High CourtDivision BenchAppeals dismissed for the reasons stated; no co...

INDO-ADEN SALT MFG. & TRADING CO. PVT. LTD. v. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, BOMBAY

Case / Petition Number:Civil Appeal Nos. 800-807 (NT) of 1974
Neutral Citation:SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1986] 1 S.C.R.

Case Details & Bench

Court
High Court
Hon'ble Judges
  • Sabyasachi Mukharji
  • K.N. Singh
Judgment Date
1986-03-12
Court Decision / Holding
Appeals dismissed.
Final Disposition
Appeals dismissed for the reasons stated; no costs.

Parties to the Case

Appellants / Petitioners

  • INDO-ADEN SALT MFG. & TRADING CO. PVT. LTD.

Respondents

  • Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay

Legal Representation & Advocates

Counsels for Petitioners

  • • P. G. Gokhale
  • • B. R. Agarwal
  • • V. Menon

Counsels for Respondents

  • • S. C. Manchanda
  • • K. C. Dua
  • • Ms. A. Subhashini

Case Synopsis & Summary

This Supreme Court opinion deals with the scope of the Income Tax Officer’s (ITO) power to reopen an assessment under section 147(a) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The appellant, a partnership later taken over by Indo-Aden Salt Works Co., had filed its valuation report and an agreement dated 24 August 1949. In the assessment year 1950-51, the ITO allowed depreciation of 6% on the aggregate value of Rs. 20,31,000, but subsequent findings revealed that about 93% of the construction was earth and only 7% masonry, with 41% of piers masonry and 59% earth. The ITO proposed reopening for the years 1955-56 to 1962-63 on the ground that the taxpayer had not disclosed fully and truly all material facts regarding asset composition, which would affect depreciation calculations. The Bombay High Court had declined to refer questions on law under section 256(2). The central issue is whether there was failure to disclose primary facts such that escapement of income warranted reopening. The Court reaffirmed the principle that the assessee must disclose primary facts; mere production of evidence is insufficient if material facts are withheld. Relying on Calcutta Discount Co. Ltd. and related precedents, the Court held that non-disclosure justifies jurisdiction to reopen. The appeals were dismissed with no costs.

Provisions of Law Cited

Income Tax Act, 1961, section 147(a)Income Tax Act, 1961, section 256(2)

Legal Doctrines & Maxims

  • Obligation to disclose primary facts, not inferential facts
  • Mere production of evidence before the ITO is not enough; there may be omission or failure to make a true and full disclosure
  • There must be primary facts from which reasonable belief of non-disclosure can be formed; ITO has jurisdiction to reopen under section 147(a)
  • Assessee knows all material and relevant facts and must bring them to the notice of the assessing authority

Submissions & Arguments

Contentions of Appellants / Petitioners

Appellants argue that essential primary facts relating to asset composition and depreciation were disclosed before the ITO: the 1949 agreement and the Valuation Report were filed and discussed, with depreciation likely on the aggregate value of Rs. 20,31,000. They contend that depreciation was discussed and agreed upon, and the ITO’s later treatment did not reveal non-disclosure of primary facts. The onus is on the revenue to show concrete non-disclosure; reliance is placed on established principles from Calcutta Discount Co. Ltd., Lakhmani Mewal Das, and related rulings that non-disclosure – whether deliberate or inadvertent – can trigger the reopening jurisdiction under section 147(a). They emphasize that only primary facts, not inferential facts, are material and that the revenue could have probed further but failed to do so; hence there was no basis to cast doubt on disclosure. The High Court’s decision to refuse a reference is consistent with the established framework.

Contentions of Respondents

Respondents contend that there was a failure to disclose fully and truly all material facts relevant to depreciation, specifically the proportion of earth versus masonry in the assets. They argue the ITO reasonably believed that the asset composition required for correct depreciation was not disclosed; the 93% earth/7% masonry composition and related conclusions about piers and reservoirs were not properly disclosed, warranting reopening under section 147(a). They rely on the rule that non-disclosure of primary facts gives jurisdiction to reopen and cite Calcutta Discount Co. Ltd. and subsequent decisions to support the principle that mere presentation of evidence does not absolve the assessee from disclosure obligations. The High Court rightly declined to call for a statement of case on a legal question, and the appeals are to be dismissed.

Cited Precedents (4)

Case NameCitationTreatmentExplanation
Calcutta Discount Co. Ltd. v. Income Tax Officer, Companies District I, Calcutta & Another41 I.T.R. 191PositiveCited to support the principle that non-disclosure of primary facts gives the ITO jurisdiction to reopen under section 147(a).
Hazi Amir Mohammad Mir Ahmed v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Amritsar110 I.T.R. 630PositiveCited for the standard on disclosure of material facts and the duty of the assessee to bring relevant facts to the notice of the assessing authority.
Income Tax Officer I Ward, Distt VI Calcutta & Others v. Lakhmani Mewal Das103 I.T.R. 437PositiveCited to reinforce that mere production of evidence is not enough; material facts must be revealed.
Malegaon Electricity Co. P. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay78 I.T.R. 466PositiveCited for the principle that non-disclosure of primary facts can lead to reassessment under section 147(a).

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Extracted Judgment Text

Exact text extracted from official judgment records.

627 A B ### c ##### INOO-ADEN SALT MFG. & TRADING CO. PVT. LTD. v. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, BOMBAY MARCH 12, 1986 [SABYASACHI MUKllARJI AND K.N. SINGH, JJ.] Jurisdiction to reopen assessment by the Income Tax Officer, when arises - Reopening assessment on the ground that the assessee had obtained depreciation at 6 per cent on the assets as masonry works, but the assets consisted of earth work wholly or substantially - Whether escaped assessment Duty of the assessee to disclose primary facts and truly Income Tax Act, 1961, section 147 (a). A partnership firm business carried on by M/s. lndo Aden D ·• Salt Works Co. was taken over by the appellant-assessee by an agreement dated 24.8.1949. During the assessment year 1950-51, the said Agreement as well as the Valuation Report of the assets had been filed before the assessing authority. The Income Tax Officer did not discuss the point whether the assets were constructed of masonry or made of earth but on the E ##### assessee's letter conveying its agreement that for the purpose of depreciation the value should be taken as Rs.20,31,000 in the aggregate, in the assessment order allowed 6 per cent #### depreciation. Later it was found that 93% of the construction works were made of earth and only 7% of masonry and that 59% ~ of piers were made of masonry and 41% of them were made of F earth were allowed 12% depreciation which rate is available ##### only if constructed entirely or mainly of wood. The Income Tax Officer, on these facts proposed to reopen the assessment on escaped income for the years 1955-56 to 1962-63. The jurisdiction of the Income Tax Officer to reopen the assessment under · section 147(a) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 and the High G Courts' 'declining to call for a statement of case on a question of law by rejecting the application under section _--(_ 256(2) of the Act are under challenge in the appeals on certificate granted by the Bombay High Court. Dismissing the appeal,s, the Cour~, H 628 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1986] 1 S.C.R. A B ### c D E G H ##### HEU>: l, l If there are some primary facts from which reasonable belief could be formed that there was some non- _Y_ ##### disclosure or failure to disclose fully and truly all material facts, the Income Tax Officer has jurisdiction to reopen the ##### assessment. Assessee itnows all the materl.al and relevant facts - the assessing authority might not. In respect of the failure to disclose, the omission to disclose may be deliberate or ##### inadvertent. That was immaterial. But if there is omission to , disclose material facts, then, subject to the other,,,. conditions, jurisdiction to reopen is attracted. [632 D-F] ~ 1.2 The obligation of the assessee is to disclose only primary facts and not inferential facts. What facts are material facts would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Further, whether there has been such non-disclosure of primary facts which has caused escapement of income in the assessment was basically a question of fact. In this case, what portion of the asset consisted of l earth and what portion or proportion consisted of masonry work was indubitably a material fact for the purpose of calculating the depreciation. If over depreciation has been allowed on the basis that the entire work consisted of masonry work, income might have been under-assessed. The Income Tax Officer can reasonably be said to have material to form that belief. (631 E-F] ##### l, 3 Mere production of evidence before the Income Tax Officer and leaving him to find out the position by further ##### probing is not enough. The assessee nust make full disclosure~ truly. There msy be omission or failure to make a true and #### full disclosure, but if some material for the assessment lay embedded in the evidence which the revenue could have uncover#### ed but did not, then, it is the duty of the assessee to bring it to the notice of the assessing authority. (632 D] Calcutta Discount Co. Ltd. v. Incone Tax Officer ##### Companies District I, Calcutta & Another, 41 I;T,R, 191; Hazi Aalr Mohd. Mir Ahmed v. Collllll.ssioner of Income-Tax, Amritsar, " 110 I.T.R. 630; Income Tax Officer I Ward, Distt VI Calcutta & Ors. v. Laldmani lfewal Das, 103 I. T. R. 437; and Malegaon Elee##### tricity Co. P. Ltd, v. Coumi.ssioner of Income Tax, Bombay, 78 I,T.R. 466 applied. '· INDO-ADEN SALT v. C.I.T, [MUKHARJI, J.] 629 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal Nos. 800-807 (NT)·of 1974. From the Judgment and Order dated 21st June, 1973 of the Bombay High Court in Income Tax Application No.6 of 1972. P.G. Gokhale, B.R. Agarwal and V, Menon for the Appel**lant.** S.C. Manchanda, K.C. Dua and Ms. A. Subhashini for the Respondent. A B The Judgment of the Court was delivered by C **SABYASACHI** **MUKHARJI,** J. These appeals are by certificate from the decision of the High Court of Bombay dated 21st June, 1973 whereby the High Court had declined the application made under section 256 (2) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter <: called 'the Act') wherein the assessee sought two questions to D be referred to the High Court. The questions were: (1) Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the re-assessment proceedings under section 147 (a) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, initiated by the Income-tax Officer for the assessment E years 1955-56 to 1962-63 against the assessee were valid in law ? (2) Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was justified in up-holding the action under section 147(a) of the Income F Tax Act, 1961 for the assessment years 1955-56 to 1962-63 ? **The** **real** **question,** **therefore,** **is** **whether** **there** **were** ##### facts from which it could be believed that there was failure or omission to disclose fully and truly all material facts G necessary for the assessment as a result of which income has ..,. escaped assessment. The assessment was sought to be re-opened - for the years 1955-56 to 1962-63 (for failure to disclose ##### fully and truly all material facts). It is well-settled that the obligation of the assessee is to disclose only primary H 630 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1986] 1 s.c.R. A facts and not inferential facts - See **Calcutta** **Discount Co.** ## Ltd. v. IncoJE Tax Officer Companies District I, Calcutta and ·- · # . **Another,** 41 l.T.R. 191. There l!llst be, therefore, (a) full ##### disclosure, and (b) true disclosure of all material facts. What facts are material for a particular case would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case, (c) there l!llst B be escapement of tax or under assessment due to such failure **or** **omission.** In this case the reason for the belief of the Income Tax Officer was that the assessee had obtained depreciation at 6 per cent on the assets which were masonry works but the assets ... ##### C really consisted of earth work wholly or substantially. If that was the position then the assessee was not entitled to depreciation as was granted. The question, is, whether the assessee had disclosed the nature of the masonry work and whether the nature of the asset had been fully and truly disclosed. D E F G H The assessee's case was that a partnership business carried on by M/s. Indo-Aden Salt Works Co. was taken over by the asses see by an agreement dated 24th August, 1949 and during the assessment year 1950-51 the said agreement dated 24th August, 1949 as well as the Valuation Report had been ##### filed before the assessing authority. It is, further, the case of assessee that there was discussion on this Valuation ##### Report. It further appears from the assessment Order and the affidavit that the Valuation Report was discussed and the amount of depreciation was more or less agreed to between the parties. The revenue's case, on the other hand, is that whichi portion of the assets consisting of masonry work and which of earth work was not discussed or disclosed. The assessee 's contention before the revenue authorities was that the primary **facts** **were** **discussed** **fully** **and** **it** **was open** **to** **the** **revenue** **to** ##### examine into this aspect greater and it was not possible after the lapse of such a long ti'me to say actually whether what portion of asset consisted of earth work has been disclosed or ##### not. It appears, however, from the order of the Tribunal that by its last letter addressed to the Income Tax Officer the._. assessee had conveyed its agreement that for the purpose o( depreciation the value should be taken as Rs.20,31,000 in the aggregate, in the assessment. The Tribunal has, further, found that in granting the depreciation the I.T.O. did not discuss ##### • INDO-ADEN SAL'.[' v. C. I. T. [MUKHARJI, J.] 631 the point whether the assets were constructed of masonry or made of earth and the l.T.O. did not exclude for depreciation the value of reservoirs, salt pans and piers and condensers and channels made of earth but allowed the depreciation claim of the assessee on the entire 11alue of the reservoirs, salt pans and .piers and condensers and channels at 6% even though these were only partly constructed of masonry and partly made of earth. The Tribunal has noticed that 93% of the construction works were made of earth and only 7% of masonry, and the facts that 41% of the piers were made of earth and only 59% of masonry was not challenged before the A.A.C. and were not in dispute before the Tribunal. There is also no dispute that depreciation at 6% is available only in respect #### of such assets constructed of masonry and not if made of ##### earth. It was also not in dispute that depreciation on piers is available at 12% only if constructed entirely or mainly of wood. The fact that for the assessment years 1955-56 to 1962-63 excessive depreciation allowance had been allowed in the original ·assessments and income chargeable to tax had escaped assessment and/or was under-assessed for these years was also not in dispute. A B ### c D The only question, therefore, is, whether there was failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and ##### truly all material facts necessary for assessment and future whether such income escaped assessment . and whether such E escapement or under-assessment has been caused as a result of the failure or omission on the part of the assessee to ##### disclose fully and truly all material facts. What facts are i material facts would depend upon the facts and circumstances of a particulate case. This follows from the scheme of the section and is well-settled by th.e authorities of this Court. F Ii: is the admitted position that the assessee had not disclosed either by valuation report or ·by statement before the l.T.O. as to what portion consisted of earth work and what portion or proportion consisted of masonry work. For the purpose of calculating depreciation that indubitably was a G ~ material fact. If over depreciation has been allowed on that ##### basis i.e. that the entirety of the work consisted of masonry work, income might ha11e been under-assessed. The Income tax Officer can reasonably be said to have material to form that belief. That position is also well-settled by the scheme of H A B 632 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1986] 1 s.c.R. the section, and concluded by the authorities of this Court. ThA ~ssessee's contention is that the I.T.O. could have found out the position by further probing. That, however, does not exonerate the assessee to make full disclosure truly. The explanation 2 to section 147 of the Act makes the position abundantly clear. The principles have also been well-settled and reiterated in numerous decisions of this Court. See Hazi **Amir** **Moh.** **Mir"** **Ahmed** **v.** **Counissioner** **of** **Income-tax, Amritsar,** 110 I.T.R. 630 and **Income-Tax** **Officer** **I** **Ward,** **Uistt.** **VI** **Calcutta** **&** **Others** **v.** **Lakhmani** **Mewal** **Das,** 103 I. T.R. 437, Hidayatullah, J, as the learned Chief Justice then was, #### c observed in Calcutta Uiscount's case (supra) that mere produc tion of evidence before the Income-tax Offlcer was not enough, that there may be omission or failure to make a true and full ##### disclosure, if some material for the assessment lay embedded in the evidence which the revenue could have uncovered but did ##### not, then, it is the duty of the assessee to bring it to the D notice of the assessing authority. Assessee knows all the material and relevant facts - the assessing authority might not. In respect of the failure to disclose, the omission to disclose may te deliberate or inadvertent. That was ##### immaterial. l\nt if there is omission to disclose material facts, then, subject to the other conditions, jurisdiction to ##### E re-open is attracted. It is sufficient to refer to the deci sion of this Court in **Calcutta** **Discount's** case (supra) where ##### it had been held that if there are some primary facts from which reasonable belief could be f orined that there was some non-disclosure or failure to disclose fully and truly all material facts, the I.T.O. has jurisdiction to reopen the **"1** F assessment. This position was again reiterated by this Court in **Malegaon** **Electricity** **Co.** **P. Ltd.** **v.** **Conmissioner** **of** **Income--** **Tax,** **Bombay,** 78 I.T.R. 466. #### c Further more bearing these principles in mind in this particular case whether there has been such non-disclosure of G primary facts which has caused escapement of income in the assessment was basically a question of fact. H The High Court was right in declining to call for a statement of case on a question of law. The appeals, there**fore,** **fail.** **However>** **there** **will** **be** **no** **order as** **to** **costs.** **S.R.** Appeals dismissed.