High CourtDivision BenchAppeal Allowed

Gujarat v. Bhogilal Keshavlal

Case / Petition Number:Civil Appeal No. 1479 of 1971
Neutral Citation:[1980] 2 S.C.R. 284

Case Details & Bench

Court
High Court
Hon'ble Judges
  • P. N. Singhal
  • A. P. Sen
Judgment Date
1979-11-21
Court Decision / Holding
Appeal allowed; High Court’s decision set aside; writ petition dismissed; Respondent No. 1 to pay costs.
Final Disposition
Appeal Allowed

Parties to the Case

Appellants / Petitioners

  • State of Gujarat

Respondents

  • Bhogilal Keshavlal
  • Sri Ayodhya Nagar Co-operative Housing Society Ltd.

Legal Representation & Advocates

Counsels for Petitioners

  • • G A Shah
  • • N. S. Pande
  • • M. N. Shroff

Counsels for Respondents

  • • P. R. Mridul
  • • Vimal Dave
  • • Miss Kailash Mehta
  • • J. N. Shroff
  • • H. S. Parihar

Case Synopsis & Summary

This appeal concerns the validity of a fresh notification under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, issued by the Gujarat Government after cancelling an earlier notification. The first notification (Aug 3, 1960 under Section 4 followed by Aug 21, 1961 under Section 6) sought to acquire land for a housing project for the Sri Ayodhya Nagar Co-operative Housing Society Ltd., with the entire cost to be borne by the society. The High Court struck down the second notification dated Sept 10, 1964, holding that since the first notification under Section 6 was invalid, the second could not stand and that the earlier Section 4 notification could not be used to support a later Section 6 declaration. The State appealed, contending that the first Section 6 notification was invalid because the compensation was to be paid by the society, and that the Government could cure the lacuna by issuing a fresh notification under Section 6 for acquisition at public expense. The Supreme Court held that: (i) the State may issue a second Section 6 notification after cancelling an invalid earlier one; (ii) a housing project can constitute a public purpose; (iii) Sections 4, 5-A and 6 form an integrated scheme and exhaustion of the Section 4 notification is not an absolute bar to a subsequent Section 6 declaration; (iv) a delay in issuing the second notification may not be unreasonable. The appeal is allowed and the High Court’s decision set aside with writ petition dismissed.

Provisions of Law Cited

Land Acquisition Act, 1894, s.4Land Acquisition Act, 1894, s.6Land Acquisition Act, 1894, s.4(1)Land Acquisition Act, 1894, s.5-ALand Acquisition Act, 1894, s.48Land Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Act, 1967

Legal Doctrines & Maxims

  • Public purpose can include housing schemes for a limited number of persons; the Government is the best judge to determine what constitutes a public purpose.
  • The Land Acquisition Act's sections 4, 5-A and 6 form an integrated scheme intended to be read together as a complete process for acquisition; a declaration under section 6 completes the process.
  • If a section 6 notification is found invalid, the Government may treat it as non est and issue a fresh notification under section 6; nothing in section 48 precludes this.
  • Section 4(1) is exhausted by a valid declaration under section 6; if the first notification under section 6 is invalid, the local plan is not necessarily foreclosed, allowing a subsequent valid notification.
  • Delay in issuing a subsequent section 6 notification may be permissible; the 1967 amendment's proviso and related authorities provide context for evaluating reasonableness.

Submissions & Arguments

Contentions of Appellants / Petitioners

The State contended that the first Section 6 notification (Aug 21, 1961) was invalid because the compensation would be paid entirely by the cooperative society; its cancellation (May 27, 1963) left room for a fresh Section 6 declaration. The State argued that the second notification (Sept 10, 1964) was valid as an acquisition at public expense for a public purpose (housing scheme). It asserted that the Land Acquisition Act’s scheme—4, 5-A and 6—must be read as an integrated process and that a housing project can satisfy the public purpose requirement. The delay between cancellation and the second notification was not necessarily unreasonable under the circumstances and the 1967 amendment contextualized such practice.

Contentions of Respondents

The respondents argued that successive Section 6 notifications for the same land are impermissible; cancellation of the first notification implies withdrawal from the acquisition and invalidates the second without a fresh Section 4 trigger. They asserted that the 1967 amendment has limited retrospective effect and only validates successive declarations for different parcels, not for the same land. They also contended that the delay in issuing the second notification was improper and that the High Court’s reasoning should stand.

Cited Precedents (15)

Case NameCitationTreatmentExplanation
Valji Mulji Soneji v. State of Bombay[1964] 3 S.C.R. 686PositiveCited to illustrate that government action under Section 6 is constrained when compensation is to be paid entirely by a private entity.
Girdharilal Amratlal Shodan & Ors. v. State of Gujarat & Ors.[1966] 3 S.C.R. 437PositiveUsed to support that cancelling a first Section 6 notification does not imply withdrawal from the acquisition; permits a fresh Section 6 declaration.
Sham Behari & Ors. v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.[1964] 6 S.C.R. 636PositiveCited for the principle that compensation paid entirely by a company invalidates the initial notification under Section 6.
Pandit Ilmdu Lal & Ors. v. The State of Punjab & Ors.[1961] 2 S.C.R. 459PositiveSupports the notion that housing schemes can constitute public purpose.
Ratilal Shankarbhai & Ors. v. State of Gujarat & Ors.AIR 1970 SC 984PositiveSupports the concept that a fresh Section 6 declaration can follow an invalid earlier one.
Ram Swarup v. The District Land Acquisition Officer, Aligarh & Ors.AIR 1972 SC 2390PositiveAffirms logic for fresh Section 6 declaration when earlier notification is invalid.
Gujarat State Transport Corp. v. Valji Mulji Soneji[1979] 3 S.C.R. 202PositiveNoted for the reasonableness of delays in issuing a second Section 6 notification.
Vishnu Prasad Sharma v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors./null/PositiveSupports the integrated scheme view of Sections 4, 5-A and 6.
Dosabhai Ratansha Karevala v. State of Gujarat & Ors.[1970] 11 Guj. L.R. 361DistinguishedEarlier authority cited but distinguished in light of Vishnu Prasad Sharma and related decisions.
State of Madhya Pradesh v. Vishnu Prasad Sharma & Ors./null/PositiveReinforces integrated approach to Sections 4, 5-A and 6.
Girdharilal Amratlal Shodan & Ors. v. State of Gujarat & Ors.[1966] 3 S.C.R. 437PositiveRepeated reference to earlier principle about not treating cancellation as withdrawal.
Shyam Behari v. State of Madhya Pradesh/null/PositiveUsed to illustrate limits on compensation-based validity of notifications.
Pandit Ilmdu Lal & Ors. v. The State of Punjab & Ors.[1961] 2 S.C.R. 459PositivePublic purpose support.
Ram Swarup v. The District Land Acquisition OfficerAIR 1972 SC 2390PositiveSupport for fresh Section 6 declarations after invalid first notifications.
Shyam Behari v. State of Madhya Pradesh/null/PositiveIllustrates invalidity when compensation burdened solely by a private entity.

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284 LA B - c ·o E . F . G STATE OF GUJARAT , I f,, _.I_ ~ L _v._ - f BHOGILAL KESHAVLAL & ANR. _November 21,_ 1979 [P. N. SmNGHAL AND A. P. SEN, JJ.] _Ltmd Acquisition Act,_ 1894, _SectiOM_ 4 & 6- _Scope_ _of._ / [287 D-E]' The first respondent owned certain Land forming part of a town planning scheme, situated within the city limits. At the request of the second reapondentF a Cooperative Housing Society, the State Government issued a Notification~ under section 4 of the Act ori August 3, 1960 stating that the' land was likely to be needed for a public purpose and it was foUowed by a farther notificatioll' of the State Goveroment under Section 6 of the Act dated August 21, 1961 that the land _was_ to be acquired at the expense of the Cooperative Housing. Society for the public purpose specified in column 4 of the Schedule to the notification. The entire expense of the acquisition was to be borne by the second respondent. The first respondent moved the High Court undor Article 226 of the Constitution cf¥U~enging the valadity of the notification under section 6 of the Act. During the pendency of the Writ Petition, the appellant by a notification dated May 27, 1963 cancelled the earlier notification under section 6 and issued a fresh notification. The High Court struck down the second notification dated September 10, 1964 issued under section 6 of the Act. In the appeal to this Court, on the question of the validity of the 2nd notification dated September 10, 1964. HElD : (i) The High Court was in error in striking down the second notification under section 6 of the Act issued on September 10, 1964. (ii) This Court in _Valjibhai Mulfibhal_ _Soneji_ v. _State_ _of_ _Bombay_ [1964] 3 S.C.R. 686 has held that the Governme111.t ~ no power to issue a notification for acquisition of land for a public purpose, where the compensation is to be entirely paid by a company. [287 C-D] In the instant case the first notification issued by the Government for acquisition of land for a public pUrpOSe at the e:xpeme, of the second respondent, the cooperative societY was therelore, invalid and the Govt. was justified in issuing the second notification under section 6 after removing the lacuna by providing for acquisition of the land for public purpo!le, at public expense • B (iii) The acquisition of land for cooperative housing society is a public purpose. The Govt. is the best judge to determine whether the ptJl'll(li8e in question is a public purpose or not. It cannot be said that a Housing Schemefor a limited tmmber of persons cannot be construed to be a public Pllrtlote· When a notific&ti.on·under section 6 of the Act is in~id, the Govt. may treat it as ineffective and issue a fresh notification under stction 6 af tlle Act and nothing in section 48 of the Act precludes the Government from ioing 110. [291 C-E} C- .J GUJARAT _v._ BHOGILAI. KESHAVLAL _(Sen,_ _1.)_ 285 _Girdharilal Amratlal Shodan_ & _Ors._ v. _State_ _of_ _Gujarat_ & _Ors._ [1966] A · 3 S.C.R. 437, _Sham Bdwri_ _&_ _Ors._ v. _State_ _of Madhya_ _Pradesh_ & _Ors._ [1964] .6 S.C.R. 636, _Pandit_ _Jhandu_ _Lal_ & _Ors._ v. _The State_ _of Punjab_ & _Ors._ [1961] 2 S.C.R. _459_ _Ratilal Shankarbhai_ & _Ors._ v. _State_ _of_ _Gujarat_ &: _Ors._ AI.R. 1970 S.C. 984, _Ram Swarup_ v. _The District_ _lAnd Acquisition Officer,_ _Aligarh_ & _Ors._ A.I.R. 1972 SC 2390, referred to. (iv) In the instant case, tho Respondent had not taken any ground in the Writ Petition with regard to the delay in the issuance of the second notificaton. The High Court was therefore, not justified in observing that "the appellant had not explained the delay by 1lling any affidavit." If there W!l6 no , ground taken, there could be no occasion for filing of any such affidavit. [292 B-C] # -r-- -- . (v) There is nothing in the Act which precludes the Govt. from issuing a fresh notification under s. 6 of the Act if tile earlier notification is found to be ineffective. The delay of one year and four months between the date of ~ancellation and the issue of the second notification cannot be regarded to be unreasonable. [292 E-F] _Gujarat State Transport_ _Corpn._ v. _Valji Mulji Soneji_ [1979] 3 S.C.R. 202, referred to CiviL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No·. 1479 of 1971. - From th~ Judgment and Order dated 254-1969 of the Gujarntl High Court in SCA No.' 271/65. _G. A. Shah, N._ _S._ _Pande_ and _M._ _N._ _Shroff_ for the Appellant. _P.R. Mridul,_ _Vimal_ _Dave_ and _Miss_ _Kailr;8N_ _Mehta_ for Respondent No.1· _J._ _N._ _Shroff_ and _H._ _S._ _Parihar_ for Respondent No. 2. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by ##### • SEN, J.-This appeal on' certificate from a judgment of the Gujarat High Court raises a question as to thd validity or otherwise of a fresh notification issued by the Government of Gujarat under s. _6_ of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, consequent upon an earlier notificationj .under s. 6 of the Act being discOIV'ered to be invalid. D p. c a· The first respondent in this case owned certain land bearing Final J>lot No. 38 forming part of Town Planning Scheme No. III (Ellis~ bridge) situate within the city of Ahmedabad. At the request of the second respondent Sri Ayodhya Nagar Co-operative Hous,ing Society Ltd., registered under the Bombay Co-operative Societies Act, 1925, Mw deemed to be registered under the Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act, 1961, formed with the object of enabling its members! to construct houses, the State Government on Augusr 3, 1960 issued a notifieatioii ..... ~...._,....~,·-·· ·• ' " #### ____________________ 286 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 2 s.c.R. _vI._ .. A under s. 4 stating that. the land was likely to be needed for a public purpose. This was followed by a notification of the State Goverii· ment dated August 21, 1961 under s. 6 of the Act stating that the hmd was to lJe acquired at the expense of Sri Ayodhya Nagar Cooperative Housing Society Ltd. for the public purpose specified in column 4 of the schedule annexed thereto. The public purpose specified in column 4 of the schedule was 'For construction of houses for Sri Ayodhya Nagar Co-operative Housing Society Ltd., Ahmedabad.' The entire expense of. the acquisition was to be borne by· the second respondent, i.e., the Co~operative Hoilsing Society . . The first respoo-~ dent moved the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution challeng- r ·c ing the validity of t11e notification under s. 6 on the( .ground that the . _..(_ .._ 'D acquisition of the land for a public purpose at the expense of the second respondent was legally invalid. On December 4. 1961 the High Court issued an _ad interim_ injunction restraining the appellant from proceeding with the acquisition proceedings. While this writ pelition was pending, the State Government by its notification dated May 27, 1963 cancelled the notification under s. 6. On Septetmber 10. 1964 the State Government issued a fresh notification under s. 6 stating that the land was tO! be acquired at theJ public expense, for the public purpose specified-in column 4 of the schedule. The public purpose specified in column 4 in the schedule was 'For housing scheme undertaken by Sri Ayodhyru Nagar C~operative Housing Society Ltd.' TE The High Court following its earlier decision in _Dosabhai_ _Ratansha_ _Keravala_ v. _State of Gujdl'at_ & _Ors.(l)_ struck down the second notification unde.r. s. 6 dated september 10, 1964. 'It held _inter_ _alia_ that (1) the first notification under s. 6 issued on August 21, 1961 being. an acquisition for a society at its cost, was. valid and. the Government F could have proceeded to complete the acquisition tmder it but, 'under a false sense ofl apprehension as to its validity, the Government cancelled it on May 27. 1963. There was no justification for cancelling the first notification under s. 6 and even if the Government wanted to cancel it out of a feeling of apprehensi0111 as to its validity, the Government need not have taken one year and ten months to do so. (2) After the G· issue of the first notification under s. 6 on August 21, 1961, the- notifi- · cation dated August 3, 1960 under s. 4 was exhausted and, therefore, could not be used to support the second notification issmxl under s. 6 . on September 11, 1964. (3) The cancellation of the fir~t notification under s. 6 by the notification dated May 27, 1963 did not have the effect of reviving the notification under s. 4 so as to make it available 11 for supporting the second notification onder s. 6. The second notifi (1) (1970) 11 Guj. L.R. 361. i - .. J .. cation under s. 6 not being supported by any notification under s. 4 WaS consequently invalid. ( 4) A notification unde.r s. 6 in order to be valid must follow within a reasonable time after the issue of a notification under s. 4. The notification under s. 4 was issued; on August 3, i960 and the socond notification under s. 6 on September l 0, 1964 and there was, thus an interval of about fo\W years and one month between the two notifications. This interval of time. could not be regarded as reasonable. Even tested by the yardstick of reasonable tim~ provided by the legislature in the second proviso introduced in s. 6 _!:>y the Land Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Act, 1967,. namely three years, the period of about four years .and one month between the two notifications under s. 4 and s. _6_ would be dearly unreasonable. The socond notification must, therefore, be beld to be invalid on this ground also. We are clearly of the opinion that the High Court was in error in striking down the second notification under s. 6 issued on September 10, 196 4. in _Valjibhai_ _Muljibhai Soneji_ v. _State_ _of_ _Bombay(_ _[1]_ _)_ the Court held that the Government has no power to issue a notifica-. tion for acquisition of land for a public purpose, where the compensation is to be entirely paid by a company. The first notification issued by the Government under s. ·6 for acquisition of the land for a public GUJARAT _V._ BHOGILAL KESHAVLAL _(Sen,_ J.) 287 B c D E F G H ·-; purpose, at the expense of the socond respondent, the Co-operative Society, was, therefore, invalid. The State Government was, therefore; justified in issuing the second notification under s. 6 after remov. ing the lacuna i.e., by providing for acquisition of the land for the said _:_ ~ public purpose, at public expense. - In an endeavour to suppo.rt the ju~gment, counsel for the first respondent advanced a three~fold contention. It was urged, firstly, that " su~cessive notifications cannot be issued under s. 6 placing reliance on _State_ _of Madhya Pradesh_ _&_ _Ors._ v. _Vishnu_ _Prasad Sharma_ _&_ _Ors.(2)_ It was pointed out that the Land Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Act, 1967 had a limited scope and it validated only successive notifications issued under s. 6 in respect of different parcels of land but did not validate successive notifications in respect of the same land. - 1 Further, it was urged that the Act was not retrospective in oper.ation - 1 Further, it was urged that the Act was not retrospective in oper.ation ~ and, therefore, the validity of the second notific"<ltion dated September _IJ-_ .. ~0, 1964 h~d to be adjudged with reference. to the pre-amendment law, Le., accordmg to the law as declared by this Court in _Vishnu · Prasad_ _Sharma's_ _case._ Secondly, it was urged, on the strengt!h of the doci . . (1) [1964] 3 S.C.R. 686. (2) {1966} 3 S.C.R. _557 ._ \ A B c D E F G H "It seems to us clear that once a declaration under s. 6 is made, the notification under s. 4{1) must be exhausted, for it has served its purpose. There is nothing in ss. 4, 5-A and 6 to suggest that s. 4(1) is a kind of reservo1r from which the government may from time to time draw out land and make declarations with respect to it successively. If that was the intention behind sections 4, 5-A and 6 we would have found some indication of it in the language used therein. But as we read these three sectiOills together we. can only find that the scheme is. that s. 4 specifies the locality, then there may be survey and drawing of maps of the land and the consideration whether the land is adapted for the purp6se for which it has to be acquired, followed by objections and making up of its mind by the government what particular land out of that locality it needs. This is fqllowed by a declaration under s. 6 specifying the particubr land . needed and that in our opinion completes the process and the notification under s. 4(1) cannot be further used thereafter. At the stage of s. 4 the land is not particularised but only the locality is mentioned; at the stage of s. 6 the land in the-locality is particularised and thereafter it seems to us that ~he notification under s. 4( 1) having served its purpose exhausts itself." Snrkar J., in a separate but concurring'judgment, observed : "My learned brother has said that ss. 4, SA and _6_ of the Act have to be read together and so read, the conclusion is clear that the Act contemplates only a single declaration under. s. 6 in respect of a notification under s. 4.'' 288 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 2 s.c.R. sion in _Dosabhai Ratansha Karevala's case_ (supra) that a notification under s. 4 is. exhausted when it is followed by declaration under s. 6. It was urged that the first notification under s. 6 dated August 2-1, 1961 was valid and the High Court was, therefore, justifi~l in holding that with its canc~llation, the notification under s. 4 lapsed. Thirdly, it was urged that there was unreasonable delay in issuing the second notification under s. 6 and, this, by itself, wasl sufficient to invalidate it. _)_ I In _Vishnu Prasad Sharma's case_ the Court held that ss. 4, 5-A •I ... .. and 6 are integrally connected and present a complete scheme for acqui-~ sition and, therefore, it was not open to the Government tOi make sue;; . · cessive declarations under s. 6. Wanchoo J. (as he then was), speaking for himmself and Mudholkar J., observed : A B c D E F G B ' ' t -'i _I_ GUJARAT _v._ BHOGILAL KESHAVLAL _(Sen,_ _J.)_ - 289 . Aften rejecting the contention that the Government may have difficulty in making the plan of its projects complete at a time, particulaly where rthe project is large, and therefore, it is necessary that it should have lXJWer to make successive declarations under s. 6, he observed : ''I cannot imagine a Government, which has,vast resour~ ces, not being able to make a complete plan of its project at a time. Indeed, I think when a.plan is made, it is a camp. Iete plan. I should suppose that before the Government start-; acquisition proceedings by the issue of a notification under s. 4, it has made its plan· for otherwise it cannot state in the notification, as it 'has to do, that the land is likely to be needed. Even if it had not then completed its plan, it would have enough time- before the making of a declaration under s. 6 to do so. I think, therefo.re, that the difficulty of the Government, even if there is one, does nt't lead to the conclusion that the Acd contemplates the making: of a number of declarations under s. 6." In the present case, the question, however, does not arise as the 'first notification under s. 6 dated August 21. 1961 being invalid, the ·Government was. not precluded fromJ making a second notification. Due to the invalidity of the notification under s. 6, the notification under s. 4 still held ~e field and on its~ strength another notification unde.r s. 6 ·Could be issued. It is, therefore, not necessary to deal with the effect of the validating Act. The matter is squarely covered by the decision of the Court _in:_ _·Girdharilal_ _Amratlal Shodan_ & _Ors._ _v._ _State_ _of Gujarat_ & _OrY.(l)_ ·The Court rejected the contention that' by cancelling the first notffica ·tion under s. 6, as here, the Government must be taken to have with-drawn from the acquisition and consequently could no~ issue a second llOtification under s. 6. There also the first notification under s. 6 was invalid and of no effect, as the Government had no power to issue a notification for acquisition for a public purpos~ wherd the compensation was to be paid entirely by a company, as held by this Court in _.Sham Behari_ & _Ors._ v. _State_ _of Madhya Pradesh_ & _Ors._ (2) . - It will be noticed that in _Girdharilal Amratlal Shodan's_ case the ~ ~ ~acts were i~entic.al. On August 3, 1960 the Government of Gujarat - JSsped a notification under s. 4 in respect of certain land falling in Final Plot No. 460 of th~ Town Planning Scheme No. III of Elisbridge in the city of Ahmedabad, stating that the land was likely to be needed for a public purpose, viz., for construction ·of houses for Sri Krishna (]) [1966] _3_ S.C.R. 437. (2) fl964] 1 6 s.c.R. 636. .. 290 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 2 S.C.R. A B c ment issued a fresh notification under s. 6 stating that the Ian~, notification under s. 6 stating that the land was neede~ t1) be acquire~ ·- 'f at the public expense for a public purpose viz., for the housing scheme undertaken by Sri Krishnakunj Government Servants' Co~openitive Housing Society Ltd. kunja Government Servants' Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. · On July 18, 1961 the State Government issued a notification under s. 6 stating that the land was to be acquired for the aforesaid public purpose at the expense of Sri Krishnakunj Government Servants' Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. On September 22, 1961, the landholder fileci a writ petition in the High Court for an order quashing the notification under s. 6. During the pendency of the-proceedings, the Government issued a notification dated April 28, 1964 c~cellii1g the aforesaid notification dated July 18, 1961. On August 14, 1964 the Govern ' The contention was that by cancelling the first notification under s. 6, the Government must be deemed to have withdrawn from the acquisition and cancelled the notification under s. 4, and therefore,D could not issue the 5econd notification under s. 6, without issuing a fresh notification: under s. 4. It was also urged that the power of the· State Government to issue a notification under s. 6 waS' exhausted, and the Government could not issue a fresh notification unde.r s. 6. The _.t-:Court rejected both the contentions observing : E F G B "Having regard to the proviso tq s. 61 of the Act, a dccla~ ration for acquisition of the land for a public purpose could only be made if the compensatiotn tol be awarded for it was: to be paid wholly or partly out of public revenues or some fund controlled ur managed by a local authority. The Govern~ ment had no power to issue · a notification for' acquisition for a pubic purpose where the compensation was to be paid ·entirely by a company. The notification dated July 18, 1961 was, theref01re, invalid and of no effect, see· _Shyam_ _Behari_ v. _State of Madhya Pradesh._ The, appellants filed the writ petition challenging the aforesaid notification on this ground. The challenge was justified and the notification was liable to be quashed by the Court." "The State Government realised that the notification was invalid, and without waiting for an order of Court, cancelled - the notification on April 28, 1964. The cancellation was in recognition of the invalidity of the notification. 111e Government had no intention of withdrawing from the acquition. Soon after the cancellation, the G·ovemment issued a fresh notification under s. 6 whereas in this case the notifi -;---· ###### ·--------### ------ / I· ... -". ·': · ; ' . I I ##### I - GUJARAT _V._ BHOGILAL KESHAVLAL _(Sen,_ J.) 291 cation under s. 6 is incompetent and invalid, the Govern t . . fi . men may treat 1t as me echve and issue a fresh notification d h . b un er s. 6. T h IS [. . ] ISJ w at, m su stance, the Government did in this case. The cancellation on April28, 1964 was no more than u recognition of the invalidity of the earlier notification.'' The first notification issued under s. 6 on August 21, .l961 was obviously invalid and of no effect. By the issue of this notification the Go\'ernment had not eiTecti\·cly execciscd its powers under s. 6. ' In the circumstances, the Government could we~ issue a fresh notification under s. 6 dated September 10, 1964. B c E F G u In _State_ _of_ _Gujarat_ v. _Musamiyan_ _Imam_ _Haidl!r_ _Bux_ _Raz:vi_ _&_ _Anr._ _etc._ _(')_ this Court v.-hile <reversing the decision of the Gujarat !· 1 High Court in _Dosabhai Ratansha Kerravala_ (supra) on which the High Court based its decision, has laid down two important principles : {I) In vie'v: of the decisions of this Court in _Pandit ilumdu Lal_ _&_ _Ors._ v. _The Stare_ _of Punjab_ & _Ors.,(2) Ratilal Shankarbhai_ _&_ _Drs._ v. _State_ _of Gujarat_ _&_ _Ors.C)_ and _Ram Swarup_ v. _The District_ _Land Acquisi-_ _tioll_ _Offir:er, Aligarh_ _&_ _Ors.(4)_ the acquisition of land for a co-operative housing society is a public purpose. The GoYernment is the best Judge to dctcnninc whether the purpose in question is <li public purpose or not; and, it cannot be said that <11 housingj scheme fat a limited number of persons cannot be construed to be a public purpose inasmuch as the need of a section of the public may be a public purpose. (2) (. 1 When a notification under s. 6 is invalid, the government may treat it r as incfi~tive and issue a fresh' notillc'atio,n under s. 6, and nothing in s. 48 of the -Acr precludes the government from doing so, as held by this Co:.:rt in _Girdlz.arilal_ _Amratutl_ _Shodan._ II ! : I ' I - . The _I_ ligh Court had not the benefit of these de~isions _when it held that acquisition of land foe a. co-operative houstng soctcty was not a public purpose and therefore. tho first notific:Ition dated August 21, 1961 i-;sucu under s. 6 of the Ac~ was valid. The sub:~tratum on Which the ucci~ion of tho I Jigh Court rests has, th;;-.rd~r~, dl_sappcared . ih' _1>_ _c_ ourt Jn · _!t-fusam1_ . _\'llll's_ _case_ utsltngUJs .t·. · - ·h··' t-u the dectston 10 _State_ _of_ _Madhya_ _Pradesh_ & _O;s._ v. _Vishnu PrasaJ_ SJwrm~ _&_ . _Ors .._ (supra) by qu t' bo The d~iston m _Vzsltnu_ _Prasad_ . [0 ] Jng the passage ref~?.rrt'd to a ve. - .. . . _Sharrnu·,_ _case_ is not an authority for the proposttion that where n notific-..ttion unucr s 6 is found to be invaliu it cannot be fot.lowcd by ~on ~nder s.. 6. In fact, the decision of thej Ihgh Court OJ {1976} Supp. S.C.R. 28. (2) [1961] 2 S.C.R. 459. t3) A.I.R. 1970 S.C. _984._ (.H A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 2390. 292 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1980] 2 S.C.R. A runs counter to what it had observed in _Dosabhai_ Ratt~nsha _Keravala's_ _case,_ after referring to the decisions of this Court in _Vishnu_ _Prasad_ _Sharma's_ case and _Girdharilal Amratlal Shodan's case_ : "If the first s. 6 notification is invalid, that is, _non_ _est,_ s. 4 notification cannot be regarded as exhausted, for its purB pose _is_ yet unfulfilled; its purpose could be fulfilled only by issue of a valid notification under s. 6.'· There. remains the question whether the High Court was right in quashing the second notification under s. 6 on the ground of unreasonable delay in its issuance. The respondent had nQ11 taken any such C ground in the writ petition filed by him. The High Court was, therefore, not justified in observing that 'the appellant had not explained the delay by filing any affidavit'. We fail to appreciate that if there was no ground taken, there could be no occasion for filing of any such .... .. ·' _I_ f - .. _I_ ~ It· I ; \ could not be made at the expense of tho second respondent. The challenge was justified and the Smte Government, therefore, withdrew the first notification under s. 6 without waiting for an order of the High Court The cancellation was in recognition of the invalidity of the notification **.** The Government had no intention of withdrawing E from the acquisition. Thereafter, thC! Government issued a fresh notification. under s. 6 making a declaration for acquisition of the bnd for a public purpose at public e:"C:pcnse. There is nothing in the Act which precludes tbe Government from issuing a fresh notification under s. 6. if the earlier notification is found to be ineffective. ThCl delay of one 1' year and fou.r months between the date of cancellation and the issue of the second notification c:nnnot be regarded to b" unreasonable, in the facts and circumsmnces of the case. In somewhat similar circumstan~ ces, this Court recently in _Gujarat_ Stat~ _Transport Corpn._ v. _Valji !vJulii_ _Soneji(')_ held the delay of about fifteen years in making the seco.nd notification under s. 6 not to bo unreasonable. We cunnot, therefore, G uphold the High Court's decision that tho second notification must be struck down on the ground of delay. !) affidavit. Further, the delay, if any, was of the respondent's own making_ He had challenged the first notification unJer s. 6, presumably on the ground tlmt the acquisition being for a public purpose, E 1' II In the result, the appeal succeeds and' is allowed with costs, tbe ju<lJ!mCnt of the High Court is ~et asiJc, and the writ petition filed by the first re~pondcnt is dismis~ed. Responuent No. 1 shall hear. the costs. N.K.A. _Appeal_ _a {lowed._ (I) (!979] J S.C.R. 20!. -----------.