High CourtSingle JudgeAppeal dismissed (without costs).

Ghaziabad Engineering Co. (P) Ltd. v. Certifying Officer, Kanpur and Anr.

Case / Petition Number:Civil Appeal No. 2171 of 1970
Neutral Citation:[1978] 2 SCR 535

Case Details & Bench

Court
High Court
Hon'ble Judges
  • V. R. Krishna Iyer
  • Jaswant Singh
Judgment Date
1978-01-13
Court Decision / Holding
Appeal dismissed.
Final Disposition
Appeal dismissed (without costs).

Parties to the Case

Appellants / Petitioners

  • Ghaziabad Engineering Co. (P) Ltd.

Respondents

  • Certifying Officer, Kanpur
  • Anr.

Legal Representation & Advocates

Counsels for Petitioners

  • • K. P. Gupta

Counsels for Respondents

  • • G. N. Dikshit
  • • O. P. Rana

Case Synopsis & Summary

Ghaziabad Engineering Co. (P) Ltd. v. Certifying Officer, Kanpur and Anr. is a Supreme Court of India decision on the legality of modifying standing orders under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946. The appellant factory sought to retain 12 days of casual paid leave for its workers; the certifying officer, after considering the company's financial position (including a 20% bonus paid to workers) and the prevailing industry practice in the Ghaziabad belt, permitted a six-day casual leave modification, a decision the Appellate Authority affirmed. The appellant challenged this order in a special leave petition under Article 136 of the Constitution, urging that the modification was illegal and that the tribunal's assessment was based on disputed facts. The Supreme Court, through Krishna Iyer, J., held that Article 136 cannot be used to canvass pure questions of fact and that the modification fell within the certifying officer's jurisdiction. It reaffirmed that casual leave is not an automatic entitlement; it is intended to cover contingencies and emergencies. Section 79(1) of the Factories Act provides a minimum number of days, not the maximum, and current regional trends in leave practices have persuasive value but are not law. The Court noted that the excess leave claimed by the workers was only about three days beyond the prevailing maximum of thirty days and that the appellant's arguments on balance sheets or local industry practices were not sufficient to warrant interference. The appeal was dismissed.

Provisions of Law Cited

Art. 136, Constitution of India, 1950Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946Factories Act, 1948, s. 79(1)

Legal Doctrines & Maxims

  • Jurisdiction of Art. 136 cannot be invoked to canvass pure questions of fact.
  • Casual leave is not an automatic entitlement; it is for contingencies and emergencies.
  • Section 79(1) of the Factories Act sets a minimum number of days of leave, not a maximum; current trends have persuasive value but are not law.

Submissions & Arguments

Contentions of Appellants / Petitioners

The appellant argued that the modification of the Standing Orders reducing casual leave to six days was illegal, relying on alleged financial weakness and balance sheets. It contended there was no positive material showing that neighboring industries were granting such leave, and that the decision amounted to a misapplication of law or an improper canvassing of facts beyond the scope of Article 136.

Contentions of Respondents

The respondents contended that the certifying officer acted within his jurisdiction under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 and the applicable rules. They argued that the six days’ casual leave was fair and reasonable in light of the company’s financial position (including a 20% bonus) and prevailing practices in the area; the Tribunal’s findings were proper and not to be disturbed by this Court under Article 136.

Cited Precedents (1)

Case NameCitationTreatmentExplanation
Alembic Chemical Works Co. Ltd. v. Workmen[1963] 1 SCR 297PositiveUsed to support the proposition that the relevant provision (79(1) of the Factories Act) sets a minimum number of leave days, not a maximum; the Court relies on this precedent in assessing fairness of the six-day casual leave modification.

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Extracted Judgment Text

Exact text extracted from official judgment records.

A B ##### c D E F G H 534 GHAZIABAD ENGINEERING CO. (P) LTD. _v._ CERTIFYING OFFICER, KANPUR AND ANR. _January_ 13, 1978 (V. R. KRISHNA IYER AND JASWANT SINGH, JJ.] _Constitution_ _of_ _India,_ 1950, _Art._ _136-Questions_ _of_ _fact cannot be canvassed_ _for invoking the jurisdiction_ _of_ _the Supreme Court._ _Casual leave, concept_ _of_ _and whether has nexus with total number_ _of_ _days_ _leave that a worker_ _is_ entitled~Value _of_ _current trend in a particular area or_ _industry-Industrial_ _En1ployment (Standing Orders)_ _Act_ 1946 _rlw_ _S._ 79(1) _of_ _Factories Act,_ 1948. As against the claim of twelve days casual leave (on a paid basis) made by the workmen of the appellant company and for modification of the Standing Orders under the Industrial Employment (Standing orders) Act 1946, and the rules framed thereunder, the certifying officer, taking into consideration (a) the financial position of the appellanfs undertaking including it having paid 20% bonus to its v,iorkers _{b) the prevalent practice in neighbouring industries in that industrial belt of giving paid casual leave, and (c) the current trend in that particular industrial area, granted the modification reducing the number of days to six, as being fair and reasonable. The appellate authority confirmed the said modification. Dis111issing the appeal by special leave, the Court HELD : 1. Supreme Court's jurisdiction under Art. 136 cannot be exploited for canvassing pure questions of fact. [535 E] 2. Casual leave is not an automatic advantage to the total number of days' leave that a worker is entitled. Casual leave is not a matter of right and it is only in the event of sudden emergencies that casual leave is allowed. Unforeseen circumstances may unexpectedly prop up necessitating sudden absence of an employee, be he in Government service or any other office or in an industrial undertaking. The whole concept of casual leave is calculated to provide for such contingencies. [535 G-H; 536 A] 3. A certain number of days' leave prescribed in S. 79(1) is the minimum and not the maximum. Current trend in a particular area or industry has not the force of law. It may have persuasive value but not more, in considering the ciaim for casual leave. In the instant case; (i) There is nothing grossly unfair or shockingly violative of fairness or justice warranting interference by this Court by exercise of its special jurisdiction. After all the excess is around three days in a year over the current trend of granting an overall maximum of thirty days, which circumstance the Tribunal has taken note of. [535 F, 536 C-D] _Ale1nbic Che1nical Works Co._ _Ltd._ v. _Workmen_ [1963] 1 SCR 297 reiterated. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2171 of 1970. Appeal by Special Leave from the Order dated 30-3-1970 of the Appellate Authority Allahabad (Industrial Tribunal) in Standing Order Appeal No. 8/69. _K._ _P._ _Gupta_ for the Appellant. _/_ _I_ GHAZIABAD ENGINEERING CO. _V._ CERTIFYING OFFICER 53 5 _(Krishna Iyer,_ _!.)_ _G._ _N._ _Dikshit_ and _0. P._ _Rana_ for Respondent No. I. A The Judgment of the Court was delivered by \ KRISHNA IYER, J.-This appeal by special leave raises a short question which has been decided adverse to the appellant by the certifying officer, Kanpur and the Industrial Tribunal which is the appellate authority. The narrow point that falls for decision is as to whether . the modification of the Standing Orders under the 1ndustrial Employ- B ment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 and the rules framed thereunder was illegally made by the certifying officer. The modification itself related to grant of six days' casual leave (on a paid basis) to the workers in the appellant's factory in Ghaziabad. The certifying officer has considered this grant of casual leave as fair and reasonable having regard to the prevalent practice in the neighbouring industries of this industrial belt and also paying attention to the financial position of the appellant's undertaking. For this purpose he has relied upon the fact that 20% bonus was paid under the Payment of Bonus Act, 1965 and has 'further stated that certain other factories have been giving paid casual leave for their workers. These facts persuaded him to grant the modification although reducing the number of days to six as against twelve which the workers originally claimed. #### c D . The appellate authority concurred by a separate discussion in the same conclusion. We are requested by Shri Gupta to reverse this concurrent refinding of fact on two grounds. He states that the undertaking of the appellant is a losing proposition and relies upon certain balance sheets stated to have been produced before the certifying officer. He also argues that there is no positive material to make out . E that other industries in the locality are graning casual leave for their workers. # l I These are pure questions of fact and this Court's jurisdiction under Art. 136 cannot be exploited for canvassing points such as these. It is clear that the modification was within the jurisdiction of the certifying officer and he has not contravened any provision of the Act or any statute. The Factories Act, 1948 prescribes ins. 79(1) a certain number of days' leave but this is the minimum and not the maximum as has been indicated in this Court's ruling in _Alembic Chemical Works Co._ _Ltd._ v. _Workmen(')._ Moreover, the model Standing Orders as well as the Schedule to the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 deal with casual leave. In this view there is nothing ille.gal in the order impugned nor are we satisfied that there is anything •hockingly violative of fairness or justice. It is a notorious fact that casut•I leave is not an automatic advantage to the total number of days' leave that a worker is entitled. It is only in the event of sudden emergencies that casual •leave is allowed and so the grievance of the appellant is exaggerated, if not imaginary., Apart from this, it is elementary that unforeseen circumstances may unexpectedly prop up necessitating sudden absence of an employee, be he in Government service or any other offices or in an industrial undertaking. The whole concept of casual (!) [1963J l S.C.R. 297. F G H 536 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1978] 2 S.C.R. A leave is calculated to provide for such contingencies. We see nothing unfair in the certifying officer according six days by way of casual leave to the workers. After all the contentment of the workers is an esseutial component of their efficiency and if the certifying officer and the Appellate Authority who deal regularly with such matters have felt that this step was fair and nothing is shown to our satisfaction that there is anything grossly unfair about this modification, we should not B interfere by exercise of the special jurisdiction of this Court. ## ' ### • The third point put forward by Shri Gupta was that according to the appellate Tribunal, the current trend is to grant an overall maximum of thirty days leave while in this case if the casual leave is also taken into account it may extend to 33t days leave. As pointed out earlier, casual leave is not a matter of right and a man may not C get casual leave unless circumstances are sudden or which in the ordinary course cannot be met by taking regular leave. Secondly, we are not satisfied that the current trend in a particular area or industry has the force of law. It may have persuasive value but not more. That is why after taking note of that circumstance, the Tribunal has still chosen to affirm the claim for six days casual leave. After all the excess is around three days in a year. D We, therefore, dismiss the appeal, but, in the circumstances, without costs. S. R. _Appeal dismissed._