Georgekutty and others v. Gibu Cherian and others

## **IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM** ## **PRESENT** ## **THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL K.NARENDRAN** **THURSDAY, THE 05TH DAY OF DECEMBER 2019 / 14TH AGRAHAYANA, 1941** ## **MACA.No.188 OF 2011** **AGAINST THE AWARD IN OP(MV)No.39/2009 OF THE ADDITIONAL MOTOR ACCIDENT CLAIMS TRIBUNAL, PATHANAMTHITTA** ## **APPELLANTS:** - **1 GEORGEKUTTY, S/O YOHANNAN, MADAKULANGARA JOHNSON VILLA,, KUDASSANAD P.O., POOZHIKAD, KARIAPLA VILLAGE, PATHANAMTHITTA DISTRICT.** - **2 MARIAMMA GEORGE, W/O.GEORGEKUTTY, MADAKULANGARA JOHNSON VILLA,, KUDASSANAD P.O., POOZHIKAD, KARIAPLA VILLAGE, PATHANAMTHITTA DISTRICT.** - **3 JOLLY GEORGE, D/O.GEORGEKUTTY, MADAKULANGARA JOHNSON VILLA, KUDASSANAD P.O., POOZHIKAD, KARIAPLA VILLAGE, PATHANAMTHITTA DISTRICT.** **BY ADV. SRI.R.RANJITH SRI.M.T.SURESH KUMAR** ## **RESPONDENTS:** - **1 GIBU CHERIAN, S/O.C.T.CHERIAN, CHERUKUVELIL HOUSE, MALAMPUZHA, PANDALAM, PATHANAMTHITTA DISTRICT, (DRIVER OF KL-3E 4564).** - **2 C.T.CHERIAN, CHERUKUVELIL HOUSE, MALAMPUZHA, PANDALAM, PATHANAMTHITTA DISTRICT, (OWNER OF KL-3E-4564).** - **3 THE ORIENTAL INSURANCE CO. LTD., RANNY BRANCH, PAZHAVANGADI P.O., PATHANAMTHITTA DISTRICT, (INSURER OF KL-3E 4564).** M.A.C.A.No.188 of 2011 2 **4 N.SOMAN, S/O.NEELAKANDAN, PATTATHIL PADEETTATHIL, THULAMPARAUBU NORTH, MANNARSALA, HARIPPAD, (DRIVER OF KL 8A 4567). 5 R.RADHAKRISHNAN NAIR, S/O.RAGHAVA KURUP, RADHAKRISHNA BHAVAN, MANKAMKUZHY P.O., VETTIYAR, MAVELIKKARA, (OWNER OF KL 8A 4567). 6 THE NEW INDIA ASSURANCE CO. LTD., KAYAMKULAM BRANCH, (INSURER OF KL 8A 4567). BY ADV. SRI.JACOB P.ALEX, SC FOR R6 BY ADV. SRI.JOSEPH P.ALEX BY ADV. GEORGE CHERIAN (SR.) BY ADV. K.S.SANTHI, SC FOR R3 BY ADV. LATHA SUSAN CHERIAN** **THIS MOTOR ACCIDENT CLAIMS APPEAL HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 05.12.2019, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:** M.A.C.A.No.188 of 2011 3 ## **JUDGMENT** The appellants are the claimants in O.P.(MV)No.39 of 2003 on the file of the Additional Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Pathanamthitta, a claim petition filed under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, claiming compensation on account of the death of one Johnson George, son of appellants 1 and 2, and brother of the 3[rd] appellant, in a motor accident which occurred on 25.07.2002, while he was travelling as a pillion rider on a motorcycle bearing registration No.KL-3/E4564, ridden by the 1[st] respondent, owned by the 2[nd] respondent and insured with the 3[rd] respondent insurer. While the 1[st] respondent rider was attempting to overtake an autorickshaw, he applied sudden break on seeing a bus coming from the opposite direction. The deceased was thrown out of the motorcycle, who was ran over by a bus bearing registration No.KL-8/A-4567 driven by the 4[th] respondent, owned by the 5[th] respondent and insured with the 6[th] respondent. In the accident, he sustained fatal injuries, who succumbed to the injuries at the place of accident itself. Alleging that the accident occurred due to rash and negligent driving of the M.A.C.A.No.188 of 2011 4 motorcycle by the 1[st] respondent rider and the bus by the 4[th] respondent driver, claim petition was filed before the Tribunal, claiming a total compensation of Rs.8,00,000/- under various heads. 2. Before the Tribunal, the 1[st] and 2[nd] respondents filed written statement admitting the accident; however, denying negligence alleged against the 1[st] respondent rider of the motorcycle. They contended that the amount of compensation claimed is highly exorbitant. 3. The 3[rd] respondent insurer of the motorcycle filed written statement admitting policy coverage of the said vehicle involved in the accident; however, denying negligence alleged against the 1[st] respondent rider. The insurer contended that the accident occurred due to the rash and negligent driving of bus by the 4[th] respondent driver. The insurer contended further that the compensation claimed is highly excessive. 4. The 4[th] and 5[th] respondents remained absent and they were set ex-parte. The 6[th] respondent insurer of the bus filed written statement admitting the policy coverage of the said vehicle; however, denying negligence alleged against the driver of that vehicle. The insurer contended that the accident M.A.C.A.No.188 of 2011 5 occurred due to the rash and negligent riding of motorcycle by the 1[st] respondent rider. The age, occupation, monthly income, etc. stated in the claim petition were denied and it was contended that the compensation claimed is highly excessive. 5. Before the Tribunal, Exts.A1 to A8 were marked on the side of the appellants/claimants. Both sides have not chosen to adduce any oral evidence. 6. After considering the pleadings and materials on record, the Tribunal arrived at a conclusion that the accident occurred due to rash and negligent riding of the motorcycle by the 1[st] respondent rider and rash and negligent driving of the bus by the 4[th] respondent driver. The Tribunal apportioned the liability between respondents 1 to 3 and respondents 4 to 6 equally. Under various heads, the Tribunal awarded a total compensation of Rs.2,94,500/- and directed respondents 3 and 6 insurers to satisfy the award equally, together with interest at the rate of 7.5% per annum from the date of petition, i.e., from 14.01.2003, till the date of deposit, with proportionate cost. Out of the award amount, appellants 1 and 2, who are the parents of the deceased, were permitted to withdraw Rs.1,00,000/- each and the balance amount was directed to be M.A.C.A.No.188 of 2011 6 deposited in a Nationalised Bank for a period of three years, as fixed deposit. 7. Dissatisfied with the quantum of compensation awarded by the Tribunal under various heads, the appellants/claimants are before this Court in this appeal. 8. Heard the learned counsel for the appellants/ claimants and also the learned Standing Counsel for respondents 3 and 6. 9. The issue that arises for consideration in this appeal is as to whether the appellants/claimants are entitled for enhancement of the compensation awarded by the Tribunal under various heads. 10. In **Sarla Verma v. Delhi Transport Corporation** **[(2009) 6 SCC 121]** the Apex Court laid down the principles governing determination of quantum of compensation in the case of death in a motor accident. The Apex Court held that, the compensation awarded does not become 'just compensation' merely because the Tribunal considers it to be just. Just compensation is adequate compensation which is fair and equitable, on the facts and circumstances of the case, to make good the loss suffered as a result of the wrong, as far as M.A.C.A.No.188 of 2011 7 money can do so, by applying the well settled principles relating to award of compensation. It is not intended to be a bonanza, largesse or source of profit. To have uniformity and consistency, Tribunals should determine compensation in cases of death, by following the well settled steps, namely, ascertaining the multiplicand (annual contribution to the family), the multiplier and calculation of loss of dependency by multiplying the multiplicand by such multiplier. 11. In **National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi [(2017) 16 SCC 680]** , a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court held that, Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 deals with the concept of 'just compensation' and the same has to be determined on the foundation of fairness, reasonableness and equitability on acceptable legal standard because such determination can never be in arithmetical exactitude. It can never be perfect. The aim is to achieve an acceptable degree of proximity to arithmetical precision on the basis of materials brought on record in an individual case. The conception of 'just compensation' has to be viewed through the prism of fairness, reasonableness and non-violation of the principle of equitability. In a case of death, the legal heirs of M.A.C.A.No.188 of 2011 8 the claimants cannot expect a windfall. Simultaneously, the compensation granted cannot be an apology for compensation. It cannot be a pittance. Though the discretion vested in the Tribunal is quite wide, yet it is obligatory on the part of the tribunal to be guided by the expression, i.e., just compensation. 12. The compensation awarded by the Tribunal under ## various heads reads thus; |SI.<br>No|Head of claim|Amount<br>claimed<br>(in rupees)|Amount<br>awarded (in<br>rupees)|Basis-vital<br>details in a<br>nutshell| |---|---|---|---|---| |1|Transportation expense|500/-|500/-|| |2|Extra nourishment|1,000/-|1,000/-|| |3|Damage to clothing|1,000/-|500/-|| |4|Funeral expense|10,000/-|7,500/-|| |5|Pain and suffering|20,000/-|10,000/-|| |6|Compensation for love and<br>affection|4,00,000/-|15,000/-|| |7|Compensation for loss of<br>earning power|8,000/-|Nil|| |8|Loss of dependency|4,00,000/-|2,60,000/-|20,000 x 13| ||Total||2,94,500/-|| 13. The accident occurred on 25.07.2002. At the time of accident, the deceased was aged 21 years. Going by the averments in the claim petition, he had completed graduation in commerce and secured admission for Post Graduate Diploma in Business Management in an institute at New Delhi. The M.A.C.A.No.188 of 2011 9 document marked as Ext.A7 is the receipt issued by EMPI Business School, New Delhi. The document marked as Ext.A8 is the score report No.0090726 issued by MAI Score, Management Aptitude Test. After considering the academic brilliance of the deceased, who had completed his graduation in commerce and secured admission for Post Graduate Diploma in Business Management, the Tribunal took the annual income of the deceased as Rs.30,000/-, for the purpose of assessing loss of dependency. The Tribunal deducted 1/3[rd] of the annual income towards the personal and living expense of the deceased. Since the 1[st] appellant, who is the father of the deceased, was aged 49 years and the 2[nd] appellant, who is the mother of the deceased, was aged 47 years, the Tribunal applied the multiplier of 13. 14. In **Shijumon v. George Abraham and others [2011 (4) KHC 945]** , a Division Bench of this Court, in respect of a motor accident, which occurred on 08.07.2003, fixed the probable monthly income of a student aged 18 years, attending Industrial Training Centre and also earning income as a rubber tapper, as Rs.3,000/-, for the purpose of assessing compensation under the head disability. The Division Bench M.A.C.A.No.188 of 2011 10 held that the probability of the appellant securing more lucrative and better employment must certainly be borne in mind. In the said case, the appellant has suffered 75% permanent disability on account of the injuries sustained in the accident. 15. In **Mekala v. Malathi M. [(2014) 11 SCC 178]** the appellant/claimant before the Apex Court was a student of 11[th] Standard, when the accident took place on 11.04.2005. She was holding first rank in her school. She had an excellent career ahead of her, but for the accident in which she sustained grievous injuries, and became a permanently disabled. In Ext.P12 disability certificate, the doctor - PW2 certified a permanent disability of 70% on account of the fractures sustained to both the legs. Upon examination PW2 opined that the appellant is not able to squat. She is not able to sit with cross legged comfortably on the floor and the right range of movement (goniometer) - Fixed Flexion Deformity (FFD) of 850 - ligament instability on account of grievous injuries. PW2 deposed that the appellant has sustained fracture of both bones in both the legs. The knee folding is restricted between 25 degree to 85 degree and the legs could not be M.A.C.A.No.188 of 2011 11 stretched fully and the knee bones are mal-united and she cannot walk without crutches. PW2 deposed further that the appellant is suffering from severe pain while walking and the thickness of her both legs are reduced. The High Court of Judicature at Madras awarded compensation under the head loss of earning, taking a monthly notional income of Rs.6,000/-, in the absence of any document on record, as she was a student. The Apex Court held that, the fact that the appellant was a brilliant student at the time of the accident should also be taken into consideration while awarding compensation to her. Therefore, taking Rs.6,000/- as monthly notional income for the purpose of awarding compensation under the head loss of earning is too meager an amount. Considering the fact that the appellant is a brilliant student, as she has secured first rank in the 10[th] Standard, she would have had a better future in terms of educational career to acquire basic or master degrees in the professional courses and she could have got a suitable public or private employment. But, on account of the permanent disablement she suffered due to injuries sustained in the accident, that opportunity is lost to her and therefore, she is entitled to compensation as per law M.A.C.A.No.188 of 2011 12 laid down by the Court in the cases of **Raj Kumar v. Ajay Kumar [(2011) 1 SCC 343]** , **R.D. Hattangadi v. Pest Control (India) Pvt. Ltd. [(1995) 1 SCC 551]** and **Govind Yadav v. New India Insurance Company Limited [(2011)** **10 SCC 683]** . Further, having regard to the undisputed fact that there has been inflation of money in the country since the occurrence of the accident, the same has to be taken into account by the Tribunal and the High Court while awarding compensation to the appellant as per the principle laid down in the case of **Govind Yadav** , which has reiterated the position of **Reshma Kumari v. Madan Mohan [(2009) 13 SCC 422]** . The Apex Court noticed that the appellant has undergone and undergoing substantial pain and suffering due to the accident, which has rendered both her legs dysfunctional. This has reduced the scope of her future prospects including her marriage substantially. It has been held in the case of **Reshma Kumari** that certain relevant factors should be taken into consideration while awarding compensation under the head of future prospect of income. In the light of the principles laid down in the said case and keeping in mind the past results of the appellant, the Apex M.A.C.A.No.188 of 2011 13 Court took her monthly income as Rs.10,000/-, for the purpose of computation of just and reasonable compensation under the head of loss of earning. The Apex Court held that the appellant is entitled for 50% increase, taking into consideration the future prospects, as per the principle laid down in **Santosh Devi v. National Insurance Company Ltd. [(2012) 6 SCC 421]** 16. In **National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Fathimath Zuhara @ Zuhra Razak and another [2016 (3) KLT 459]** a Division Bench of this Court, in respect of a motor accident, which occurred on 10.09.2005, added 50% of the notional income of Rs.12,000/- fixed by the Tribunal, towards future prospects, taking note of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of **Mekala** . In the said case, the victims were Engineering students of LBS College of Engineering, Kasaragod, who were aged 19 years at the time of the accident. On a survey of the authorities on the subject, the Division Bench noticed that the constant and consistent stand of the Apex Court is that, while fixing the compensation payable under the head loss of dependency, though the minor concerned had not started earning, the Court/Tribunal has to M.A.C.A.No.188 of 2011 14 fix the monthly income notionally for the aforesaid purpose, and such fixation has to be made with reference to various aspects, such as the educational career graph, future prospects, etc. 17. In the instant case, the deceased had completed graduation in commerce and secured admission for Post Graduate Diploma in Business Management in a Business School in New Delhi based on his score in Management Aptitude Test. Considering the above aspects, this Court deem it appropriate to re-fix the notional monthly income of the deceased as Rs.4,500/-, for the purpose of assessing compensation under various heads. 18. In **Pranay Sethi [(2017) 16 SCC 680]** , a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court held that, the determination of 'just compensation' has to be on the foundation of evidence brought on record as regards the age and income of the deceased and thereafter the apposite multiplier to be applied. The formula relating to multiplier has been clearly stated in **Sarla Verma [(2009) 6 SCC 121]** and it has been approved in **Reshma Kumari v. Madan Mohan [(2013) 9 SCC 65]** . The age and income, as stated earlier, M.A.C.A.No.188 of 2011 15 have to be established by adducing evidence. The Tribunal and the Courts have to bear in mind that the basic principle lies in pragmatic computation which is in proximity to reality. It is a well accepted norm that money cannot substitute a life lost but an effort has to be made for grant of just compensation having uniformity of approach. There has to be a balance between the two extremes, that is, a windfall and the pittance, a bonanza and the modicum. In such an adjudication, the duty of the Tribunal and the Courts is difficult and hence, an endeavour has been made by this Court for standardization which in its ambit includes addition of future prospects on the proven income at present. As far as future prospects are concerned, there has been standardization keeping in view the principle of certainty, stability and consistency. In **Pranay Sethi** the Apex Court approved the principle of 'standardisation' so that a specific and certain multiplicand is determined for applying the multiplier on the basis of age. 19. In **Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh [(2013) 9 SCC 54]** , a Three- Judge Bench of the Apex Court held that, in case of self-employed persons also, if the deceased victim is below 40 years, there must be addition of 50% to the actual income of M.A.C.A.No.188 of 2011 16 the deceased while computing future prospects. In **Munna Lal Jain v. Vipin Kumar Sharma [(2015) 6 SCC 347]** another Three- Judge Bench followed the principle stated in **Rajesh** . In **Pranay Sethi** , after expressing the opinion that the dicta laid down in **Reshma Kumari** being earlier in point of time would be a binding precedent and not the decision in **Rajesh** , the Constitution Bench observed that, in **Munna Lal Jain** , the Three-Judge Bench should have been guided by the principle stated in **Reshma Kumari** which has concurred with the view expressed in **Sarla Devi** or in case of disagreement, it should have been well advised to refer the case to a Larger Bench. 20. In **Pranay Sethi [(2017) 16 SCC 680]** the Constitution Bench held that, while determining the income, an addition of **50%** of actual salary to the income of the deceased towards future prospects, where the deceased had a **permanent job** and was **below the age of 40 years** , should be made. The addition should be **30%** , if the age of the deceased was **between 40 to 50 years** . In case the deceased was between the age of **50 to 60 years** , the addition should be **15%** . Actual salary should be read as actual salary less tax. M.A.C.A.No.188 of 2011 17 The Apex Court held further that, in case the deceased was **self-employed** or on a **fixed salary** , an addition of **40%** of the established income should be the warrant where the deceased was **below the age of 40 years** . An addition of **25%** where the deceased was **between the age of 40 to 50 years** and **10%** where the deceased was between the age of **50 to 60 years** should be regarded as the necessary method of computation. The established income means the income minus the tax component. 21. In the instant case, at the time of accident, the deceased was a student aged 21 years, who had secured admission for Post Graduate Diploma in Business Management. In view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in **Pranay Sethi** , an addition of **40%** of the notional monthly income of the deceased, as re-fixed in this appeal, can be made towards future prospects, since the deceased was aged **below 40** **years** . 22. Therefore, for the purpose of re-fixing the compensation under the head loss of dependency, **40%** of the monthly income of the deceased notionally re-fixed in this appeal as Rs.4,500/-, i.e., a sum of Rs.1,800/- (4,500 x M.A.C.A.No.188 of 2011 18 40/100) has to be added towards future prospects. In the result, the monthly income of the deceased, for the purpose of re-fixing the compensation under the head loss of dependency, is reckoned as Rs.6,300/- (4,500 + 1,800). 23. In **Sarla Verma [(2009) 6 SCC 121]** , the Apex Court, after referring to its earlier decisions in **Kerala State Road Transport Corporation v. Susamma Thomas [(1994) 2 SCC 176]** , **U.P. State Road Transport Corporation v. Trilok Chandra [(1996) 4 SCC 362]** and **New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Charlie [(2005) 10 SCC 720]** held that the multiplier to be used should be as mentioned in column (4) of the Table in paragraph 40 of the said decision [prepared by applying **Susamma Thomas** , **Trilok Chandra** and **Charlie** ], which starts with an operative multiplier of **18** [for the age groups of 15 to 20 and 21 to 25 years], reduced by one unit for every five years, i.e., multiplier of **17** for 26 to 30 years, multiplier of **16** for 31 to 35 years, multiplier of **15** for 36 to 40 years, multiplier of **14** for 41 to 45 years, and multiplier of **13** for 46 to 50 years, then reduced by two units for every five years, i.e., multiplier of **11** for 51 to 55 years, multiplier of **9** for 56 to 60 years, multiplier of **7** M.A.C.A.No.188 of 2011 19 for 61 to 65 years and multiplier of **5** for 66 to 70 years. 24. In **Pranay Sethi [(2017) 16 SCC 680]** the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court held that, as far as the multiplier is concerned, the Claims Tribunal and the Courts shall be guided by Step 2 that finds place in paragraph 19 of **Sarla Verma** , read with paragraph 42 of the said judgment. 25. In the instant case, as on the date of accident, the deceased was aged 21 years. The Tribunal applied a multiplier of 13, based on the age of the mother of the deceased, who was aged 47 years. In **Royal Sundaram Alliance Insurance Company Ltd. v. Mandala Yadagari Goud [(2019) 5 SCC** **554]** a Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court held that, it is the age of the deceased which has to be taken into account for assessing loss of dependency and not the age of the dependents. In the light of the decisions of the Apex Court in **Mandala Yadagari Goud's case** , **Sarla Verma's case** and **Pranay Sethi's case** referred to supra, the multiplier of 13 applied by the Tribunal is not correct and proper and the proper multiplier to be adopted is **18** . 26. In **Sarla Verma v. Delhi Transport Corporation [(2009) 6 SCC 121]** the Apex Court, on the question of M.A.C.A.No.188 of 2011 20 deduction towards the personal and living expenses of the deceased held that, the personal and living expenses of the deceased should be deducted from his monthly income, to arrive at the contribution to the dependents. Where the deceased was **married** , the deduction towards personal and living expenses of the deceased should be **one-third** where the number of dependent family members is **2 to 3** ; **onefourth** where the number of dependent family members is **4 to 6** ; and **one-fifth** where the number of dependent family members **exceeds 6** . In regard to **bachelors** , normally, **50%** is deducted as personal and living expenses, because it is assumed that a bachelor would tend to spend more on himself. Even otherwise, there is also the possibility of his getting married in a short time, in which event the contribution to the parent(s) and siblings is likely to be cut drastically. Further, subject to evidence to the contrary, the father is likely to have his own income and will not be considered as a dependant and the mother alone will be considered as a dependent. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, brothers and sisters will not be considered as dependants, because they will either be independent and earning, or married, or be dependent on the M.A.C.A.No.188 of 2011 21 father. Thus even if the deceased is survived by parents and siblings, only the mother would be considered to be a dependant, and 50% would be treated as the personal and living expenses of the bachelor and 50% as the contribution to the family. However, where family of the bachelor is **large and dependent on the income of the deceased** , as in a case where he has a widowed mother and large number of younger non-earning sisters or brothers, his personal and living expenses may be restricted to **one-third** and contribution to the family will be taken as **two-third** . 27. In **Reshma Kumari [(2013) 9 SCC 65]** a ThreeJudge Bench of the Apex Court reproduced paragraphs 30, 31 and 32 of **Sarla Verma** and approved the same, in paragraph 38 of the decision, by stating that, the standards fixed in **Sarla Verma** provide guidance for the appropriate deduction for personal and living expenses. One must bear in mind that the proportion of a man's net earnings that he saves or spends exclusively for the maintenance of others does not form part of his living expenses but what he spends exclusively on himself does. The percentage of deduction on account of personal and living expenses may vary with reference to the number of M.A.C.A.No.188 of 2011 22 dependent members in the family and the personal living expenses of the deceased need not exactly correspond to the number of dependants. Therefore, the standards fixed in **Sarla Verma** on the aspect of deduction for personal living expenses in paras 30, 31 and 32 must ordinarily be followed unless a case for departure in the circumstances noted in the preceding paragraph is made out. In paragraph 43.6 the Apex Court directed that, insofar as deduction for personal and living expenses is concerned, the Tribunals shall ordinarily follow the standards prescribed in paragraphs 30, 31 and 32 of the judgment in **Sarla Verma** , subject to the observations made in para 38 of **Reshma Kumari** . 28. In **Pranay Sethi [(2017) 16 SCC 680]** , the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court, after considering the analysis made in **Sarla Verma** , which was reconsidered in **Reshma Kumari** , approved the method provided therein by stating that, as far as the guidance provided for appropriate deduction for personal and living expenses is concerned, the Tribunals and Courts should be guided by the conclusion in paragraph 43.6 of **Reshma Kumari** . 29. In the instant case, at the time of accident, the M.A.C.A.No.188 of 2011 23 deceased was a bachelor aged 21 years. In the light of the decisions of the Apex Court in **Sarla Verma** , **Reshma Kumari** and **Pranay Sethi** referred to supra, the deduction of **50%** of the notional monthly income of the deceased has to be made towards his personal and living expenses. Therefore, the Tribunal went wrong in deducting only 1/3[rd] of the notional monthly income towards personal and living expenses of the deceased. 30. Towards loss of dependency, the Tribunal awarded a sum of Rs.2,60,000/- (2,500 x 12 x 13 x 2/3). In this appeal, the monthly income of the deceased has already been re-fixed as Rs.4,500/-. Adding 40% of the notional monthly income of the deceased towards future prospects (4,500 + 1,800 = 6,300); deducting 50% towards the personal and living expenses of the deceased; and applying the multiplier of 18, the compensation under the head loss of dependency is refixed as Rs.6,80,400/- (6,300 x 12 x 18 x 1/2), resulting an additional compensation of **Rs.4,20,400/-** (6,80,400 – 2,60,000). 31. In the impugned award, towards funeral expenses the Tribunal awarded a sum of Rs.7,500/-. Towards loss of M.A.C.A.No.188 of 2011 24 love and affection, the Tribunal awarded a sum of Rs.15,000/-. The Tribunal awarded no compensation under the head loss of estate. 32. In **Rajesh [(2013) 9 SCC 54]** a Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court granted Rs.25,000/- towards funeral expenses, Rs.1,00,000/- towards loss of consortium and Rs.1,00,000/- towards loss of care and guidance for minor children. 33. In **Pranay Sethi [(2017) 16 SCC 680]** the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court held that the head relating to loss of care and guidance for minor children does not exist. Though **Rajesh** refers to **Santosh Devi v. National Insurance Company Limited [(2012) 6 SCC 421]** , it does not seem to follow the same. The conventional and traditional heads cannot be determined on percentage basis because that would not be an acceptable criterion. Unlike determination of income, the said heads have to be quantified. Any quantification must have a reasonable foundation. There can be no dispute over the fact that price index, fall in bank interest, escalation of rates in many a field have to be noticed. The Court cannot remain oblivious to the same. There has M.A.C.A.No.188 of 2011 25 been a thumb rule in this aspect. Otherwise, there will be extreme difficulty in determination of the same and unless the thumb rule is applied, there will be immense variation lacking any kind of consistency as a consequence of which, the orders passed by the Tribunals and Courts are likely to be unguided. Therefore, the reasonable figures on conventional heads, namely, **loss of estate** , **loss of consortium** and **funeral expenses** should be **Rs.15,000/-** , **Rs.40,000/-** and **Rs.15,000/-** respectively. The principle of revisiting the said heads is an acceptable principle. But the revisit should not be fact-centric or quantum-centric. The Apex Court observed that, it would be condign that the amounts that have quantified as above should be enhanced on percentage basis **in every three years** and the enhancement should be at the rate of **10% in a span of three years** , which will bring in consistency in respect of those heads. 34. In **Santosh Devi v. Mahaveer Singh [(2018) 9 SCC 146]** a Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court granted compensation on conventional heads, in terms of the figures standardised by the Constitution Bench in the year 2017, in **Pranay Sethi** , to the wife and children of one Puran Chand, M.A.C.A.No.188 of 2011 26 who died in a motor accident, which occurred on **30.12.1992** . 35. In **Sureshchandra Bagmal Doshi v. New India Assurance Company Limited [(2018) 15 SCC 649]** the Apex Court granted the figures on conventional heads standardised by the Constitution Bench in the year 2017, in **Pranay Sethi** , i.e., Rs.15,000/- as loss of estate; Rs.40,000/towards loss of consortium; and Rs.15,000/- as funeral expenses to the parents [appellants before the Apex Court], who lost their only daughter in a motor accident which occurred on **16.08.1998** . In the said decision, Rs.40,000/granted in **Pranay Sethi** towards loss of consortium was granted to the appellants, who are the **parents** of the deceased, towards **loss of love and affection** . Paragraphs 1 and 14 of the said decision read thus; “ **1.** Fate can be cruel. This is a tragic case where the only daughter of a lawyer husband and a doctor wife, who got married early and unfortunately became a widow also at a young age, died in a vehicular accident, which took place on **16.8.1998** . The claim of the parents (appellants herein) in respect of this unfortunate demise forms the subject matter of the present appeal. xxx xxx xxx **14.** Now coming to the last aspect, i.e., the conventional heads, in **National Insurance Company Ltd. v.** M.A.C.A.No.188 of 2011 27 **Pranay Sethi [(2017) 16 SCC 680]** , it has been standardised at Rs.15,000 for loss of estate; Rs.40,000 towards loss of consortium (in the present case loss of love and affection) and Rs.15,000 towards funeral expenses. The total amount, thus, would be Rs.70,000, which as per the said judgment is capable of being enhanced @ 10 per cent in the span of every three years. However, we are still within the window of three years.” “underline supplied” 36. In **Magma General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nanu Ram @ Chuhru Ram [(2018) 18 SCC 130]** , after referring to the decision in **Pranay Sethi** , the Apex Court held that in legal parlance, 'consortium' is a compendious term which encompasses 'spousal consortium', 'parental consortium' and 'filial consortium'. The right to consortium would include the company, care, help, comfort, guidance, solace and affection of the deceased, which is a loss to his family. With respect to a spouse, it would include sexual relations with the deceased spouse. **Spousal consortium** is generally defined as rights pertaining to the relationship of a husband-wife which allows compensation to the **surviving spouse** for loss of 'company, society, co-operation, affection, and aid of the other in every conjugal relation'. **Parental consortium** is granted to the M.A.C.A.No.188 of 2011 28 **child** upon the premature death of a parent, for loss of 'parental aid, protection, affection, society, discipline, guidance and training'. **Filial consortium** is the right of the **parents** to compensation in the case of an accidental death of a child. An accident leading to the death of a child causes great shock and agony to the parents and family of the deceased. The greatest agony for a parent is to lose their child during their lifetime. Children are valued for their **love** , **affection** , companionship and their role in the family unit. 37. In **Magma General Insurance** the Apex Court held that consortium is a special prism reflecting changing norms about the status and worth of actual relationships. Modern jurisdictions world-over have recognised that the value of a child’s consortium far exceeds the economic value of the compensation awarded in the case of the death of a child. Most jurisdictions therefore permit parents to be awarded compensation under loss of consortium on the death of a child. The amount awarded to the parents is a compensation for loss of the **love** , **affection** , care and companionship of the deceased child. The Motor Vehicles Act is a beneficial legislation aimed at providing relief to the victims or their M.A.C.A.No.188 of 2011 29 families, in cases of genuine claims. In a case where parents have lost their **minor child** , or **unmarried son or daughter** , the parents are entitled to be awarded loss of consortium under the head of **filial consortium** . Parental Consortium is awarded to children who lose their parents in motor vehicle accidents under the Motor Vehicles Act. The Apex Court held further that, the amount of compensation to be awarded as consortium will be governed by the **principles** of awarding compensation under 'loss of consortium' as laid down in **Pranay Sethi** . 38. In **Magma General Insurance** , the deceased was aged 24 years, who was engaged in the business of manufacturing 'namkeen products', who died in a motor accident which occurred on 01.12.2013. The **father** , **brother** and **sister** of the deceased filed claim petition under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act. The Claims Tribunal did not award any compensation to the **brother** of the deceased, as he could not be considered to be a dependent. Compensation was awarded to the **father** and **unmarried sister** of the deceased, who were held to be dependents. The father and sister of the deceased filed appeal before the Punjab and M.A.C.A.No.188 of 2011 30 Haryana High Court for enhancement of the compensation awarded by the Claims Tribunal. The High Court found that the Claims Tribunal used the wrong principle for application of multiplier. The multiplier ought to have been taken on the basis of the age of the deceased and not that of his father. The High Court, while re-assessing the compensation granted a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rs.50,000/- x 2) towards loss of love and affection to the father and unmarried sister of the deceased. The insurer filed S.L.P. before the Apex Court contending, inter alia, that the father and sister of the deceased could not be considered as dependants, and were not entitled to compensation. In case of death of bachelor, only the mother could be considered to be a dependant. The grant of Rs.1,00,000/- on account of loss of love and affection, and Rs.25,000/- towards funeral expenses is erroneous. It was contended that only Rs.30,000/- could have been awarded as per the judgment in **Pranay Sethi** . [i.e., loss of estate - Rs.15,000/- and funeral expenses – Rs.15,000/-] The Apex Court held that, considering that the deceased was living in a village, where he was residing with his aged father, who was about 65 years old, and an unmarried sister, the High Court M.A.C.A.No.188 of 2011 31 correctly considered them to be dependants of the deceased, and made a deduction of 1/3[rd] towards personal expenses of the deceased. [Para.16 @ page 135 of SCC] The Apex Court found that the deceased was a bachelor, whose mother had **pre-deceased** him. The father of the deceased was about 65 years old and his sister was unmarried. The deceased was **contributing** a part of his meagre income to the family for their sustenance and survival. Therefore, the Apex Court held that the father and unmarried sister of the deceased would be entitled to compensation under his dependants. [Para.18 @ page 136 of SCC] Dealing with the contention of the insurer that the High Court had wrongly awarded Rs.1,00,000/towards loss of love and affection, and Rs.25,000/- towards funeral expenses, the Apex Court, after quoting Para.52 of the decision in **Pranay Sethi** , decreased the compensation under the head funeral expenses from Rs.25,000/- to Rs.15,000/-. However, the amount awarded under the head loss of love and affection was maintained. After explaining the concept of **spousal consortium** , **parental consortium** and **filial consortium** , the Apex Court deem it appropriate to award the father and unmarried sister of the deceased, an amount of M.A.C.A.No.188 of 2011 32 Rs.40,000/- each for loss of filial consortium. 39. In view of the law laid down by the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in **Pranay Sethi** , which was followed in **Santhosh Devi** and **Suresh Chandra Bagmaldoshi** referred to supra, the compensation payable under the conventional heads of loss of estate, loss of consortium and funeral expenses should be Rs.15,000/-, 40,000/- and Rs.15,000/- respectively. The aforesaid figures quantified by the Apex Court should be enhanced on percentage basis, at the rate of 10%, in a span of every three years. 40. In view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in **Magma General Insurance Company Ltd** ., after referring to the decision in **Pranay Sethi** , the surviving spouse is entitled for spousal consortium; children of the deceased are entitled for parental consortium; and parents of a deceased child, who died in a motor accident, are entitled for filial consortium. The amount of compensation that has to be awarded will be governed by the principles of awarding compensation under the head loss of consortium, as laid down in **Pranay Sethi** . 41. In **Indian Bank v. ABS Marine Products (P) Ltd. [(2006) 5 SCC 72]** one of the contentions raised was that, M.A.C.A.No.188 of 2011 33 any direction issued by the Apex Court in exercise of power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India to do proper justice and the reasons, if any, given for exercising such power, cannot be considered as law laid down by that Court under Article 141. It was also pointed out that, other Courts do not have the power similar to that conferred on the Apex Court under Article 142 and any attempt to follow the exercise of such power will lead to incongruous and disastrous results. The Apex Court left open that question, observing as follows; "Though there appears to be some merit in the first respondent's submission, we do not propose to examine that aspect." Though the said question was left open, the Apex Court observed as follows in Para.26 of the judgment; "26. ….... Many a time, after declaring the law, this Court in the operative part of the judgment, gives some directions which may either relax the application of law or exempt the case on hand from the rigour of the law in view of the peculiar facts or in view of the uncertainty of law till then, to do complete justice. While doing so, normally it is not stated that such direction/order is in exercise of power under Article 142. It is not uncommon to find that Courts have followed not the law declared, but the exemption/ relaxation made while moulding the relief in exercise of power under Article 142. When the M.A.C.A.No.188 of 2011 34 High Courts repeatedly follow a direction issued under Article 142, by treating it as the law declared by this Court, incongruously the exemption/ relaxation granted under Article 142 becomes the law, though at variance with the law declared by this Court. The Courts should therefore be careful to ascertain and follow the ratio decidendi, and not the relief given on the special facts, exercising power under Article 142. …..." 42. In **State of Punjab v. Rafiq Masih [(2014) 8 SCC 883]** a Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court affirmed the view taken in **ABS Marine Products' case (supra)** holding that, the directions issued under Article 142 do not constitute a binding precedent unlike Article 141 of the Constitution of India. They are direction issued to do proper justice and exercise of such power, cannot be considered as law laid down by the Supreme Court under Article 141 of the Constitution of India. The Apex Court held further that, the directions of the Court under Article 142 of the Constitution, while moulding the relief, that relax the application of law or exempt the case in hand from the rigour of the law in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances do not comprise the ratio decidendi and therefore lose its basic premise of making it a binding precedent. Paras.11 to 13 of the judgment read thus; M.A.C.A.No.188 of 2011 35 "11. Article 136 of the Constitution of India was legislatively intended to be exercised by the Highest Court of the Land, with scrupulous adherence to the settled judicial principle well established by precedents in our jurisprudence. Article 136 of the Constitution is a corrective jurisdiction that vests a discretion in the Supreme Court to settle the law clearly and make the law operational to make it a binding precedent for the future instead of keeping it vague. In short, it declares the law, as under Article 141 of the Constitution. 12. Article 142 of the Constitution is supplementary in nature and cannot supplant the substantive provisions, though they are not limited by the substantive provisions in the Statute. It is a power that gives preference to equity over law. It is a justice oriented approach as against the strict rigors of the law. The directions issued by the Court can normally be categorised into one, in the nature of moulding of relief and the other, as the declaration of law. 'Declaration of Law' as contemplated in Article 141 of the Constitution: is the speech express or necessarily implied by the Highest Court of the land. This Court in the case of **Indian Bank v. ABS Marine Products (P) Ltd. [(2006) 5 SCC 72]** , **Ram Pravesh Singh v. State of Bihar [(2006) 8 SCC 381]** and in **State of U.P. v. Neeraj Awasthi [(2006) 1 SCC 667]** , has expounded the principle and extolled the power of Article 142 of the Constitution of India to new heights by laying down that the directions issued under Article 142 do not constitute a binding precedent unlike Article 141 of the M.A.C.A.No.188 of 2011 36 Constitution of India. They are direction issued to do proper justice and exercise of such power, cannot be considered as law laid down by the Supreme Court under Article 141 of the Constitution of India. The Court has compartmentalised and differentiated the relief in the operative portion of the judgment by exercise of powers under Article 142 of the Constitution as against the law declared. The directions of the Court under Article 142 of the Constitution, while moulding the relief, that relax the application of law or exempt the case in hand from the rigour of the law in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances do not comprise the ratio decidendi and therefore lose its basic premise of making it a binding precedent. This Court on the qui vive has expanded the horizons of Article 142 of the Constitution by keeping it outside the purview of Article 141 of the Constitution and by declaring it a direction of the Court that changes its complexion with the peculiarity in the facts and circumstances of the case. 13. Therefore, in our opinion, the decisions of the Court based on different scales of Article 136 and Article 142 of the Constitution of India cannot be best weighed on the same grounds of reasoning and thus in view of the aforesaid discussion, there is no conflict in the views expressed in the first two judgments and the latter judgment." ## 43. In **Magma General Insurance Company Ltd.** , the Apex Court maintained the compensation awarded by the High M.A.C.A.No.188 of 2011 37 Court at the rate of Rs.50,000/- to the father and unmarried sister of the deceased towards loss of love and affection. However, the compensation under the head funeral expenses was decreased from Rs.25,000/- to Rs.15,000/-, after quoting para 52 of the decision in **Pranay Sethi** . After explaining the concept of spousal consortium, parental consortium and filial consortium, the Apex Court awarded the father and unmarried sister of the deceased an amount of Rs.40,000/- each for loss of filial consortium. 44. As already noticed, the compensation that has to be awarded to the surviving spouse towards spousal consortium; to the children of the deceased towards parental consortium; or to the parents of the deceased child towards filial consortium, is for loss of **love and affection** and such other matters. In such circumstances, once the surviving spouse is awarded compensation towards spousal consortium; or the children of the deceased are awarded compensation towards parental consortium; or the parents of the deceased child are awarded compensation towards filial consortium, they are not entitled for award of further compensation under the head loss love and affection, as it would result in duplication or M.A.C.A.No.188 of 2011 38 ## overlapping of compensation under the relevant heads. 45. The concept of spousal consortium to the surviving spouse; parental consortium to the children of the deceased; and filial consortium to the parents of the deceased child laid down by the Apex Court in **Magma General Insurance Company Ltd.** does not speak anything as to the right of **siblings** to get compensated under the head loss of consortium. In **Magma** , after noticing the fact that the mother of the deceased had pre-deceased him, his father was aged 65 years old, his sister was unmarried, and the deceased was **contributing** a part of his meagre income to the family for their sustenance and survival, the Apex Court granted a sum of Rs.40,000/- as compensation to unmarried sister of the deceased under the head filial consortium, after maintaining the compensation (Rs.50,000/- x 2) awarded by the High Court towards loss of love and affection, which can only be treated as a direction issued by the Apex Court in exercise of its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India to do proper justice and the exercise of such power cannot be considered as law laid down by the Apex Court under Article 141 of the Constitution of India. M.A.C.A.No.188 of 2011 39 46. In view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in **Pranay Sethi** and **Magma General Insurance Company Ltd.** referred to supra, the compensation awarded by the Tribunal under the head funeral expense is re-fixed a Rs.15,000/-, resulting an additional compensation of **Rs.7,500/-** (15,000 - 7,500); Rs.15,000/- awarded under the head loss of love and affection is re-fixed as Rs.40,000/- each (40,000 x 2 = 80,000), payable to appellants 1 and 2 under the head filial consortium, resulting an additional compensation of **Rs.65,000/-** (80,000 - 15,000). As already noticed, the concept of spousal consortium to the surviving spouse; parental consortium to the children of the deceased; and filial consortium to the parents of the deceased child laid down by the Apex Court in **Magma General Insurance Company Ltd.** does not speak anything as to the right of **siblings** to get compensated under the head loss of consortium. Therefore, the 3[rd] appellant, who is the sister of the deceased is not entitled for any compensation under the head loss of love and affection or loss of consortium. 47. The Tribunal awarded no compensation towards loss of estate. In view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in M.A.C.A.No.188 of 2011 40 ## **Pranay Sethi [(2017) 16 SCC 680]** an amount Rs.15,000/- can be granted under the head loss of estate. Accordingly, the appellants are granted a sum of **Rs.15,000/-** towards loss of estate. 48. The Tribunal awarded Rs.10,000/- as compensation towards pain and suffering of the deceased. 49. In **Jyni and others v. Raphel P.T. and others [2016 (2) KHC 870]** a Division Bench of this Court held that, death in an accident is generally the result of violent impact on the body resulting in serious injuries causing severe pain. The magnitude of the ordeal may vary from case to case depending upon the nature of injuries sustained. In cases of instantaneous deaths also pain and suffering is invariably present, as in the case of survival for hours or days. In cases of instantaneous death as well as cases where the deceased was unconscious between the time of accident and the time of his death, some notional amount is payable under the head pain and suffering. A slightly higher amount can be awarded under this head, if the death is not instantaneous. Therefore, a conventional amount in the range of Rs.5,000/- to Rs.15,000/could be awarded under the head pain and suffering in such M.A.C.A.No.188 of 2011 41 cases. 50. In the instant case, the deceased succumbed to the injuries on the date of accident. Considering the nature of injuries, the compensation of Rs.10,000/- awarded by the Tribunal is just and reasonable, which requires no enhancement in this appeal. 51. Towards transportation to hospital the Tribunal awarded a sum of Rs.500/-; towards extra nourishment a sum of Rs.1,000/-; and towards damage to clothing and articles a sum of Rs.500/-. Considering the fact that the accident is of the year 2002, the compensation under the head transportation expenses is re-fixed as Rs.1,000/-, resulting an additional compensation of **Rs.500/-** (1,000 - 500) and the compensation under the head damage to clothing and articles is re-fixed as Rs.750/, resulting an additional compensation of **Rs.250/-** (750 - 500). The compensation awarded by the Tribunal under the head extra nourishment cannot be said to be on the lower side, which requires no enhancement in this appeal. 52. This appeal was filed with a delay of 83 days, which was condoned by the order dated 02.12.2019 in M.A.C.A.No.188 of 2011 42 C.M.Appl.No.265 of 2011, subject to the condition that the question as to whether the appellants/claimants are entitled for interest for the additional compensation, if any, granted in this appeal for the period of delay in paying process to send notice to party respondents (i.e., for the period from 14.02.2011 to 04.07.2018) shall be decided at the time of final hearing. In C.M.Appl.No.265 of 2011, notice was ordered to the respondents on 14.02.2011. However, process to serve notice to the respondents was paid only on 06.07.2018. On account of the delay in remittance of process, the additional compensation granted in this appeal will carry interest only at the rate of 7% per annum. 53. In the result, the appellants/claimants are entitled for payment of an additional compensation of **Rs.5,08,650/-** (Rupees Five Lakhs Eight Thousand Six Hundred and Fifty only) [4,20,400 + 7,500 + 65,000 + 15,000 + 500 + 250] in this appeal, which will carry interest at the rate of **7%** per annum from the date of petition till realisation. The additional compensation granted in this appeal shall be apportioned among appellants 1 and 2 in the ratio of 50:50. Respondents 3 and 6 shall satisfy the additional compensation granted in this M.A.C.A.No.188 of 2011 43 appeal in the ratio 50:50, together with interest, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this judgment, after deducting the liability, if any, of the appellants/claimants towards Balance Court Fee and Legal Benefit Fund. Payment of additional compensation to the appellants shall be in terms of the directives issued by this Court in Circular No.3 of 2019 dated 06.09.2019 and clarified further in Official Memorandum No.D1-62475/2016 dated 07.11.2019. This appeal is disposed of as above. No order as to costs. Sd/- **ANIL K. NARENDRAN JUDGE** yd