George v. Sudha @ Lalitha

## **`IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM`** ## **`PRESENT THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL K. NARENDRAN`** ``` & ``` ``` THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE G. GIRISH ``` ``` WEDNESDAY, THE 6[TH] DAY OF MARCH 2024 / 16TH PHALGUNA, 1945 ``` ``` R.C.REV.NO.64 OF 2024 ``` ``` AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 18.12.2023 IN R.C.A. NO.234 OF 2019 OF ADDITIONAL DISTRICT COURT, IRINJALAKUDA ARISING OUT OF THE ORDER DATED 19.08.2019 IN R.C.P.NO.21 OF 2010 OF RENT CONTROL COURT (MUNSIFF), IRINJALAKUDA REVISION PETITIONER/APPELLANT/RESPONDENT: ``` ``` GEORGE AGED 78 YEARS S/O. ANTHONY, OLLUKKARAN HOUSE, PUDUKKAD DESOM, PUDUKKAD P.O., THORAVU VILLAGE, MUKUNDAPURAM TALUK, THRISSUR DISTRICT, PIN - 680302 ``` ``` BY ADV N.L.BITTO ``` ## **`RESPONDENT/RESPONDENT/PETITIONER:`** ``` SUDHA @ LALITHA AGED 58 YEARS, WIFE OF MOHANAN BABURAJ, AYYANITHARA HOUSE, THALIKKULAM VILLAGE, VALAPPAD P.O., CHAVAKKAD TALUK, THRISSUR DISTRICT, PIN - 680567 ``` ``` THIS RENT CONTROL REVISION HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 06.03.2024, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: ``` 2 R.C.Rev.No.64 of 2024 ## **ORDER** ## **Anil K. Narendran, J.** The petitioner is the respondent-tenant in R.C.P.No.21 of 2010 on the file of the Rent Control Court (Munsiff), Irinjalakuda, a petition filed by the respondent herein-landlady, invoking the provisions under Section 11(3) of Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, seeking eviction of the tenant from the petition schedule shop room, for the bona fide need of her husband for starting readymade business. In the Rent Control Petition, the landlady has stated that there is a small room near the petition schedule shop room, which is lying vacant. Business cannot be conducted in the said room alone. Besides, the entrance to the said room is from the petition schedule shop room. Before the Rent Control Court, the tenant entered appearance and filed counter, opposing the order of eviction sought for. On the side of the landlady, Exts.A1 to A4 were marked and the husband of the landlady was examined as PW1. On the side of the tenant, Exts.B1 and B2 were marked. The tenant has not chosen to adduce any oral evidence. After considering the pleadings and evidence on record, the Rent Control Court, by the order dated 25.02.2012, dismissed the Rent Control Petition, declining an order of eviction under 3 R.C.Rev.No.64 of 2024 Section 11(3) of the Act, on a finding that the need projected in the Rent Control Petition for seeking an order of eviction under Section 11(3) of the Act is not bona fide. Based on that finding, the Rent Control Court did not adjudicate on the applicability of the provisos to Section 11(3) of the Act. Challenging the order dated 25.02.2012 of the Rent Control Court, the landlord filed R.C.A.No.31 of 2012, invoking the provisions under Section 18(1)(b) of the Act. That appeal was allowed by the judgment dated 08.02.2018, granting an order of eviction under Section 11(3) of the Act, on a finding that the need projected in the Rent Control Petition for seeking eviction of the tenant is bona fide and that the provisions of the first proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act have no application in the facts and circumstances of the case and that the tenant is not entitled to the protection under the second proviso to Section 11(3). 2. Challenging the order of eviction granted by the Appellate Authority in R.C.A.No.31 of 2012, the tenant filed R.C.Rev.No.114 of 2018 before this Court, invoking the provisions under Section 20 of the Act. By the judgment dated 31.01.2019, this Court disposed of R.C.Rev.No.114 of 2018 by remanding the matter to the Rent Control Court for the purpose of considering the first and second provisos to Section 11(3) of the Act. The rest of 4 R.C.Rev.No.64 of 2024 the findings entered under Section 11(3) of the Act were confirmed and the parties were given liberty to adduce further evidence with regard to the first and second provisos to Section 11(3) of the Act. 3. After the order of remand, the Advocate Commissioner, who submitted Ext.C1 report and Ext.C1(a) rough plan, was examined as PW2. The tenant was examined as RW1. After considering the pleadings and evidence on record, the Rent Control Court found that the first proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act has no application in the facts of the case on hand and that the tenant is not entitled to the protection under the second proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act. Accordingly, the Rent Control Court, by the order dated 19.08.2019, allowed R.C.P.No.21 of 2010 under Section 11(3) of the Act and directed the tenant to put the landlady in vacant possession of the petition schedule shop room, within a period of one month. Challenging the finding of the Rent Control Court on the applicability of the first and second provisos to Section 11(3) of the Act and the order of eviction granted under Section 11(3) of the Act, the tenant filed R.C.A.No.234 of 2019 before the Rent Control Appellate Authority, Irinjalakuda, which ended in dismissal by the judgment dated 18.12.2023, confirming the finding of the Rent Control Court that the tenant failed to prove the first and 5 R.C.Rev.No.64 of 2024 second provisos to Section 11(3) of the Act. Feeling aggrieved, the tenant is before this Court in this Rent Control Revision, invoking the provisions under Section 20 of the Act. 4. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant. 5. The issue that requires consideration in this Rent Control Revision is as to whether any interference is warranted on the findings of the Rent Control Court as well as the Appellate Authority in the impugned order/judgment on the applicability of the first and second provisos to Section 11(3) of the Act. 6. Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act deals with eviction of tenants. As per Section 11(3) of the Act, a landlord may apply to the Rent Control Court, for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building if he bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him. As per the first proviso to Section 11(3), the Rent Control Court shall not give any such direction if the landlord has another building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village except where the Rent Control Court is satisfied that for special reasons, in any particular case it will be just and proper to do so. As per the second proviso to Section 11(3), the Rent Control 6 R.C.Rev.No.64 of 2024 Court shall not give any direction to a tenant to put the landlord in possession, if such tenant is depending for his livelihood mainly on the income derived from any trade or business carried on in such building and there is no other suitable building available in the locality for such person to carry on such trade or business. 7. As already noticed hereinbefore, by the order of this Court dated 31.12.2019 in R.C.Rev.No.114 of 2018, the matter was remanded to the Rent Control Court only for the purpose of considering the applicability of the first and second provisos to Section 11(3) of the Act. The rest of the finding entered under Section 11(3) of the Act was confirmed by that order. 8. As per the first proviso to Section 11(3), the Rent Control Court shall not give any such direction if the landlord has another building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village except where the Rent Control Court is satisfied that for special reasons, in any particular case it will be just and proper to do so. 9. In **M.L. Prabhakar v. Rajiv Singal [(2001) 2 SCC 355]** the Apex Court was dealing with a case in which eviction on the ground of _bona fide_ requirement was sought for under Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. In the said decision, 7 R.C.Rev.No.64 of 2024 the Apex Court relied on the law laid down in **Ram Narain Arora v. Asha Rani [(1999) 1 SCC 141]** , wherein it was held that the question whether the landlord has any other reasonably suitable residential accommodation is a question which is intermixed with the question regarding _bona fide_ requirement. Whether the landlord has any other reasonably suitable residential accommodation is a defence for the tenant. Whether the other accommodation is more suitable than the suit premises would not solely depend upon pleadings and non-disclosure by the landlord. The landlord having another accommodation would not be fatal to the eviction proceedings if both the parties understood the case and placed materials before the court and case of neither party was prejudiced. On the facts of the case on hand, the Apex Court found that, even though the landlord has not mentioned about the other two premises, the material in respect of the other two premises was placed before the Rent Controller as well as before the High Court, thus no prejudice has been caused, and the parties have squarely dealt with this question. ## 10. In **Vasantha Mallan v. N.S. Aboobacker Siddique** **[2020 (1) KHC 21]** the question that arose before a Division Bench of this Court was whether a landlord is bound to plead under 8 R.C.Rev.No.64 of 2024 first proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act, the availability of vacant building in his possession and seek to explain special reason for non-occupation of such premises, in a proceeding initiated for eviction of the tenant under Section 11(3) of the Act. The Division Bench held that the initial burden to prove that landlord is in possession of the vacant building, if any, is only upon the tenant unless the landlord himself admits any such vacant building to be in his possession. Only when the primary burden of proof in this behalf is discharged by the tenant, the burden shifts to the landlord to show otherwise or that the vacant premises are not suited to his needs. He can successfully discharge his part of the burden by adducing evidence either through his own testimony or others or in any other legal manner. Law does not require the landlord to plead that he is in possession of any vacant building and has special reasons for its non-occupation. It is up to the tenant alone to take up the contention and prove that landlord is in vacant possession of premises. 11. In **Vasantha Mallan** , relying on the law laid down by the Apex Court in **M.L. Prabhakar [(2001) 2 SCC 355]** the Division Bench held that, it is not incumbent on the landlord to disclose in his pleading availability of vacant building in his 9 R.C.Rev.No.64 of 2024 possession. The non-disclosure of vacant premises cannot be picked up as a reason or circumstance to doubt the bona fides of the claim of the landlord put forward under Section 11(3) of the Act. The Division Bench made it clear that it is not obligatory for the landlord to disclose in his pleadings the details of the vacant buildings available in his possession. Nor does first proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act insist the landlord to plead that the buildings available in his possession are not sufficient to meet his requirements. These are matters of evidence rather than pleadings. Failure of the landlord to disclose availability of buildings in his possession and plead special reasons for not occupying them, cannot be taken as a valid and legal ground for rejecting the claim of the landlord as not _bona fide_ . What could at the most be said is that it might be a fair and reasonable conduct if the landlord disclosed in his pleadings the details of buildings in his possession and simultaneously explained the reason for non-occupation of the premises for his alleged needs. ## 12. In **Dineshan Pillai P.B. v. Joseph @ Jose [2019 (3)** **KHC 206]** a Division Bench of this Court was dealing with a case in which one of the contentions of the tenant was that the landlord has several other vacant buildings of his own in his possession to 10 R.C.Rev.No.64 of 2024 start the proposed business. The Division Bench noticed that, the pleadings are very vague with respect to the first proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act. It is stated that the landlord has several other buildings. No particular vacant room has been identified or pointed out in the pleadings. The Division Bench opined that it is obligatory on the part of the tenant to plead and prove the identity of the vacant building in the possession of the landlord. In the absence of specific pleadings, disclosing the identity of the vacant building in the possession of the landlord, it can be said that the tenant has not discharged the initial burden of proof under the first Proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act. 13. As already noticed hereinbefore, in the Rent Control Petition, the landlady has stated that there is a small room near the petition schedule shop room, which is lying vacant. Business cannot be conducted in the said room alone. Besides, the entrance to the said room is from the petition schedule shop room. As per Ext.C1(a) rough sketch prepared by the Advocate Commissioner, who was examined as PW2, a room is lying vacant on the eastern side of the petition schedule shop room. Another room is lying vacant on the upstairs. The petition schedule shop room is on the ground floor. Regarding the room lying vacant on the eastern side of the petition 11 R.C.Rev.No.64 of 2024 schedule shop room, the landlord contended that there is no separate entrance for that room. On the above aspect, the tenant, who was examined as RW1, has deposed that he did not notice any door for the room lying on the eastern side of the petition schedule shop room. RW1 has also deposed that the said room is on the rear side of the petition schedule shop room, which has no shutter. As per Ext.C1 report of the Advocate Commissioner the vacant room on the eastern side of the petition schedule shop room is a small room. The Advocate Commissioner, who was examined as PW2, deposed that the said room has no windows. No one can enter that room from outside. There is a door in the petition schedule shop room through which one can enter that room. At the time of the inspection the said door remained closed. As per the report, there is another room lying vacant in the upstairs. As rightly noticed by the Rent Control Court, the tenant cannot dictate that the proposed business of the husband of the landlady in readymade dress should be conducted in the room lying vacant in the upstair portion. Though the tenant contended that a room lying on the northern side of the petition schedule shop room is lying vacant, the Advocate Commissioner has reported that the said room is owned by a third party. It is after considering the pleadings and evidence 12 ## R.C.Rev.No.64 of 2024 on record that the Rent Control Court as well as the Appellate Authority arrived at a conclusion that the provisions under the first proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act is not attracted in the facts and circumstances of the case on hand. Viewed in the light of the law laid down in the decisions referred to supra, it cannot be contended that the reasoning of the Rent Control Court as well as the Appellate Authority on the above aspect is either perverse or patently illegal. It cannot also be contended that the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority has committed a manifest error, while arriving at such a conclusion on the above aspect, warranting an interference of this Court in this Rent Control Revision. 14. As per the second proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act, the Rent Control Court shall not give any direction to a tenant to put the landlord in possession, if such tenant is depending for his livelihood mainly on the income derived from any trade or business carried on in such building and there is no other suitable building available in the locality for such person to carry on such trade or business. ## 15. In **Ammeer Hamsa v. Ramabhadran and another** **[2019 (2) KHC 465]** a Division Bench of this Court held that, it is trite law that both limbs under the second proviso to Section 11(3) 13 R.C.Rev.No.64 of 2024 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act are conjunctive and the burden of proof is on the tenant. Thus, the legal position has been settled by a long line of decisions and the courts below have rightly placed reliance upon those decisions. Vide: **Narayanan Nair v. Pachumma [1980 KLT 430]** , **Prasannan v.** **Haris [2005 (2) KLT 365]** , **Vineethan v. Fathima and others [2016 (1) KHC 631]** . In view of the legal position well settled by the aforesaid decisions, the landlord is not required to plead or prove other sources of income of the tenant. That apart, income is a fact which remains exclusively in the knowledge of each person only and another person cannot adduce evidence to prove income. Merely on the reason that the landlord has stated that the tenant has other sources of income and he is not mainly depending upon the income from the business carried on in the tenanted premises, for his livelihood and he failed to prove so, the tenant cannot escape from the burden of proof cast on him under the first limb of the second proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act. Where the statutory provision itself explicitly imposes the burden of proof on a party to the lis, there cannot be any variation whatever be the pleadings of the other party in that respect. The second proviso to Section 11(3) is an exception to the principal provision, granting protection to the 14 ## R.C.Rev.No.64 of 2024 tenant. When the second proviso itself imposes the burden of proof on the tenant, the question whether the landlord has pleaded or proved the facts constituting the said proviso is insignificant and irrelevant. Even if the landlord pleaded so, the burden of proof will not be shifted to him. Since the second proviso to Section 11(3) is an exception to the principal provision, which would dis-entitle the landlord to get the order of eviction under Section 11(3), the burden of proof, under the said proviso is always on the tenant and unless the burden of proof under the second proviso is discharged satisfactorily, the tenant is not entitled to get protection under the said proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act. 16. Though the evidence of PW1, the husband of the landlady, was that the tenant has another establishment by name Aljo Bakers, no reliable materials were placed before the Rent Control Court to substantiate that fact. After considering the evidence of the tenant, who was examined as RW1, the Rent Control Court found that there is no other source of income for the tenant, though the tenant has not chosen to produce any materials to show that he is depending for his livelihood mainly on the income derived from the business conducted in the petition schedule shop room. However, the Rent Control Court, after considering Ext.C1 15 R.C.Rev.No.64 of 2024 report of the Advocate Commissioner and his oral testimony as PW2, has arrived at a conclusion that other suitable buildings are available in the locality for the tenant to carry on his business conducted in the petition schedule shop room. The Rent Control Court as well as the Appellate Authority noticed in the impugned order/judgment that the Advocate Commissioner has reported the availability of many rooms adjacent to the petition schedule shop rooms, which were found closed. After considering the pleadings and evidence on record, the Rent Control Court as well as the Appellate Authority concurrently found that the tenant failed to prove the second limb of the second proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act. When both limbs under the second proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act are conjunctive and the tenant failed to prove the second limb of that proviso, the Rent Control Court as well as the Appellate Authority rightly found that the tenant is not entitled to the protection under the second proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act. Viewed in the light of the law laid down in the decisions referred to supra, it cannot be contended that the reasoning of the Rent Control Court as well as the Appellate Authority on the above aspect is either perverse or patently illegal. It cannot also be contended that the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority has 16 R.C.Rev.No.64 of 2024 committed a manifest error, while arriving at such a conclusion on the above aspect, warranting an interference of this Court in this Rent Control Revision. 17. Section 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act deals with revision. As per sub-section (1) of Section 20, in cases, where the appellate authority empowered under Section 18 is a Subordinate Judge, the District Court, and in other cases the High Court, may, at any time, on the application of any aggrieved party, call for and examine the records relating to any order passed or proceedings taken under this Act by such authority for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality, regularity or propriety of such order or proceedings, and may pass such order in reference thereto as it thinks fit. As per sub-section (2) of Section 20 of the Act, the costs of and incident to all proceedings before the High Court or District Court under sub-section (1) shall be in its discretion. 18. In **Rukmini Amma Saradamma v. Kallyani Sulochana [(1993) 1 SCC 499]** , the scope of revisional powers of the High Court under Section 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 came up for consideration before the Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court. While considering whether 17 R.C.Rev.No.64 of 2024 the High Court could have re-appreciated entire evidence, the Apex Court held that, even the wider language of Section 20 of the Act cannot enable the High Court to act as a first or a second court of appeal. Otherwise, the distinction between appellate and revisional jurisdiction will get obliterated. Hence, the High Court was not right in re-appreciating the entire evidence both oral or documentary in the light of the Commissioner's report. The High Court had travelled far beyond the revisional jurisdiction. Even by the presence of the ‘ ’ - word propriety it cannot mean that there could be a re appreciation of evidence. Of course, the revisional court can come to a different conclusion but not on a re-appreciation of evidence; on the contrary, by confining itself to legality, regularity and propriety of the order impugned before it. ## 19. In **T. Sivasubramaniam v. Kasinath Pujari [(1999)** **7 SCC 275]** the Apex Court held that, the words ‘to satisfy itself’ employed in Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 no doubt is a power of superintendence, and the High Court is not required to interfere with the finding of fact merely because the High Court is not in agreement with the findings of the courts below. It is also true that the power exercisable by the High Court under Section 25 of the Act is not an appellate power to 18 R.C.Rev.No.64 of 2024 reappraise or reassess the evidence for coming to a different finding contrary to the finding recorded by the courts below. But where a finding arrived at by the courts below is based on no evidence, the High Court would be justified in interfering with such a finding recorded by the courts below. 20. In **Ubaiba v. Damodaran [(1999) 5 SCC 645]** the Apex Court considered the exercise of revisional power by the High Court, under Section 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, in the context of an issue as to whether the relationship of landlord-tenant existed or not. It was urged that whether such relationship existed would be a jurisdictional fact. Relying on the decision in **Rukmini Amma Saradamma** it was contended that, however wide the jurisdiction of the revisional court under Section 20 of the Act may be, it cannot have jurisdiction to re-appreciate the evidence and substitute its own finding upsetting the finding arrived at by the appellate authority. The Apex Court held that, though the revisional power under Section 20 of the Act may be wider than Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 it cannot be equated even with the second appellate power conferred on the civil court under the Code. Therefore, notwithstanding the use of the expression ‘propriety’ in 19 R.C.Rev.No.64 of 2024 - Section 20 of the Act, the revisional court will not be entitled to re appreciate the evidence and substitute its own conclusion in place of the conclusion of the appellate authority. On examining the impugned judgment of the High Court, in the light of the aforesaid ratio, the Apex Court held that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction by re-appreciating the evidence and in coming to the conclusion that the relationship of landlord-tenant did not exist. 21. In **Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Dilbahar Singh [(2014) 9 SCC 78]** a Five-Judge Bench of the Apex Court considered the revisional powers of the High Court under Rent Acts operating in different States. After referring to the law laid down in **Rukmini Amma Saradamma** the Apex Court reiterated that even the wider language of Section 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 does not enable the High Court to act as a first or a second court of appeal. The Constitution Bench agreed with the view of the Three-Judge Bench in **Rukmini Amma Saradamma** that the word ‘propriety’ does not confer power upon the High Court to re-appreciate evidence to come to a different conclusion, but its consideration of evidence is confined to find out legality, regularity and propriety of the order impugned before it. 20 R.C.Rev.No.64 of 2024 22. In **Thankamony Amma v. Omana Amma [AIR 2019 SC 3803 : 2019 (4) KHC 412]** considering the matter in the backdrop of law laid down in **Rukmini Amma Saradamma** , **Ubaiba** and **Dilbahar Singh** the Apex Court held that the findings rendered by the courts below were well supported by evidence on record and could not even be said to be perverse in any way. The - High Court could not have re appreciated the evidence and the concurrent findings rendered by the courts below ought not to have been interfered with by the High Court while exercising revisional jurisdiction. 23. In **Abdul Salam v. Sebastian [2013 (4) KLT 592]** , a Division Bench of this Court held that, even though in the decisions of the Apex Court and this Court, it has been held that, in revisional jurisdiction there cannot be a re-appreciation of evidence in order to come to a different conclusion on the same set of facts, it has been held in those decisions itself that, if the view taken is perverse and the statutory scheme has not been kept in mind and if it requires correction, then Court can re-appreciate the evidence. When the argument is that, the approach made by the authorities are perverse, it cannot be said that this Court cannot look into the pleadings and scan through the evidence to find out whether the 21 R.C.Rev.No.64 of 2024 conclusions have been arrived at properly on the pleadings and evidence. ## 24. In **Regy V. Edthil v. Hubert Leslie D'Cruz [2016 (2)** **KLJ 164]** , a Division Bench of this Court held that, the High Court (in revision) is obliged to test the order of the Rent Control Court on the touch stone of whether it is according to law. For that limited purpose, it may enter into reappraisal of evidence for the purpose of ascertaining whether the conclusion arrived at by the Rent Control Court is wholly unreasonable or is one that no reasonable person acting with objectivity could have reached on the material available. 25. Viewed in the light of the law laid down in the decisions referred to supra, conclusion is irresistible that the reasoning of the Rent Control Court and the Appellate Authority on the applicability of the first and second provisos to Section 11(3) of the Act is neither perverse nor patently illegal. It cannot also be said that, while ordering eviction of the tenant under Section 11(3) of the Act, the Rent Control Court and the Appellate Authority has committed a manifest error, warranting interference of this Court, in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction under Section 20 of the Act. Therefore, we find no reason to interfere with the order of eviction passed by 22 R.C.Rev.No.64 of 2024 the Rent Control Court and the Appellate Authority under Section 11(3) of the Act. 26. The learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant would submit that the tenant is doing business in the petition schedule shop room. The tenant may be granted at least ten months’ time to vacate the petition schedule shop room. The tenant is prepared to clear the entire dues, if any, towards arrears of rent, within a time limit that may be fixed by this Court, and he shall continue to pay monthly rent for the remaining period, without any default, till he gives vacant possession of the petition schedule shop room to the landlady. 27. In such circumstances, this Rent Control Revision is dismissed declining interference on the impugned judgment/order of the Rent Control Appellate Authority and the Rent Control Court; however, by granting four months' time to the petitioner-tenant, to surrender vacant possession of the petition schedule shop room to the respondent-landlady, subject to the following conditions: - (i) The respondent-tenant in the Rent Control Petition shall file an affidavit before the Rent Control Court or the Execution Court, as the case may be, within two weeks from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order, expressing an unconditional undertaking that he will 23 R.C.Rev.No.64 of 2024 surrender vacant possession of the petition schedule shop room to the petitioner-landlady within four months from the date of this order and that, he shall not induct third parties into possession of the petition schedule shop room and further he shall conduct any business in the petition schedule shop room only on the strength of a valid licence/permission/consent issued by the local authority/statutory authorities; (ii) The respondent-tenant in the Rent Control Petition shall deposit the entire arrears of rent as on date, if any, before the Rent Control Court or the Execution Court, as the case may be, within two weeks from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order, and shall continue to pay rent for every succeeding months, without any default; (iii) Needless to say, in the event of the respondent-tenant in the Rent Control Petition failing to comply with any one of the conditions stated above, the time limit granted by this order to surrender vacant possession of the petition schedule shop room will stand cancelled automatically and the petitioner-landlady will be at liberty to proceed with the execution of the order of eviction. Sd/- ## **ANIL K. NARENDRAN, JUDGE** Sd/- **G. GIRISH, JUDGE** MIN