High CourtDivision BenchAppeal allowed; matter remitted to High Court f...

INDIAN MERCANTILE ASSN. (TENANTS) v. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.

Case / Petition Number:Civil Appeal No. 3334 of 2008
Neutral Citation:[2008] 7 S.C.R. 916

Case Details & Bench

Court
High Court
Hon'ble Judges
  • Dr. Arijit Pasayat
  • Lokeshwar Singh Panta
Judgment Date
2008-05-06
Court Decision / Holding
Appeal is allowed to the extent of remitting the matter to the High Court for fresh disposal in accordance with law; High Court to decide on merits. Interim order of status quo shall operate for eight weeks. No opinion on merits is expressed by the Supreme Court at this stage. The final disposition remains subject to High Court’s fresh determination.
Final Disposition
Appeal allowed; matter remitted to High Court for fresh disposal in accordance with law.

Parties to the Case

Appellants / Petitioners

  • Indian Mercantile Association (Tenants)

Respondents

  • Union of India
  • Others

Legal Representation & Advocates

Counsels for Petitioners

  • • Harish N. Salve
  • • MY Deshmukh
  • • Neetu S. Chauhan
  • • Rameshwar Prasad Goyal

Counsels for Respondents

  • • Gopal Subramanium
  • • ASG.
  • • M.L. Verma
  • • Arvind Kumar
  • • Poonam Prasad
  • • Laxmi Arvind
  • • Dattatray Vyas
  • • Mahima C. Shroff
  • • Chirag M. Shroff
  • • Sunil Kumar Verma

Case Synopsis & Summary

This Civil Appeal challenges a Bombay High Court order dismissing a writ petition filed by tenants represented by the Indian Mercantile Association seeking relief under the Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Act, 1976 (MHAD Act). The appellants argued that the High Court erred in assuming the existence of an exclusive alternative remedy under the Act (notably Section 103-A) and that the relief they sought could not be confined to a writ petition. The respondents urged that the relief prayed for under the writ petition falls within the ambit of the statutory remedy and that the High Court correctly refused to entertain the petition, especially given the remedy under Section 103-A and related provisions. The Court noted that the Mumbai Building Repairs and Reconstruction Board had, during proceedings, acknowledged an application under Section 103-A, though the record was inconsistent about its timing and exact scope. The judgment remitted the matter to the High Court for disposal on merits in accordance with law, clarifying that it had not expressed any opinion on the merits. It also held that relief under Section 103-A could not be granted in an appeal, thereby allowing the appeal to the extent of remand and preserving interim protections for a limited period (eight weeks). The Court explicitly preserved issues for fresh consideration and did not decide the underlying merits.

Provisions of Law Cited

Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Act, 1976 - Section 103-AMaharashtra Housing and Area Development Act, 1976 - Section 92Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Act, 1976 - Chapter VIII-AMaharashtra Housing and Area Development Act, 1976 - Section 130-DA (as referred to in judgment)Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 226Public Premises ActProviso to Section 103-A (MHAD Act)

Legal Doctrines & Maxims

  • Doctrine of exhaustion of alternate remedies

Submissions & Arguments

Contentions of Appellants / Petitioners

The appellants argued that the High Court erred in treating the existence of an alternative statutory remedy as a bar to entertaining the writ petition, especially since relief sought under Section 103-A may not be appealable or available in writ proceedings. They highlighted that the Board itself conceded the existence of a Section 103-A application and that the relief prayed for in the writ petition cannot be categorically denied under the Act. They urged remand to the High Court for fresh merits-based consideration, noting that some interim relief had been discussed during proceedings and that the matter should be resolved on law rather than defaulting to procedural bar.

Contentions of Respondents

The respondents contended that the writ petition was correctly dismissed on the ground that a statutory remedy under the MHAD Act existed and that the relief sought was not appropriate for grant under the Act. They emphasized proviso-related limitations, and argued that the High Court should not have entertained the writ petition or granted the sought relief, as the remedy under Section 103-A is a statutory remedy, not a writ-based remedy. They urged that the appeal should be disposed of in accordance with the statutory framework rather than by remand for merits-based adjudication.

Cited Precedents (1)

Case NameCitationTreatmentExplanation
Crawford Bayley v. Union of India2006 (6) SCC 25Mentioned OnlyThe judgment references Crawford Bayley as a precedent but does not apply its principles to decide the case.

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Extracted Judgment Text

Exact text extracted from official judgment records.

[2008] 7 S.C.R 916 • ~ A INDIAN MERCANTILE 1.B. ASSON. (TENANTS) _V._ UNION OF !NOIA AND ORS. (Civil Appeal No. 3334 of 2008) MAY 6, 2008 B ## **[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT AND LOKESHWAR SINGH PANTA, JJ.]** _Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Act, 1976_ - _s. 103-A_ - _Writ petition before High Court seeking relief under_ c _the Act_ - _Dismissal of on the ground of availability of alternative remedy_ - _On appeal, plea that alternative remedy was not available_ as _relief in terms of s 103-A could not be granted in appeal_ - _Held.· In view of the fact that it has been admitted by the opposite party that relief was sought_ u/s _130-_ D _A, matter remitted to High Court for disposal on merits_ - _Constitution of India. 1950_ - _Article 226._ _'(_ CIVIL APPELLATE JURISIDICTION : Civil Appe:::I No. 3334 of 2008. E From the Order dated 25.8.2008 of the High Court of Juudicature at Bombay in WP No. 213012006. Harish N. Salve, MY Deshmukh, Neetu S. Chauhan and Rameshwar Prasad Goyal for the Appellant. F Gopal Subramanium, ASG., M.L. Verma, Arvind Kumar, Poonam Prasad, Laxmi Arvind, Dattatray Vyas, Mahima C. Shroff, Chirag M. Shroff and Sunil Kumar Verma for the Respondents. ~ The Judgment of the Court was delivered by G H **DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.** 1. Leave granted. 2. Challenge in this appeal is to the order dated 25th August, 2006 pc:issed by a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court dismissing the writ petition filed by thi:~ appellants on tre 916 ~ 917 .. " c F INDIAN MERCANTILE 1.B. ASSON. (TENANTS) _v._ UNION OF INDIAAND ORS. [DR ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.] ground that they have an alternative statutory remedy by way of A Appeal. Reference was made to Section 103-A of the Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Act, 1976 (in short the 'MHAD Act') and a decision of this Court in _Crawford Bayley v. Union of India_ (2006 (6) SCC 25). 3. While issuing notice on 10.11.2006 it was inter alia[B ] ordered as follows: "Permission to file additional documents is granted. The additional documents are taken on record. Issue notice. .,. Counsel for the respondent no.2, present on caveat, accepts notice. Notice shall go to the unrepresented respondents to show cause why this matter be not remitted to the High Court for fresh consideration in view of the fact D that the relief sought for in prayer(d) of the writ petition may not be available ur1der the Public Premises Act. In the meantime, there shall be status quo as regards possession." .", ..., .J. E 4. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the High Court had erroneously concluded about existence of an alternative statutory remedy overlooking the parameters of Sections 92 and 103-A of the MHAD Act. It is pointed out that the relief in terms of Section 103A cannot be granted in appeal. F It is stated that the Mumbai Building Repairs and Reconstruction Board (in short the 'Board') has accepted that appellant filed an application in terms of Section 103-A of MHAD Act, though earlier it had taken the stand before the High Court that no such application was filed. Before the High Court the Board had stated in the counter affidavit that the appellants have not made any[G ] application in terms of Section 103 of the MHAD Act to enable the respondents 5 & 6 to initiate acquisition proceedings. The position was reiterated in the counter affidavit filed in this Court stating that the appellants had not made any application under Chapter VIII A of the MHAD Act to enable the respondent Nos.5 H 918 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 7 S.C.R. ' > A & 6 to initiate acquisition proceedings. But after the rejoinder was filed, it has been accepted that in fact such an application has been filed on 28.8.1986 and the later in May, 1987 the appellants filed application before the Executive Engineer, Cooperative Housing Societies, Repair and Reconstruction Cell B of Board. This clearly indicates the position, which has been indirectly accepted, that in the application made in May, 1987, it was pointed out that there was no condition regarding > requirement of premises being at least 50% of residential nature. It is accepted that said averment is substantially correct. c It is stated that the application is not traceable. Board has, however, not denied the assertion of the appellant about the same. 5. Mr. Gopal Subramanium, learned Additional Solicitor General pointed out that even though application has been filed D in terms of Section 103A of the MHAD Act, the appellants are not entitled to any relief. ReliancP is placed on the proviso to said section. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant pointed out that E[proviso ][in ][question·was inserted ][in ][1989. But the application ] was made much earlier in May, 1987. It is fairly accepted by learned counsel for the respondents that the nature of the relief in terms of prayer (B) in the writ petition cannot be granted under the Act. Above being the position, we set aside the impugned order of the High Court and remit the matter to it for fresh F disposal in accordance with law. The interim order dated 10.11.2006 shall operate for a period of eight weeks. In the mean time it shall be open to the parties to move the High Court for such interim protection as is available in law. We make it clear that we have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the G case. ' : ... ( ·' b _.,:_ ... _4_ 1.>' f..=.':' 7. Appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent without any order as to costs. K.K.T. Appeal allowed. H