Fuljit Kaur v. State of Punjab & Ors.

(2010] 7 S.C.R. 317 A ## FULJIT KAUR _v._ STATE OF PUNJAB & ORS. (Civil Appeal No. 5292 of 2004) ## JUNE 3, 2010 B # **[DR. B.S. CHAUHAN AND SWATANTER KUMAR, JJ.]** . _Punjab Urban Estate (Sale of Sites) Rules, 1965:_ _rr. 2(aaj, 2(e), 4, 5-A_ - _'Additional price', 'tentative price',_ c - _'sale price' and 'liability to pay additional price' 'Provisional_ . _price' and 'tentative price'_ - _Connotation of_ - _Allotment of plot_ - - _in haste Allottee asked. to deposit 'provisional price'_ - _Subsequently, demand raised for additional price High Court upholding the demand notice_ - _HELD: There is_ a 0 _difference between 'provisional price' and 'tentative price' and it may take_ a _long time for the State to determine the tentative price_ - _There is nothing in the scheme of the Act or the Rules indicating that_ a _person to whom the plot has been allotted_ · _cannot be aske.d to pay the 'tentative price'"""'. Further, the sale_ E . _price in the cases covered by the land acquisition Act is the aggregate of the tentative price and, the 'additional price' which is attributable to the enhanced compensation awarded_ - _by the reference court High Court has rightly relied upon the case of Preeta Singh wherein Supreme Court upheld the 'sale price' as determined under r.4_ F F · _Punjab Urban Estates (Development and Regulation) Act, 1964:_ - - _Urban Development Housing Constitution of India, 1950_ - _Articles 14 and 136._ _Constitution of India, 1950:_ - - _Article 136 Dismissal of SLP in limine HELD: Does_ 317 H SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010) 7 S.C.R. 318 A _not operate as res judicata_ - _Nor does it mean that the judgment of High Court has been affirmed_ - _Nor can the impugned judgment be said to have merged with such_ a _dismissal order passed by Supreme Court_ - _An order rejecting a special leave petition at the threshold without_ B _detailed reasons therefor does not constitute any declaration of law or_ a _binding precedent_ - _Punjab Urban Estate (Sale of Sites) Rules, 1965_ - _Doctrine of merger_ - _Precedents._ _Article 14_ - _Equality before law_ - _HELD: Is a trite, which_ C _cannot be claimed in illegality and, therefore, cannot be claimed by_ a _citizen or enforced by_ a _court in a negative manner_ - _A wrong decision in favour of any particular party does not entitle any other party to claim its benefits_ - _Punjab Urban Estate (Sale of Sites) Rules, 1965._ D The appellant applied on 23.2.1987 for allotment of a residential plot in an urban area. On 25.2.1987, an allotment letter allotting a 400 sq. yard plot was issued to the appellant asking her to deposit the "provisional price". Subsequently, by letter dated 25.3.1992 the E additional demand was made. The allottee filed a writ petition before the High Court challenging the additional demand as arbitrary and unreasonable. The High Court upheld the demand notice. F In the instant appeal filed by the allottee, it was contended for the appellant that the High Court committed an error in dismissing the writ petition of the appellant and relying upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in _Preeta Singh's_ case1. It was submitted that in the case of D.S. _Laungia[2 ]_ such unreasonable and arbitrary G demand was quashed by the High Court and the said judgment attained finality as the special leave petition 1. _Preeta Singh_ & _Ors. vs. Haryana Urban Development Authority_ & _Ors._ 1996 (1) Suppl. scR 621 = (1996) a sec 756. 2. D.S. _Laungia_ & _Anr. vs. The_ State _of Punjab_ & _Ors._ AIR 1993 Pub. & Har. H 54. FULJIT KAUR _v._ STATE OF PUNJAB & ORS. 319 preferred by the State against the said judgment was A withdrawn; that pursuant to the direction of the Supreme Court, though the additional price was determined, but no recovery was made from D.S. Laungia and, therefore, the appeal deserved to be allowed. B ## Dismissing the appeal, the Court > 1.1. There is a difference between the "provisional price" and the "tentative price" and it may take a long time for the State to determine the tentative price. A perusal of rr. 2(aa), 2(e), 4 and 5-A of the Punjab Urban Estate C (Sale of Sites) Rules, 1965 shows that the "tentative price" means the price determined by the State Government from time to time in respect of a sale of site by allotment and while doing so, the Government has to ,take into consideration various factors including the a~ount paid D as compensation; the phrase "additional price" has been defined as the price determined by the State Government having regard to the enhanced compensation payable to :lhe iand owners in pursuance of the award passed by the <tourt on a reference made u/s 18 or further appeal under E ihe Land Acquisition Act 1894; and the "sale price" is the . price payable in respect of an allotment of site, which is th~ aggregate of the tentative price and the additional price, in case the land has been acquired under the 1894 Act. There is nothing in the scheme of the Punjab Urban F ·Estates (Development and Regulation) Act 1964 or the · 1965 Rules from which it can be inferred that tentative price is synonymous with the provisional price, and that a person, to whom the plot has been allotted on provisional price, cannot be asked to pay the tentative G price determined by the government. (para 18-19] (335A-G] 1.2. In the instant case, the calculations were furnished by the respondents as to on what basis tentative price had been determined. There is nothing on H 320 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2010] 7 S.C.R. A record to show that the tentative price determined by the State was unreasonable or arbitrary nor is it the case of the allottee that the market value of the land has not been enhanced while deciding the reference under the 1894 Act. While deciding this case, the High Court placed B heavy reliance upon the judgment of this Court in _Preeta Singh,_ wherein, after taking note of various statutory provisions of Act of 1964 and the 1965 Rules, particularly, r.2(aa), the Court upheld the sale price as determined in Rule 4. The High Court has taken into consideration all c statutory provisions, the calculations made by the respondents as to under what circumstances the "tentative- price" had been fixed, and reached the conclusion that the demand was justified. The High Court also rejected the plea that judgment in _D.S. Laungia_ was an authority on the issue. [para 16, 20 and 22] [335-H; 0 338-B-C; 333-B-C] _Preeta Singh_ & Ors. Vs. _Haryana Urban Development Authority_ & Ors. 1996 (1) Suppl. SCR 621- = {1996) 8 SCC 756; _Bangalore Development Authority_ Vs. _Syndicate Bank_ E (2007) 6 $CC 711; _Tamil Nadu Housing Board_ & Ors. _Vs._ Sea _Shore Apartments Owners' Welfare Association_ 2008 (1) SCR 370 = (2008) 3 SCC 21, relied on. D.S. _Laungia_ & _Anr._ Vs. _The State of Punjab_ & Ors. F AIR1993 Pub.&Har. 54, disapproved. > 1.3. It may be pertinent to mention here that the allotment had been made to the appellant within 48 hours of submission of her application though in ordinary cases, it takes about a year. The appellant was further G favoured to pay the provisional price in four instalments in two years, as is evident from the letter dated 8.4.1987. Making the allotment in such a hasty manner itself is arbitrary and unreasonable and is hit by Article 14 of the Constitution. This Court has consistently held that "when H a thing is done in a post-haste manner, malafide would FULJIT KAUR _v._ STATE OF PUNJAB & ORS. 321 be presumed." Anything done in undue haste can also A be termed as "arbitrary and cannot be condoned in law." Thus, such an allotment in favour of the appellant is liable to be declared to have been made in arbitrary and unreasonable manner. However, the Court is not inclined to take such drastic steps as the appellant has developed B the land subsequent to allotment. [para 26) (340-8-F] _Dr._ S.P. _Kapoor Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh_ & _Ors._ 1982 ( 1 ) SCR 1043 =AIR 1981 SC 2181; _Madhya Pradesh Hasta Shi/pa Vikas Nigam Ltd. Vs. Devendra Kumar Jain_ & C _Ors._ 1994 ( 6 ) Suppl. SCR 344 = (1995) 1 SCC 638; _Bahadursinh Lakhubhai Gohif, Vs. Jagdishbhai M. Kamalia_ & _Ors._ 2003 (6) Suppl. SCR 1023 =AIR 2004 SC 1159; and _Zenit Matap/ast P. LTd. Vs. State of Maharashtra_ & _Ors._ 2009 (14) SCR 403 = (2009)10 sec 388, relied on D 2.1. Ther~ is no dispute to the settled proposition of law tha.t dismissal of.a special leave petition _in limine_ by this Court does not mean that the reasoning of the judgment of the Hi~h Court j:lgainst which the special leave· petition has been filed stands affirmed or the E judgment and orper impugned merges with such order of this Court on dismissal _qt_ the petition. It simply means that this Court did not consider the case worth examining for the reason, which may be other than merit of the case. Nor such an order of this Court operates as _res judicata._ F An order rejecting the special leave petition at the threshold without detailed reasons therefor does not constitute any declaration of law nor a binding precedent. [para 8) [328-8-D) _Kunhayammed_ & _Ors. v. State of Kera/a_ & _Anr._ 2000 (1) G Suppl. SCR 538 = AIR 2000 SC 2587; _The Workmen of Cochin Port Trust Vs. The Board of Trustees of .the Cochin Port Trust_ & _Anr._ 1978 ( 3) SCR 971 =AIR 1978 SC 1283; _Ahmedabad Manufacturing_ & _Calico Printing_ Co. _Ltd. Vs. The Workmen_ . & _Anr._ 1981 ( 3 ) SCR . 213 =AIR 1981. SC 960; H 120101 _1_ s.~.R. 322 SUPREME COURT REPORTS - A _Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. Vs. State of Bihar_ & _Ors._ 1986 ( 3 ) SCR 553 =AIR 1986 SC 1780; _Supreme Court Employees' Welfare Association Vs. Union of India_ & _Ors._ 1989 ( 3 ) SCR 488 = AIR 1990 SC 334; _Yogendra Narayan Chowdhury_ & _Ors. Vs. Union of India_ & _Ors._ 1995 ( 6 ) Suppl. SCR - B 17 =Al~ 1996 SC 751; _Union of India_ & _Anr._ Vs. _Sher Singh_ ~..Ors. 1997 ( 1 ) SCR 1048·= AIR 1997 SC 1796; _V.M. Safgaocar_ & _Bros. (P) Ltd. Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax_ 2000 ( 2 ) SCR 1169 =AIR 2000 SC 1623; _Saurashtra Oil Mills Assn., Gujrat Vs. State of Gujrat_ & _Anr._ 2002 ( 1 ) - c SCR 1099 =AIR 2002 SC 1130; _Union of India_ & _Ors. Vs. Jaipa/ Singh_ 2003 (5) Suppl. SCR 115 = (2004) 1 SCC 121; and _Y. Satyanarayan Reddy Vs. Manda/ Revenue Officer, Andhra Pradesh_ 2009 (13 ) SCR 872 = (2009) 9 SCC 447, relied on. D _State of Maharashtra Vs. Digambar_ 1995 ( 1 ) Suppl. SCR 492 = AIR 1995 SC 1991, referred to. . 2.2. In the fact-situation of the case in _D.S. Laungia,_ the question of application of doctrine of merger did not E arise and even by no stretch of imagination it can be held that this Court has approved the judgment in D.S. Laungia, rather a different view is required to be taken in view of the fact that this Court had expressed doubts about the correctness of the said impugned Judgment. F [para 12] [331-D] 2.3. The ·respondent cannot claim parity with D.S. Laungia in view of the settled legal proposition that Article 14 of the Constitution of India does not envisage for. negative equality. Article 14 is not meant to perpetuate G illegality or fraud. It has a positive concept. Eq•1ality is a trite, which cannot be claimed in illegality and, therefore, cannot be claimed by a citizen or enforced by a court in a negative manner. If an illegality and irregularity has been committed in favour of an individual or a group of H . FULJIT KAUR _v._ STATE OF PUNJAB & ORS. · 323 individuals or a wrong order has been passed by a A judicial forum, others cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the higher or superior court for repeating or multiplying the same irregularity or illegality or for passing wrong order. A wrong order/decision in favour of any particular party does not entitle any other party to claim the benefits on B the basis of the wrong decision. Even otherwise Art.14 cannot be stretched too far, otherwise it would make function of the administration impossible. Thus, even if some other similarly situated persons have been granted some benefit inadvertently or by mistake, such order c does not confer any legal right on the appellant to get the same relief. [para 13-14) [332-A-F] _Coromande/' Fertilizers Ltd. ·Vs. Union of India_ & _Ors._ 1985 SCR 523 =AIR 1984 SC 1772; _Panchi Devi Vs. State of Rajasthan_ & _Ors._ 2008 (17) SCR 1325 = (2009) 2 SCC D 589; and _Shanti Sports Club_ & _Anr. Vs. Union of India·_ & _Ors._ 2009 (13) SCR 710 = (2009) 15 SCC 705; _Chandigarh Administration_ & _Anr Vs. Jagjit Singh_ & _Anr._ 1995 ( 1 ) SCR 126 =AIR 1995 SC 705; _Smt Sneh Prabha Vs. State of UP._ & _Ors.,_ AIR 1996 SC 540; _Jalandhar Improvement Trust Vs._ E _Sampuran Singh,_ AIR 1999 SC 1347; _State of Bihar_ & _Ors. Vs. Kameshwar Prasad Singh_ & _Anr.,_ 2000 ( 3 ) SCR 764 =AIR 2000 SC 2306; _Union of India_ & _Ors. Vs. Rakesh Kumar,_ 2001 ( 2) SCR 927 =AIR 2001 SC 1877; _Yogesh Kumar_ & _Ors. Vs. Government of NCT Delhi_ & _Ors.,_ 2003 ( 2 F ) SCR 662 = AIR 2003 SC 1241; _Union of India_ & _Anr. Vs. International Trading Company_ & _Anr.,_ 2003 (1) Suppl. SCR 55 = AIR 2003 SC 3983; _Mis Anand Button Ltd. Vs. State of Haryana_ & _Ors.,_ AIR 2005 SC 565; _K.K. Bhalla Vs. State of M.P._ & _Ors.,_ 2006 SCR 342 =AIR 2006 SC 898; G and _Maharaj Krishan Bhatt_ & _Anr. Vs. State of Jammu_ & _Kashmir_ & _Ors.,_ 2008 (11) SCR 670' = (2008) 9 SCC 24, relied on. 2.4. It cannot be said that the State could not make H 324 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 7 S.C.R. - A any recovery from D.S. Laungia. This Court, vide order dated 20.05.2010, asked the respondents to explain this - , aspect and file an affidavit of the Administrator of the Authori~y. In response thereto, an Affidavit was filed explaining the entire position in respect of the allotment - B and recovery of dues furnishing all details and according to the said affidavit, the money is being recovered from all defaulters including D.S. Laungia along with interest. [para 27] [340-G-H; 341-A-B] ## Case Law Reference |c|||| |---|---|---|---| ||1996(1)Suppl.SCR|621relied on|para 4| ||AIR1993 Pub.&Har.54|54<br>disapproved|para 4| ||1978( 3 )SCR971|reliedon|para 8| |D|1981( 3 )SCR213|relied on|para 8| ||1986(3)SCR553|relied on|para 8| ||1989( 3 )SCR488|relied on|para 8| |E|1995( 6 ) Suppl.SCR|SCR17reliedon|para 8| ||1997( 1 )SCR1048|reliedon|para 8| ||2000( 2 )SCR1169|relied on|para 8| |F|2002( 1 )SCR1099|relied on|para 8| ||2003(5)Suppl.SCR11.5.Felie~.on||para 8| ||2009(13)SCR872|reliedon|para 8| ||1995 ( 1 ) Suppl.SCR|SCR492referred to|para 9| |G|||| ||2000( 1 ) Suppl.SCR538relied on||para10| ||(1985)SCR523|relied on|para13| ||2008(17)SCR1325|relied on|para13| H FULJIT KAUR _v._ STATE OF PUNJAB & ORS. 325 ||2009(13)SCR710|relied on|para 13|A| |---|---|---|---|---| ||1995 ( 1 )SCR126|relied on|para 14|| ||AIR 1996SC540|relied on|para 14|| ||AIR 1999SC1347|relied on|para 14|8| ||Anr., 2000 ( 3 )SCR764 relied on||para 14|| ||2001( 2 )SCR927|relied on|para 14|| ||2003 ( 2 )SCR662|relied on|para 14|| |||||c| |,'|2003(1) Suppl.SCR|SCR55relied on|para 14|| ||AIR 2005SC565|relied on|para 14|| ||2006 SCR342|relied on|para 14|| ||2008 (11)SCR670|relied on|para 14|D| ||2001) 6sec111|relied on|para23|| ||2008(1)SCR370|relied on|para24|| ||1982 ( 1 )SCR1043|relied on|para26|E| ||1994 ( 6 ) Suppl. SCR 344 relied on||para26|| ||2003(6) Suppl.SCR|SCR1023 relied on|para26|| ||2009(14)SCR403|relied on|para26|F| CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 5292 of 2004. From the Judgment and Order date 21.12 .1999 of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Civil Writ Petition No. 4763 of 1992. G Sanjay Sarin and Ashok Mathur for the Appellant. Rachana Joshi lssar and Stiailendra Kumar for the Respondents. ~ 326 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 7 S.C.R. A The Judgment of the Court was delivered by **DR. B.S. CHAUHAN,** J. 1. This is a unique case which reveals that an influential person can have allotment of a residential plot in discretionary quota. within 48 hours of submission of application and then assert in Court that she has 8 a right to have a land on a throwaway price and not to deposit the sale price for quarter of a century. 2. This appeal has been preferred against a Judgment and Order dated 21.12.1999 in Writ Petition No. 4763 of 1992 of C the High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh, dismissing the petition against the Demand Notice of additional price for residential plot. 3. Facts and circumstances giving rise to this case are that D the appellant made an application on 23.02.1987 for allotment of a residential plot in Urban Estates, SAS Nagar, Punjab. The Administration, vide letter dated 25.02.1987, issued the · allotment letter in favour of the appellant in respect of plot No. 702, measuring 400 sq. yards in Sector 70 Urban Estate SAS E Nagar, making it clear that as the proper calculation could not be made and tentative price had not been determined, the allottee has to deposit provisional price of Rs. 93000/- in four installments upto 15.10.1989. Subsequently, vide letter dated 25.03.1992, additional demand of Rs. 2,19,000/- was made, however, instead of depositing the said amount, appellant F challenged the said Demand Notice by filing Writ Petition No. 4763 of 1992 before the High Court of Punjab & Haryana contending that the additional demand was arbitrary and unreasonable. A large number of similar cases were also pending before the High Court and some had earlier been G disposed of. However, the Writ Petition filed by the appellant has been dismissed by the High Court vide impugned Judgment and Order dated 21.12.1999 upholding the demand dated 25.03.1992. Hence this appeal. - H 4. Sh. Vijay Hansaria, learned senior counsel appearing FULJIT KAUR _v._ STATE OF PUNJAB & ORS. 327 [DR. S.S. CHAUHAN, J.] for the appellant, has submitted that the High Court committed an error in dismissing the said Writ Petition relying upon the Judgment of this Court in _Preeta Singh_ & _Ors. Vs. Haryana Urban Development Authority_ & _Ors._ (1996) 8 SCC 756. In _D.S. Laungia_ & _Anr. Vs. The State of Punjab_ & _Ors._ AIR 1993 Pub.&Har. 54, such unreasonable and arbitrary demand had been quashed by the High Court and the State Government was issued direction to re-determine the amount taking into consideration the provisions of the Punjab Urban Estate (Sale of Sites) Rules, 1965 (hereinafter called as, "the Rules") and provisions of Punjab Urban Estates (Development and Regulation) Act, 1964 (hereinafter called as, "the Act"). The said Judgment has attained finality as the State had preferred Special Leave Petition against the said Judgment & Order before this Court but later on, it was withdrawn. After redetermining the additional price, no recovery has been rr;iade from Sh. D.S. Laungia till date. Therefore, the appeal deserves to be allowed. A 8 C D 5. On the other hand, Ms. Rachna Joshi lssar, learned counsel appearing for the respondent vehemently opposed the appeal contending that the High Court has rightly relied upon E the Judgment in _Preeta Singh_ (supra). In _D.S. Laungia_ (supra), the State Government, being aggrieved, had challenged the said Judgment and Order before this Court by filing the Special Leave Petition but it was withdra·wn for. certain reasons. Therefore, it cannot be held that the Judgment in _D.S. Laungia_ F (supra) stood approved by this Court. Calculations had been made strictly in consonance with the Statutory provisions of the Act and the Rules, particularly taking note of Rule 2(aa) and 2(e) of the Rules and it is to be recovered from _D.S. Laungia_ also. The High Court was fully satisfied regarding determination of G the additional price and therefore, no fault can be found with impugned Judgment and Order. Hence, the appeal is liable to be dismissed. 6. We have considered the rival submissions made by learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. H 328 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 7 S.C.R. A 7. -:-he questions do arise as to whether such an order of withdrawal passed by this Court amounts to confirmation/ approval of the judgment and order of the High Court and as to whether appellant could be treated differently. 8. There is no dispute to the settled proposition of law that 8 dismissal of the Special Leave Petition in limine by this Court does not mean that the reasoning of the judgment of the High Court against which the Special Leave Petition has been filed before this Court stands affirmed or the judgment and order impugned merges with such order of this Court on dismissal C of the petition. It simply means that this Court did not consider the case worth examining for the reason, which may be other than merit of the case. Nor such an order of this Court operates as res judicata. An order rejecting the Special Leave Petition at the threshold without detailed reasons therefore does not D constitute any declaration of law or a binding precedent. [Vide _The Workmen of Cochin Port Trust Vs. The Board of Trustees of the Cochin Port Trust_ & _Anr._ AIR 1978 SC 1283; _Ahmedabad Manufacturing_ & _Calico Printing_ Co. _Ltd. Vs. The Workmen_ & _Anr._ AIR 1981 SC 960; _Indian Oil Corporation_ E _Ltd. Vs. State of Bihar_ & _Ors._ AIR 1986 SC 1780; _Supreme Court Employees' Welfare Association Vs. Union of India_ & _Ors._ AIR 1990 SC 334; _Yogendra Narayan Chowdhury_ & _Ors. Vs. Union of India_ & _Ors._ AIR 1996 SC 751; _Union of India_ & _Anr. Vs. Sher Singh_ & _Ors._ AIR 1997 SC 1796; _V.M._ F _Sa/gaocar_ & _Bros. (P) Ltd. Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax_ AIR 2000 SC 1623; _Saurashtra Oil Mills Assn., Gujrat Vs. State of Gujrat_ & _Anr._ AIR 2002 SC 1130; _Union of India_ & _Ors. Vs. Jaipa/ Singh_ (2004) 1SCC121; and _Y. Satyanarayan Reddy Vs. Manda/ Revenue Officer, Andhra Pradesh_ (2009) G 9 sec 447]. 9. In _State of Maharashtra Vs. Digambar_ AIR 1995 SC 1991, this Court considered a case wherein against the judgment and order of the High Court, special leave petition was not filed but when other matters were disposed of by the H FULJIT KAUR _v._ STATE OF PUNJAB & ORS. 329 [DR. 8.S. CHAUHAN, J.] High Court in terms of its earlier judgment, the Authorities A approached this Court challenging the correctness of the same. It was submitted in that case that if the State Authorities had accepted the earlier judgment and given effect to it, it was not permissible for the Authority to challenge the subsequent judgments/orders passed in terms of the earlier judgment which B had attained finality. This Court repealed the contention observing that the circumstances for non-filing the appeals in some other or similar matters or rejection of the SLP against such Judgment in limine by this Court, in some other similar matters by itself, would not preclude the State Authorities to c challenge the other orders for the reason that non-filing of such SLP and pursuing them may seriously jeopardize the interest , of the State or public interest. 10. _In Kunhayammed_ & _Ors. v. State of Kera/a_ & _Anr._ , AIR 2000 SC 2587, this Court reconsidered the issue and D some of the above referred judgments and came to the conclusion that dismissal of special leave petition in limine by a non-speaking order may not be a bar for further reconsideration of the case for the reason that this Court might not have been inclined to exercise its discretion under Article E 136 of the Constitution. The declaration of law will be governed by Article 141 where the matter has been decided on merit by a speaking judgment as in that case doctrine of merger would come into play. This Court laid down the following principles:- E F "(i) Where an appeal or revision is provided against an order passed by a court, tribunal or any other authority before superior forum and such superior forum modifies, reverses or affirms the decision put in issue before it, the · decision by the subordinate forum merges in the decision G by the superior forum and it is the latter which subsists, remains operative and is capable of enforcement in the eye of law. (ii) The jurisdiction conferred by Article 136 of the Constitution is divisible into two stages. The first stage is H 330 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 7 S.C.R. - A upto the disposal of prayer for special leave to file an appeal. The second stage commences if and Vfhen the leave to appeal is granted and the special leave petition is converted into an appeal. - (iii) Doctrine of merger is not a doctrine of universal or - B unlimited application. It will depend on the nature of jurisdiction exercised by the superior forum and the content or subject-matter of challenge laid or capable of being laid shall b"e determinative of the applicability of merger. The superior jurisdiction should be capable of reversing, - c modifying or affirming the order put in issue before it. Under Article 136 of the Constitution the Supreme Court may reverse, modify or affirm the judgment-decree or order appealed against while exercising its appellate jurisdiction and not while exercising the discretionary jurisdiction - D disposing of petition for special leave to appeal. The doctrine of merger can therefore be applied to the former and not to the latter. (iv) An order refusing special leave to appeal may be a E non-speaking order or a speaking one. In either case it . does not attract the doctrine of merger. An order refusing special leave to appeal does not stand substituted in place of the ord_er under challenge. All that it means is that the Court was not inclined to exercise its discretion so as to allow the appeal being filed. F G H (v) If the order refusing leave to appeal is a speaking order, i.e., gives reasons for refusing the grant of leave, then the order has two implications. Firstly, the statement of law contained in the order is a declaration of law by the Supreme Court within the meaning of Article 141 of the Constitution. Secondly, other than the declaration of law, whatever is stated in the order are the findings recorded by the Supreme Court which would bind the parties thereto and also the court, tribunal or authority in any proceedings subsequent thereto by way of judicial discipline, the FULJIT KAUR _v._ STATE OF PUNJAB & ORS. 331 [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.] Supreme Court being the Apex Court of the country. But, A this does not amount to saying that the order of the COL•rt, tribunal or authority below has stood merged in the order of the Supreme Court rejecting the special leave petition or that the order of the Supreme Court is the only order binding as res judicata in subsequent proceedings B between the parties." 11. The Court came to the conclusion that where the matter has been decided by a non-speaking order in limine the party may approach the Court for reconsideration of the case inexceptional circumstances. C 12. In view of the above, in the fact-situation of the case in. D.S. _Laungia_ (supra), question of application of doctrine of merger did not arise and even by no stretch of imagination it can be held that this Court has approved the judgment in D.S. D _Laungia_ (supra), rather a different view is required to be taken in view of the fact that this Court had expressed doubts about the correctness of the impugned Judgment by making the following observations :- "In the instant matter as also in the matters enumerated in the letter of Mr. G.K. Bansal, Advocate for the petitioners dated January 25, 1994, seeking withdrawal of all these matters, we are constrained to remark that no reasons have been assigned as to why the State of Punjab is submitting to the _impugned orders of the High Court which prima facie appear to us to be unsustainable._ The direct result of the withdrawal would not only be compounding to an illegality but would otherwise cause tremendous loss to the State exchequer. We, therefore, direct that the reasons which impelled the State to seek withdrawal of these matters be placed before us in the form of an affidavit 'by the Chief Secretary, Punjab or the Secretary of the Department concerned justifying the step for seeking withdrawal." (Emphasis added) E f G H 332 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 7 S.C.R. A A 13. The respondent cannot claim parity with _D.S. Laungia_ (supra) in view of the settled legal proposition that Article 14 of the! Constitution of India does not envisage for negative equality. Article 14 is not meant to perpetuate illegality or fraud. Article 14 of the Constitution has a positive concept. Equality B is a trite, which cannot be claimed in illegality and therefore, ·cannot be enforced by a citizen or court in a negative manner. If an illegality and irregularity has been committed in favour of an individual or a group of individuals or a wrong order has been passed by a Judicial Forum, others cannot invoke the c jurisdiction of the higher or superior court for repeating or multiplying the same irregularity or illegality or for passing wrong order. A wrong order/decision in favour of any particular party does riot entitle any other party to claim the benefits on the basis of the wrong decision. Even otherwise Art.14 cannot be 0[stretched too far otherwise it would make function ][of ][the ] administration impossible. [vide _Coromandel Fertilizers Ltd. Vs. Union of India_ & _Ors._ AIR 1984 SC 1772; _Panchi Devi Vs. State of Rajasthan_ & _Ors._ (2009) 2 SCC 589; and _Shanti Spo1ts Club_ & _Anr. Vs. Union of India_ & _Ors._ (2009) 15 SCC E 705]. 14. Thus, even if some other similarly situated persons have been granted some benefit inadvertently or by mistake, such order does not confer any legal right on the petitioner to get the same relief. (Vide _Chandigarh Administration_ & _Anr_ F _Vs. Jagjit Singh_ & _Anr.,_ AIR 1995 SC 705; _Smt Sneh Prabha Vs. State of UP._ & _Ors.,_ AIR 1996 SC 540; _Jalandhar Improvement Trust Vs. Sampuran Singh,_ AIR 1999 SC 1347; _State of Bihar_ & _Ors. Vs. Kameshwar Prasad Singh_ & _Anr.,_ AIR 2000 SC 2306; _Union of India_ & Ors. Vs. _Rakesh Kumar,_ G AIR 2001 SC 1877; _Yogesh Kumar_ & Ors. Vs. _Government of NCT Delhi_ & Ors., AIR 2003 SC 1241; _Union of India_ & _Anr._ Vs. _International Trading Company_ & _Anr.,_ AIR 2003 SC 3983; M/s _Anand Button Ltd._ Vs. _State of Haryana_ & _Ors.,_ AIR 2005 SC 565; _K.K. Bhalla_ Vs. _State of MP._ & Ors., AIR 2006 H FULJIT KAUR _v._ STATE OF PUNJAB & ORS. 333 [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.] SC 898; and _Maharaj Krishan Bhatt_ & _Anr. Vs. State of Jammu_ & _Kashmir_ & _Ors.,_ (2008) 9 SCC 24). 15. In view of the above, the submissions made by Shri Hansaria, Amicus Curiae in this regard are preposterous and not worth consideration. B 16. In the instant case, tbe High Court has taken into consideration all statutory provisions and calculations made by the respondents as under what circumstances the "tentativeprice" had been fixed and reached the conclusion that the demand was justified. The Court also rejected the submissions C made on behalf of the allottees that judgment in _D.S. 1[Laungia ]_ (supra) was an authority on the issue. 17. Rules 2(aa), 2(e), 4 and 5 of the Rules which have · direct bearing on the questions raised in this appeal read as o under: _"2(aa)- 'Additional Price' means such sum of money as may be determined by the State Government, in respect of the sale of_ a _site by allotment, having regard to the amount of compensation by which the compensation_ E _awarded by the Collector for the land acquired by the State Government of which the site sold forms_ a _part, is enhanced by the Court on_ a _reference made under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, and the amount of cost incurred by the State Government in_ F _respect of such reference._ _2(e)- 'tentative price'_ means such sum of money as may be determined by the State Government from time to time, in respect of the sale of a site by allotment, having regard G among other matters, to the amount of compensation awarded by the Collector under Land Acquisition Act,. 1894 for the land acquired by the State Govetnrnent of which the site sold forms a part. H SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 7 S.C.R. 334 A B _4. Sale Price:-_ In the case of sale of a site by allotment the sale price shall be: (a) where such site forms part of the land acquired by the State Government under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894; and (i) no reference under Section 18 thereof is made against the award of the Collector of such reference having been made has failed, the tentative price. c D E (ii) On a reference made under Section 18 thereof the compensation awarded by the Collector is enhanced by the Court. The aggregate of the tentative price and the additional price; > (b) in any other case, such. final price as may be determined by the State Government from time to time. · (2) In case of sale of site by auction the sale price shall be such reserve price as may be recommended by the State Government from time to time or any higher price determined as a result of bidding in an open auction. · ## _5-A: Liability to pay additional price._ F G H (1) In the case of sale of site by allotment the transferee shall be liable to pay to the State Government in addition to the tentative price, the additional price, if any determined in respect thereto under these rules. (2) The additional price shall be payable by the transferee within a period ofthirty days ofthe date of demand made in this behalf by the Estate Officer. > Provided that the Chief Administrator may in a particular case, and for reasons to be recorded in writing allow the applicant to make payment of the said amount within a further period not exceeding thirty days." FULJIT KAUR _v._ STATE OF PUNJAB & ORS. 335 [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.] B 18. A perusal of the above quoted rules shows that the A "tentative price" means the price determined by the State Government from time to time in respect of a sale of site by allotment and while doing so, the Government has to take into consideration various factors including the amount paid as compensation. B 19. The phrase 'additional price' has been defined as the price determined by the State Government having regard to the enhanced compensation payable to the land owners in pursuance of the award passed by the court on a reference C made under Section 18 or further appeal under the Act 1894. The sale price is the price payable in respect of an allotment of site. If the site sold by the competent authority forms part of the land acquired by the State Government under the Act 1894 and no reference under Section 18 thereof is made against the award of the Collector or such reference having been made D has failed, the sale price is the tentative pfice as defined in Rule 2(e) of the Rules but if the compensation awarded by the Collector is enhanced by the court on a reference made under Section 18 of the Act 1894, then the sale price means the aggregate of the tentative price and the additional price. If the E site allotted by .the competent authority does not form part of the land acquired by the State Government under the Act 1894, then the sale price would mean such final price as may be determined by the State Government. However, there is nothing in the scheme of the Act 1964 and the rules from which it can F be inferred that tentative price is synonymous with the provisional price, and that a person, to whom the plot has been allotted on provisional price, cannot be asked to pay the tentative price determined by the government. There is a difference between the "provisional price" and the "tentative G price" and it may take a long time for the State to determine the tentative price. 20. In the instant case, the calculations had bee1' furnished by the respondents as on what basis tentative price had been determined. H ||336|336|336<br>SUPREME COURT REPORTS|[2010] 7 S.C.R.| |---|---|---|---|---| |A|**A.**||**Cost of land**|| ||1.|1.|Costofland per acreofSector|Rs.90,000/-| ||||70 SAS Nagar|| |B|2.||Solatium charges @30%|Rs.27,000/-| ||3.||Interest charges from the|Rs.43,000/-| ||||dateofNotification tillth!3|| ||||dateofAward @12% from|| ||||1980 to 1984 for 4 Years|| |c|4.||Interest charges 15% from 1984 to|| ||||1990 for 6 yearsonthe costofland|Rs.1,44, 180/-| |||||Rs.3,04,380/-| |D|**B.**|**B.**|**CostofInternalandExternal Development**|| ||1.||Water Supply @ Rs.1.35 lacs.|Rs.1,35,000/- ·| ||2.||Sewerage @ Rs.59,000/-|Rs.59,000/-| |E|3.||Sterm Water @iRs.1,32,000/-|Rs.1,32,000/-| ||4.||Roads @ Rs.55,000/- per acre|Rs.55,000/-| ||5.||Bridges&Others @Rs.11,000/- per acre|per acre<br>Rs.t1 ,000/-| |**F**|6.||Horticulture @ Rs.36,000/- per acre|Rs.36,000/-| ||7.||Street lightening @Rs.15,000/-per acre|Rs.15,000/-| ||8.|Electrification @Rs.15,000/-per acre||Rs.15,000/-| |G|9.|Conservancy charges @Rs.9,000/-per acreRs.9,000/-||| ||10. Utility|10. Utilityservi~es@Rs.20,000/-per acre||Rs.20,000/-| ||||..|| ||11. Maintenance|11. Maintenance&Re-surfacingofroads||| |H||for 5 years @ Rs.63,000/- per acre||Rs. 63,000/-| ||FULJIT KAUR_v._STATE OF PUNJAB & ORS.|FULJIT KAUR_v._STATE OF PUNJAB & ORS.|STATE OF PUNJAB & ORS.|STATE OF PUNJAB & ORS.<br>337|| |---|---|---|---|---|---| ||. [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]||||| |12. Maintenance|12. MaintenanceofPublic Health service||||A| ||@ Rs.39,000/- per acre|||Rs.39,000/-|| |13. Maintenance & Re-surfacing of roads|13. Maintenance & Re-surfacing of roads||||| ||·Beyond 5 years @RsA5,000/- per acre|||Rs.45,000/-|| |14. Division of H.T. Line@ Rs.7,000/-|14. Division of H.T. Line@ Rs.7,000/- per acre.|per acre.Rs.7,000/-|||B| |15. Earth Filling @Rs.10,000/-|15. Earth Filling @Rs.10,000/- per acre|||Rs.10,000/-|| |||||Rs.6,51,000/- .|| |c.|(i) Establishment charges@14%+3%|3%|||c| ||onthe costofland.|||Rs.51,745/-|| |(ii) Interest charges @1% for plotable|(ii) Interest charges @1% for plotable||||| ||area(55%)|||Rs. 2,662/-|| |(iii) Interest charges for 3 years @10%|(iii) Interest charges for 3 years @10%||||| ||each Year on development charges|||Rs.1,51,200/-|D| |(iv) Unforeseen charges as well as escalation|(iv) Unforeseen charges as well as escalation|||(iv) Unforeseen charges as well as escalation|| ||Charges @10%|||Rs.1,16,098/-|| ||Total expenditure per acre||Rs.12, 77,064/-||| ||Total Expenditureof306.59 acres of land||306.59 acres of land||E| ||Acquired for Sector 70 SAS Nagar|Rs.39, 15,34,824/-|||| ||Saleable area 6,74,233 Sq.yds.||||| ||Reiteper sq.yd. 39,15,34,824=Rs.580/-||||| ||6,74,233||||F| 21. The plots measuring 100 sq.yds. were to be allotted at tentative price calculated at subsidized rate of 10% less than the reserve price while plots measuring 150, 200 and 250 sq.yds. were to be allotted· at tentative price equal to the reserve price. The plots measuring 300 and 400 sq.yds. area G are to be allotted at tentative price equal to 1-1/2 times of the reserve price and plots measuring 500 sq.yds. were to be anotted at tentative price equal to double the reserve price. Taking the overall position into account, the Government fixed the reserve price at Rs.520/- per sq.yd. for calculating the H .. ' 338 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [20'10] 7 S.C.R. A tentative prices, in the above manner, for plots of various sizes. 22. There is nothing on record to show that the tentative price determined by the State could be unreasonable or arbitrary and it is not the case of the~allottee that the market 8[value ][of ][the ][land ][has ][not ][been ][enhanced ][while ][deciding ][the ] reference under the Act 1894. While deciding this case, the High Court placed heavy reliance upon the judgment of this Court in _Preeta Singh_ (supr,a) wherein after taking note of various statutory provisions of Act 1964 and Rules 1965, C particularly, Rule 2(aa) and sale price as determined in Rule 4, this Court came to the following conclusion: D E G H "7. A conjoint reading of the above Rules would clearly indicate that the allottee is liable to pay a sale price including the additional price and the cost incurred and also the cost of improvement of the sites. It is to be remembered that the respondent HUDA is only a statutory body for catering to the housing requirement of the persons eligible to claim for allotment. They acquire the land, develop it and construct buildings and allot the buildings or the sites, as the case may be. Under these circumstances, the entire expenditure incurred in connection with the acquisition of the land and development thereon is required to be borne by the allottees when the sites or the buildings sold after the development are offered on the date of the sale in accordance with the regulations and also conditions of sale. It is seen that in the notice dated 9-8-1990, the total area, net area, the payable amount for the gross acreage, the acreage left for the developmental purpose, balance recoverable from the plot-holders, plot-table area h~ve been given for each of the areas and recovery rate also has been mentioned under the said notice. Under these circumstances, there is no ambiguity left in the calculations. If, at all, the appellants had got any doubt, they would have approached the authority and sought for further information. It is not the case that they had sought the information and FULJIT KAUR _v._ STATE OF PUNJAB & ORS. 339 [DR. S.S. CHAUHAN, J.] > the same was withheld. Under these circumstances, we do. A not find any illegality in the action taken by the respondents .. The High _Court;_ therefore, was right in refusing to interfer~ with the order." 23. In _Bangalore Development Authority Vs. Syndicate_ 8 _Bank_ (2007) 6 SCC 711, this Court, while considering a similar issue, laid down large number of principles including the following : - "Where the plot/flat/house has been allotted at a tentative or provisional price, subject to final determination of price C on completion of the project (that is acquisition proceedings and development activities), the development authority will be entitled to revise or increase the price. But where the allotment is at a fixed price, and a higher price or extra payments are illegally or unjustifiably demanded D and collected, the allottee will be entitled to refund of such excess with such interest, as may be determined with reference to the facts of the case." 24. In _Tamil Nadu Housing Board_ & _Ors. Vs. Sea Shore Apartments Owners' Welfare Association_ (2008) 3 SCC 21, while deciding the similar issue, this Court held as under :- E "So far as price is concerned, in 1991, when the names of applicants were registered, it was clarified that the priee indicated was 'tentative price' and it was subject to 'final F price' being fixed by the Board. In any case when the scheme was altered from seven types to fifteen types flats, it was stated that the amount shown was merely tentative selling price. The intending purchasers, therefore, were aware of the fact that the final price was to be fixed by the G . Board. In fact an agreement to that effect was executed .·"by all prospective allottees wherein they agreed that they would pay the amount which would be finally fixed by the Board ................ In the circumstances, it cannot be said that the allottees were not aware of the above condition H 340 [2010] 7 S.C.R. ## SUPREME COURT REPORTS ## A and they were compelled to make payment and thus were treated unfairly or unreasonably by the Board." 25. The instant case is squarely covered by the aforesaid Judgments of this Court and particularly, _Preeta Singh_ (supra) B and in view thereof, the appeal is liable to be disr;nissed. 26. Before parting with the case, it may be pertinent to mention here that the allotment had been made to the appellant within 48 hours of submission of her application though in ordinary cases, it takes about a year. Appellant had further been C favoured to pay the aforesaid provisional price of Rs. 93,000/ - in four installments in two years, as is evident from the letter dated 8.4.1987. Making the allotment in such a hasty manner itself is arbitrary and unreasonable and is hit by Article 14 of the Constitution. This Court has consistently held that _"when a_ D _thing is done in a post-haste manner, ma/afide would be presumed."_ Anything done in undue haste can also be termed as _"arbitrary and cannot be condoned in law."_ [vide _Dr._ S. _P. Kapoor Vs. State of Himacha/ Pradesh_ & _Ors._ AIR 1981 SC 2181; _Madhya Pradesh Hasta Shi/pa Vikas Nigam Ltd. Vs._ E _Devendra Kumar Jain_ & Ors. (1995) 1 SCC 638; _Bahadursinh Lakhubhai Gohil Vs. Jagdishbhai M. Kamalia_ & _Ors._ AIR 2004 SC 1159; and _Zenit Matap/ast P. LTd. Vs. State of Maharashtra_ & _Ors._ (2009)10 SCC 388]. Thus, such an allotment in favour of the appellant is liable F to be declared to have been made in arbitrary and unreasonable manner. However, we are not inclined to take such drastic steps as the appellant has developed the land subsequent to allotment. G 27. We further find no force in s4bmission made by Sh. Vijay Hansaria, Sr. Advocate, that in spite of making recalculation in view of the directions issued by the High Court in the case _ofD.S. Laungia_ (supra), State could not make any recovery from Sh. Laungia. This Court, vide order dated H 341 FULJIT KAUR _v._ STATE OF. PUNJAB & ORS. [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.] 20.05.2010, ~sk~ the respondents to explain this aspect and A file an affidavit olthe AdministratGI' of the Authority. In response th~reto, an Affidavit had been filed by the Chief Administrator, Great~r Mohall Development Authority, explaining the entire position in respect of the allotment and recovery of dues furnishing all details and according to this Affidavit, the money B is being recovered from all defaulters including Shri D.S. Laungia along with interest. 28. In view of the above, we find.no force in the appeal, it lacks merit and is, accordingly, dismissed. No order as to C costs. R.P. Appeal dismissed.