Harbans Kumar and Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh

A B ## c D E F 28 HARBANS KUMAR! AND ORS. _v._ STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH _October_ 6, 1978 [JASWANT SINGH AND A. P. SEN, JJ.] _U.P._ _Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act,_ 1950 _(Act_ 1 _of_ 1951). _Section_ 39 ( 1) _(e), interpretation_ _of-Computation_ _of_ _compensation._ On the vesting of the forests belonging to the appellants in the State of U.P. by virtue of Section 4 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms. Act, 1950 (Act 1 of 1951). the question arose about the assessment and payment of co111pensation therefor to the heirs of the intermediary. The compensation officer held that the average annual inco.me from the said forests which could be taken into consideration while computing its compensation was Rs. 4551/- as disclosed by the appellants' accounts for a period of 22 years pr~ceding the date of vesting in terms of clause (i) of Section 39(l){e) of the Act and Rs. 450/- was its annual yield on the date of vesting as per terms of clause (ii) of Section 39(l)(e) of the Act. The compensation officer held that Rs. 5001/- was the annual income from the aforesaid forest to the intermediaries. The High Court in appeal held that Rs. 2000/- and not Rs. 450/was the income under clause (ii) of Sectiolll 39(1)(e) of the Act and thereforeca.me to the conclusion that Rs. 3000/- was the ave.rage annual income on the basis of \Yhich gross assets had to be calculated in computation of compensation in respect of the said forest. Dismissing the appeals by certificate the Court, _HEW:_ I. The opening words of Section 39(1)(e) of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition Acti 1950 which is couched in very emphatic terms govern not only clause (1), but also clause (il.) of the Section. Consequently neither of the two factors mentioned in Section 39(l)(e) of the Act can be ignored while computing the average annual income. The connotation of the word 'average' does not admit of any doubt. [3 lA-B] (ii) On a true construction of Section 39(1)(e) of the Act, it is clear that G the Legislature cast an obligation on the compensation officer to work out the compensation by computing the average annual income giving due weight to both the factors mentioned in the aforesaid clauses (i) and (ii). He 8 cannot adopt either of these sub-clauses. Under sub clause (ii) the annual yield on the date of vesting is to be appraised by taking into consideration, _inter alia,_ the number and age of the trees, the area under forest and the produce. [3 IC, 32E] _Durgi Devi and_ _Ors._ v. _State_ _of_ _U.P._ [1978] 3 SCR p. _595,_ _Ganga_ _Devi_ _v._ _State_ _of_ _U.P.,_ [1972] 3 S.C.C. 126; applied. ######,. HAJ\BANS KUMAR! _v._ u. P. STATE _(laswf;lnt Singh,_ _l.)_ 29 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 171, 171A- A 1710 of 1969. From the Judgment and decree dated 10-12-1963 of the A!Jahabad High Court in First Appeal No. 511/55. _Lal_ _Narain Sinhil,_ _P._ _P._ _Singh,_ _I. B._ _Dadachilnji,_ _K._ _John_ and _J._ B _Sinha_ _for_ the Appellants. ### ' ;,. _.G._ _N._ _Dikshit_ and _M. V._ _Goswami_ for the Respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by lASWANT SINGH, J. These five appeals by certificates under Article 133(1)(c) of the Constitution granted by the High Court of Judica- C ture at Allahabad shall be dis~ed of by this judgment as they raise a common question relating to the interpretation of section 39 (1) ( e) of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 (Act No. 1 of 1951) (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). D E F G H # • _f_ As the facts giving rise to these appeals are identical, it shall suffice to narrate the facts of the case culminating in Appeal No. 171 of 1969. The predecessor-in-interest of the appellants, the late Jodha Mal, owned several private forests in the State of U.P. including the one consisting of tliNe compartments comprising a total area of 484.57 acres in village Rajiwala Attick Farm, Mahal Sansar in District Dehradun. On the vesting of the said forest in the State of U.P. by virtue of s•ection 4 of the Act, the qut<Stion arose about the ru;sessment and payment of compeTisation therefor to the heirs of the intermediary. On service of draft compeJ1Sation roll prepared undtr section 40 of the Act, each one of the appellants, filed separate objections in regard thereto before the Compensation Offioer, Dehradun, who disposed of the samc by bis order dated August 31, 1953 holding that the average annual income for the said forest which could be taken into considera·tion while computing its compensation was Rs. 4,551/- as disclosed by the appellants' accounts for a period of 22 years preceding the date of vesting in terms of clause (i) of section 39(1) (e) of the Act and Rs. 450/- was its annual yield on the date of vesting as per terms of clause (ii) of section 39(1) (e) of the Act. Dividing the sum total of these two figures by 2, the Compensation Offioer held that Rs. 5,0011- was the annual income from the aforesaid forest to the intermediaries. Aggrieved by the computation of compensatiOTI, the respondent preferred an appeal to the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad under section 50 of the Act. The appellant's also filed cross appeals claiming that the average annual income as assessed by the Compensation Officer was too low. Being of the view that while com A B ##### c D E F G B 30 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1979] 2 S.C.Rc puling the average annual income from the forest, both the reeults. arrived at by working both the clauses of section 39 (1 )( e) of the Act had to be looked into and considered and it had to be objectively decided as to what the average annual incorn~ from the forest would be, the High Court held that Rs. _2,0001-_ and not Rs. 4501- was the income under clause (ii) of section 39 (1) ( e) of the Act. On the aforesaid basis, the High Court came to the conclusion that Rs. 3,0001a:id not Rs. 5,001/- was the average annual income on the basis of which gross assets had to be calculated in computation of compensation in respect of the aforesaid forest. The High Court by its judgment a::id decree dated December 10, 1963, disposed of the appeal and the cross appeal in the manner indicated above. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the High Court, the appellants have come up in appeal to this Court. The respondent has also filed objections with; regard to the item of Rs. 2,000/-. Mr. Lalnarayan Sinha appearing on behalf of the appella::its has. raised a very short point. Assailing the method adopted by the High Court in computing the compensation, he has urged that true High Court has missed the real purport and meaning of the provisions relating to the computatio::i of compensation and that the relevant portion of section 39 of the Act did not authorise the High Court to calculate· the compensation by taking a mean of the aforesaid two figures. He has further urged that having worked out the average annual income according to the method indicated in clause ( i) of section 39 (I) ( e) of the Act, the High Court was not required to work out the a::inual yield of the forest on the date of vesting. We regret, we cannot accede ##### to this contention. Section 39 ( !) ( e) of the Act provides as follows : "39.Gross assets of a mahal.-(1) Gross assets as respects a mahal shall be the aggregate gross income of the land or estate comprised in the mahal and such income shall comprise ............... . ( e) average annual i::icome from forests, which shall be computed (i) on the basis of the income for a period of twenty to forty agricultural years immediately preceding the date of vesting as the Compensation Officer may consider reasonable, and (ii) on the appraisemcnt of the annual yield of the forest on the date of vesting." ' #### ' _J_ _T_ HARBANS KUMAR! _v._ u. P. STATE _(JaS)4.\'llll_ _Singh,_ _J.)_ 31 It will be noticed that the opening WOJds of the above quored section which is couched in very emphatic terms govern not only clause (i) but also clause (ii) of section 39(1) (e) of the Act. ConS'O<juently neitl!er of the two factors mentioned in section 39 ( 1) ( e) of the Act can be ignored while computing the avera!}! annual income. Now so far as the connotation of the word 'avera~' is ooacerned, it does not admit of any doubt. According to shorter Oxford English Dictionary, the word 'average' means arithmetical mean to estimate by dividing the aggregate of a series by the number of its units'. The same is the connotation of the word 'average' according to the Rm1dom House Dictionary of the English Language where the total receipt has bei~n stated to mean the total receipt from sales divided by the number of the units sold. On a true constructio:i of section 39 ( 1) ( e) of the Act, it ap~ars to us that the legislature cast an obligation on the Compensation Officer to work out the compensation by computing the average annual income giving due weight to both the factors mentioned in the aforesaid clauses (i) a:id (ii). Accordingly, we are of the view that the High Court was correct in computing the average income by adding up to two figures i.e. of Rs. 4,551/- and Rs. 2,000/- and arriving at a mean on that basis. The position is also not _res illtegra_ as in Smt. _Durgi Devi_ _&_ _Ors. v. State_ _of_ _U.P.(')_ this Court held that the average annual income has to be arrived at by taking bto consideration not only the income referred to in clause (i) of &~ction 39(1) (e) but also the estimated annual yield of the forest on the date "f vesting. The following observations made therein are apposite · "A plain reading of clause ( e ~ _CIL_ secticm 39 ( 1) shows that its sul>-clauses (i) and {ii) do not provide for two alternative methods of calculating the average annual income of the forest. The conjunction 'and' at the end of sub-clause (i) cannot be read as "or". It conjoi:is the two sub-clauses, and in effect, read in the context of "shall" in the opening part of clause ( e), mandates the compensation officer to take both the factors into consideration in assessbg the average annual income from the forest. The· reason why tl!e legislautre has made compliance with the requirement of this subclause (ii), also, obligatory, appears to be to ensure that the compensation assessed has a reasonable nexus and proportion to the actual a:id potential value of the forest as on tl!e date of vesting. If a forest has been repeatedly, wholly and indiscriminately exploited within forty years or less imme (1) [1978] 3 S.C.R. 595~U978] 3 S.C.C. 101. B ###### c: D _E_ F G H A B #### c D E F 32 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1979] 2 S.C.ll. diately before the vesting, its actual and potential value as a forest on the date of the vesting might be far less than the one calculated on the basis of its average annual i':icome of the preceding 20 to 40 years as the ca~ may be. In such a case, average annual income calculated merely on the basis of the income for a period of 20 to 40 years preceding the vesting, may cause fortuitous inflation in the assessment of compensation. Conversely, if a forest has been very little exploited in the preceding forty years and is well-preserved and well-developed on the date of vesting than calculation of its average annual income on the basis of sub-clause (i) alone, without taking into account its potential yield cm the date of the vesting, will make the compensation assessed wholly illusory, having no relation whatever to the value of the forest as at the date of vesting .. Entry of the appraised annual yield of the forest on the date of vesting, fato computation under clause ( e), operates as a counterpoise against fortuitous inflation or deflation in the assessment." Again hi _Ganga Devi_ v. _State of Uttar Pradesh(')_ it was pointed out by thls Court that ia computing the average annual income under clause ( e) of section 39 ( 1), the compensation officer has to refer to both these sub-claus•es (i) and (ii). He cannot adopt either of these sub-clauses. It was also pointed out that under sub-clause (ii) the annual yield on the date of vesting is to be appraised by taking into consideration, _inter_ _alia_ the number and age of the trees, the area under forest and the produce. For the foregoing reasons, we find no merit in these appeals which are dismissed with costs. S.R. _Appeals dismissed._ ###### (]) [1972] 3 s.c.c. 126. \