High CourtDivision BenchAppeal dismissed

Gammon India Ltd. v. Niranjan Dass

Case / Petition Number:Civil Appeal No. 1741 of 1980
Neutral Citation:1984 SCR 959

Case Details & Bench

Court
High Court
Hon'ble Judges
  • D.A. Desai
  • R.B. Misra
  • Ranganath Misra
Judgment Date
1983-12-05
Court Decision / Holding
Appeal dismissed. The Supreme Court held that the termination was a case of retrenchment rather than closure, failed to satisfy the prerequisites of Section 25F, and accordingly reinstated the Industrial Tribunal’s award. The respondent was held entitled to back wages, continued service until superannuation, and terminal benefits, with 12% interest on arrears and costs awarded to the respondent.
Final Disposition
Appeal dismissed

Parties to the Case

Appellants / Petitioners

  • Gammon India Ltd.

Respondents

  • Niranjan Dass

Legal Representation & Advocates

Counsels for Petitioners

  • • Mr. U.R. Lalit
  • • Mr. V.N. Ganpule
  • • Mrs. V.D. Khanna

Counsels for Respondents

  • • Mr. Jitendra Sharma

Case Synopsis & Summary

This is a Civil Appeal arising from a reference under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, concerning the termination of Niranjan Dass, a Senior Clerk employed by Gammon India Ltd. The respondent received a notice dated September 14, 1967, stating that his services would not be required after October 14, 1967 due to a recession in the company’s volume of business. The Government referred the dispute to an Industrial Tribunal to determine whether the retrenchment was unjustified or illegal. The Tribunal held retrenchment to be illegal and unjustified and directed that the respondent continue in service with back wages. The Delhi High Court initially held that the termination was governed by Section 25FFF (closure) and not retrenchment, hence no compensation was payable; a Letters Patent Appeal restored the Tribunal’s award. The Supreme Court, however, disagreed with the closure rationale, ruling that the termination was a case of retrenchment, not closure, and that the statutory pre‑conditions of Section 25F were not complied with. It upheld the Tribunal’s finding and directed reinstatement with back wages and other benefits, including interest and costs. The decision clarifies that termination for recession can amount to retrenchment unless specific closure provisions apply, and it highlights the need to comply with the preconditions of valid retrenchment. The appeal is dismissed, and the respondent is to be treated as continuing in service to superannuation with back wages and terminal benefits where appropriate.

Provisions of Law Cited

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, Sec 2(oo) (retrenchment)Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, Sec 25F (pre-requisites for retrenchment)Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, Sec 25FFF (closure)Article 226 (writ jurisdiction)

Legal Doctrines & Maxims

  • ipso facto retrenchment

Submissions & Arguments

Contentions of Appellants / Petitioners

The appellant contends that the Delhi office closure is not retrenchment but closure under Sec. 25FFF, making the termination valid without the preconditions of Sec. 25F and without compensation. It is argued that the reference was about whether retrenchment was illegal or unjustified and that the case concerns closure rather than retrenchment; therefore, the High Court misapplied Sec. 25FFF and the Tribunal’s remit. The appellant urges that the termination followed a closure of an office, a distinct category from retrenchment, and that the remedy lies in respecting the closure framework rather than treating the layoff as retrenchment.

Contentions of Respondents

The respondent contends that the termination was retrenchment under Sec. 2(oo) and not closure. The notice recited recession in the volume of work and did not state Delhi office closure; the pre‑requisites of Sec. 25F were not complied with, rendering the retrenchment void ab initio. The reference required the Tribunal to determine illegality or unjustified retrenchment, and thus the respondent seeks reinstatement with back wages, revised pay scales, and terminal benefits, along with interest and costs, as losses from unlawful removal from service.

Cited Precedents (7)

Case NameCitationTreatmentExplanation
Pipraich Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Pipraich Sugar Mills Mazdoor Union[1956] SCR 172OverruledThe judgment notes that the Pipraich view does not hold the field in light of later decisions (State Bank of India v N. Sundara Money, Hindustan Steel, etc.), effectively overruling that stance on retrenchment versus closure.
State Bank of India v. N. Sundara Money[1976] 3 SCR 160PositiveCited as part of the line of decisions that shaped the modern understanding of retrenchment and related remedies.
Hindustan Steel Ltd. v. The Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Orissa and others[1977] 1 SCR 586PositiveCited as supportive authority for the retrenchment framework post‑Pipraich and for subsequent interpretations.
Santosh Gupta v. State Bank of Patiala[1980] 3 SCR 340PositiveCited as part of the evolving jurisprudence on retrenchment versus closure and the prerequisites for valid retrenchment.
Delhi Cloth and General Mills Ltd. v. Shambu Nath Mukerjee[1978] SCR 591PositiveCited within the lineage of decisions on retrenchment and closure, contributing to the current reasoning.
Mohan Lal v. Management of M/s Bharat Electronics Ltd.[1981] 3 SCR 518PositiveCited as authority in the retrenchment doctrine and its limitations.
L. Robert D'souza v. The Executive Engineer, Southern Railway & Anr.[1982] 3 SCR 251PositiveCited as part of the judicial guidance on retrenchment and related remedies.

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Extracted Judgment Text

Exact text extracted from official judgment records.

A B ##### c D # f 959 - GAMON INDIA LIMITED _v._ NIRANJAN DASS _December 5,_ _1983 ._ . · [0.A. DESAI, R.B. MISRA AND RANGANATH MISRA, JJ,J _Industrial_ _Disputes Act_ _1947,_ _Section 2_ _(oo)_ _retrenchmetJt-What_ _is-_ _Services terminated on account of recession in_ _work':'"·Termiliation_ _whether O!flOUnts_ _to retrenchment._ The respondent was employed by the appellant!Company as a Senior Clerk till he received a notice terminating his services. The notice stated that on account of reduction in volume of the business of the Company as a result of recession, his serviceS were being terminated. On a reference by the Government, whether_ the retrenchment of the respondent was unjuStified or illegal the Industrial Tribunal held that since the conditions for a villid retrenchment have not been complied with, the respon· dent continued to be in service . Dismissing the Appeal of the Company, · HELD: 1. The award of the Tribunal was correct and unassailable. The respondent had become surplus on account of reduction in volume of work and that constitutes retrenchment· even in the traditional sense of the term [963 HJ _Pipraich Sugar Mills Ltd._ v. _Pipraich Sugar Mills Mazdoor Union,_ [1956) SCR 172; _State Bank_ _of India_ v. _N._ _Sundara Money,_ [1976] 3 SCR 160; _Hindustan_ _Steel Ltd._ v. _The Presiding Officer, Labour Court. Orjssa and others,_ [1977] 1 SCR _S86; Santosh Gupta_ v. _State Bank of Patiala,_ (1980] 3 SCR 340; _Delhi Cloth_ _and_ ·Jn a petition undei Acticle 226, a Single Judge held that since the termination OT the services was consequent upon the closure of the Delhi office, E the case would be governed by Section 25 FFF of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 which does not prescribe payment of co1npensation as a cOndition precedent to a valid termination of service by way of retrenchment. In the Letters Patent Appeal, the Division Bench set aside the judgment of the SingJc Judge on the ground that the reference to the Industriat Tribunal was to consider whether the retrenchment was illegal or unjustified and there- . F - fore it was not open to the Single Judge to come to the conclusion that the case waS one of closure governed by Section 25 F FF. The Division Bench therefore restored the Tribunal's award. G H . ·~ b D H 960 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1984) I 9,C.ll. _Genrol_ _Mills Ltd._ v. _Shambu_ _Nath_ _Mukerjee,_ [1978] l SCR 591; _Mohah._ _Lal_ v . _Manaffement_ _of_ _M/s_ _Bharat Electronict Ltd._ [1981] 3 SCR 518; _L. Robert D'suoza_ v. _The Executive Engineer, Southirn Railway_ & _Anr._ [1982] 3 SCR 251, referred ' - t.o. 2. Tho pre-requisite for a_ valid retrenchm.ent as laid down in Section _'25_ F has not been complied with, and therefore the retr"nchmeot bringing about termination.of service ia _ab_ ~nitio :void. [964 E] in the instant _case, the n·otice fecites that as a result of the recession in the volum_e of the work of the company, the services of the respondent would not be required by tho company after October 14, 1967 and that this notice contemplated by section 25F ca). Not even on~ word is Stated in the notice that the_ office·to which the reS:pondent was attached was -in the process of being closed down, so his seri<ices.would no more be required. [963 D-E) • - ### 3. The terminatiori • of service for the reasons mentioned in the notice is n0 t covered by any of the Clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Section 2 (oo) which defines retrepchment anjf it is now well-settled that where the termination of service does not fall wJthin any of the excluded categories, the termination would be _ipso_ _facto_ retrenchment. It was not even attemPted to be urged that the case of the respondent would fatl in any of the excluded categories. It is there!or.e, indisputably a case of retrenchment. [964 C-D] 4 (i). The appellant will have to establish the fact that the respondent has· reached the age of superannuation and that physical. re-instatement is not - possible. [965 A] (ii). The respondent 'will be entitled to all backwages including benefit of rCvised ·wag'es or salary i-f there is revis_ion of pay-~ales with yearly increment, revised d~arriess _al1owa.i:ice or vafiable dearness allowance and all terminal benefits if be waS reached the age of superanriuaiion i;uch as Provident Fund, Gratuity etc. Back wap should be calculated as if the respondent continued in sorvico uninterrupted.' [965 B-CJ (iii). Tho respondent has been unlawfully kept out of service. The appellant-company shall therefore pay aU the arrears with 12 per cent; interest from the date the amount became due and payable tjll realisation. [965 DJ CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal .. No. 1741 of 1980. ~ Fr9m the Judgment and Order dated. 16th January, 1980 of the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi, in Letters Patent Appeal No. 25 of 1970. . ' _U.R._ _Lalit, V,N .._ _Ganpule_ and. _Mrs._ _V.D._ _Khanna_ for the Appellant, _)_ .. GAMMON INDIA LTD. _v._ NIRANJAN DASS _(Desai,_ _J.)_ 961 _Jitendra_ _Sharma_ for the Respondent. The Judgment of the Court was -Oelivered by .DESAI; J. Respondent Shri Niranjan Dass was employed as a Senior Clerk by the appellant-company as per the appointment order contained in the letter dated April 10, 1962. The letter of appointment _inter alia_ provided that the respondent may be· posted anywhere in India or abroad as per the requirements of the company and it was signed by its Zonal Manager, Central Zo.ne, Delhi. Respondent continued to serye in that capacity when on September 14, 1967, he was served with a notice terminating his services. The notice reads as under : Your leave shall run.· concurrently with the notice period, and you may avail of.leave due to you, if any, during the notice period. Personnel Section at Head Office have been advised to settle your dues, and you may write to them in the matter . We take this opportunity to thank you for your past s.ervices, and it is very unfortunate that tl;ie present circumstances have compelled us to issue this notice .. A B ###### c E F "Due to the reduction in the volume of business of the Company as a result of the recession in· (sic) services . will not be required by the company after the 14th' October,'1967, and this may be treated as statutory notice {) of <me month of termination of your.service. Should it be possible for us to offer you a job at any of our works sites at a later date, we shall inake you a fresh offer at that time." G Respondent raised an indµstrial dispute and the appropriate Government by the order dated May 30, 1968 referred the industrial dispute for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal. The reference was couched in the fol!owin$ language. · A B ##### c D .E F 962 ·SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1984) 1 s.c.R. ## . . "Whether the retrenchment ·of Shri Niranjan Dass is unjustified or illegal and if so, what directions are necessary in this respect." By the award dated February 25, 1969. ihe Industrial Tribunal held that the retrenchment of the respondent was illegal ~nd unjustified and gave a declaration that he continues to be in service of the appellant-company and is entitled to: his wages till he _ii_ lawfully retrenched. Appellant-company challenged the award in Civil Writ No. 462 of 1969 filed by it in the High Court. of Delhi. A learned Single Judge held that as the Delhi·office of the appellant-company was closed, the case of the respondent would be ·governed . by Sec. 25FFF being termination consequent upon closure, and therefore payment of compensation was not a condition precedent and the termination of service was valid, The learned Judge accordingly set aside the award .and remitted the matter to the Tribunal to decide what directions, if any, are necessary in respect of reterenchment of the respondent in the light of the discussion in the judgment Respondent preferred Letters Patent Appeal No .. 25 of 1970 against the decision of the learned Single Judge. A Division' Bench of Delhi High Court held that the reference made by the appropriate Government required the Indust'rial Tribunal to consider whether the retrenchment. was illegal or unjustified and therefore it was ·implicit in the reference itself that it was a·case of retrenchment, validity' of which to be examined in the reference and therefote it was not open to the learned Single Judge to change the 'base' of the reference an\! to come to the conclusion that the case was one of closure of the .the lndustrial undertaking. governed by Sec. 25FFF of !>he Industrial . Disputes Act. Approaching the matter from this angle, the Divison Bench set aside the decision of the learned Single Judge and .restored the award made by the Industrial, Tribunal. Hence this appeal by the company by special leave. The Industrial Tribunal held that respondent was retrenched from service by the appellant and the pre-conditions for a va(id retrenchment were not complied with and therefore the respondent was entitled to a· declaration that he contines ro· be in service with all the benefits flowing from the said declaration. · A· learned Single Judge of the High Court interfered with this award ~olding that the appellant-company had closed its Delhi· office and therefore the termination of service was consequent upon the closure and even if it constitutes retrenchment, the case would be governed by Sec. _;!SFFF_ whfoh does not prescribe payment of compensation as a _t_ ##### .. •· ### 't . #### i ;.. I ##### ~ GAMMON INDlA LTD. _v._ NIRANJAN DASS _(Desai,_ _J.)_ . 9~3 condition-precedent to a valid termination of service by way of teterncbment. In the Letters Patent Appeal at the inst.ance of the respond~nt, the Division Bench set aside tlie judgment of the .learned Single Judge holding that it was not open to the learned Single Judge to bold that it was a case of closure covered by Sec. 25FFF because it was implicit in the reference that the .case was one of retrenchment and the only question with the Industrial Tribunal was called upon to .. deci.de. was whether the retrenchment was unjustified - or illegal. It is not necessary to examine the view expressed·. by the - Divison Bench of tlie High Court whether the assumption underlying ·an order of reference is unquestionable at the hearing of the reference. The question, however, is wheth~r the learned Single Judge, who .interfered with the award of the Tribunal was justified in coming to the conclusion that the case was one of closure covered by Sec. 25FFF or the Industrial Tribunal was right in holding that ·it i~ a case of retrenchment covered by Sec. 25F of Industrial ·Disputes Act. This point can be answered by mere refrrence to the notice ser~ed by the appe!lant·company on the respondent intimating to him that his services will no more be required effective from October 14, 1967. The.notice as a whole ltas been extracted hereinbefore. The notice recites that as a result of recession in the volume of work oi'the company, services of the respondent would nO" more be required by the company after October 14, 1967 and this notice n\ay be treated as a statutory notice as contemplated by Sec. 25F(a). There is not even a whisper in the notice that as the Delhi office is being closed down, the services of the respondent would not be required. An attempt was made while.leading evidence before. the Industrial Tribunal to show that the Zonal office at Delhi was closed on January 31, 1968 whil.e the Central Zone' office was closed somewhere in October, 1967. If by September, 1967, the appellantcompany had resolved to close the office at Delhi to which the respondent was attached, it is unthinkable that ·that aspect would noi be recited in the notice. The necessity for termination of service of the respondent recited in the notice was recession in the work handled by the company. 'Not even one word is stated in the notice that the office to which the respondent was attached was in the process of being closed down, so his services would no more be required. On a true construction of the notice, it would appear that the respondent .had become surplus on account of reduction in volume of work and that constitutes retrenchment even in the traditional sense of the term as interpreted in _Pipraich_ _Sugar Mills Ltd._ v. _Pipraich Sugar Mills_ A B c D E F H SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1984] 1 s.C,I\. _Mazdoor Union(')_ though that view does not'hold the field. in view - of the recent decisions of this Court in _State ·Bank_ _of India_ v. _N. Sundara Money(') Hindustan Steel Ltd.·_ v. _The_ _Presiding Officer,_ _Labour Co1,1rt,_ _Orissa and Others;(') Santosh Gupta_ v. _State Bank_ _of_ _Pat/a/a;(') Delhi Cloth and General Mills Ltd._ v. _Shambu Nath_ _Mukerjee;(_ _[5]_ _)_ _Mohan_ _Lal_ v. _'Management_ _of_ _M/s Bharat Electronics_ _Ltd(')_ and _L._ _Robert D'souza_ ·v. _The_ _Executive Engineer, Southern·_ _Railway_ & _Anr.(_ _[1]_ _)_ The recitals and averments in the notice leave no• room for doubt that the service of . the respondent was terminated for the reason that on account of .recession and reduction in the volume of work of the company, respondent has become surplus. Even apart from this, the termination of service 'for the reasons mentioned in the notice is not covered by any of the clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Sec. 2(oo) which defines retrenchment and it' is by now well-settled that where the termination of service does not fall within any of the excluded categories, the termination would be _ipso_ _facto_ reternchment. It was not even. attempted to be urged that the case of the respondent would fall in any of the excluded categories. It is there indisputably a case of retrenchment. It is not disputed that the pre-requisite for a valid retrenchment as laid down in Sec. 25F has not been complied with and therefore the.retrenchmenLbringing about termination of service is _a/1_ _initio_ void. Viewed from this angle, the award of the Industrial Tribunal was· correct and unassialable and the learned Single Judge was in errodn interfering with the same.' Undoubtedly, the Division Bench of the High Court has set aside the order of the learned Single Judge and restored the award for reasons ·of its own. However, for the reasons herein indicated, the decision of the Division Bench in Letters.Patent Appeal No. 25 of 1970 is. upheld and ·confirmed and this appeal must therefore fail and accordingly it is dismissed. · ' In the course of hearing of this appeal, it was stated that the respondent has reached the age of superannuation therefore physical re-instatement in service is. not possible. . Appellant will have to (lY [19561 SCR I 72 . (2) {1976] _3_ SCR 160 (3) [1977] 1 SCR 586 (4) [1980] 3 SCR·340 (5) 1197811 SCR 591 (6) (1981] 3 SCR, 518 (7) . [1982) 3 SCR 251 A B D E F G ###### ·e '· ### ~ i ! dAMMON INDIA tTo. f, NiRANJAN DASS _(Desai,_ /.) 96~ . establish that fact but in the event, the appellant shows that under a valid rule, respondent.,has reached the stage of superannuation and therefore physical re•instatement is not possible, it is hereby declared that the respondent shall continue to )le in service un·interruptedly from the date of the attempted termination of seruice till the date of sup~rannuation. - Resp~ndent won.Id be entitled to all back wages including the benefit o~ revised wages or salaiy if during the period there is revision of p_ay'scales with yearly focrement, revised dearness allowance or variable dearness allowance and. all terminal b"enefits if . he .has reached the age .of superannuation such as Provident Fund, Gratuity etc. Back wages should be calculated as. if the respondent . · continued in service uninterrupted_ He is also entitled to "leave encashment and bonus if other workmen-in the same category were paid the same. It appears that the respondent h.as been unlawfully kept out o[ service, therefore it is but just that the appellant-company shall pay all the ·arrears as calculated according to the directions here· in given with 12% interest from the date the amount became due and payable till realisation. Appellant shall also pay costs - to the respondent quantified at Rs. 5,000.· The appellant is directed to ·pay the amount as herein directed to be paid within 3 months.from today.'. ' Mr: Jitendra Sharma, learned counsel for the respondent stated that the costs awarded to the respondent be paid to the legal Aid Cell set up by Indian Association of Lawyers in colloboration ·with Woinens' Council. Order accordingly. ·Ns.K. _Appeal dismused._ ' ###### c D E F