F. C. Mullin v. Union Territory

Case Details & Bench

Court: High Court
Hon'ble Judges: P. N. Bhagwati
S. M. Fazal Ali
Judgment Date: 1981-01-13
Court Decision / Holding: Writ petition allowed; sub-clauses (i) and (ii) of Clause 3(b) of the Conditions of Detention were held unconstitutional and void. A detenu is entitled to have an interview with a legal adviser at any reasonable hour after appointment by the Superintendent of Jail, without mandatory presence of Customs/Central Excise officers. The period of interviews with family and friends should be at least two per week, and such interviews should occur at a reasonable time and without undue delay, not requiring prior approval from a District Magistrate; the interview need not be in the presence of a designated officer if convenient. The court emphasized that rights of the detenu include the right to consult a legal adviser and to have personal contact with family, and that these rights must be balanced with minimal restrictions, in accordance with Articles 14 and 21.
Final Disposition: Writ petition allowed; relief granted as described above.

Parties to the Case

Appellants / Petitioners

F. C. Mullin

Respondents

The Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi

Legal Representation & Advocates

Counsels for Petitioners

• N. M. Ghatate (Dr.)
• S. V. Deshpande

Counsels for Respondents

• lfardayal Hardy
• M. N. Shroff

Case Synopsis & Summary

F. C. Mullin, a British national detained in Delhi under Section 3 of the COFEPOSA Act, challenged the detention conditions on account of the right to consult a lawyer and to meet family members. The petitioner argued that the restrictions—interviews with legal counsel only by prior appointment and in the presence of a Customs Officer, and family interviews limited to monthly visits—violate Articles 21 and 14 of the Constitution and thus are invalid. The Court recognized the essential distinction between preventive detention (to pre-empt harm) and punitive detention (to punish) and emphasized that preventive detention must meet Article 21's test of reasonableness, fairness, and justice. Drawing on Maneka Gandhi's expansion of Article 21, Sampat Prakash's minimal restrictions principle, and the Sunil Batra decisions, the Court stressed that detention does not strip detainees of all rights and that those rights must be exercised under a regime of due process. The Court held that the specific sub-clauses of Clause 3(b) of the Detention Conditions (i) and (ii) are unconstitutional, as they violate Articles 14 and 21. It ordered a relaxation: a detenu should be allowed to consult a legal adviser at any reasonable hour after a jail appointment, without mandatory presence of a customs officer, and two interviews per week with family and friends; these measures align with the detenton's dignity and the minimal restriction principle.

Provisions of Law Cited

COFEPOSA Act, Sec. 3Article 21Article 22Article 14Article 32Punjab Manual Rules 559A and 550Clause 3(b) (i) and (ii) of the Conditions of Detention

Legal Doctrines & Maxims

Art. 21 right to life must be interpreted broadly and protects dignified living
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1979) expansion of Article 21 to require reasonable, fair and just procedures
Sampat Prakash v. State of Jammu and Kashmir (1969) 3 SCR 574 — minimal restrictions in preventive detention
Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration (I) (1979) 1 SCR 392; Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration (II) (1980) 2 SCR 557 — prisoners’ rights and due process in detention/prison context
D. B. Patnaik v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1975) 2 SCR 24 — convicts retain fundamental rights
State of Maharashtra v. Prabhakar Sanzgiri (1966) 1 SCR 702 — rights under incarceration continue
Weems v. United States (1877) — living constitution principle for interpretation
Kharak Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1964) 1 SCR 232 — expansion of Article 21 meaning
Eve Pal's Case (417 U.S. 817) and Charles Wolff's Case (41 L. Ed. 2d 935) — supportive US authorities on due process in detention
M.O. Hoscot v. State of Maharashtra (1979) 1 SCR 192
Hussainara Khatoon v. Bihar (1980) 1 SCC 81

Submissions & Arguments

Contentions of Appellants / Petitioners

The petition contends that the COFEPOSA detention conditions restricting interviews with counsel and family violate Articles 21 and 14, and that the restrictions defeat the purpose of due process in preventive detention. The argument emphasizes the distinction between preventive detention and punitive detention, asserting that rights to consult a lawyer and to interact with family are core to life with dignity and must be protected with minimal interference. It cites Maneka Gandhi, Sampat Prakash, and Sunil Batra to support a broader, more rights-protective interpretation and seeks two weekly interviews with family and friends and removal of mandatory officer presence during interviews.

Contentions of Respondents

The respondents defend the detention framework as a necessary security measure and administrative control. They argue that the state must regulate interviews to prevent abuse and ensure order, and that the procedures fall within permissible limits under Articles 21 and 14. They contend that some restriction is inherent to preventive detention and that the existing rules help maintain oversight and security risk management.

Cited Precedents (13)

Case Name	Citation	Treatment	Explanation
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India	[1979] 1 SCC 248	Positive	Expanded Art. 21 to require reasonable, fair and just procedures; used as basis for testing detention procedures.
M.O. Hosot v. State of Maharashtra	[1979] 1 SCR 192	Positive	Reinforced due process and rights while in detention.
Hussainara Khatoon v. Bihar	[1980] 1 SCC 81	Positive	Signaled right to speedy trial and fair treatment; cited in broader due process context.
Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration (I)	[1979] 1 SCR 392	Positive	Affirmed prisoner's rights and due process protections.
Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration (II)	[1980] 2 SCR 557	Positive	Expanded interpretation of Article 21 in detention and prison context.
Sampat Prakash v. State of Jammu and Kashmir	[1969] 3 SCR 574	Positive	Established minimal restriction principle in preventive detention.
D. B. Patnaik v. State of Andhra Pradesh	[1975] 2 SCR 24	Positive	Held convicts retain essential fundamental rights, including Art 21.
State of Maharashtra v. Prabhakar Sanzgiri	[1966] 1 SCR 702	Positive	Affirmed that rights persist under incarceration; supports Art 21 interpretation.
Weems v. United States	54 U.S. 801	Positive	Historical principle for broad interpretation of constitutional provisions.
Charles Wolff's Case	41 L. Ed. 2d 935	Positive	Supportive comparison on prisoner rights in U.S. jurisprudence.
Eve Pal's Case	417 U.S. 817	Positive	Reinforces due process rights of prisoners.
Kharak Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh	[1964] 1 SCR 232	Positive	Broad interpretation of right to life under Article 21.
Munn v. Illinois	94 U.S. 113	Mentioned Only	Quoted to illustrate living constitution concept; not controlling precedent here.

Extracted Judgment Text

Exact text extracted from official judgment records.

516 FRANCIS CORALIE MULLIN .. ##### ' [. ] B c D [P. N. BHAGWATI AND S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, JJ.] _Right_ _of_ _the_ _detenu_ _under_ _Conservation_ _of_ _Foreig11_ _Exchange_ _&_ _Prevention_ _of_ _Smuggling Activitiea Act, to_ _have_ _interview wilh a lawyer_ _and_ _the_ _mtm·_ _bm of_ _hu_ _family-Section_ 3(b)({) _&:_ (ii) _read_ _with_ _rule_ _559A and_ _550_ _of_ _the_ _Punjab_ _Manual_ _of_ _the Superintendence_ _and_ _Management_ _of_ _lail.J-Whethtr_ _voilate3_ _Article.J_ 14 _and_ 21 _of_ _the Constitution and hence invalid-Di3tirlctioll_ _between_ pre~·mtive _detention_ _with_ _punitive detention-Constitution,of_ Indf~ 1950 _Article_ 21, _scope_ _of._ Allowing the writ petition, the Court HEll> : ( 1) While considering the question of validity of conditiom of detention coum must necessarily bear in mind the vital distinction betm:en preventive detention and ptmitive detention. Punitive detention is intended to inflict punishment on a person, who is found by the judicial process to have committed an offence, while preventive detention is not by way of punishment at all, but it is intended to pre-empt a pe~on from indulging in conduct injurio\18 to tho society. [523 A·B] THE ADMINISTRATOR, UNION TERRITORY OF DELHI & ORS. _January_ 13, 1981 E (2) Tho power of preventive detention has been recognised as a noceseary evil and is tolerated in a free society in the larger interest of security of th,e State and maintenance of public order. It is a drastic power to detain a person without trial and in many countries it is not allowed to be exercised except in times of war or aggression. The Indian Constitution does recognise the existence of this power, but it is hedged-in by various safeguards set out in Articles 21 and 22. Article 22 in clauses (4) to (7) d.t1lls specifically with F safeguards against preventive detention and enjoins that any law of preventive detention or action by way of preventive detention taken under such law m111t be in confonnity with the restrictions laid down by those clause! on pain of -.-.... invalidation, Article 21 also lays down restrictions on the power of preventive detention. [523 B-DJ t #### ••• r G II Article 21 as interpreted in _Mantka_ _Gandhi'3_ callt requires that no one shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except by procedure establish ed by law and this procWure must be rea!lonablo, fair and just and not arbitrary, whimsical or fanciful and it is for the Court to decide in the exercise of its corutitutional power of judicial review whether the deprivation of life or personal liberty in a given ca.se is by procedure, which is reasonable, falr and just or it is otherwise. The law of preventive detention must, therefore, pass the test not only of Article 22 but also of Article 21. But, despite these safeguards laid down by the Constitution and creatively evolved by the Courts. the power of preventive detention is a frightful and awesome power with drastic consequences affectin~ personal liberty, which is the moet cheri8hed F. C. MULLIN _V._ UNION TERRITORY 517 and prized possession of man in a. civilised society. It i.~ a power to be exer~ A cised with the greatest care and caution and the courts have to be ever vigilant to see that this power is not abused or misused, inasmuch as the preventive detention is quilitatively different from punitive detention and their purposes are diiferent. In case of punitive detention, the person has full~t opportunity to defend himself, while in case of preventive detention, the opportunity that be has for contesting the action of the Executive is very limited. Therefore, the "restrictions placed on a person preventively detained must, consis- B tently with the effectiveness of detention, be minimal". [524 A-G] _Maneka Gandhi_ v. _Union_ _of_ _India,_ [1979] 1 SCC 248; _M.O. Hoscot_ v. _State_ _of_ _Maharashtra,_ [1979] 1 SCR 192; _Hussainara Khatoon_ v. _State_ _of_ _Bihar,_ [1980] 1 SCC 81; _Sunil Batra_ (I) v. _Delhi Administration,_ (1979] 1 SCR 392; _Sunil Batra_ _(II)_ v. _Delhi Administration,_ [1980] 2 SCR 557, referred to. _Sampat Prakash_ v. _Stflte_ _of_ _Jammu_ _and Kashmir,_ [1969] 3 SCR 574, follnwed. 3. The prisoner or detenu has all the fundamental rights and other legal rights available to a free person, save those which are incapable of enjoyment by reason of incarcera.tion. A prisoner or detenu is not stripped _c_ of his fundamental or other legal rights, save those which are inconsistent D with his incarceration, and if any of these rights are violated, the Court will immet!iately spring into action and run to his rescue. [525 B-C, 526 G-H, _521_ A] _Sunil Batra_ (/) v. _Delhi Administration,_ [19791 1 SCR 392~ _Sunil Batra_ (II) v. _Delhi Administration,_ [1980l 2 SCR _551,_ _State_ _of_ _Maharashtra_ v. _Pra-_ _bhakar Sanzgiri,_ [19661 1 SCR 702; _D._ _B._ _Patnaik_ v. _State_ _of_ _Andhra_ _Pradesh,_ .£ [19751 2 SCR 24. followed. _Eve_ _Pall's Case,_ 417 US 817: 41 Lawyers Edition 2nd _495;_ _Charles_ _Wolff's_ _Case,_ 41 Lawyers Edition 2nd 935, quoted with approval. (4) While arriving at the proper meaning and content of the right to life, the attempt of the court should always be to expand the reach and ambit of :,r- -the fundan1ental right rather than to a.ttenuate its meaning and content. A - · constitutional provision must be construed, not in a narrow and constricted sense, but in a wide and liberal manner so as to anticipate and take account of chllnging conditions and purposes so tha.t the constitutional provision does ## • not get atrophied or fossilized but remains flexible enough to meet the newly emerging problems ap.d challenges. This principle applies with greater force in relation to a fundamental right enacted by .the Constitution. The fundamental right to life which is the most precious human right and which forms F G the ark of all other rights must therefore be interpreted in a broad and expansive spirit so as to invest it with significance and vitality which may endure for years to come and enhance the dignity of the individual and the worth of the human person. [527 C-D, 528 A-C] _Weems_ v. _U.S. 54_ Lawyers Edition 801, quoted with approval. _(5)_ The right to life enshrined in Article 21 cannot be restricted to mere animal existence. It means something much more than just physical survival. �� **�** �� - **�** �� A B c D E F G D 520 SUPR.EME COURT REPORTS [1981} 2 S.C.R. then any other Jail official may, if thought necessary, watch the interview but in a month to a detenu. When an undertrial prisoner is granted the facility [532C-F] (10) The right of a detcnu to consult a legal adviser of his choice for any purpose not necessarily limited to defence in a criminal proceeding but also for securing release from preventive detention or filing a writ petition or prosecuting any claim or proceeding, civil or crimine.I is obviously included in the right to live with human dignity and is also part of personal liberty and the detenu cannot be deprived of this right nor can this right of the detenu be interfered with except in accordance with reasonable, fair and just procedure established by a valid law. [531 C-E] ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition No. 3042 of 1980. (Under Article 32 of the Constitution.) _N._ _M._ _Ghatate_ (Dr.) and _S. V. Deshpande_ for the Petitioner. _lfardayal Hardy_ and _M._ _N. Shroff_ for the Respondents Nos. 1-2. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by BnAGWATI, J. This petition under Article 32 of the Constitution raises a question in regard of the right of a detenu under the Conservation of Foreign Exchange & Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act (hereinafter referred to as COFEPOSA Act) to have interview with a lawyer and the members of his family. The facts giving rise to the petition are few and undisputed and may be briefly stated as follows: The petitioner, who is a British national, was arrested and detained in the Central Jail, Tihar under an Order dated 23rd November 1979 issued under section 3 of the COFEPOSA Act. She preferred a petition ih this Court for a writ of habeas corpus challenging her detention, but by a judgment delivered by this Court on~ 2'1fh February 1980, her petition was rejected with the result that she continued to remain under detention in the Tihar Central Jail. Whilst under detention, the petitioner experienced considerable difficulty in t. having interview with her lawyer and the members of her family. Her daughter aged about five years and her sister, who was looking .~ after the daughter, were pemiitted to have interview with her only once in a month and she was not allowed to meet her daughter more often, though a child of very tender age. It seems that some criminal proceeding was pending against the petitioner for attempting to smuggle hashish out of the country and for the purpo~e of her defence in such criminal proceeding, it was necessary for her to consult her lawyer, but even her lawyer found it difficult to obtain an interview with her because in order to arrange an interview, h0 wa~ F. C. MULLIN _V._ UNION TERRITORY _(Bhagwati,_ J.) 521 required to obtain prior appointment from the District Magistrate, Delhi and the interview could take place only in the presence of a Customs Officer nominated by the Collector of Customs. This pro~ cedure for obtaining interview caused considerable hardship and inconvenience and there were occasions when, even after obtaining prior appointment from the District Magistrate, Delhi, her lawyer <:ould not have an interview with her since no, Customs Ofticer nomi~ nated by the Collector of Customs remained present at the appointed time; The petitioner was thus effectively denied the facility of interview with her lawyer and even her young daughter 5 years old could not meet her except once in a month. This restriction on interviews was --~posed by the Prison Authorities by virtue of clause 3 (b) sub-clauses .- (i) and (ii) of the Conditions of Detention laid down by the Delhi Administration under an Order dated 23rd August 1975 issued in exercise of the powers conferred under section 5 of the COFEPOSA _At-_ Act. These two sub-clauses of clause 3 (b) provided inkr alia as under: _\,-:_ ~ - -- "3, The conditions of detention in respect of classifica~ tion and interviews shall be as under : (a) (b) Intenriews : Subject to the direction issued by the Administrator from time to time, permission for the grant of interviews with a detenu shall be granted by the District Magistrate, Delhi as under : (i) _Interview_ _with_ _legal_ adv~er : Interview with legal adviser in connection with defence of a detenu in a criminal case or in regard to writ petitions and the like, may be allowed by prior appointment, in the presence of an officer of Customs/Central Excise/ Enforcement to be nominated by the local Collector of Customs/Central Excise or Deputy Director of Enforcement who sponsors the case for detention. (ii) _Interview_ _with_ _family_ _members:_ A monthly interview may be permitted for members of the family consisting of wife, . children or parents of the detenu ......... " The petitioner, therefore, preferred a petition in this Court under Article 32 challenging the constitutional validity of sub-clauses (i) A B c D E F G R �� F. C. MULLIN _V._ UNION TERRITORY _(Bhpgwati,_ J.) 523 1 the question of validity of con~tions of detenti~n. TJ;t.e~~ }~ . ~ ~it~F A distinction between these two. kinds of detention. 1p'unitive deten~19.!'.;~. distinction between these two. kinds of detention. 1p'unitive deten~19.!'.;~. is judicial process to have intended to - ' inflict punishment committeCI on a person,' . an offence, ' who\ while is f~uhd 'preventive _"bi_ th't . . I <kt~mi6n' is .riot by way of punishment at all, but it is intended to: JSte:~mpt ~: ~rson from indulging in conduct ~njur.ious to the . society. . B The power of preventive detention has been recognised as a n~cessary:. evil and is tolerated in a free society in the larger in,terest of [1] security . of the State and maintenance of public order. It is a drastic power to · detain a person without trial and there are many countries where it · is not aHowed to be exercised except in times of war or aggression. -~ ~~j ~tnfitit~tion, do.es 1~ec.~ise _the exi~tence. of ~is power, but it is c ~~j ~tnfitit~tion, do.es 1~ec.~ise _the exi~tence. of ~is power, but it is heiigchl!ifl:>by v~nous safeguards set out m Articles 21 and 22. Art. 22 - ""' ' ' '- _: ·_,_ < ' ' - - r •• ' _:._ ~ \o • - ..J }. ' .. ...,., • < 0 ' - ""' ' ' '- _: ·_,_ < ' ' - - r •• ' _:._ ~ \o • - < 0 ' n:i ~clauses ( 4) to (7), . deals spe<;rfically w1th saf(.:g_u~rd~ ~~;:qn~~ pr!!ventive detention and .ally law of preventive. d,et~ntjon- -~·c.mm by . .Pt way of preventive detention ~e~ 11fid~r s,uch l~w. ~~st "~e :in . con 3 formity with the restri~tions laid· down by tho~e ).Clauses on p,ain of 3 on p,ain of i~va!idation. But apart from Art. 22, there is also Ari. 21 whiCh lays · D do\%. ·resttictions on the power of preventive detention. Until the deci sfon ·~r tbts·· Court in _Maneka_ Gandh~ v. _Union_ _of lndia(l),_ a very narrow and constricted meaning was given to the guarantee embodied in Art. 21 and that article was understood to embody only that aspect of the rule of law, which requires that no one shall be deprived of. his life or personal liberty without the authority of law. It was construed only as ·a guarantee against executive action unsupported by law. So long as there was some law, which prescribed a pro ce:d~re authorising depriv~tion of life or personal ~berty, it _ was . sdpPO~~d ~o tneet .the ~equlre~ent of Art. 21. But in _Maneka,_ _Gandhi's_ ca~e . {supra),. this .cou~ Jor t4e _first time opened-up a _ne~ gilp~nsion of Art. 2l and laid down that Art. 21 is not. only a guarantee against ·-.ei.e~qtive action unsupported by law, butfs also a re~~ri~iio~ on .law ' ll:iaking .. It is not enough to secure compliance wit4 the . prescription .. of Adic;le -21 that thefe should be a law prescribing some semblanee of a 'proqedore fot' depriving a t>erson of his life or personal liberty, but · tli'e pi-oc~l:ue· t>rescribed by the law must be _reasonable,_ - _fair_ _and_ _just_ and if it is not so, the law would be void as violating the guarantee of Art. 21. This Court expanded the scope and ambit of the right to life and personal liberty enshrined in Art. 21 and sowed_ the seed for future development of the law enlarging this most fun~a mental of Fundamental Rights. This decision in _Maneka_ _Gandhi's_ case became the starting point-the-spri'ng-board-for a most spectacular evolution of the law culminating in the decisions in _M._ _0._ _Hoscot_ v. E. F G· R (l) [1979] 1 sec 248 524 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] 2 S.C.R. A _State of_ ;u _aharashtra,_ ( [1] ), _H ussainara_ _Khatoon' s_ _case_ (2), the _first_ _Sunil_ _Batra's_ _case(')_ and the _second_ _Sunil_ _Batra's_ _case.(4-)_ The position now is that Art. 21 as interpreted in _Maneka_ _Gandhi's_ _case_ (supra) requires that no one shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except by procedure established by law and this procedure must be reasonable, fair and just and not arbitrary, whimsical or B fanciful and it is for the Court to decide in the exercise of its constitutional power of judicial review whether the deprivation of life or personal liberty in a given case is by procedure, which is reasonable, fair and just or it is otherwise. The law of preventive detention has therefore now to pass the test not only of Art. 22, but also of Art. 21 and if the constitutional validity of any such law is challenged, the 1c Court would have to decide whether the procedure laid down by such law for depriving a person of his personal liberty is reasonable, fair and just. But despite these safeguards laid down by the Constitution and creatively evolved by the Courts, the power of preventive detention is a frightful and awesome power with drastic consequences D affecting personal liberty, which is the most cherished and prized possession of man in a civilised society. It is a power to be exercised with the greatest care and caution and the courts have to be ever vigilant to see that this power is not abused or misused. It must always be remembered that preventive detention is qualitatively different from puuitive detention and their purposes are different. In case of E punitive detention, the person concerned is detained by way of punishment afl';;:r he is found guilty of wrong doing as a result of trial where he has the fullest opportunity to defend himself, while in case of preventive detention, he is detained merely on suspicion with a view to preventing him from doing harm in future and the opportunity that he has for contesting the action of the Executive is very limited. F Having regard to this distinctive character of preventive detention, which aims not at punishing an individual for a wrong done by him, A A. ####, G but at curtailing his liberty with a view to pre-empting his injurious--~ activities in future, it has been laid down by this Court in _Sampat_ _Prakash_ v. _State_ _of_ _Jammu_ _and_ _Kashmir(")_ "that the restrictions placed on a person preventively detained must, consistently \\ith the effectiveness of detention, be minimal." The question which then arises is whether a person preventively detained in a prison has any rights which he can enforce in a Court (1) [1979] 1 SCR 192 (2) [1980] 1 sec 81 (3) [1979]1 SCR 392 (4) [1980] 2 SCR 557 (5) [1969] 3 SCR 574. , t F. C. MULLIN _v._ UNION TERRITORY _(BhagwaO,_ _J.)_ 525 of law. Once his freedom is curtailed by incarceration in a jail, does he have any fundamental rights at all or does he leave them behind, when he enters the prison gate? The answer to this question is no longer _res_ _integra._ It has been held by this Court in the two _Sunil_ _Batra_ _cases_ that "fundamental rights do not flee the person as he enters the prison although they may suffer shrinkage necessitated by incarceration .., The prisoner or detenu has all the fundamental rights and other legal rights available to a free person, save those which are incapable of enjoyment by reason of incarceration. Even before the two _Sunil_ _Batra_ _cases,_ this position was impliedly accepted in _State_ _of_ _Maharashtra_ v. _Prabhakar_ _Sanzgiri(l)_ and it was spelt-out clearly -~ and in no uncertain terms by Chandrachud, J. as he then was, in _D. B._ _Patnaik_ v. _State_ _of Andhra_ _Pradesh(_ _[2 ]_ _)_ : "Convicts are not, by mere reason of the conviction, denuded of all the fundamental rights which they otherwise possess. A compulsion under the authority of law, following upon a conviction. to live in a prison-house entails to by its own force the deprivation of fundamental freedoms like the right to move freely throughout the territory of India or the right to ''practise" a profession. A man of profession would thus stand stripped of his right to hold consultations while serving out his sentence. But the Constitution guarantees other freedoms like the right to acquire, hold and dispose of property for the exercise of which incarceration can be no impediment. Likew:se, even a convict is entitled to the precious right guaranteed by Art. 21 of the Constitution that he shall not be deprived of his life or pe~son~ liberty except according to procedure established by law." This statement of the law was affirmed by a Bench of five Judges of _X_ this Court in the _first_ _Sunil_ _Batra_ _case_ (supra) and by Krishna Iyer, J. speaking on behalf of the Court in _the_ _second Sunil Batra_ _case_ (supra). Krishna Iyer, J. in the latter case pror.:leded to add in his characteristic style; "The jurisdictional reach and range of this Court's writ to hold prison caprice and cruelty in constitutional leash is incontestable" and concluded by observing; "Thus it is now clear law that a prisoner wears the armour of basic freedom even behind - bars a'nd that on breach thereof by lawless officials the law will respond to his distress signals through 'writ' aid. The Indian human has a constant companion-the Court armed with the Constitution." (1) [1966] 1 SCR 702 (2) [1975] 2 SCR 24. A B c B E F G H 526 .·suPREME COURT REPORTS {1981] 2 S.C.R, _1_ .. A It is iriterestmg to note tltat tlie Supreme Colirt of th~ United ·States t ~ .a.Iib . .taken the same view ill. regard to rights of p~isoners: - Mr. r~e~Douglas struck ·a humanistic note when he said _in_ _Eve_ _Pati>i_ grs'{l)-: . . . "Prisoners are still persons entitled to all constitutional B rights unless their liberty has been constitutionally curtailed by procedures that satisfy all the requirements of due pro c~ss.'' S~.lUs~.in _Charles Wolff's case,(2)_ Mr. Justice White made the same ~iU:tt: in1'n11;lhf!tic t~Ilis .·. ~ _. - 1 ~i _.._ t;~ J~1iuf,.;thou~~ his rights may be dimi·riished by environment, a prisoner· is not wholly stripped off constitutional · protections, when he is imprisoned for crime. There is no iron curtain drawn between the Constitution and the prisons of this country.u Mr. l.JJStice Douglas reiterated lils thesis when he asserted·: 0 ~·.Ey~ry prisoner's. li.,erty 'i.e. of courses, circumscribed by the very fact of his confinement, but his interest in the limited liberty left to him is then only the more substantial. Conviction of a crime does not render one a non-person whose rights are subject to the whim of the prison adminisE ttation, and tRerefore, the imposition of any serious punish· ~~~r ..,within the system requires procedural safeguards." F' ·. Mr. Justice Marshall also expressed himself clearly and explicitly in the same terms : . . ' . ''I have previously statfd my view that a prisoner does not shed his basic constitutional rights at the prison gate, and I fully support the court's holding that the . interest of inmates in freedom from imposition of serious . discipline is a 'liberty··, enlitled to due process proteetion." ~at;i~·.~t~ted by these ·l~arned Judg~ i~ :re~rd ~o the riih!~ 9(.~ pmoner under the Constitution of _the United States app~es equ~y. in regard to the rights of a prisoner or detenu under our · constitJ. tionai system. It must, therefore, now be taken to be well-settled that a prisoner or detenu is not stripped of his fundamental or other legal rights, save those which are inconsistent with his incarceration, and if any of these rights are violated, the Court which is to use the words n:. of Krishna Iyer, J., "not a distant abstraction omnipotent in the (1) 417 U.S. 817 : 41 L. ed. 2d 495 (2) 41 L. ed. 2d 935, J F •. c.- MULLIN _V._ UNION TERRITORY _(Bhagwatj,_ J.) 52 7 _1_ ~ books. but an activist institution which is the cynosure of public ho~; will immediately spring into action and run to his ·rescue. We must therefore proceed to consider whether any of the Fundamental Rights of the detenu are violated by sub-climses - (i) · and (ii) of clause 3(b) so as to result in their invalidation wh9Uy Qr i~ I>¥t : Yi.e will fu~t t!ife -~!? for considerat~oll: the}~un~~~_pt_al j:i~ A ' B c D F G ### • ~f :the <letenu under Article 21 because that is a Fundam~nt~ R,!ght which has, after the decision in _Maneka Gandhi's case_ (supra), a highly activist magnitude and it embodies a constitutional value of supreme importance in a democratic society. It provides that no one shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to ~oce~ure established by law and such procedure shall be reasonable fair, .and just.- Now what is the true scope and ambit of the right to ~~e,J~a~anteed under· -t~i_s :~~cle ? While arri~iii~ at the pro.Per meaning and content of the right to life, we must .remember t!tat it is a constitutional provision which we are expounding and moreover it is a provision enacting a· Fundamental right and the attempt of the court should always be t<> ·expand· the reaeh and ambit of the fund~..: mental right· xathet than· to ·attenuate its: meaning and cnntent. The luminous· guideline ·in ·the interpretation of a constitutional provision is::. provided. by the Supreme Court· of United States in _Weems_ v. _il.s.__ 54 -~awyers Edition 801. \ "Legislation, both statutory and constitutional'is enacted, it is true, fto:tn an experience of · evils, but-its general language sliollld,not, therefore, be necessarily colllined to the form that evil had, ·therefore taken . .Time works changes, brings into existence new conditions and : purwses. · J:}!e(efore, a principle,· to~ be vital, must- be capable- of · wider a}.1plieation tha:n m.isch_ief. which gave it -birth. ·This is peculiary true of Constitutions. They are not ephemeral enactments designed to meet passing occasions. TMy are, to use the word~ of Chief Justice Marshall, "designed to approach immOrality as nearly as htima'n institutions cim apPr~ach1t~. The "future is their care, ~nd provisions for evenrs. bf'go6d arid ·bad tendencies ·a.f which no prophecy· can ·t;e· made. In the. application of a:. constitution, therefore: 6'\ir . contemplation cimnO't' be only of what has been, 'buf Of ·wnat 'may' be.' ###### Under any other rule a constitution would indeed be as easy of application as it would be deficient in efficacy and power. Its general principles would have little value, and be converted by precedent into important and lifeless formulas. Rights declared in the words might be lost in reality. And this has been recognised. The meaning and vitality of the D E F 528 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] 2 S.C.R. Constitution have developed against narrow and restrictive construction." This principle of interpretation which requires that a Constitutional provision must be construed, not in a narrow and constricted sense_, but in a wide and liberal manner so as to anticipate and take account of changing conditions and purposes so that the Constitutional provision does not get atrophied or fossilized but remains flexible enough to meet the newly emerging problems and chall~nges, app1ies with greater force in relation to a fundamental right enacted by the Constitution. The fundamental right to life which is the most precious human right and which forms the ark of all other rights must therefore be interpretated in a broad and expansive spirit so as to invest it with significance and vitality which may endure for years to come and enhance the dignity of the individual and the worth of the human person. Now obviously, the right to life enshrined in Article 21 can not be restricted to mere animal existence. It means something much more than just physical survival. In _Kharak_ _Singh_ v. _State of_ _Uttar_ Prade.~h(l) Subba Rao J. quoted with approval the fo11owing passage from the judgment of Field J. in _Munn_ v. _lllinois(_ _[2]_ _)_ to emphasize the quality of life covered by Article 21 : *"By the term "life" as here used something more is meant than mere animal existence. The inhibition against its deprivation extends to all those limbs and faculties by which life is enjoyed. The provision equally prohibits the mutilation of the· body or amputation of an arm or leg or the putting out, of an eye or the destruction of any other organ of the. body through which the soul communicates with the outer world." and this passage was again accepted as laying down the correct law by the Constitution Bench of thls Court in the _first_ _Sunil_ _Batra_ _case_ {supra). Every limb or faculty through which life is enjoyed is thus G protected by Article 21 and _a_ _fortiorari._ this would include the faculties of thinking and feeling. Now deprivation which is inhibited by Artide 21 may be total or partial, neither any limb or faculty can be totally destroyed nor can it be partially damaged. Moreover it is every kind of deprivation that is hit by Article 21, whether such deprivation be permanent or temporary and, furthermore, deprivaH (1) [1964] l S.C.R. 232 (2) [1877) 94 u.s. 113 _*Sunil Batra v._ _Delhi Admn._ P. 503. against or impairs human dignity would constitute deprivation _pro_ _tanto_ of this right to live and it would have to be in accordance with reasonable, fair and just procedure established by law which stands the test of other fundamental rights. Now obviously. any form of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment would be offensive to human dignity and constitute an inroad into this right to live and it would, on this view, be prohibited by Article 21 unless it is in accordance with procedure prescribed by law, bu~ no law which authorises and no procedure which leads to such torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment can ever stand the test of reasonableness and non-arbitrariness: it would plainly be unconstitutional and void as being violative of Articles 14 and 21. n would thus be seen that there is implicit in Article 21 the right to protection against torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment which is enunciated in Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and guaranteed by Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. This right to live which is comprehended within the broad connotation of the right to life can concededly be abridged according to procedure established by law and therefore when a person is lawfully imprisoned, this right to live is bound to suffer attenuation to the extent to which it is incapable of enjoyment by reason of incarceration. The prisoner or detenu obviously cannot move about freely by going outside the prison walls nor can he socialise at his free will with persons outside the jail. But, as part of the F. C. MULLIN _v._ UNION TERRITORY _(Bhagwati,_ _J.)_ 529· tion is not an act which is complete once and for all : it is a contnuing act and so lClng as it lasts, it must be in accordance. with pro cedure established by law. It is therefore clear that any act which damages or injures or interferes with the use of, any limb or faculty of a person, either permanently or even temporarily, would be within the inhibition of Article 21. But the question which arises is whether the right to life is limited only to protection of limb or faculty or does it go further and embrace something more. We think that the right to life includes the right to 1ive with human dignity and all that goes along with it, namely, the bare necessaries of life such as adequate nutrition, clothing and shelter and facilities for reading, writing and expressing one ~~w~~ / ' self in diverse forms, freely moving about and mixing and commingling with fellow human beings. Of course, the magnitude and content of the components of this right would depend upon the extent of the economic development of the country, but it must, in any view of the matter, include tne right to the basic necessities of life and also the right to carry on such functions and activities as constitute the bare minimum expression of the human-self. Every act which offends c J) E II' G H 530 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ~ ~ . . . . [1981] 2 S.C.R. \ . **·** A right ~ live with human dignity ~nd th~efore . as. a ·neces?a_ry: c,qD!pO; nent of the right to life,,h_e wo~d l:!e entit_ledto have_in~e.rvi~~~w!~ ~h~ .. IJ1Cmb~rs :o~ his: fa~ly and friends aQd no pri_s~:m ·regulflf!ew;~ p~ure l;eid : dewp.. ·by :Prison regulation regulating the right -m ~ve ~nterviews with the members of the family and friends can be upheld as constitutionally valid under Articles 14 and 21, unless it is reasonB able, fai~ an~ j~t. c D F G The sanie consequence would follow even if this problem is considered from the point of view of the right to personal Uberty enshrined · in Article 21, for the right to have interviews with members of the family and friends is clearly part of personal liberty guaranteed under that Article. The expression 'personal liberty' occurring in Article 21 has been given a broad and liberal interpretation in _Maneka_ _Gandhi's_ case (supra) and it has been held in that case that the expression 'personal liberty used in that' Artjcle ·is of the widest · amplitude and it covers a variety of rights which ·go to constitute the personal liberty of a man and it also iricludes rights which "have be~n raised to the:status of dis~ tinct 'F~.uitlamental ' ~igbtS' and given.~- aaditionai p;rotectien . 'uflder ArtiCte ··19"'. - There 'can . therefore· be-- n5: doub't -that ·'persoriaf tiblriy' wourn- incliide •the. dgh:tto . sO<:iatis·e 'wifli members otth'e fatrrlly' ami ftlehels Si.ib]ect,· csf C'outse,· to any valid prison regulations· · aiid under Articles· 14 and 21, such prison regulations must be reasonable and non-arbitrary. If any prison regulation or procedure laid down by it regulating the right to have interviews with members of the family and friends is arbitrary or unreasonable, it would be liable to be struck d·owri as invalid as being violative of Articles 14 and 21. . . Now obviously \fhen an undertrial prisoner is granted the facility of interviews, with relatives and friends twice in a week under Rule 55~A. and . a oonviciect · p~o~r is ~~t~ - to have. inte~i~~ ~t)l his .. r~latives· ami .friends ·onee irr a wee~· under .Rule 550, it. is :diffi.eult to Understand how 6Ub-clause (.ii) of-CJ.ause •3 (b) of·the C~~.tion~ " Of Detention Order, which restricts the interview oil.ly to ·one in .a .month in case of a detenu, can possibly be regarded as reasonable and nonarbitrary, particularly when a detenu stands on a higher pedestal than an undertrial prisoner or a convict and, as held by this Court in _Sampath_ _Prakash's case_ (supra) restrictions placed on a detenu must. "consistent ~t!J;:th~ etJ:ectiv~qess _of detention,· be minimal." We would . tq~~~f~r_c -u1tt!~it~tingly.:ho!d sub-clause (ii) of ~l~1:1se ·3(b} to be vi~affi'~# }\JtiGl~: 14-~nd 21· if!. so-far: as i~ ·permitr. only_ one inte:r~,r~~:--, ~~-to. a,detenu. -W~:;are-of the.view that a-detenU-J!l.US~ ~;'~~t Je4-t~~~ye-atleast two ~iews in a week with relatiyes ·~.Jtiends and·it sbould be possible-_for a relative or friend to have inteniew with **.** ._ \ p, _c._ MULLIN _v._ UNION TERRITORY _(Bhagwa01_ _J.)_ 531 at any reasonable hour on obtaining permission f h J .l d . h l t _h_ e [dctcoil ] S pcrintendent - t c a1 an 1t s ou d not be necessary to _)_ fr ~. [rn ] [the ] he [0 ] rmission of t h c D' 1s t · net 1v "·I · ag1strate, Delhi, as the latter - S<"<k ·~ure~ould be cumbrous and unnecessary from the point of view . [1 ] prOC· 'ty and hence unreasonable. We would go so far as to say tha\ of secun I 550 d 559 A . "'pendently of Ru es an,.,., we would regard the pre· e~en tn"" . - k f . scnt uorm of two interviews m_ a wee or pnsoners as furnishing a cri., f ... b,t we would consider reasonable and non-arbitrary tenon•nu A B The same reasoning must also result in invalidation of sub-clause (i) of clause 3(b) of the Conditions of Detention Order which pres, cnbes that a detenu can have interview with a legal adviser only after obtaining prior permission of the District Magistrate, Delhi and the c interview has to take place in the presence of an offtcer of Customs/ - 1 Central Excise/Enforcement to be nominated by the local Collector uf CustomsjCentral Excise or Deputy Director of Enforcement who bas sponsored the case for detention. The right of a detenu to conmit 11 legal adviser of his choice for any purpose not necessarily limited to defence in a criminal proceeding but also for securing release fro?I preventive detention of filing a writ petition or prosecuting any ~aun or proceeding, civil or criminal, is obviously included in the fight lo live with human dignity and is also part of personal liberty and the detenu cannot be deprived of this right nor can this right of ~~ dete~u be interfered with except in acc~rd'ance with reasonable, ~~~and Just procedure established by a valid Jaw. A prison regula U~nb may, therefore, regulate the right of a detcnu to have interview "it [11] Blegalad' VtSer - m a manner which is reasonable, fau · an d' JUst bt u ; ; ; ' ~~~and Just procedure established by a valid Jaw. A prison regula D E - lat~annot prescribe an arbitrary or unreasonable procedure for reguA:gl 1 &uch an interview and if it does 50 it would be violative of - c es 14 a d 21 ' d - . \1ve · . [0 ] - Now in the present case the kg'Jl a viscr can F ' ' ing pe tntervicw - • Wit · h n dctcnu only by prior appointment n f ter o b · t~tn- tly ca:SSIOO or the District Magistrate, Delhi. This would obvi?U.\)U}d h &reat hardship and inconvenience because the legal adviser 'r.d lht:ve to apply to the District Mugistrate, Delhi well in a~vance ~ be _also the time fixed by the District M:~gistrate, Delhi may _1_ ~ittitj~UJ!able to the legal adviser who would ordinarily be a busy riV!t to :ns and, in that event, from a practicnl point of view the # I [8 ] ing pe - • Wit n dctcnu only by prior appointment n f ter o t~tn-tly ca:SSIOO or the District Magistrate, Delhi. This would obvi?U.\)U}d h &reat hardship and inconvenience because the legal adviser 'r.d lht:ve to apply to the District Mugistrate, Delhi well in a~vance ~ be _also the time fixed by the District M:~gistrate, Delhi may _1_ ~ittitj~UJ!able to the legal adviser who would ordinarily be a busy G riV!t to :ns and, in that event, from a practicnl point of view the the lntervie ult [8 ] legal adviser would be rendered illusory. Moreover, ~a! l: V.: rnust take place in the presence of an officer of Customs/ ~ Cq_~torn:~~/Enforcement to be nominated by the local Collect~r 'Ponso entral Excise or Deputy Director of Enforcement w o 11 ::able p/~d the detention and this too would seem to be an uttrea• <~Ce ti{ :~ural requirement because in order _to_ secure the yJ;~i c officer at the interview, the District Magistrate, e 1 . - ... -- - ~- - .. -~---- -..... - ·-· A B c D .£ SUPREME COURT REPORTS 532 [1981] 2 s.c.a, would have to fix the time for the interview in consultation w·th "E . . b D I ~ Collector of Customs/Central ~elSe or t e epu~y Director of Enforcement and it ~ay ~come d~cult to s~ncbro'nise tbe time which suits the legal adviser With the. time convement to the concemed ofli. cer and furthermore if the nommated officer does not, for any reaso 0 attend at the appointed time, as seems to have happened on quite ' few occasions in. the case of the petitioner, the interview cannot ~ held at all and the legal adviser would have to go back without m~t- · ing the detenu and the entire procedure for applying for an appointment to the District Magistrate, Delhi would have to be gone through once again. We may point out that no s-atisfactory explanation has been, given on behalf of the respondents disclosing the rationale of this re- '1 . ' qwrement. .., We are therefore of view that sub-clause (i) of clause 3(b) regulating the right of a detenu to have interview with a legal adviser of his choice is violative of Arts. 14 and 21 and must be held to be unconstitutional and void. We think that it would be quite reasonable if a detenu were to be entitled to have interview with his kgal adviser at any reasonable hour during the day after taking appointment from the Superintendent of the Jail, which appointment should be given by th~ Superintendent without any avoidable delay. We may odd that ~~ intcrvie\Y heed not necessarily take place in the presence of a notiU· nated officer of CustomsjCentral Excise/Enforcement but if the presence of such officer can be conveniently secured at the time of th: interview without involving any postponement of the interview, then liuch officer and if his presence cannot be so secured, tbcn any other Jail official may, if thought necessary, watch the interview but .not _[50 ]_ as to be within hearing distance of the detenu and the Jagal adVISe!• . We accordingly allow the writ petition and grant relief to the e~~~:nt -1. indicated above. . v.o.K. _Petition_ II _11_ _V"_ _[.-·(J. ]_ MGIPP-$7SCJ/81-8-7-19Sl-2SOO