High CourtConstitution BenchAppeals dismissed

H.S. Srinivasa Raghavachar and Others v. State of Karnataka and Others

Case / Petition Number:Civil Appeals Nos. 3828-3832 of 1983
Neutral Citation:1987 SCR 1190

Case Details & Bench

Court
High Court
Hon'ble Judges
  • Chinnappa Reddy, J.
Judgment Date
1987-04-23
Court Decision / Holding
Appeals dismissed without cost
Final Disposition
Appeals dismissed

Parties to the Case

Appellants / Petitioners

  • H.S. Srinivasa Raghavachar and Others

Respondents

  • State of Karnataka
  • Others

Legal Representation & Advocates

Counsels for Petitioners

  • • B.R.L. Iyengar
  • • Soli J. Sorabjee
  • • S.K.V. Iyengar
  • • Mrs. Shyamala Pappu
  • • S. Lakshminarasu
  • • K. Ram Kumar
  • • Mrs. Indira Sawhney
  • • P.R. Ramasesh

Counsels for Respondents

  • • M. Veerappa
  • • Ashok Sharma

Case Synopsis & Summary

This Constitution Bench decision concerns the vires of amendments to the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 by Amendment Act I of 1974, notably Section 44 as amended, and the creation of Tribunals under Section 48 with provisions (including Section 48(8)) restricting appearances by legal practitioners. The appellants challenged (i) the removal of the landlord’s right to resume land for personal cultivation or for non-agricultural purposes, (ii) the constitution of Tribunals with unspecified qualifications, and (iii) the bar on Advocates appearing before Tribunals (Section 48(8)), arguing these violated the basic structure of the Constitution, repugnance to Parliament’s laws (Entries 77 and 78, List I), and fundamental rights protections for tenants and others. The Court, in a Constitution Bench led by Chinnappa Reddy, holds that no provision offends the basic structure and that the Amendment Act clearly pursues agrarian reform in line with Articles 39(b) and (c). It reasons that the reform fosters ownership by tillers and does not destroy essential rights of tenants beyond reason, notes that some Tribunals can function without a trained judicial mind, and finds that Section 48(8) conflicts with the Advocates Act but that the remedy lies in constitutional hierarchy. The appeals are dismissed, upholding the amendments and Tribunal framework, and reaffirming pre-Waman Rao reasoning while approving Jaswant Kaur’s stance on advocacy before Tribunals.

Provisions of Law Cited

Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961: Sections 5, 14, 16, 44, 48(8), 48A, 45, 63-79, 112, 112A, 112B, 113-115, 118, 44(1)Karnataka Land Reforms (Amendment) Act I of 1974: introduces Section 48 and Section 48A; Omits Sections 14 and 16; amends 44Section 2(6) (pre-amendment basic holding)Section 5 (prohibition on creation/continuation of tenancies)Section 14 (resumption of land from tenants)Section 16 (restrictions on resumption)Section 44(1) (vesting of lands in State Government)Section 45 (registration of tenants as occupants)Section 63-79 (ceiling on land holdings)Section 112 (duties of the court), 112A (duties of the Tahsildar), 112B (duties of the Tribunal)Section 112, 113-115, 118 (procedure/appeal)Advocates Act, 1961 - Section 30Indian Bar Councils Act, 1926 - Section 14Constitution provisions: Articles 31-A, 31-B, 31-C; Articles 39(b), 39(c); Ninth Schedule; Entry 77-78, List I (Seventh Schedule)Constitution of India, Ninth Schedule (amendments included therein)Articles 31-A, 31-B, 31-C (as discussed in Waman Rao); Keshavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (basic structure doctrine)Waman Rao & Ors. v. Union of India, [1981] 2 SCR 1Jaswant Kaur v. State of Haryana, AIR 1977 Punjab & Haryana 221

Legal Doctrines & Maxims

  • Basic Structure Doctrine
  • Directive Principles—Articles 39(b) and (c)

Submissions & Arguments

Contentions of Appellants / Petitioners

The appellants argued that the 1974 Amendment Act, especially the removal of the landlord’s right to resume land for personal cultivation and for non-agricultural purposes, was ultra vires, even though placed in the Ninth Schedule; the Tribunals prescribed under Section 48 (and the exclusion of legal practitioners under Section 48(8)) were repugnant to the Advocates Act and Bar Councils Act; the amendments were not genuinely agrarian reform and attempted to weaken tenancy protections; a reconsideration of Waman Rao’s stance might be warranted in light of broader constitutional structure.

Contentions of Respondents

The respondents contended that the amendments were a legitimate measure of agrarian reform, aimed at distribution of land and welfare, valid under the Ninth Schedule; the Tribunals were designed to provide specialized resolution in occupancy disputes; the exclusion of advocates for tribunals was either a valid legislative choice subject to constitutional hierarchy or a temporary measure to ensure efficient functioning; appeal/revision structure was altered in a manner consistent with reform.

Cited Precedents (3)

Case NameCitationTreatmentExplanation
Waman Rao & Ors. v. Union of India[1981] 2 SCR 1PositiveThe Court confines itself to Waman Rao, stating that it is not necessary to revisit earlier decisions pre-Waman Rao and explicitly reinforces its underlying reasoning in line with Waman Rao’s conclusions on basic structure and the validity of 9th Schedule amendments.
Jaswant Kaur v. State of HaryanaAIR 1977 Punjab & Haryana 221PositiveThe Court adopts the reasoning of Jaswant Kaur to hold that Section 48(8) need not be enforced to bar Advocates from appearing before Tribunals, aligning with the view that advocacy access should not be obstructed in those tribunals.
Keshavananda Bharati v. State of KeralaSCR 1973 (Suppl.) 1PositiveThe Court relies on the basic structure doctrine articulated in Keshavananda Bharati to frame its assessment of the amendments’ compatibility with the Constitution’s fundamental features.

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Extracted Judgment Text

Exact text extracted from official judgment records.

H.S. SRINIVASA RAGHAVACHAR ETC. ETC. A _v._ STATE OF KARNATAKA & ORS. APRIL 23, 1987 [0. CHINNAPPA REDDY AND MURARI MOHON DUTT, JJ.) B _Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961-Sections_ _44,_ _48(8) and_ _48A-Right_ _of landlord_ _to_ _resume land_ _if_ _bona fide required for_ _personal cultivation-Taken away by Karnataka Land Reforms_ _(Amendment) Act, 1974-Whether constitutionally valid-Amendment_ _law aimed at agrarian reform-Advocates not_ _to_ _be_ _prevented from_ C _appearing before Tribunals functioning under the Act-Tribunals func-_ _tions under the Act-Whether to be manned by judicial personnel._ _Administrative law-Statutory Tribunals-Whether_ _to_ _be_ _a_ _lay_ _tribunal or judicial tribunal-Some disputes required trained judicial_ _mind, many do not require application_ _of trained judicial mind-Land_ D _Tribunals under Section 48(8)_ _of Karnataka Land Reforms Act,_ _1961_ _do not require trained judicial personnel._ _Advocates Act, 1961/lndian Bar Councils Act, 1926-section 30/_ _Section_ _14-Advocates-Right_ _of_ _appearance before Tribunals-_ _Section 48(8) of Karnataka Land Reforms Act,_ _1961 not to be enforced_ E _so as_ _to prevent Advocates from appearing before Tribunals under the_ _Act._ #### _Constitution of lndia, 1950-Articles 31-A, 31-B and 31-C,_ _39(b)_ J.. _and (c)_ _and Ninth Schedule--Karnataka Land Reforms (Amendment)_ _Act, 1974-Constitutional validity_ _of-Law clearly aimed at_ _agrarian_ F _reform._ The Karnataka Land Reforms Act. 1961 was substantially amended by the Amendment Act I of 1974 and it was included in the Ninth Schedule as was the principal Act. Section 5 was amended and the provisos were omitted. Sections 14 and 16 were deleted. Section 44 was G amended. New sub-section (1) provided that: "All lands held by or in the possession of tenants (including tenants against whom a decree or order for eviction or a certificate for resumption is made or issued) immediately prior to the H date of commencement of the Amendment Act, other than lands 1189 t A 1190 SUPREM)3 COURT RlifORTS [1987] 2 S.C.R. held by them under leases per01itted under Section S, shall, with effect on and from the said date, stand transferred to and vest in the State Government.'' A new Section 48 providing for the constitution of Tribunals was introduced, Sub-section (8) of Section 48 provided that no legal B practitioner shall be allowed to appear in any proceeding before the Tribunal. Section 48A dealt with the procedure to be atlopted by tile Tribunal in its enquiry into applications !'lllde uq!ler &e~tion 45 for registration of a person as an occupant. ~. The provision for an appeal from the decision of the court and the C further right of revision under the amended Act were taken away and there was no right of appeal or revision against the decision of the Tribunal. The 1974 Amending Act took away the righ~ which was saved _,>-_ by the original Act in favour of the widow, unmarried woman, minor and disabled person to create a tenancy or lease of the land. The more important right which was taken aw11y ~y t)Je 1974 Amendment was the D right of the landlord to resume the land if he bona fitle required the land for personal cultivation or for a non.agricultural purpose. This right was denied by the Amending Act even if the income by the cultivation of the land which he was entitled to resume was tile 11rincipal source of income for the maintenance of the landlord. f E The Writ Petitions challenging the amendments filed by the appellants were dismissed by the High Court. In the appeals, it was contended on behalf of the appellants that the 1974 Amendment insofar as it took away the right of a landlord to resume possession of the tenanted land where he bona fide required the F land for personal cultivation and had no other principal source of income was ultra vires, notwithstanding its inclusion in the Ninth Schedule, as it offended the basic structure of the Constitution, that the provision for the constitution of a Tribunal consisting of persons with unspecified qualifications in the place of a court was similarly ultra vires .the powers of the State Legislature, and that Section 48(8) which G · excluded legal practitioners from appearing before the Tribunals was repugnant to Section 30 of the Advocates Act, 1961 and Section 14 of the Indian Bar Councils Act, 1926 and the State Legislature was not competent to make a law repugnant to laws made by Parliament pursuant to entries 77 and 78 of List I of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution and that important questions which fall for consideration H under Section 48A should not be left to a Tribunal consisting of mem· ###### ## H.S. SRINIVASA _v._ STATE 1191 hers nominated by the Siate Government with no regard for any A qualification. It was also contended that the 1974 Amendment Act was not a law pertaining to agrarian reform; nor was It a law directed towards securing that the ownership and control of the material resources of the community w~tf so dlstriblited as besi to subserve the common good or B that the operatillll ilf the ecortomic system did not result in the concentration of wealth and niearts Of production to the common detriment. that far from setting atlt to achieve these goals, the Amendment Act set out in quite opposite direction by seeking to reduce to destitution small landlorils whose sole means of livelihood was the tenanted land which they were allbwed Id resume for personal cultivation, that the original C Act was very fair as It recogllised poverty amongst landlords as well as poverty amongst lenallis and afforded a measure of protection to the poorer sections of the landlords, and that _Waman Rao's_ _case_ to the eident it upheld Articles 31-A, 31-B and 31-C and the validity of the legislations impugned therein required re-consideration. _D_ t Dismissing the appeals, this Court, HELD: 1. No provisioil of the Amending Act offends the basic structure of the Constitution. [1204G-H) 2. The 1974 Amending Act took away the right which was saved E by the original Act in favour of the widow, unmarried wamen, minor and disabled person to create a tenancy or lease of the land. The more important right which was taken away by the 1974 Amendment was the right of the landlord to resume the land if he bona fide required the land for personal cultivation or for a non-agricultural purpose. l 1201E-F) 3. It is too late in the day to contend that, in the existing system of economic relations, ownership of land to the tiller of the land is not the best way of securing the utmost utilisation of land, a material resource of the community for the common good of the entire community. It is now well recognised that in the absence of common ownership of land in F the existing system of economic relations, the greatest incentive G for maximum production is the feeling of identity ·and security which is possible only if the ownership of the land is with the tiller. It is in recognition of this principle that 'landlordism' was sought to be totally done away with by the amendment of Section 5 of the Act, by the omission of Sections 14 and 16 and by the amendment of Section 44. ll204C-E) H 1192 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [!987] 2 S.C.R. 4. If between a landlord who did not himself personally cultivate A the land and a tenant who so cultivated the land, the legislature prefer,._. red the cultivating tenant, it is not possible to hold that such preference is not part of a programme of agrarian reform pursuant to the Directive Principles contained in Articles 39(b) and (c) of the Constitution. There is not the slightest doubt that the amendment was a law clearly aimed at B agrarian reform to secure these Directive Principles. It is tme that one of the conditions subject to which alone a landlord could resume land for personal cultivation under Section 16 of the Act was that the income from the land proposed to be cultivated by the landlord on resumption _,__ should be the principal source of income for the maintenance of the _,, landlord, but the question of resumption of land from a tenant would _,, c [not arise unless a tenant was already cultivating the land. ] [If, ] [therefore, ] a tenant is already cultivating the land and if, presumably, that is the source of his livelihood, there is no reason why he should be dispossessed to enable a landlord whose source of livelihood it was not until then _>-_ to make it his principal source of maintenance hereafter. [ 1204E-G] D 5.1 The mal-functioning of some of the Tribunals cannot possibly vitiate the provision relating to the constitution of the Tribunal and entrustment of the decision of certain issues to the Tribunal. There can be no doubt that while the decision of some disputes require a trained judicial mind to be applied to it, there are many other questions which do not require the application of any trained judicial mind. The dis- + E pules contemplated by Section 48A do not appear to be disputes of a nature where the application of a trained judicial mind is absolutely essential. (1205C, DJ ### ...... ' ...... ' 5.2 Land Tribunals have functioned very well in some of the States where under the respective State Acts more complicated quesF lions than ones under Section 48A were entrusted to the Land Tribun- _¥_ als. The failnre of the Land Tribunals to function efficiently in the State bas apparently been taken note of by the Legislature itself and the Act bas since been amended making provision for an appeal and revision. The failure of some of the Land Tribunals to function efficiently cannot be said to be sufficient to stigmatise wholesale, the functioning of all the G Tribunals constituted under the Act and invalididate the provisions of the Act relating to Tribunals. l 12050-F] ·+ 6.1 Section 48(8) will not he enforced so as to prevent Advocates from appearing before the Tribunals functioning under the Act, since this provision is repugnant to Section 30 of the Advocates Act, 1961 H and Section 14 of the Indian Bar Councils Act, 1926 and the State H.S. SRINIVASA _v._ STATE (REDDY, J.J 1193 Legislature is not competent to make a law repugnant to laws made by A Parliament pursuant to Entries 77 and 78 of List I of the Seventh ...._ Schedule oftbe Constitution. [120SG·H; 120liA] 6.2 In regard to decisions already rendered by the Tribunals, it is not necessary to re-open them on the ground that legal practitioners were not allowed to appear before the Tribu"nals in those cases. [ 12058] B i I 7. It is not necessary either to re-consider or to go behind the decision in _Waman Rao's_ case for the purpose of this case. [12020] _Wamiln Rao_ _&_ _Ors._ v. _Union_ _of India,_ [1981] 2 SCR 1 and _Jaswant Kaur_ v. _State_ _of Haryana,_ AIR 1977 Punjab & Haryana 221, C referred to. ~ CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 3828·3832 of 1983 etc. From the Judgment and Order dated 31.8.82/1.9.1982 of the D Karnataka High Court in W.P. Nos. 19486, 23347 23348, 23349 and 25366 of 1981. B.R.L. Iyengar, Soli J. Sorabjee, S.K.V. Iyenger and Mrs. Shyamala Pappu, S. Lakshminarasu, K. Ram Kumar, Mrs. Indira Sawhney and P.R. Ramasesh for the Appellants. E M. Veerappa and Ashok Sharma for the Respondents. ~-. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by CHINNAPPA REDDY, J. The question raised in the several F _-,i_ appeals is primarily that of the vires of sec. 44 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 as amended by the Karnataka Land Reforms (Amendment) Act I of 1974. In order to appreciate the submissions made to us, it will be useful to set out the relevant provisions of the Act before it was amended by Act I of 1974. Section 2(6) as it stood before the amendment defined "basic holding" as meaning land which G ..l was equal to two standard acres. "Ceiling area" was defined as mean..- ing land which was equal to eighteen standard acres. "Court" was defined to mean the court of Munsif within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the land was situate. "Family holding" was defined as meaning land equal to six standard acres. "Small holder" was defined to mean a land owner owning land not exceeding two basic holdings H ' 1194 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1987) 2 S.C.R. whose total net annual income including the income from such land A did not exceed one thousand two hundred rupees. "Standard acre" was defined to mean one acre of the first class of land or an extent equivalent thereto consisting of any one or more classes of land specified in Part A of Schedule I determined in accordance with the formula in Part B of the said Schedule. Chapter II (Sections 4 to 43) B contained 'General provisions relating to Tenancies' and Chapter III (Sections 44 to 62) dealt with 'Conferment of owner-ship on tenants'. Section 5 prohibited the creation or continuation of any tenancy in respect of any land after the appointed day and barred the leasing of land for any period whatsoever. It was, however, provided that (a) any small holder might create or continue a tenancy or lease the land owned by him and (b) any land owner who was a minor, a widow, an C unmarried woman, a person incapable of cultivating land by reason of any physical or menta·l disability or a soldier in service in the Armed Forces of the Union or a seaman, might create or continue the tenancy or lease the land owned by him or her. It was further provided that tenancies of resumable lands could be continued until the dispossesD sion of the tenants unders s. 14 and of non-resumable land until the date of vesting under s. 44. Section 14 provided for resumption of lands from tenants. Sub-section 1, 4 and 6 s. 14 may be usefully extracted here. Sub-sections 2, 3 and 5 do not appear to be necessary for the purposes of the present case. Sub-Sections 1, 4 and 6 were as follows:E A B + F G H '14. Resumption of land from tenants-(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in sections 22 and 43, but subject to the provisions of this section and of sections 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20 and 41, a landlord may, if he bona fide requires land, other than land referred to in the first proviso to clause (29) of sub-section (A) of section 2, (i) for cultivating personally, or (ii) for any non-agricultural purpose, file with the Court a statement indicating the land or lands owned by him and which he intends to resume and such other particulars as may be prescribed. On such statement being filed, the Court shall, as soon as may be after giving an opportunity to be heard to the landlord and such of his tenants and other persons as may be affected, and, having due regard to continuity, fertility and fair distribution of lands, and after making such other inquiries as the Court deems necessary, ~-###### H.S. SRINIVASA _v._ STATE [REDDY, J.J 1195 determine the land or lands, which the landlord shall be entitled to resume, and shall issue a certificate to the landlord to the effect that the land or lands specified in such certificate has been reserved for resumption; and thereupon the right to resume possession shall be exercisable only in respect of the lands specified in such certificate and shall not extend to any other.land. Explanation:- Subject to such rules as may be prescribed. the Court within the jurisdiction of which the greater part of the land held by the landlord is situated shall be the Court competent to issue a certificate under this section." A 8 'C x x x x x x x x (2) x (3) x x x x x x x x x (4) In respect of tenancies existing on the appointed day, as soon as may be after the expiry of fifteen months from the 0 appointed day, as soon as may be after the statement under sub-section( I) is filed, the Court shall after such inquiry as it deems fit, determine the lands which will be non-resumable lands leased to tenants for purposes of this Act. (5) x x x x x X1~ X x x (6) Notwithstanding anything .contained in sub-section (5), where the landlord belongs tO any of the following categories, namely: (i) minor; E (ii) a person incapable of cultivating land by reason of any F physical or mental disability, . (iii) a widow; (iv) an unmarried woman; Then, the application to the Court for possession of land shall be made, within fifteen months from the appointed day or one year from the date on which- (a) in the case of category (i), he attains majority; G H 1196 A , ' B - -C D ' ' E F, . ;; SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1987] 2 S.CR. \ (b) in the case of cateogy(ii), he ceases to be subject to such physical or mental disablity; . )' (c) in the case of category (iii), she remarrie,:. ., . ... < (d) in the case of category (iv), she marries, whichever is later: Provided that where land is held by two or more joint landlords, the provisions of this sub-section shall not apply .~ unless all such landlords, belong to the categories specified in clauses (i) and (ii) and the application shall be made within one year from the date on which any one of such ~ landlords ceases to belong to any such category and an appli- . _J_ cation by any one of the joint-holders shall be deemed to be a valid application on behalf of all the joint holders: Provided further that where a person belonging to any of the categories specified in clause (i) or (ii) of this subsection, is a member of a joint family, the provisions of this -sub-section shall not apply unless all the members of the joint family belong to the categories specified in clauses (i) and (ii), but where the share in the joint family of a person belonging to 'any of such categories has been separated by metes and bounds before the filing of the statement under sub-section (i), if the Court on mquiry is satisfied that the share of such , .. person in the land separated, having regard to the area, asses.. :: ' sment; classification and value of the land is in the same pro I _I_ portion as the share of that person in the entire joint family property, and not in a larger proportion, the provisions of the sub-"section shall be applicable to such person." . x x x x x . x x .x x x. x x x x _)_ x x _'r_ ,., ' (7) x. (8) x -_Section 15 provided for resumption of land by soldiers and seamen. Section 16 prescribed the conditions restricting resumption of land G under s. 14. It is necessary to extract the whole of s. 16. It was as follows: _•·/_ -----.- H ' "' 16. Conditio.ns restricting resumption of land under sec tion 14, The right of a landlord to resume for cultivating the - land personally under section 14, shall be subject to the ' following conditions, namely: H.S. SRINIVASA _v._ STATE (REDDY, l.l 1197 ( 1) If the landlord owns land not exceeding two basic holdA ings he shall be entitled to resume one half of the land .__,, leased to the tenant: Provided that the right to resume by such landlord shall be subject to the condition that in the case of a protected tenant, such tenant, shall be left with at least one B standard acre of* the land actually held by him, which-ever is less. -+ (2) If the landlord owns land exceeding two basic hold... ~- ings, he shall be entitled to resume one-half of the area leased to the tenant, provided that the total area resumed c by the landlord does not exceed three family holdings. (3) No landlord who has been cultivating personally land exceeding three family holdings shall be entitled to resume . any land leased. D (4) The right to resume land under clauses (1) to (3) shall be subject to the further condition that the land resumed from all the tenants holding under the landlord together _,. with the extent of land, if any, cultivated personally and any non-resumable land held by the landlord by him shall not exceed three family holdings . E .._ (5) In respect of lands cultivated with plantation crops, the landlord shall not be entitled to resume more than one-half of the land leased to a tenant. ..... (6) If more tenancies than one are held under the same F landlord, then the landlord shall be entitled to resume land only from tenants whose tenancy **or tenancies** **are** **the** shortest in point of duration: ..... Provided that the landlord shall be 'entitled to resume lands held by protected tenants only if the required extent G of land cannot be resumed from tenants other than protected tenants: Provided further that where such tenancy or tenancies shortest in point of duration shall on resumption leave with the tenants land in_ extent which will be less than a H I \ SUPREME COURT REPORTS ' [1987] 2 S.C.R. basic holding, the resumption shall be made In respect tJf tenancy or tenancies next longer in point of duration. _r_ (7) The right to resume land by the landlord, other than a ·landlord owning land llot exceeding-two basic hnldlrtgs •. shall be subject to the further 'condition that !rt the case of protected tenants, each protected tenant shall be left with a ba'Sic holding or the land actually held by him, whichever is less. l ' (8) The right to resume land from any' tetiant sha11 be exer ~if~ble _under~; 14 only once .. ·. - ' - · · · _, '< (9) The income by the cultivati~n of th~ latld ~hvhich he is entitled to resume shall be the principal source of income for the maintenance of the landlord. - · :-·- f; :. B - c 0 E 1198 ·,,.-- ; '··' .. (IO) If as a result of the resumption of land urtder section _I_ 14, a fragment is created, the person entitled to the larger I ·part of fhe land shall be entitled to the fragment also. ' .. ·', : _:_ . . ' . . . . ~ . " . : . . .. (10 A) If any pers6n h~s after the '18th November, 1961 and before the appointed day transferred any land, other. wise than by 'partitimi, then; in calculating the extent of land owned by such person for purposes of the preceding clauses, the area so transferred shall be taken into consideration, and land exceeding the resumable area so calcu - lated shall be deemed.to be non-resumable land, and such person shall not be entitled to resume such non-resumable land. ·.·. Explanation-For purp~ses of this clause: a land shall be _)_ _'r_ 'deemed to have been transferred;' if it has been transferred by act of parties (whether by sale; gift; 'mortgage, with possession, exchange, lease or any other disposition) made - '"'"· ·.i - intervivas. · · - ·· 1 _·'(_ ·' · .: - "· . ; :1'-· 1 •' J '·' ·.c;.' · '· - - '.,' : ' '. !, - ' ' -v: ' · ;, '(iO BfNotwithstanding any.thing contained in clauses (1) to ( 10) (both inclusive). ors. 142, the exient of land, if any. 1 - - '.,' : ' '. !, - ' ' '---- · . . resumable, by any lan.dlord in Bombay Area shall be sub _-:-_ ''• [01 ] "' -:ject to the restrictions arid conditions specified in sections ''31A;31B and 31C of the.Bombay Tenancy and AgriculH ·: _.•!>_ - •' tural LandsAct, 1948;·a.sinserted by the Bombay Tenancy H.S. SRINIVASA _v._ STAIE [REDDY, J.[ 1199 and Agricultural Lands (Amendment) Act 1955 (Bombay A Act 13 of 1956), notwithstandii'lg the provisions of the Bombay Tanancy (Suspension of Provisions and Amendment) Act, 1957 (Mysore Act 13 of 19571. (10 C} Notwithstanding anything contained in clauses (!) to ( 10) (both inclusive), ors. 142, the extent of land, if apy, B resumable, by any landlord in the Hyderabad Area, shall be subject to the restrictions and conditions specified in the Hyderabad Tenancy and.Agricultural Lands Act, 1950, as in force in the Hyderabad Area on the !st November 1956. ( 11) No landlord who at any time before the appointed day had resumed land from any tenant for personal cultivation under the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948, or the Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950, shall be entitled to resume again under section 14 any land left with the same tenant." Section 44 provided for the vesting of certain lands in the State Government. Sub-sec. I was as follows: c· D' "(I) As soon as may be after the determination of the non-resumable lands under sub-section (4) of section 14, by each Court, the State Government may by notification E declare that with effect from such date as may be specified in such notification (hereinafter referred to as the date of vesting) all the non-resumable lands determined by such Court which are leased to tenants, whether protected or otherwise, and all lands leased to permanent and other tenants referred to in the first proviso to clause (29) of F • sub-section (A) of section 2 in the area wiihin jurisdiction of such Court shall stand transferred to and vest in the State Government." Section 45 provided for the registration of tenants as occupants of land on certain conditions. Section 47 provided for the payment of compensation to the land owner in regard to the extinguishment of rights in lands vesting in the State Government under s. 44. Chapter IV (sections 63 to 79) dealt with 'ceiling on land holdings'. Section 63 prescribed the ceiling on the extent of land which any person may hold either as a land-owner, landlord' or tenant or as a mortgagee with possession or otherwise or partly in one capacity and partly in another. G H 1200 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1987] 2 S.C.R. A Section 68 provided for the vesting of land surrendered by the owner in the State Government, Section 72 provided for payment of compensation for lands surrendered to and vested in the State Government. We are not concerned,with Chapters V, VI, VII, and VIII. Chapter IX dealt with 'Procedure and Jurisdiction of Court and Appeals'. Section B 112 prescribed the duties of the court and among the duties were "(g) to issue a certificate relating to reservation of land for resumption under sub-section ( 1) of s. 14 and (h) to determine the non-resumable lands under sub-sec. (4) of sec. 14." Sections 113, 114 and 115 provided for enquiry by the court and the procedure to be adopted. Section 118 provided for an appeal from the Court to the District Court. c The broad scheme of the provisions mentioned or set out above was that there was not only to be a ceiling on the holding of land, the system of leasing of land was to be abolish~d and cultivating tenants were to be invested with rights of ownership. However, certain limited classes of cases were recognised where leases were permitted on the one hand and on the other tenants were deprived of the right to remain D in possession of the land. It was provided that leases were permissible in cases when the landlord was under some disability as specified in s. 5. It was also provided that a land owner could seek, subject to the prescribed limits, resumption of land from tenants, if he bona fide required the land for cultivating personally or for any non-agricultural purpose. The right to resume land for personal cultivation was no E doubt subject to several severe conditions, one of the most important of which was that the income by the cultivation of the land which he was entitled to resume should be the principal source of income for the maintenance of the land owner. In other words, the Act while fixing a ceiling on the holding of land and generally conferring ownership F [rights on tenants, did not altogether ignore the interests of the smaller ] landlords and did in fact offer some measure of protection to those who desired to personally cultivate the tenanted land. ~ + ' The Act was substantially amended in 1974. 'Basic holding' and 'family holding' ceased to be defined. "Ceiling area" was defined to G mean the extent of land which the person or family was entitled to hold under s. 63. Section 5 was amended and the provisos were omitted. It -f was however provided by sub-sec. 2 that the prohibition against creation of tenancies or leases would not apply to tenancies created by a soldier or a seaman. The savings in respect of a minor widow or a minor woman under the original sec.,,:; was taken away. Section 14 was H omitted. Section 16 was also omitted. Section 44 was amended. The new sub-section 1 of sec. 44 is as follows: H.S. SRINIVASA _v._ STATE [REDDY, J.) 1201 "44(1) All lands held by or in the possession of tenants A (including tenants against whom a decree or order for eviction or a certificate for resumption is made or issued) immediately prior to the date of commencement of the Amendment Act, other than lands held by them under leases permitted under Section 5, shall, with effect on and from the said date, stand transferred to and vest in the B State Government." A new section 48 was introduced providing for the Constitution of \'r Tribunals, a Tribunal for each taluq consisting of the Assistant Commissioner of the Revenue Division and four other members to be nominated by the State Government of whom one shall be a person C belonging to the scheduled castes or scheduled tribes. No qualifica"'- tions were prescribed for the nomination of persons to membership of the Tribunal. Sub-section 8 of section 48 provided that no legal practitioner shall be allowed to appear in any proceeding before the Tribunal. Section 48A dealt with the procedure to be adopted by the Tribunal in its enquiry into applications made under s. 45 for registra- D lion of a person as an occupant. Sec. 112A provided for the .duties of the Tahsildar ands. J !2B provided for the duties of the Tribunal. The provision for an appeal from the decision of the court and the forther ~- right of revision under the amended Act were taken away and there "as no right of appeal or revision against the decision of the Tribunal. -... Thus, we see that the 1974 Amending Act took away the right which E was saved by the original Act in favour of the widow, unmarried woman, minor and disabled person to create a tenancy or lease the .i,.c land. The more important right which was taken away by the 1974 Amendment was the right of the landlord to resume the land. if he bona-fide required the land for personal cultivation or for a non..,. agricultural purpose. The right to resume the land if he bona-fide F required the land for personal cultivation was denied by the Amending Act even if the income by the cultivation of the land which he was entitled to resume was the principal source of income for the maintenance of the landlord. The principal submission of the learned counsel for the appel- G I ants was that the 1974 amendment in so far as it took away the right of a landlord to resume possession of the tenanted land where he bonafide required the land for personal cultivation and had no other princi**pal source** **of income for his** **own** **maintenance, was ultra vires, not-** withstanding its inclusion in the Ninth Schedule, as it offended the basic structure of the Constitution. Another submission which was H 1202, SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1987) 2 S.C.R. \ . A made by the learned counsel was that the provision for the constitution ol a 'Tribunal consisting of persons with unspecified qualifications in the place of a court was similarly ultra Vires the powers of the State Legislature. The third submission of the learned counsel was that s. 47(8) which excluded legal practitioner from appearing before the Tribunals was in conflict with s. 30 of the Advocates' Act and had, B therefore, to yield. · c It is necessary for us to mention here that the principal Act was . included in the JXth Schedule of the Constitution on October 20, 1965 and the Amendment Act of 1974 was similarly included in ihe IXth the Schedule on September 7, 1974. ###### We do not think that it is necessary to hark back to the decisions '• ' ' . ' ' ' ' of this court.rendered prior to the one in _Waman Rao_ _&_ _Ors ._ . v. _Union,_ ) _of India,_ [1981] 2 SCR 1. One of the petitioners who presented his case in person did argue that Waman Rao's case to the extent that,it upheld Arts.'31-A, 31-B and '.ll-C and to the extent that it upheld the validity D 1 of the. legislations impugned therein required reconsideration. We do not agree that it is necessary either to reconsider or to go behind Waman Rao for the purposes of this case. Chandrachud, CJ.. speaking for the majority of the judges of the Constitution Bench stated their conclusions in regard to Arts. 31-A, 31-B and 31-C as follows: E F G H " "( 1) The Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951 which introduced Article 3 !A into the Constitution· with retros. " pective effect and section 3 of the Consiituiion (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955 which substituted a new clause(!), -· sub-clauses (a) to (e), for ·the original clause'(!) with retrospective effect, do not damage any of the basic. or essential features of the Constitution or its basic structure and are valid ;md .constitutional being within the constituent power of the Parli.ament. (2) Section 5 of the Constitution (First Amendment) Act !951 introduced Article 3 lB into the Constitution which reads thus: "3 lB x x x x x x x . x x In Keshvananda Bharati ( 1973, Suppl., SCR 1) decided on April 24, 1973 i_t was held by the majority that Parliament has no power to amend the Constitution so as to H.S. SRINIVASA _v._ STATE [REDDY, J.] 1203 damage or destroy its basic or essential features or its basic A structure. We hold that all amendments to the Constitution· which were made before April 24, 1973 and by which the 9th Schedule to the Constitution was amended from time to time by . the inclusion of various Acts and Regulations therein, are valid and constitutional. Amendments to the Constitution made on or after April 24, 1973 by which the B 9th schedule to the Constitution was amended from time to _,., time by the inclusion of various Acts and Regulations therein, are open to challenge on the ground that they, or " any one or more of them, are beyond constituent power of ...,..the Parliament since they damage the basic or essential features of the Constitution or its basic structure. We do c not pronounce upon the validity of such subsequent constitutional amendments except to say that if any Act/Regulation included in the 9th Schedule by a Constitutional amendment made on or after April 24, 1973 is saved by Article 3 lA, or by Article 3 lC as it stood prior to its amendment by the 42nd Amendment, the challenge to the validity D of the relevant Constitutional Amendment by which that Act or Regulation is put in the 9th Schedule, on the ground that the Amendment damages or destroys a basic or essential features of the Constitution or its basic structure as reflected in Articles 14, 19 or 31,"will become otiose. + tial features of the Constitution or its basic structure as reflected in Articles 14, 19 or 31,"will become otiose. + E (3) Article 31 C of the Constitution, as it stood prior to its amendment by section 4 of the Constitution ( 42nd Amendment) Act, 1976, is valid to the extent to which its # - constitutionality was upheld in Keshavananda Bharati . **.** ' constitutionality was upheld in Keshavananda Bharati . .Article 3JC, as it stood prior to the Constitution (42nd Amendment) Act does not damage any of the basic or F essential features of the Constitution or its basic structure. "' (4) All the Writ Petitions and Review Petitions relat essential features of the Constitution or its basic structure. (4) All the Writ Petitions and Review Petitions relating to the validity of the Maharashtra Agricultural Lands Ceiling Acts are dismissed with costs." In the course of the submissions, the learned counsel suggested [G ] that the 1974 Amendment Act was not a law pertaining to agrarian reform; nor, it was said, was it a law directed towards securing that the ownership and control of the material resources of the community were so distributed as best to subserve the common good or that the operation of the economic system did not result in the concentration of H 1204 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1987] 2 S.C.R. A wealth and means of production to the common detriment. It was suggested that the 1974 Amendment Act far from setting out to achieve these goals set out in quite opposite direction by seeking to reduce to destitution small landlords whose sole means of livelihood was the tenanted land which they were allowed to resume for personal cultivation. It was said that the original Act was very fair as it recogB nised poverty amongst landlords as well as poverty amongst tenants and afforded a measure of protection to the poorer sections of the landlords. We are unable to agree with the submission that the Amendment is not aimed at agrarian reform or at securing the objectives mentioned in Arts. 39(b) and (c) of the Constitution. It is too late in the day to contend that, in the existing system of economic relations, ownership of land to the tiller of the land is not the best way of C securing the utmost utilisation of land, a material resource of the community for the common good of the entire community. It is now well recognised by leading economists everywhere that in the absence of common ownership of land and in the existing system of economic relations, the greatest incentive for maximum production is the feeling D of identity and security which is possible only if the ownership of the land is with the tiller. It is obviously in recognition of this principle that 'landlordism' was sought to be totally done away with by the amendment of s. 5 of the Act, by the omission of secs, 14 and 16 and by the amendment of s. 44. If between a landlord who did not himself personally cultivate the land and a tenant who so cultivated the land, the E legislature preferred the cultivating tenant, we are unable to hold that such preference is not part of a programme of agrarian reform pursuant to the Directive Principles contained in Arts. 39(b) and (c). We do not have the slightest doubt that the amendment was a law clearly aimed at agrarian reform, to secure the Directive Principles contained in Arts. 39(b) and (c). It is true that one of the conditions subject to which alone a landlord could resume land for personal cultiF vation under s. 16 of the Act was that the income from the land proposed to be cultivated by the landlord on resumption should be the principal source of income for the maintenance of the landlord. But it is important to notice that the question of resumption of land from a tenant would not arise unless a tenant was already cultivating the land. If, therefore, a tenant is already cultivating the land and if, presumG ably. that is the source of his livelihood, there is no reason why h_e should be dispossessed to enable a landlord whose source of hvehhood it was not until then to make it his principal source of maintenance hereafter. We do not think that any provision of the Amending Act offends the basic structure of the Constitution. H In regard to the constitution of the Tribunal, it was argued that }_!_ ##### H.S. SRINIVASA _v._ STATE (REDDY. J.] 1205 + very important questions fell for consideration under s. 48A and it was wholly wrong that the decision of such questions should be left, not to a judicial Tribunal, but to a Tribunal consisting of members nominated by the State Government with no regard for any qualification. Our attention was invited to several decisions of the Karnataka High Court where the functioning of such ill-constituted Tribunals was exposed and castigated. It is true that it was commented in some of those cases that the Tribunals were functioning in a most unjudicial manner. quite often without applying their minds at all to the questions at issue and in some cases, in utter violation of the principles of natural justice. We are unable to see how the mal-functioning of some of the Tribunals can possibly vitiate the provision relating to the Constitution of the Tribunal and the entrustment of the decision of certain issues to the Tribunal. We do not want to enter into a discussion of the question whether a lay Tribunal cannot function more efficiently than judicial Tribunal in resolving certain peculiar questions. There can be no doubt that while the decision of some disputes require a trained judicial mind to be applied to it, there are many other questions which do A B c -~ not require the application of any trained judicial mind. The disputes D contemplated bys. 48A do not appear to be disputes of a nature where the application of a trained judicial mind is absolutely essential. We also notice that Land Tribunals have functioned very well in West Bengal and Kerala where under the respecting State Acts more complicated questions than the ones under s. 48A are entrusted to Land Tribunals. The failure of the Land Tribunals to function effi E ciently in the State of Karnataka has beeri apparently taken note of by the Legislature itself and the Act has since been amended making provision for an appeal and revision. So much to the credit of the Karnataka Legislature. But we do not see how the failure of some of the land Tribunals to function efficiently can be said to be sufficient to stigmatise wholesale, the functioning of all the Tribunals constituted under the Act and to invalidate the provisions of the Act relating to F Tribunals. The last submission was in regard to sub-sec. 8 0£ sec. 48 which prohibited legal practitioners from appearing in proceedihgs befqre the Tribunals. The argument was thats. 48(8) was repugnant to s. 30 !if the Advocates Act, 1961 and s. 14 of the Indian Bar Councils Act. It ~as G said that the State Legislature was not competent to make a Jaw repugnant to laws made by Parliament pursuant to Entries 77 and 78 of List I of the 7th Schedule of the Constitution. The submission of the learned counsel is fully supported by the judgment of a Full Bench--of High Court of Punjab and Haryana in _Jaswant Kaur_ v. _State_ _of_ _Haryana,_ AIR 1977 Punjab & Haryana 221. We adopt the reasoning of H E 1206 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ !987) 2 S.C.R. A the High Court of Punjab & Haryana and direct that s. 48(8) .;,ill not be enforced so as to prevent Advocates frow appearing befor~ tlW Tribunals functioning under the Act. In regard to the decisions already rendered by the Tribunals we do. not think that it is necessary to reopen them on the ground that legal practitioners were not allowed to appear before the Tribunals in those cases. AU the civil appeals are, B therefore, dismissed, in the circumstances without cost. N.P.V. Appeals dismissed. +