High CourtDivision BenchAppeals allowed; decree of the Trial Court rest...

Gannon Dunkerley & Co. Ltd. v. Union of India

Case / Petition Number:Civil Appeals Nos. 2584 and 2585 of 1966

Case Details & Bench

Court
High Court
Hon'ble Judges
  • J. C. Shah
  • K. S. Hegde
Judgment Date
1969-10-28
Court Decision / Holding
Appeals allowed; decree passed by the Trial Court restored with costs in the High Court and in this Court; interest on the decreed amount at 6% per annum from the date of the suit till payment; one hearing fee.
Final Disposition
Appeals allowed; decree of the Trial Court restored with costs; interest as specified.

Parties to the Case

Appellants / Petitioners

  • Gannon Dunkerley & Co. Ltd.

Respondents

  • Union of India

Legal Representation & Advocates

Counsels for Petitioners

  • • H. R. Gokhale
  • • G. L. Sanghi
  • • J. B. Dadachanji
  • • Ravinder Narain

Counsels for Respondents

  • • Jagdish Swarup, Solicitor-General
  • • V. A. Seyid Muhammad
  • • B. D. Sharma
  • • S. P. Nayar

Case Synopsis & Summary

Gannon Dunkerley & Co. Ltd. v. Union of India concerns a claim by the appellant contractor for payment at an enhanced rate over the basic contract rate for reinforced concrete work at the Sindri Fertilizer Factory project. The claim rests on two triggers: alterations, omissions and substitutions ordered by the Engineer-in-charge and the consequent increase in difficulty and cost, and a longer project period contributing to higher labour and material prices. The contract empowered the Engineer-in-charge to issue instructions for work not covered by the agreement, and required the contractor to perform such work at rates specified or negotiated, with the Superintending Engineer’s decision deemed final in disputes. The main question was whether the suit, filed in 1956, was time-barred under the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, by Articles 56, 115 or 120, or if it fell outside the Schedule. The High Court had held the claim could be governed by Art. 56 or Art. 115, or limited by Art. 120. The Supreme Court held that the claim is not for the price of work done (Art. 56) nor a breach-of-contract remedy (Art. 115); instead, it is a claim for enhanced rates arising from changed circumstances, governed by Art. 120. Consequently, the appeals are allowed, the Trial Court’s decree is restored, with costs, and interest on the decreed amount at 6% per annum from the date of suit.

Provisions of Law Cited

Limitation Act, 1908Article 56Article 115Article 120First Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1908

Legal Doctrines & Maxims

  • Right to sue accrues; accrual of the right to sue determines the starting point of limitation under Article 120
  • No right to sue until accrual of the asserted right; accrual may occur upon breach or clear threat to infringe
  • A claim for enhanced rates due to changed circumstances is not automatically a breach-of-contract claim and may fall outside Articles 56 and 115; may fall under Article 120

Submissions & Arguments

Contentions of Appellants / Petitioners

The appellant contends that the claim is for payment at an enhanced rate due to alterations and increased complexity, not for the price of work done nor for breach of contract. Since the claim arises from changes in circumstances and is not a direct breach, it does not fit Art. 56 or Art. 115. The proper limitation is Art. 120 (six years), commencing only when the right to sue accrues, not merely when benefits are received. The Engineer-in-charge’s orders for additional work, and the lack of a written arbitration for this specific claim, support a view that the claim is not barred by the three-year limit under those articles. The appellant relies on accrual principles from prior authorities, including Bolo v. Kokan and Others, to argue accrual occurred at a point that falls within the six-year window.

Contentions of Respondents

The respondent contends that even if Art. 120 applies, the claim for enhanced rates should be tested against six-year limitation since the right to sue accrues when the defendant benefits from the work, or when there is a continuing breach. They argue the suit was filed after a long delay and that the claim was effectively a claim for price overrun, not a pure breach claim, and that the relief sought should be barred by time. They also emphasize that the arbitration clause did not cover this particular claim and that the period starting after the event of benefit or breach should bar the action under Article 120.

Cited Precedents (1)

Case NameCitationTreatmentExplanation
Bolo v. Kokan and OthersL.R. 87 I.A. 325PositiveCited as authority for the accrual principle—the right to sue accrues, and limitation under Article 120 begins when accrual occurs.

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Extracted Judgment Text

Exact text extracted from official judgment records.

**A** **B** #### c **D** E **F** **G** **H** 47 **GANNON** **DUNKERLEY** **&** **CO.** **LTD.** _v._ **UNION** **OF** INDIA _October_ 28, 1969 [J. C. SHAH AND K. S. HEGDE, JJ.) _Limitation Act,_ _1908-Suit_ _for_ _payment_ _at_ _an_ _additional_ _rate_ _over_ _**contract rate in view**_ _**of**_ _**altered circumstances**_ _**and**_ _**co1nplex nature_**_ _**of**_ _work-Claim_ ;., _not_ _one_ _for_ _price_ _of_ _work done nor /or comtunsuiion_ _for_ _breach_ _of_ _contract-Therefore Art._ 56 _and Art._ 115 _of First_ _Schedule_ _noti_ _applicable-Suit governed_ _by_ _Art. 120----Commencement_ _of period_ _of_ _**/imitation under Article.**_ The appellant-comp'!lly filed a suit agafust the Union of India demanding payment at an .~nhanced rate over the basic rate stipulated in a construction contract with the- Union of India. The clailn related to revision of rates due to the complex nature and increase in the quantity of work and in respect of work not covered by the contract. The additional work was done at the request of the Engineer-in-charge who m1der the terms of the contract was competent to give instructions for work not covered by the ten:.-.s of the contract and fix the rate at which-remuneration was to be P"'<l in respect of such work. The Union of India contended that the claim was barred by the law of limitation. The trial court decreed the suit fur the amount certified by the Superintending Engineer. On. appeal the High Court held that the claim was governed eithe·r by Art. 56 or by Art. 115 of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1908, and a suit, more than three years of the date on which the **work** **was** **done** **and** **in** **any** **event** **of** **the** **date** **on** **which** **the** **claim** **was** rejected, was barred. Allowing the apeal to this Court and restoring the **decree** **for** **the** **trial** **court,** HELD : (i) Article _56_ of the First Schedule to the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, prescribes a period of three years for a suit for the price of the work done by the plaintiff for the defendant at his request. where no time has been fixed for payment, and the period of limitation commences to run from the date when the work is done. A suit is governed by Art. _5_ 6 if it arises out of a contract to pay the pric.e of work done at the request of the defendant. The claim in the present case is for pavment lllOt an additiolllll rate over the stipulated rate in view of change in circumstances and not for the price of work done by the appellant. even though the additional work was done at the. request of the Engineer-incharge. [51 Fl (ii) Article _115_ of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act is a residuary article dealing with the claim for compensation for the breach of any oontract, express or implied, not in writing registered and not specially provided for in the 'first schedule. The period of limitation in 'uch cases . is three years and it commences to run when the contract is **broken,. or** **where** **there** **are** **&uccessive** **breaches** **whe.n** **the** **breach** **in** **respect** of which the suit is instituted occurs or where the breach is continuing when it ceases. The suit filed by the appellant company is not a suit for ccmpensation for breach of contract express or implied; it is a suit for enhanced rate because of change of circumstances, and in respect of work not CQ\>ered by the contract. The additional work directed bv the. Engineer-in-charge whe.n carried out may be deemed to be done under the 48 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1970] 3 S.C.R. terms of the IX)nb:act; but the claim for enhanced rates does not arise **A** **out** **of** **the contract :** **it** **is** **in** **any** **case** **not** **a .claim** **for** **compensation** **for** breach of contract. [51 HJ **(iii)** **The claim** **is,** **therefore, not covered** **by** **any** **specific** **article** **under** the First Schedule and must fall within the terms of Art. 120. Under this Article the period of six years commences to run when the right **to** **sue** **accrues.** **There** **is** **no** **right** **.to** **sue** **until** **there** **is** **an** **accrual** **of** **the** right asserted in the suit and its infringement or at least a clear and 'un- R equivocal threat to infringe the right by the defendant against whom the suit is instituted. [52 CJ _Bolo_ v .. _Kokao 9nd Others,_ L.R. 87 I.A. 325, referred to. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 2584 and 2585 of 1966. Appeals from the judgment and decrees dated January 19, 1965 of the Patna High Court in First Appeals Nos. 190 and 213. of 1960. _H._ _R. Gokhale,_ _G._ _L._ _Sanghi,_ _J._ _B. Dadachanji_ and _Ravinder_ _.Narain,_ for the appellant (in both the appeals). _Jagdish Swarup, Solicitor-General, V._ _A._ _Seyid Muhammad,_ _B._ _D. Sharma_ and _S._ _P._ _Nayar,_ for the respondent (in both the appeals). The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Shah, J. The Government of India invited tenders for "reinforced concrete work relating to the foundation and superstructure of the Fertilizer Factory building at Sindri" in the State of Bihar. The tender submitted by the appellant Company was accepted on November 22, 1947 and a formal contract in that behalf was executed on November 26, 1948. By cl .. 12 of the ~ontract. insofar as it is relevant, it was provided : "The Engineer-in-charge shall have power to make any alterations in, omissions from, additions to, or substitutions for, the original specifications, drawings,. ##### designs artd insiructlons, ......, and the :::<>ntractor shall be bound to carry out the work in accordance with ##### any i,nstructions which may be given to him ....... . and any altered, additional or substituted work which the contractor may be directed' to . do in the manner above specified as part of the work shall be carried out by the contractor on the same conditions in all respects on which he agreed to do the main work, and at the same rates as are specified in that tender for the main work. . . . . . . And if the altered, additional or substi· tuted work includes any class of work, for which ncnate is specified in this contract, then such class of work shall #### c **D** E F G #### .. A B #### c D E F G H .· GANNON DUNKERLEY I', UNION _(Shah,_ J.) 49 be carried out at the rates entered in the current schedule of rates of the Hazaribagh P.W.D. district which was in force at the time of the acceptance of the contract minus/plus the percentage which the total tendered amount bears to the estimated cost of the entire work put to tender, and if the altered, additional or substituted work is not entered in the said schedule of rates, then the contractor shall within seven days of the date of his receipt of the order to carry out tht; work inform the Engineer-in-charge of the rate which it is his intention to charge for such class of work, and if the Engineer-incharge does not agree to this rate he shall, by notice in writing, be at liberty to cancel his order to carry out ##### such class of work, ...... provided ...... that if the contractor shall commence work or incur any expenditure in regard thereto before the rates shall have been determined . . . . . . then . . . . he shall only be entitled to be paid in respect of the work carried out or expenditure incurred . . . . . . according to such rates as shall be fixed by the Engineer-in-charge. In the event of a dispute, the decision of tlfe Superintending Engineer of the Circle shall be final." Clause 25 of the agreement provided, insofar as it is relevant : "Except where otherwise provided in the contract all questions and disputes relating to the meaning of the ·specifications, designs, drawings, and instructions, hereinbefore mentioned and as to the quality of workmanship,. or mat~rial~ used on the work, or as to any other quest10'.1•. claim, n~ht, matte~ or thing whatsoever, in any way ansmg out of, or relatmg to the contract, designs, drawmgs, specifications, estimates, instructions, orders or these conditions, or otherwise concerning the works, or tlie execution, or failure to execute the same, whether arising during the progress of the work or after the com' pletion or abandonment thereof shall be referred to a ##### Superintending Engineer ...... to be nominated by the Chief Engineer for arbitration in thQ manner provided ##### by law relating to arbitration ......., " The Sindri Factory Buildings were to be constructed under the advice and guidance of M/s. Chemical Construction Corporation of New York. That Firm made delay in supplying the drawings and specifications which involved work of a complicated nature not included m the original contract. Time for completion of the work was on that account eii:tended till February 26, 1950. On September 20, 1950 the appellant Company made a demand for payment at an enhanced rate of 421% over the basic ###### so SUPREME COURT REPORTS fl 970] 3 s.c.R. rates s1ipulated under the original contract. This claim was made on five grounds : 1. That there was a "substantial deviation" in the nature of work of which the detailed work draw ings were supplied to the appellant Company after the date of the contract. The work involved was of a complex nature requiring highly skilled Jabour, and that additional labour and materials not covered by the contract rates were required; 2. That there was "great increase in the price of materials 'and labour on account of undue prolongation of the period of work;" 3. That there was increase in the cost of transportation on account of rise in the price of petrol and mcrease in railway freight; 4. That the Government of India entered into other contracts incidental to the construction of the Sindri Factory at substantially higher rates which directly affected the cost of labour and materials of the appellant Company who had to compete with the other contractors; 5. That additional work ordered to be done involved in many instances quantity of work several times the work set out in the contract. By his letter dated September 13, 1950, the Additional Chief Engineer rejected the claim. In September 1954 the disputes relating to the claim for rise in cost of material and labour due to delay in supplying detailed work drawings, the claim .·arising from rise in price of petrol and for increase in the cost of material and labour due to other contractors working on the site, were referred to arbitration, but northe claims for revision of rates due to complex nature of the work ·and increase in the quantity of work. # The arbitrator rejected the claims of the Company m respect of the matters which were referred. Thereafter the appellant Company filed a suit on August 9, 1956, against the Union of India, for a decree for Rs. 3,62,674/9/6 being the amount cfaimed at the rate of 42!% above the contract ra~ in the alternative, a, decree for Rs. 2,44,000/, being the amount ch1imed at the rate of 28.l % above the contract rate as recommended by the Executive Engimeer, and in the further aiternative, a decree for Rs. 1,36,222/ at the rate of 18 .17 % above the contract rate as certified by the Superintending Engineer. The Union of India contended, _inter_ _alia,_ that the claim was barred by the law of limitation. A B #### c D E F G H B ### c D E F G ff GANNON DUNKERLEY V. UNION _(Shah,_ J.) 51 The Trial Court held that the claim was not. barred by the law of limitation and decreed the claim for Rs. 1,36,222/- as certified by the Superintending Engineer. Agins! the decree passed by the Trial Court the appellant Company as well as the Union of India appealed to the High Court. Before the High Court, in support of the appeal only the plea of limitation was pressed on behalf of the Union of India. In the view of the High Court the claim was governed either by Art. 5 6 or by Art. 115 of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1908, and the suit not having been filed within three years of the Jate on which the work was done and in any event of the date on which the claim was rejected was barred. The appellant Company has appealed to this Court with certificate. The appellant Company had undertaken under the terms of the contract to do specific construction work at "basic rates". The Engineer-in-charge was by the terms of cl. 12 of the agreement competent to give instructions for work not covered by the tenns of the contract, and it was provided that remuneration shall be paid at the rate fixed by the Engineer-in-charge for such additional work, and in case of dispute the decision of the Superintending Engineer shall be final. It is common ground that the claim made by the appellant Company was not covered by the arbitration agreement, and on that account it was not referred to the arbitrator. The claim in suit related to the revision of rates due to the complex nature of the work and due to increase in the quantity of work and also grant of contracts to other competing parties at substantially higher rates and other related matters. Article 56 of the First Schedule to the Indian Limitation Act. 1908, prescribes a period of three years for a suit for the price of, work done b)' the plaintiff for the defendant at his request, where no time has been fixed for payment, and the period of limitation commences to run from the date when the work is done. A suit is governed by Art. 56 if it arises out of a contract to pay the price of work done at the request of the defendant. The claim in the present case is for payment at an additional rate over the stipulated rate in view of change in circumstances, and not for ###### price of work done by the appellant Company. It is true that additional work was done at the request of the Engineer-in-charge, but the claim in suit was not for the price of work done but for enhanced rates in view of altered circumstances. Article 115 of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act is a residuary article dealing with the claim for compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied, not in writing registered and not specially provided for, in the First Schedule. The period of limitation in such cases is three years and it commences 52 SUPREME,COURT REPORTS [1970] 3 s.c.R. to run when the contract is broken, or where there are successive breaches when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs, or where the breach is continuing when it ceases. The suit filed by the appellant Comp11.ny is not a suit for compensation for breach of contract express or implied : it is a suit for enhanced rate because of change of circumstances, and in respect of work not covered by the contract. The additiQnal work directed by the Engineer-in-charge when carried out may be deemed to be done under the terms of the contract : bat the claim for enhanced rates ·does not arise out of the contract : it is in any case not a claim for compensation for breach of contract. A B \ The claim is therefore not covered by any specific article under the First Schedule, and must fall within the terms of Art. 120. C The Solicitor-General appearing on behalf of the Union of India contended that even if the claim falls within the terms of Art. 120 of the Limitation Act, it was barred, for, the appellant Company had in the suit made a claim for work done more than six years before the institution of the suit. Counsel submitted that under Art. 120 the period of limitation commences to run from the date D on which the defendant obtains the benefit of the work done by the plaintiff. But under Art. 120 of the Limitation Act the period of six years for suits for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in the Schedule commences to run when the right to sue accrues. In our judgment, tliere is no right to sue until there is an accrual of the right asserted in the suit, and .its infringement, or E at least a clear and unequivocal threat to infringe that right by the defendant against whom the suit is instituted : _Bolo_ v. _Kokan_ _and·_ _Others(')._ The appeals are allowed and the decree passed by the Trial Court is restored with costs in the High Court and in this Court. One hearing fee. The appellant will be entitled to ihterest on the F' amount decreed at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of the suit till payment. ###### R.KP.S. Appeals allowetf_ (I l L.R. 57 I.A. 325 at ~~p.~~ 331.