High CourtDivision BenchAppeal dismissed

Indu Bhusan De & Ors. v. State of West Bengal

Case / Petition Number:Civil Appeal No. 2065 of 1971
Neutral Citation:1986 SCR 547

Case Details & Bench

Court
High Court
Hon'ble Judges
  • E. S. Venkatramiah
  • Ranganath Misra
Judgment Date
1986-08-12
Court Decision / Holding
Appeal dismissed; there will be no order as to costs.
Final Disposition
Appeal dismissed

Parties to the Case

Appellants / Petitioners

  • Indu Bhusan De and others

Respondents

  • State of West Bengal

Legal Representation & Advocates

Counsels for Petitioners

  • • B.P. Maheshwari
  • • S.N. Aggarwal
  • • B.M. Bagaria

Counsels for Respondents

  • • D.N. Mukarjee
  • • G.S. Chatterjee

Case Synopsis & Summary

This is a Civil Appeal from the Calcutta High Court challenging the vires of the Calcutta City Civil Court Act (1953) and its amendments, which fixed the local limits and pecuniary jurisdiction of the City Civil Court at Calcutta (initially Rs. 10,000, later raised to Rs. 50,000, and finally to Rs. 1 lakh). The appellants contended that Parliament alone had the power to regulate the jurisdiction of the High Court, arguing the Act encroached upon the High Court’s jurisdiction and was thus ultra vires the State Legislature. The High Court, and the learned Single Judge before it, rejected this contention, finding the Act intra vires. The judgment undertakes a detailed constitutional analysis of the distribution of legislative powers under the Government of India Act, 1935 and the lists (List I, List II, List III) as they stood in 1953, especially Entries 1, 2 in List II, Entry 53 in List I and Entry 15 of List III, along with Article 141 of the Constitution. It cites the path-breaking Narotham Das/Narothamdas case (Constitution Bench) and State of Bombay v. Narothamdas Jethabhai & Anr. (1951) to establish that the phrase “administration of justice” authorizes legislating to confer or withdraw jurisdiction of courts, and thereby validates the Act as intra vires. Amarendra Nath Roy Chowdhury v. Bikash Chandra Ghose & Anr. is cited with approval. The Court ultimately dismisses the appeal, holding that the Act is within the legislative competence of the State. The final order is: appeal dismissed, with no costs.

Provisions of Law Cited

Calcutta City Civil Court Act (21 of 1953) section 5(2)Government of India Act, 1935 (Entries 1 and 2 of List II; Entry 53 of List I; Entry 15 of List III)List I, List II and List III of Schedule VII of the ConstitutionConstitution of India Article 141

Legal Doctrines & Maxims

  • The expressions 'administration of justice' and 'constitution and organisation of courts' are wide enough to include the power and jurisdiction of courts; administration of justice includes the power to try civil and criminal matters, define, enlarge, alter, amend and diminish jurisdiction titling and pecuniarily.
  • Administration of justice authorises making of law conferring on or taking away from courts jurisdiction to entertain cases (broader interpretation of lists)

Submissions & Arguments

Contentions of Appellants / Petitioners

The appellants contended that the Calcutta City Civil Court Act, by fixing the City Civil Court’s local limits and monetary jurisdiction (ultimately up to Rs. 1 lakh), divested the High Court of its jurisdiction and encroached on Parliament’s exclusive legislative domain. Citing Entries in List I/II/III and Article 141, they urged that the Act was ultra vires the State Legislature. They relied on precedents (notably Narotham Das’s case) to argue that administration of justice involves the jurisdiction of courts and that changes to that jurisdiction require constitutionally appropriate authorization. The appellants sought a declaration of ultra vires.

Contentions of Respondents

The State contended that the Act falls within the broad ambit of 'administration of justice' and the 'jurisdiction and powers of all courts' as enumerated in the Union/State lists in 1935, allowing a State Legislature to legislate on the administration/organization of courts and their jurisdictions, save for the Supreme Court. The Presidential assent to the Act and its consistency with pre-Constitution law, as well as the binding precedent upholding similar state Acts (Bombay City Civil Court Act) were relied upon to justify intra vires validity.

Cited Precedents (2)

Case NameCitationTreatmentExplanation
State of Bombay v Narothamdas Jethabhai & Anr.[1951] S.C.R. 51PositiveConstitution Bench decision cited as binding precedent; followed by the court in affirming intra vires interpretation.
Amarendra Nath Roy Chowdhury v. Bikash Chandra Ghose & Anr.AIR 1957 Calcutta 534PositiveApproved as binding precedent aligning with Narotham Das's case; used to support intra vires position.

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Extracted Judgment Text

Exact text extracted from official judgment records.

#### " # . _Calcutta City Civil Court Act (21of1953) section 5(2) fixing local_ _limits and pecuniary jurisdiction of City Civil Courts-Whether the Act_ _is_ _ultra vires_ _the_ _Constitution for want_ _of legislative competence of the_ _State Legislature-Entry 53_ _of List_ _I,_ _Entries 1 and 2_ _of List II and_ _Entry_ _15 of List Ill of the Government of India Act,_ _1935_ _(of Entry llA_ _of List III of Schedule VII of the Constitution)-Binding nature of the_ _Supreme Court decision-Constitution of India,_ _1950 Article 141._ INDU BHUSAN DE & ORS. _v._ THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL AUGUST 12, 1986 [E.S. VENKATARAMIAH AND RANGANATH MISRA, JJ.] A B c - • .._ D The Calcutta City Civil Court Act empowered the State Government to establish a civil court to be called the City Civil Court and under section 5(2) thereof the local limits and the jurisdiction of the City Civil Court was tu be the city of Calcutta. Section 5(2)·as it stands now f1Xed the jurisdiction of the City Civil Court at Rupees one lakh and excluded the High Court's jurisdiction up to that limit. E _'(_ The appellant moved the Calcutta High Court for a declaration that the Act was ultra vires the jurisdiction of the State Legislature and contended that Parliament alone had the legislative competence to make law affecting the jurisdiction of the High 'Court. The learned Single Judge and also the Division Bench negatived the appellant's plea and held that the Act was _intra vires_ the Constitution. Hence the appeal by certificate. Dismissing the appeal, the"Court, F HELD: I. Entries I and 2 of List II of the Government of India G Act, 1935 (now Entry llA of List ·m of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution) authorised law making on subject of administration of justice, constitution and organisation of courts and jurisdiction and powers thereof excepting in regard to the Supreme Court. The Calcutta City Civil Court Act received the Presidential assent and was therefore, competent to bring about a change in the prevailing position obtaining H 547 A B c D E F G H 548 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1986] 3 S.C.R. under the Letters Patent of the Calcutta High Court. [551E-G] 2. In _Narotham Das's_ case, the Supreme Court took the view namely, "administration of justice" authorised making of law conferring on, or taking away from, courts, jurisdiction to entertain cases. Inasmuch as the provisions of the Bombay City Civil Court Act, 1948 considered in _Narotham Das's_ case and the provisions of the Calcutta Act, are _in pari materia,_ the High Court correctly held that the Act was _intra vires_ the Constitution. The decision of the Constitution Bench in _Narotham_ Das's case is clear and binding precedent under Article 14 l of the Constitution, against the appellant's stand. [55JE-F; H) _State_ _of_ _Bombay_ v. _Narothamdas Jethabhai_ & _Anr.,_ [1951) S.C.R. SJ, followed. _Amarendra Nath Roy Chowdhury_ v. _Bikash Chandra Chose_ _&_ _Anr.,_ A.LR. 1957 Calcutta 534, approved. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2065 of 1971 From the Judgment and Order dated 28.7.1970 of the Calcutta High Court in Original Order No. 125 of 1970. B.P. Maheshwari, S.N. Aggarwal and B.M. Bagaria for the Appellants. D.N. Mukarjee and G.S. Chatterjee forthe Respondents. The,Judgment of the Court was delivered by RANGANATH MISRA, J. This appeal by certificate from the Calcutta High Court assails the affirming judgment of the Division Bench upholding the dismissal of a writ petition challenging the vires of the Calcutta City Civil Court Act (21of1953) and its later amendment on the ground of want of legislative competence of the State Legislature. The City Civil Court Act ('Act' for short), empowered the State Government to establish a civil court to be called the City Civil Court and under section 5 thereof the local limits and the jurisdiction of the City Civil Court was to be the city _gf_ Calcutta. Sub-section (2) of s. 5 ptovided: "Subject to the provisions of sub-sections (3) and (4), the A B c D E F G H ## .... INDU Bf!'USAN _v._ STATE OF W.B. [MISRA. J.] 549 City Civil Court shall have jurisdiction and the High·Court shall not have jurisdiction to try suits and proceedings of a ·civil nature not exceeding Rs.10,000-in value." The value of Rs.10,000 was later enhanced to Rs.50,000 and again to Rs. 1 lakh. The appellant moved the Calcutta High Court for a declaration that the Act was _ultra_ _vires_ the ~tate legislature. It was 'contended that Parliament alone had the legislative competence to make law affecting the jurisdiction of the High Court. The learned single judge as also the Division Bench negatived the appellant's plea and have held that the Act was _intra vires_ the Constitution. It is appropriate to refer to the relevant legislative entries in the three lists-Union, State and Concurrent- as they stood in 1953 when the Act was enacted. In the Union List entries 77, 78 and 95 are relevant. They provide: "77. Constitution, organisation, jurisdiction and powers of the Supreme Court (including contempt of such Court), and the fees taken therein; persons entitled to practise before the Supreme Court. 78. Constitution and organisation (including vacations) of the High Courts except provisions as to officers and servants of High Court; persons entitled to practise before the High Court. 95. Jurisdiction and powers of all courts, except the Supreme Court, with respect to any of the matters in this list; admiralty jurisdiction." Entry 3, List II at the relevant time provided: "3. **Administration of justice,** con~titution ~nd **organisa-** tion of all courts except the Supreme Court and the High Courts; officers and servants of the High Court; procedure in rent and revenue courts; fees taken in all courts except the Supreme Court." ...._, Entry 65, List II provides: "65. Jurisdiction and powers of all courts, except the A B c D E F G H 550 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1986] 3 S.C.R. Supreme Court, with respect to any of the matters in this list." _¥_ ~ Entry 46, List III provides: "46. Jurisdiction and power of all courts, except the Supreme Court, with respect to any. of the matters in this **list."** A Constitution Bench of this Court in _State_ _of Bombay_ v. _Naro-_ _thamdas Jethabhai_ _&_ _Anr.,_ [1951] S.C.R. 51, examined the validity of the Bombay City Civil Court Act of 1948. the provisions of that Act and the impugned Act are almost similar. The challenge to the vires of the Bombay Act had to be examined keeping the provisions of Government of India Act, 1935, in view inasmuch as that was a preConstitution legislation. Each of the learned Judges wrote a separate judgment but all of them were agreed that the Bombay Act was a law with respect to a matter enumerated in List II and was not _ultra vires._ Entry 53 of List I was to the following effect: . "53. Jurisdiction and powers of all courts, except the Federal Court, with respect to any of the matters in this **list .** ..... " Entries 1 and 2 of List II were as under: "l. ... The administration of justice, constitution and organisation of all courts, except the Federal Court, and fees taken therein; ..... . 2. Jurisdiction and powers of all courts, except the Federal Court, with respect to any of the matters in this list; procedure in Rent and Revenue Courts." Entry 15 of List III was to the following effect: "15. Jurisdiction and powers of all courts, except the Federal Court, with respect to any of the matters in this List." The two relevant entries in List II of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution authorised law making on subject of administration of justice, constitution and organisation of courts and jurisdiction and pow ##### _t:._ \ ###### +- INDU BHUSAN _v._ STATE OF W.B. [MISRA, J.) 551 ers thereof exCepting in regard to the Supreme Court. These were the A two ·expressions with reference to which Fazal Ali, J. i_n _Narotham_ _Das's_ case observed thl)S'. ###, .. ' " ... **the expressions** **"administtatiort' of justice"** **and** "con~ stifution and organisation of courts"; which have been used therein without any qualification or limitation, are wide enough to include the power and jurisdiction of courts, f<H" how can justice be administered if courts have no power and jurisdiction to administer it, and how can courts function without any power of jurisdiction. Once this fact is clearly grasped, it follows that, by virtue of the words used in Entry I of List II; the Provincial Legislature can invest the courts constituted by it with power and jurisdiction to try every cause or matter that can be dealt with by a court . of civil or criminal jurisdiction and that the expression "administration of justice" must necessarily include-the power to try suits and proceedings of a civil as well as criminal nature irrespective of who the parties to the suit or **proceeding or what its subject-matter may be. This power** must necessarily include the power of defining, enlarging, altering, amending and diminishing the jurisdiction of the courts and defining their jurisdiction tettitotialiy and B c D E F G i-1 pecuniarily.~ _The_ other learned Judges constituting the Bench took the same view n·arnely, "administration of justice" authorised making of law confer**ring on, or taking away from, courts, jqrisdiction to entertain cases.** This decision of the Constitution Bench clearly negatives t_he claim of the appellant that the impugned Act was _ultra vires_ the jurisdiction of the West Bengal Legislature. Admittedly the Act received Presidential assent and was, therefore, competent to bring about a change in the prevailing position obtaining under the Letters Patent of the Calcutta High Court. _A_ similar challenge as in the present dispute had also been raised before the Calcutta High Court in the case of _Amarendra Nath_ _Roy_ _Chowdhury_ v. _Bikiish Chandra Ghose_ _&_ _Anr.,_ AIR 1957 Calcutta 534 and a learned single Judge relying on the decision of the Constitution Bench referred to above had held that the Act was _intra vires_ the State legislature. We ate of the view that the decision of the Constitution Bench_ is a clear and binding precedent against the appellant's stand. 552 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1986] 3 S.C.R. A The appeal has no merit and is, therefore, dismissed. There will be no order as to costs in this Court. S.R. Appeal dismissed. l ) 1.