capacity and not as a karta of the joint Hindn family. Even assuming he took the loan as karta, still he would be personally and severally liable to repay it. The remaining points are equally devoid of substance. The contention based on s. 289 (2) of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 does not arise. No doubt, the Collector is empowered under s. 7 ( 1) of the Land Improvement Loans Act to recover all the _taccavi_ dues from the defaulter as arrears of land revenue, and by reason of s. 288, the provisions of s. 289 are attracted. By s. 21!8, it is provided that the provisions of the Act witli regard to the recovery of arrears of land revenue shall apply to all arrears of land revenue and 'sums of money recoverable as arrears of land revenue' due at the commencement of the Act. The Collector could, therefore, have mken resort to s. 289 (1) for the recovery of the unrealised amonnt of the _t,accavi_ loan by attachment and sale of properties belonging to the appellanf. But, the ilaka of Tahsil Sagri was not, in fact, ever attached under s. 289 ( n. In the instant case, no previous sanction of the Board of Revenue was obtained under s. 272(2). Consequently, the attachmen~ could not be said to be one made under s. 289 ( 1). Further, s. 289 applies only to those cases in which the provisions of s. 243 ( 1) have been made applicable by the Government under a notification issued under s. 243(2). It is nobody's case that a notification contemplated bys. 243 (2) was ever issued. The question of s. 289 (2) operating as a bar to the recovery proceedings after expiry of a period of three years, therefore, does not arise. There is also a fallacy in the argument. The provisions of s. 289 run thus: "289. Attachment of village for arrears of land revenue. Cl) At any time after an arrear of land revenue has accrutld, the Collector may attach the village or any area therein L ... ## - • I. B. GUPTA _v._ STATE _(Sen,_ J.) 187 in respect of which the arrear is due and place it under his own management or that of an agent appointed by him for that purpose for such period as he may consider nece~sary : Provided that the period for which any village or 1my area therein may be so attached, shall not exceed three years from the commencement of the agricultural year next following the date of attachment, and the attachment shall be cancelled if the arrears are sooner liquidated. (2) Upon the expiry of the period of attachment, the village shall be restored free of any claim on the part of the Government for any arrear of land revenue due in respect thereof." When an arrear of land revenue has accmed, the Collector may under s. 289 ( 1) attach a village or any area therein in respect of which the arrear is due and place it under his own management or that of an agent appointed by him for that purpose., The proviso to s. 289 ( 1), however, interdicts that the period for which any village or any area therein may be so attached, shall not exceed three years from the commencement of the agricultural year next following the date of attachment, and the attachment shall be cancelled if the arrears are sooner liquidated. Ifs. 289 (2) is read in the context of sub-s. (1), it will be clear that upon the expiry of the period of three years the village has to he restored free of any claim on the part of the Government for any arrear of land revenue due in respect thereof. The consequence that ensues is that liability for payment of land revenue in respect of the village or any area therein in respect of which arrears are due stands discharged. There is a distinction between arrears of land revenue and other government dues recoverable as if they were arrears of land revenue. In respect of other sums of money recoverable as arrears of land revenue, the debtor is not discharged of his liability for payment of such dues even after three years. A B c D E F ' ... ... The next question is whether by virtue of s. 291 (3), the appellant G stood relieved of all liability for payment of arrears of _taccavi_ dues after the expiry of ten years. We may here reads .. 291 (3). It is in these terms: "291 (3) Upon the expiry of the period of lease the holding shall be restored to the tenure-holder concerned free of any claim on the part of the State Government for any arrears in respect of such holding." B c D E F G H lSS SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 1 S.C.R. The High Court has relied upon the affidavit of the Chief Revenue Account>ant, Collectorate stating that certain plots of Mulrnndp<Jr Farm were for the first time let out in the year 1959-60. It would, therefore, appear that the period of ten years had not expired when the recovery proceedings were initiated. There remains the question whether the Government is bound to recover the unrealized sum of _taccavi_ loan from the amount of compensation money and relying upon s. 6 (e) of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition a,nd Land Reforms Act it is urged that that is the only remedy left. The contention, we are afraid, proceeds on a misconception of the purpo.rt and effect of s. 6 ( e) of the Act, which reads : "6(e). all amounts ordered to be paid by an intermediary to the State Government under Sections 27 and 28 of the U.P. Encumbered Estates Act, 1934, and all amounts due from him under the Land Improvement Loans Act, 1883, or the Agricultural Loans Act, 1884, shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the said enactments, become due forthwith and may, without prejudice to any other mode of recovery provided therefor, be realized by deducting the amount from the compensation money payable to such intermediary under Chapter III." It is plain upon its terms, that the provisions of s. 6 ( e) are not obligatory. It is an enabling provision. It provides that all amounts due under the Land Improvement Loans Act, shall notwithstanding anything contained therein, become due 'forthwith', upon the vesting of the zamindari rights. It then lays down that such dues may, without prejudice to any other mode of recovery provided therefor, be rel!lised by deducting the amount from the compensation money payable to such intermediary. It, therefore, provides an additional mode of recovery for realisation of the dues. The1 word 'may' ins. 6(e) clearly indicates that the Government has the option to fall back upon the compensation amount. It does not entail in the consequence that the mode indicated in s. 6 ( e) is the one and the only mode available. The High Court has observed that the entire amount of compensa" tion money which fell to the appellant's share amonnting to Rs. 38,951.8P had been adjnsted towards the loan, on the boasis that the half share of the appellant in the zamindari property had been hypothecated as security for the loan. The recovery proceedings now pending before the Collector is for the balance remaining after such adjustment together with interest. It was faintly argued by learned counsel for the appellant tliat the Government was bound to render an account of the rents and profits ## **I. B.** GUPTA _V._ STATE _(Sen,_ _J.)_ 189 realised from the letting of plots of Mukundpur Farm, but he did not pursue the argument any further and rightly so. The High Court has observed that it had scrutinized the accounts maintained by the Government and the same have been maintained as required by t11e _taccavi_ rules as per appendix 'A' to Form **VIL** It was certainly not open to the High Court to gr11nt any such relief under Art. 226 of the Constitution particularly when it involved consideration of disputed question of fact. The result, therefore, is that the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. **P.B.R.** _Appeal dismissed._ **A** **B** ###### ##