High CourtDivision BenchAppeals allowed; High Court order quashing the ...

HMT WATCHES LTD. v. M.A. ABIDA & ANR.

Case / Petition Number:Criminal Appeal Nos. 471 of 2015 and 472 of 2015
Neutral Citation:[2015] 3 S.C.R. 719

Case Details & Bench

Court
High Court
Hon'ble Judges
  • Dipak Misra
  • Prafulla C. Pant
Judgment Date
2015-03-19
Court Decision / Holding
Appeals allowed. The impugned order quashing the criminal complaints is set aside. The trial court shall proceed with the trials of the criminal complaints. No order as to costs.
Final Disposition
Appeals allowed; High Court order quashing the proceedings set aside; trial to proceed; no order as to costs.

Parties to the Case

Appellants / Petitioners

  • HMT Watches Ltd.

Respondents

  • M.A. Abida
  • Anr.

Legal Representation & Advocates

Counsels for Petitioners

  • • Liz Mathew
  • • M.F. Philip
  • • Malavika Prasad
  • • C.V. Francis
  • • Arun Francis
  • • Sindhu Mohan
  • • Mukti Chowdhary
  • • Swati Setia

Counsels for Respondents

  • • Basant R.
  • • Romy Chacko

Case Synopsis & Summary

These appeals challenge a Kerala High Court order that quashed multiple criminal complaints under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, by invoking jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Supreme Court held that the High Court committed a grave error of law in quashing the proceedings by accepting disputed factual defences and treating them as uncontroverted at the Section 482 stage. The disputed issues — such as whether the cheques were given as security, whether there was an outstanding liability, or whether the signatory of the demand notice was authorized — were factual in nature and could only be resolved by the trial court after producing evidence. The Court reaffirmed that the jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is limited and should not be invoked to decide disputed questions of fact or to bypass the proper trial procedure. It also clarified that an instruction of stop payment can attract liability under Section 138 NI Act, citing Pulsive Technologies, Modi Cements, and related authorities. The judgment underscores that the purpose of criminal proceedings under Section 138 is to secure prompt payment, and courts should avoid premature discharge of the proceedings when material facts remain in dispute. Accordingly, the appeals are allowed and the trial court is directed to proceed with the trials.

Provisions of Law Cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, Section 482Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, Section 138Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, Section 139Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, Section 140

Legal Doctrines & Maxims

  • Abuse of process of court
  • Disputed questions of fact (should not ordinarily be determined at the 482 stage)
  • Parameters of jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
  • Presumption in favour of the holder (Section 139 NI Act)
  • Defence which may not be allowed under Section 138 (Section 140 NI Act)
  • Stop payment instruction can attract liability under Section 138 NI Act

Submissions & Arguments

Contentions of Appellants / Petitioners

The High Court erred in quashing the criminal complaints under Section 482 Cr.P.C. by accepting disputed factual defences. Liability under Section 138 NI Act is primarily a matter for trial evidence; the court should not decide disputed questions of fact at the 482 stage. The plea that cheques were given as security or that there was no outstanding liability is a question of fact to be resolved by the trial court. Even the issue of authorization of the demand notice's signatory could not be adjudicated in a 482 petition when controverted. Stop-payment instructions can attracting liability under Section 138 (as seen in Pulsive Technologies and Modi Cements). The court should rely on established precedents rather than prematurely terminating proceedings.

Contentions of Respondents

The cheques were given as security, and there was no legally enforceable liability to pay; thus the ingredients of Section 138 NI Act were not made out. The accused admitted replying to the demand notice, which, coupled with the disputed facts about authorization and liability, undermines the validity of proceeding under Section 138. The High Court’s intervention under Section 482 was appropriate to prevent abuse of process and to ensure that only continuing, non-frivolous prosecutions proceed to trial.

Cited Precedents (4)

Case NameCitationTreatmentExplanation
Surya Lakshmi Cotton Mills Limited v. Rajvir Industries Limited and Ors.2008 (1) SCR 432PositiveCited to explain the parameters of High Court's jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and to clarify that the court should not ordinarily decide disputed questions of fact at that stage.
Rallis India Limited v. Poduru Vidya Bhushan and Ors.2011 (5) SCR 289PositiveCited for guidance on not entering into disputed questions of fact at the 482 stage and on the limits of interference by the High Court.
Pulsive Technologies P. Ltd. v. State of Gujarat(2014) 9 SCALE 437PositiveCited to support that stop payment instructions can attract liability under Section 138 NI Act.
Modi Cements Ltd. v. Kuchil Kumar Nandi(1998) 1 SCR 1192PositiveCited for the proposition that a stop-payment instruction can attract the offence under Section 138 NI Act.

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Extracted Judgment Text

Exact text extracted from official judgment records.

## [2015] 3 S.C.R. 719 ## HMT WATCHES LTD. A v. ## M.A. ABIDA &ANR. (Criminal Appeal No. 471 of 2015 etc.) ## MARCH 19, 2015 B ## **[DIPAK MISRA AND PRAFULLA C. PANT, JJ.]** _Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973- s. 482- Jurisdiction_ - - _under Scope of Criminal proceeding u/s. 138 of_ C _Negotiable Instruments Act- Quashed by High Court- Held: High court committed grave error by exceeding its jurisdiction by quashing the proceeding accepting disputed factual_ - - _defences Negotiable instruments Act, 1881 s. 138._ D - - _Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 s. 138 Offence_ - _under Dishonor of cheque because of stop-payment_ - _instruction Held: Such instruction also would attract the offence uls. 138._ E ## **Allowing the appeals, the court** **HELO: 1. The High Court has committed grave error of law in quashing the criminal complaints filed by the appellant in respect of offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, in exercise of powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. by accepting factual defences of the accused which were disputed ones. [Para 14] [727-G-H]** _Suryalakshmi Cotton Mills Limited v. Rajvir Industries Limited and Ors._ **(2008) 13 SCC 678: 2008 (1) SCR 432;** _Rallis India Limited v. Poduru Vidya Bhushan and Ors._ **(2011) 13 sec 88: 2011 (5) SCR 289- relied on.** **F** G **H** 719 720 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2015) 3 S.C.R. A 2. The High Court further erred in observing that Section 138(b) of Negotiable Instruments Act stood uncomplied, even though respondent No.1 (accused) had admitted that he replied the notice issued by the complainant. Also, the fact, as to whether the signatory B of demand notice was authorized by the complainant company or not, could not have been examined by the High Court in its jurisdiction u/s. 482 Crl.P.C. when such plea was controverted by the complainant before it. [Para C 10) [725-D-E] 0 3. Instruction of "stop payment" issued to the banker could be sufficient to make the accused liable for an offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. [Para 13) [727-E] _Pulsive Technologies P. Ltd. vs. State of Gujarat_ (2014) 9 SCALE 437; _Modi Cements Ltd. vs. Kuchil Kumar Nandi_ (1998) 3 sec 249: 1998 (1) SCR 1192- relied on. E ## CASE LAW REFERENCE F 2008 (1) SCR 432 relied on Para 11 2011 (5) SCR 289 relied on Para 12 (2014) 9 SCALE 437 relied on Para 13 1998 (1) SCR 1192 relied on Para 13 CRIMINALAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 471 of2015. G From the Judgment and Order dated 25.02.2014 of the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam in CRLMC No. 2367 of 2008. H WITH H MT WATCHES LTD. v. M.A.ABIDA 721 A Criminal Appeal No. 472 of2015 Liz Mathew, M.F. Philip, Malavika Prasad, C.V. Francis, Arun Francis, Sindhu Mohan, Mukti Chowdhary, Swati Setia for the Appellant. Basant R., Romy Chacko for the Respondents. The Judgment of the Court wa!ii delivered by **PRAFULLA C. PANT,** J. 1. These appeals are directed C against judgment and order dated 25.2.2014 passed by the High Court of Kerala in Criminal M.C. No 2366 of 2008 and Criminal M.C. No. 2367 of 2008, whereby the said Court has allowed the petitions and quashed the proceedings of crirltinal 0 complaint case Nos. 1790, 1791, 1792, 1793, 1794, 1795, 1796, 1824, 1825, 1826, 1827, 1828, 1829, 1830 and 1831 of 2007 pending in the Court of Judicial First Class Magistrate (Court No. IV), Kechi; and C.C. Nos.1208, 1209, 1210,1211 and 1212 of2007, pending in the Court of Judicial First Class E Magistrate (Court No. Ill), Kechi. All these criminal complaint cases were pertaining to offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (hereinafter referred to as "the N. I. Act"). F 2. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the papers on record. 3. Succinctly stated, the appellant filed criminal complaint cases against respondent- M.A. Abida stating that as many G as 57 cheques dated 28.09.2006 were issued by her in discharge of outstanding liability towards the complainant/ appellant (HMT Watches Ltd.). When the cheques were presented for collection the same were received back, dishonoured by bankers with the endorsement - "payment H [2015] 3 S.C.R. ## 722 SUPREME COURT REPORTS - A stopped by the drawer". Notice of demand dated 9.10.2006 was issued by the complainant to the respondent no.1 but she failed to make the payment of the amount mentioned in the cheques, i.e., total Rs.1,79,86,357/-. Instead, she sent reply to the notice disputing liability to pay. On this, complainant - B filed twenty criminal complaints mentioned above, against the respondent no.1 with regard to the offence punishable under Section 138 of the N. I. Act. 4. The accused-M.A.Abida filed Criminal M.C. No. 2366 C of 2008 and Criminal M.C. No. 2367 of 2008 challenging the proceedings initiated by the complainant on the ground that she was Re-Distribution Stockist (RDS) of watches manufactured by the appellant. The business with the appellant D was done till September, 2003 on "cash and carry" basis. The accused further pleaded in the petitions filed before the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, that after 2003 the appellant company used to collect cheques towards the amount covered by distinct invoices with respect E to various consignments for securing payment of amount covered by the invoices. 5. The High Court accepted the plea of the accused (respondent no.1) and quashed the criminal complaint cases. F Hence, these appeals through special leave. 6. On behalf of the appellant, it is argued before us that the High Court committed a grave error of law in quashing the proceedings of the criminal complaint cases on the factual G pleas taken by the respondent no.1. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent no.1 contended that since the cheques were given as security, as such there was no liability to make the payment, and the ingredients of the offence punishable under Section 138 of the N.I Act were not made H out. H MT WATCHES LTD. v. M.A.ABIDA [PRAFULLAC. PANT, J.] 723 7. Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 reads as under: "138. Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc., of funds in the accounts. - Where any cheque drawn by a person on an account maintained by him with a banker for payment of any amount of money to another person from out of that account for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability, is returned by the bank unpaid, either because of the amount of money standing to the credit of that account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement made with that bank, such person shall be deemed to have committed an offence and shall, without prejudice to any other provisions of this Act, be punished with imprisonment for "a term which may extend to two year", or with fine which may extend to twice the amount of the cheque, or with both: B c D E Provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply unless- ( a) The cheque has been presented to the bank within a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier. F (b) The payee or the holder in due course of the cheque, as the case may be, makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice, in writing, to the drawer, of the cheque, ''within thirty days" of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheques as G H 724 [2015) 3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS ## A unpaid, and (c) The drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of the said amount of money to the payee or, as the case may be, to the holder in due course of B the cheque, within fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice. Explanation: For the purpose of this section, "debt or other liability" means a legally enforceable debt or c other liability." 8. Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 provides that there shall be a presumption in favor of holder of a cheque as to the debt or liability. It reads as under: D E "139. Presumption in favour of holder. - It shall be presumed, unless the Contrary is proved, thatthe holder of a cheque received the cheque of the nature referred to in section 138 for the discharge, in whole or in part, or any debt or other liability." 9. Section 140 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 prohibits what cannot be a defence in a prosecution in respect of offence punishable under Section 138 of the N.l.Act. It reads F as Linder: "140. Defence which may not be allowed in any prosecution under section 138. - Defence which may not be allowed in any prosecution under section 138 It shall not be a defence in a prosecution of an G offence under section 138 that the drawer had no reason to believe when he issued the cheque that the cheque may be dishonoured on presentment for the reasons stated in that section." H 725 HM TWATCHES LTD. v. M.A.ABIDA [PRAFULLAC. PANT, J.] 10. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, we are A of the view that the accused (respondent no.1) challenged the proceedings of criminal complaint cases before the High Court, taking factual defences. Whether the cheques were given as security or not, or whether there was outstanding liability or not is a question of fact which could have been determined only B by the trial court after recording evidence of the parties. In our opinion, the High Court should not have expressed its view on the disputed questions of fact in a petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, to come to a conclusion C that the offence is not made out. The High Court has erred in law in going into the factual aspects of the matter which were not admitted between the parties. The High Court further erred in observing that Section 138(b) of N. I. Act stood uncomplied, even though the respondent no.1 (accused) had admitted that o he replied the notice issued by the complainant. Also, the fact, as to whether the signatory of demand notice was authorized by the complainant company or not, could not have been examined by the High Court in its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure when such plea was E controverted by the complainant before it. 11. In _**Surya/akshmi Cotton Mills Limited**_ **v.** _**Rajvir Industries Limited and others',**_ this Court has made following observations explaining the parameters of jurisdiction F of the High Court in exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure: - **"17.** The parameters of jurisdiction of the High Court in exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is now well settled. Although it is of wide amplitude, a great deal of caution is also required in its exercise. What is required is application of the well-known legal principles involved G H 726 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015) 3 S.C.R. A in the matter. xxx xxx xxx 22. Ordinarily, a defence of an accused although appears to be plausible should not be taken into B consideration for exercise of the said jurisdiction. Yet again, the High Court atthat stage would not ordinarily enter into a disputed question of fact. It, however, does not mean that documents of unimpeachable character c should not be taken into consideration at any cost for the purpose of finding out as to whether continuance of the criminal .proceedings would amount to an abuse of process of court or that the complaint petition is filed for causing mere harassmen! to the accused. D While we are not oblivious of the fact that although a large number of disputes should ordinarily be determined only by the civil courts, but criminal cases are filed only for achieving the ultimate goal, namely, to force the accused to pay the amount due to the E complainant immediately. The courts on the one hand should not encourage such a practice; but, on the other, cannot also travel beyond its jurisdiction to interfere with the proceeding which is otherwise F genuine. The courts cannot also lose sight of the fact that in certain matters, both civil proceedings and criminal proceedings would be maintainable.' 12. In _Rallis India Limitedv. Poduru Vidya Bhushan_ G _**and** others2,_ this Court expressed its views on this point as under:- H "12.Atthe threshold, the High Court should not have interfered with the cognizance of the complaints having been taken by the trial court. The High Court 727 H MT WATCHES LTD. v. M.A.ABIDA [PRAFULLAC. PANT, J.] could not have discharged the respondents of.the said liability at the threshold. Unl~ss the parties are given opportunity to lead evidence, it is not possible to come to a definite conclusion as to what was the date when the earlier partnership was dissolved and since what date the respondents ceased to be the partners of the firm." A B In view of the law laid down by this Court as above, in the present case High Court exceeded its jurisdiction by giving its opinion on disputed questions of fact, before the trial co_urt. C 13. Lastly, it is contended on behalf of the respondent no.1 that it was not a case of insufficiency of fund, as such, ingredients of offence punishable under Section 138 of the · N.l.Act are not made out. We are not inclined to accept the D contention of learned counsel for respondent no.1. In this connection, it is sufficient to mention that in the case of Pulsive Technologies P. Ltd. vs. State of Gujarat3, this Court has already held that instruction of "stop payment" issued to the E banker could be sufficient to make the accused liable for an offence punishable under Section 138 of the N. I. Act. Earlier also in Modi Cements Ltd. vs. Kuchil Kumar Nandi[4] , this Court has clarified that if a cheque is dishonoured because of stop payment instruction even then offence punishable under F Section.138 of N. I. Act gets attracted. 14. For the reasons as discussed above, we find thatthe High Court has committed grave error of law in quashing the criminal complaints filed by the appellant in respect of offence G punishable under Section 138 of the N.I. Act, in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by accepting factual defences of the accused which were disputed ones. Such defences, if taken before trial court, after recording of the evidence, can be better appreciated. H H 728 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015) 3 S.C.R. A 15. Therefore, for the reasons, as discussed above, these appeals deserve to be allowed. Accordingly, the appeals are allowed. The impugned order dated 25.2.2004 passed by High Court of Kerala in Criminal M.C. Nos. 2366 of 2008 and 2367 of 2008 is hereby quashed. The trial court shall proceed B with the trial in the criminal complaint cases. It is clarified that we have not expressed our opinion as to correctness of the defence pleas taken by the respondent no. 1. No order as to costs. C Kalpana K. Tripathy Appeals allowed.