High CourtDivision BenchAppeal dismissed; death sentence upheld for the...

Iman Ali & ANR. v. State of Assam

Case / Petition Number:Criminal Appeal No. 232 of 1967
Neutral Citation:[1968] 3 SCR 611

Case Details & Bench

Court
High Court
Hon'ble Judges
  • V. RAMASWAMI
  • M. SHELAT
  • V. BHARGAVA
Judgment Date
1968-03-28
Court Decision / Holding
Appeal dismissed; the High Court’s enhancement to death was upheld and the death sentence remains in force.
Final Disposition
Appeal dismissed; death sentence upheld for the appellants.

Parties to the Case

Appellants / Petitioners

  • Iman Ali
  • Jogesh Chandra Arjya

Respondents

  • State of Assam

Legal Representation & Advocates

Counsels for Petitioners

  • • K. Rajendra Chaudhuri

Counsels for Respondents

  • • Naunit Lal

Case Synopsis & Summary

Iman Ali and Jogesh Chandra Arjya were convicted by a Sessions Court for an offence punishable under section 396 IPC (dacoity with murder) and were sentenced to life imprisonment. The Assam and Nagaland High Court enhanced their sentences to death after issuing notices to show cause for a death sentence, and the appellants sought Special Leave to appeal. The Supreme Court examined whether the High Court properly interfered with the trial court’s discretionary sentencing, given that the trial court had not stated reasons for the life term. The appellants contended that the principle laid down in Dalip Singh v. State of Punjab (death should ordinarily follow murder unless reasons for a lesser penalty are recorded by the trial judge) did not justify the High Court’s action here, particularly since the conviction under s.396 IPC was not based on constructive liability. The Court held that while Dalip Singh provides guidance on appellate restraint, it is not controlling where the trial court gave no reasoning and direct evidence shows the accused personally committed cold-blooded murders to facilitate dacoity. The High Court’s reasoning and the gravity of the crime justified intervention. The judgment emphasizes that in cases of direct participation in murder, the same severity applies even when the conviction is under s.396 IPC, and distinguishes contrary Allahabad decisions that dealt with constructive liability rather than direct culpability.

Provisions of Law Cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, s. 367Code of Criminal Procedure, s. 439Indian Penal Code, ss. 396, 302Constitution of India, Art. 136

Legal Doctrines & Maxims

  • In murder cases, death sentence ordinarily to be imposed unless the trial judge records reasons for a lesser penalty
  • The discretionary power to enhance a sentence should be exercised rarely and only for the strongest possible reasons
  • Dalip Singh and Others v. State of Punjab principle (1954) SCR 145) — appellate restraint in modifying sentences
  • Lal Singh v. Emperor (AIR 1938 All 625) as cited and distinguished in context of 396 IPC cases

Submissions & Arguments

Contentions of Appellants / Petitioners

The appellants argued that the High Court exceeded its remit by enhancing to death without a reasoned basis from the trial court, which had imposed life imprisonment without explanation. They relied on the Dalip Singh principle to contend that death should follow murder only when the trial judge has recorded reasons; since no reasons were given, the High Court’s intervention was improper. They maintained that the conviction under s.396 IPC was not constructive liability for murder and that direct evidence tied the crime to the appellants themselves, not the gang as a whole, limiting the applicability of constructive-liability considerations.

Contentions of Respondents

The State contended that the murders were cold-blooded and committed to facilitate dacoity, warranting the maximum penalty. The High Court’s enhancement was asserted as justified because the trial court had not provided reasons, and the nature of the offense, with direct involvement by the appellants, justified severe punishment. The State argued that Dalip Singh’s guideline is not controlling in this factual matrix and emphasized the gravity of the crime.

Cited Precedents (2)

Case NameCitationTreatmentExplanation
Dalip Singh and Others v. State of Punjab[1954] SCR 145DistinguishedThe Court acknowledges the Dalip Singh principle but states it is not applicable here since the trial court did not give reasons for the life sentence; the present case involves direct participation in murder.
Lal Singh v. EmperorAIR 1938 All 625DistinguishedCited to illustrate a broader view on 396 IPC cases; distinguished because the Allahabad decision dealt with constructive liability and not direct culpability by a specific accused.

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Extracted Judgment Text

Exact text extracted from official judgment records.

**IMAN** **ALI** **&.** **ANR.** _v._ **STATE OF ASSAM** _March_ 28, 1968 [V. RAMASWAMI, **J.** M. SHELAT AND V. BHARGAVA, **JJ.]** _**Code**_ _**of**_ _**Crbninal Procedure,**_ _ss._ **367,** _**439-Jndian**_ _**Penal Code.**_ _**ss.**_ **396,** _**302-Accused convicted of**_ _**1nurder**_ _**during**_ _**dacoit;v-Trial**_ _**Court**_ _**passing**_ _**Sentence**_ _**of**_ _**life**_ _**imprison1nent**_ _**lvit/Jout**_ _**givbzg reasons-High Court**_ _**en/Jc;ncing**_ _**sentence to**_ _**that**_ _**of death-Considerations**_ _**for**_ _**interfering**_ _**with**_ _**discretion of trial court-Different**_ _**considerationv do**_ _**not**_ _**necessaril."**_ _**apply**_ _**li·hen**_ _**conviction**_ _**is**_ _**under**_ _**s.**_ **396** _**and**_ _**not**_ _**s.**_ **302** _**of**_ _**I.P.C.**_ The appellants were convicted by the court of sessions for an offence punishable under s. 396 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to imprisonment for life. T~y were held to have shot dead two inmates of a house in which along with others they had gone to commit dacoily. One of the appellants filed an appeal in the High Court against his con· viction. The High Court thereafter gave notice to both the appellants to **shO\V** **cau·se** **why** **the** **sentence** **of** **impi'isonment** **passed** **against- each** **of** th.em should not be enhanced to death. After hearing them the High. Court sentenced them both to death. The order was challenged in this Court and it wos urged that the High Court should not have interfered with the discretion of the Sessions Judge in the matter of passing the **appropriate** **sentence** **and** **that** **the** **considerations** **which** **app]y** **to** **a sentence** under s. 302 J.P.C. would not apply to a case under s. 396 I.P.C. HELD : (i) The offence committed by the appellants was heinous and committed in cold blood with the sole object of committing dacoity. It was not a case of constructive liability but the appellants had themselves committed the murders and therefore no advantage could be taken of the fact that the conviction was under s. 396 and not under s. 302. On the above facts the enhancement of sentence by the High Court from life imprisonment to death was justified especially whea the trial court had **not** **given** **any** **reasons** **for** **_awarding** **the** **lesser** **s-cntencc.** **Jn** _**Dalip**_ _**Singh's**_ **cnse** **this** **Court** **only** **cautioned** **the** **appcl1ate** **court** **against** **interfering** **if** **the** **discretion** **of** **the** **trying** **judge** **is** **exercised** **for** **reasons** **recorded** **by** **him'** **and** **if** **it** **appears** **from** **the** **:reasons** **that** **he** **had** **exercised** **a** **judicial** mind in not awarding the sentence of death. (612 F-613BJ. _Dalip Singh_ & _Ors._ v. _State_ _of Punja/>._ [1954] S.C.R. 145, 156. explained. _Lal_ _Singh_ v. _Emperor,_ A.I.R. 1938 Alld. 625, distinguished. CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 232 of 1967. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated August 30, 1967 of the Assam and Nagaland High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 115 of 1964. _K._ _Rajentlra_ _Chaudhuri,_ for the appellants. _Naunit_ _Lal,_ for the respondent. **A** **B** ### c **D** E **F** **G** **H** A B ### c **D** E F G **H** IMAN ALI _v._ ASSAM ( _Bhargava,_ _J.)_ 611 The Judgment of the Court. was delivered by **Bbargava,** **J.** The appellants, Iman Ali and Jogesh Chan_dta. Arjya, were convicted by the court of Session for an offence pumsh· able under section 396 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to imprisonment for life. The facts found by the <:ourt of Ses· sion for convicting the appellants were that, on the mght between 11th and 12th Mav 1962, between 1 and 2 a.m., the appellants, # along with about fi or 13 others, com.n~itted dacoit~ in the bou~e of 1 Tenu Arjya. At the time of comm1tmg the daco1ty the daco1ts· broke open the door of the house with the cross·bar of a plough .. Four dacoits, including the two appellants, entered the house, while the remaining persons remained standing outside. As soon' as the door was broken, Golapi, the wife of Tenu Arjya, was shot at with a gun by Iman Ali appellant, and then the other appellant Jogesh Chandra Arjya shot Tenu Arjya. Both Golapi ~d her husband Tenu Arjya fell down dead. Thereafter, the dacmts de·· mantled money from Hari Charan Arjya, the son of the two de· ceased persons; They took away a sum of Rs. 2,500/. which.was. kept in a quilt and also removed the gold eaMings, on~ silver· necklace and one waist band from the person of Golap1. The· commission of this offence in the manner descdbed above was held· by the Sessions Court to be proved on the basis of the evidence· given by the prosecution, and, thereupon, finding both the appel· !ants guilty of the offence punishable under s. 396, I.P.C., that court sentenced each of these appellants to imprisonment for life .. Iman Ali appellant filed an appeal in the High Court of Assam and Nagaland. The learned Judges of the High Court, on pcrus· ing the judgment, were of the _prima facie_ opinion that, if the con· viction of Iman Ali was to be upheld, there was no justification for not awarding to him the sentence of death and, consequently, they issued notice to Iman Ali to show cause why the sentence should not be enhanced. At the same time, a notice was also issued to· the other appellant Jogesh Chandra Arjya by the learned Judges _suo motu_ to show cause why his sentence should also not be en· hanced to sentence of death. Thereafter, tlie appeal of Iman Ali was heard and both the appellants were heard in respect of the· show cause notices issued to them. Opportunity was, in addition. offered to Jogesh Chandra Arjya to urge whatever could be said" on his behalf against his conviction also. The High Court affrnl· ed the findings of fact of the Court of Session and enhanced the· ~ente.nce of both th~se appellants, so that the sentence of rigorous 1mpnsonment for hfe was altered to sentence of .death with the· direction that they be hanged by the neck till they are d;ad. Doth the appellants sought leave from the High Court to appeal to this Cou:t, but leave was refused. Thereupon, both of them sought special leave under Article 13~ of the Constitution. By an order dated 8th December, 1967, this Court ~ranted special leave limit· 612 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1968) 3 S.C.R. ed to the question whether, in this case, the enhancement of the sentence from life imprisonment to sentence of death was justified. Consequently, in this appeal, the only point that falls for determination is whether th~ order of the High Court enhancing the sentence of the appellants from life imprisonment to death was justified and should be upheld. Learned counsel for the appellants, in challenging the justification for the order of enhancement of sentence by the High Court, relied on the principle laid down by this Court in _Dalip_ _S,ingh and OtMrs_ v. _State of_ _Punjab('),_ which was explained in the followinj! words : "In a case of murder, the death sentence should ordinarily be imposed unless the trying Judge for reasons w.hicJi· should normally be recorded considers it proper tb ·award the lesser penalty. But the discretion is his and if he gives reasons on which a judicial mind could properly be found, an appellate court should not inter fere. The power to enhance a sentenee from transportation. to death should very rarely be exercised and only for the strongest possible reasons. It is not enough for till appellate court to say, or think, tl1at if left to itself it would have awarded the greater penalty because the discretion does not belong to the appellate court but to the trial Judge and the only ground on which an appellate court can interfere is that the discretion has been improperly exercised, as for example, where no reasons #### are _given and none can be inferred from the circumstances of the case, or where the facts are so gross that no normal judicial mind would have awarded the lesser penalty." It appears to us, however, that, in the .present case, this principle is of no assistance to the appellants for challenging the step taken by tile High Court. This Court cautioned the appellate court against interfering if the discretion of the trying Judge is exercised for reasons recorded by him and if it appears from the reasons that he had exercised a judicial mind in not awarding the sentence A B ### c D E F of death. In the present case, as mentioned by the High Court _G_ and as is apparent from the judgment of the Court of Session, the trial court awarded the sentence of imprisonment for life without giving any reasons at all for adopting that course. It is true that the appellants were not convicted in the present case for the offence of murder _aimpllclter_ imder seefion 302, I.P .C.; but that, in our opinion, is immaterial. The conviction of the appellants under s. 396, I.P.C., was not based on constructive liability as H members of the gang of dacoits. There was clear finding by the H (i) [1954) S.C.R. "145 at p, _156._ A B #### _c_ IMAN ALI _v._ ASSAM _(Bhargava,_ 1.) 613 Court of Session which has been upheld by the High Court that each of these appellant& committed a cold-blooded murder by shooting two inmates of the house simply with the object of facilitating commission of dacoity by them. Those persons were shot and killed even though they had not even tried to put up any resistance. The offence under s. 396, I.P.C., was therefore, no less heinous than an offence under s. 302, l.P.C. In these circumstances, when the Court of Session gave no reason at all for not awarding the sentence of death and for sentencing them to imprisonment for life only, it cannot be held that the High Court was not justified in interfering with that order. Learned counsel in this connection referred us to a decision of a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in _Lal Singh_ v. _Emperor('),_ where it was held : "We do not consider that as a general rule a sentence of death should necessarily follow a conviction under s. 396, 1.P.C., and this Section differs from s. 302, D l.P.C., in that respe.ct. The rule is under s. 302, that a sentence of death should follow unless reasons are shown for giving a lesser sentence. No such rule applies to s. 396, 1.P.C." Again, we do not think that the learned Judges of the Allahabad High Court intended to lay down that, even in cases where a perE son is convicted for the offence under s. 396, l.P.C., and there is clear evidence that he himself had committed a cold-blooded murder in committing the dacoity, a sentence of death should not follow. Clearly, the view expressed was meant to apply to those cases where there could be no definite finding as to which person committed the murder and all the members of the gang are held F constructively guilty of the offence punishable· under s. 396; I.P.C. A principle enunciated for such a situation cannot be applied to !\ case where there is direct evidence that a particular accused committed the murder himself, as is the finding i.n the present case. In these circumstances, the order made by the High Court must be held to be justified and the appeal is dismissed. G G.C. _Appeal dismissed._ (I) A.I.R. 1938 Alld. _62S._