High Court of KeralaDivision BenchWrit Appeal dismissed; Single Judge’s order aff...

Employees' State Insurance Corporation v. Sudheesh Das

Case / Petition Number:WA No. 1356 of 2014 (in WP(C) 21928/2014)

Case Details & Bench

Court
High Court of Kerala
Hon'ble Judges
  • Ashok Bhushan, Ag.CJ
  • A.M. Shaffique, J
Judgment Date
2014-10-01
Court Decision / Holding
WA No. 1356 of 2014 dismissed. The High Court confirmed the judgment of the learned Single Judge, held that admission need not be disturbed, and clarified that the apex’s observations on Clause 8 are not to be treated as a general precedent; the seat allocation should be honored, and the ward admission granted in the present case stands.
Final Disposition
Writ Appeal dismissed; Single Judge’s order affirmed; admission of the respondent stands; Apex Court guidance on Clause 8 noted but not treated as general precedent.

Parties to the Case

Appellants / Petitioners

  • Employees' State Insurance Corporation
  • Deputy Medical Commissioner, Medical Education ESIC
  • The Medical Director, ESIC
  • Regional Director ESIC, Sub Regional Office, Kollam

Respondents

  • Sudheesh Das

Legal Representation & Advocates

Counsels for Petitioners

  • • Sri. P. Sankaran Kutty Nair

Counsels for Respondents

  • • Sri. M.R. Hariraj

Case Synopsis & Summary

This writ appeal challenges a Kerala High Court decision allowing a writ petition filed by Sudheesh Das for admission to an MBBS course in ESIC Medical Education Institution under the ESIC management quota, in the ward of an insured person category. The ESIC challenged the order on grounds that admission under the ward of an insured person is governed by criteria requiring the ward to be an employee as defined in the ESI Act, with continuous insurable employment for five years as on January 1 of the admission year and at least 78 days of contribution in each contribution period during that five-year span. Sudheesh’s father was employed under the ESIC scheme but took illness leave in 2009, resulting in a shortfall of 78 days’ contribution for the 2009-10 period, making the ward claim contestable. The writ petition, relying on a prior Kerala High Court decision (Remya Krishnan R. v. ESIC, 2013 KHC 3697) and later Supreme Court observations in that line (Exhibit P8), had secured admission for the petitioner. The appellants invoked the Division Bench ruling and the Apex Court’s direction to accommodate wards of insured persons, while cautioning that Clause 8 of the Prospectus should not be treated as precedent. The High Court eventually clarified that while the Apex Court’s directions are binding, Clause 8 stands open for fresh consideration in appropriate cases, and that admission need not be disturbed given the last date had passed and the seats were filled. The WA was dismissed, affirming the Single Judge’s order and the admission.

Provisions of Law Cited

Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948Clause 8 of the Prospectus

Submissions & Arguments

Contentions of Appellants / Petitioners

The ESIC contended that admission under the ESIC ward quota is strictly governed by the eligibility criteria in the policy and the prospectus; reliance was placed on the Division Bench decision that was later set aside by the Supreme Court in Remya Krishnan and its subsequent rulings. They argued that permitting admission under Clause 8 without strict adherence to the five-year continuous insurable employment and 78-days contribution requirement would tantamount to creating a precedent that could undermine the stated quota and policy framework; considering last date had passed and seats were filled, the admission should not be disturbed and Clause 8 should be treated with caution, not as a universal precedent.

Contentions of Respondents

Sudheesh Das, relying on Remya Krishnan R. v. ESIC, argued that wards of insured persons can be admitted in ESIC medical colleges under the wards quota when the employee was in service and eligible; the apex directive in Remya Krishnan and subsequent observations supported admission in analogous circumstances, and the interpretation of Clause 8 by the Single Judge should be treated with flexibility to achieve a humane outcome and to fill the seats.

Cited Precedents (1)

Case NameCitationTreatmentExplanation
Remya Krishnan R. v. Employees' State Insurance Corporation and others2013 KHC 3697Mentioned OnlyCited as a controlling reference in the context of wards of insured persons, but the Supreme Court later cautioned that Remya Krishnan’s observations should not be treated as a binding precedent in all cases.

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Extracted Judgment Text

Exact text extracted from official judgment records.

## **IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM** ## **PRESENT:** **THE HONOURABLE THE AG.CHIEF JUSTICE MR.ASHOK BHUSHAN & THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE A.M.SHAFFIQUE** **WEDNESDAY, THE 1ST DAY OF OCTOBER 2014/9TH ASWINA, 1936** **WA.No. 1356 of 2014 () IN WP(C).21928/2014 --------------------------------------------** **AGAINST THE ORDER/JUDGMENT IN WP(C) 21928/2014 of HIGH COURT OF KERALA DATED 19.9.2014** ## **APPELLANT(S)/APPELLANTS/RESPONDENTS: ------------------------------------** **1. EMPLOYEES STATE INSURANCE CORPORATION REPRESENTED BY ITS DIRECTOR GENERAL PANCHADEEP BHAVAN COMRADE INDERJEET GUPTA (CIG) MARG NEW DELHI-110002.** **2. THE DEPUTY MEDICAL COMMISSIONER MEDICAL EDUCATION EMPLOYEES STATE INSURANCE CORPORATION PANCHADEEP BHAVAN COMRADE INDEERJEET GUPTA (CIG) MARG NEW DELHI-110002.** **3. THE MEDICAL DIRECTOR ESI CORPORATION, PANCHADEEP BHAVAN COMRADE INDERJEET GUPTA (CIG) MARG NEW DELHI-110002.** **4. THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR ESI CORPORATION, SUB REGIONAL OFFICE, KOLLAM-680020.** **BY ADV. SRI.P.SANKARANKUTTY NAIR** ## **RESPONDENT(S)/RESPONDENT/PETITIONER:** **------------------------------------** **SUDHEESH DAS, AGED 19 YEARS S/O M.P.DASAKUMAR, RESIDING AT SURYA, URATTIKKAD MAANNAR P.O., ALAPPUZHA-689622** **BY SRI.M.R.HARIRAJ** **THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 01-10-2014, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:** ## **ASHOK BHUSHAN, Ag.CJ & A.M.SHAFFIQUE, J ----------------------------------------------** ## **W.A.No. 1356 of 2014** **---------------------------------------------Dated this the 1[st] October, 2014** ## **JUDGMENT** ## **Ashok Bhushan, Ag.CJ.** Heard learned counsel for the appellants as well as learned counsel for the respondent. 2. This Writ Appeal has been filed against the judgment dated 19.9.2014 in W.P(C).No.21928 of 2014 by which judgment, the Writ Petition filed by the respondents was allowed. The respondent/writ petitioner had applied for admission to the MBBS course conducted by the ESIC Medical Education Institution. He applied for consideration of his candidature under the quota earmarked for ESIC management quota. The application was under the category of “Wards of Insured Persons”. The criteria for qualification as an insured person is given as follows: 2 _**WA.1356/14**_ _“8. Insured person for the purpose of availing benefit ESIC Management Quota for his/her wards shall be, as under:_ _'The insured person' shall be an 'employee' as defined in the ESI Act; and he/she should have been in continuous insurable employment for a period of five years as on 1[st] January of the year of admission and should have paid at least 78 days of contribution in each contribution period, during this five year period”._ 3. Father of the writ petitioner was an employee of the Aluminium Industries Ltd., who admittedly was covered under the Employees State Insurance Scheme under the Employees State Insurance Act, 1948. The writ petitioner was informed that he could not be considered for the reason that his father had proceeded on leave for the period from 13.5.2009 to 13.10.2009 in connection with illness and therefore had not paid at least 78 days of contribution during the contribution period from 1.4.2009 to 30.9.2009. Aggrieved by the stand taken by the Corporation, the Writ Petition was filed praying for a direction to the respondents to consider the writ petitioner 3 _**WA.1356/14**_ as a ward of insured person for the purpose of Exhibit P2 and to consider him for admission to the MBBS Course under the ESI Medical Colleges in the quota for wards of insured persons in the ESIC Management quota. The learned Single Judge relying on an earlier judgment reported in _**Remya Krishnan R. v. Employees' State Insurance Corporation and others**_ (2013 KHC 3697) held that wards of whose employees, who were on leave due to illness were also entitled for the benefit of admission. In the Writ Petition an interim order was passed by the learned Single Judge under which, the writ petitioner was already given admission in the MBBS course. The learned Single Judge, by his final judgment, held that the writ petitioner was entitled for admission and confirmed the interim order. The Corporation, aggrieved by the judgment of the learned Single Judge, has come up in the Writ Appeal. 4. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that against the judgment, which was relied on in the 4 _**WA.1356/14**_ impugned judgment, an appeal was filed before the Division Bench by the Corporation, which was allowed. The candidate, Remya Krishnan R. filed appeal before the Apex Court, which was decided as per Exhibit P8 judgment. The appeal was allowed by the Apex Court and the judgment of the Division Bench was set aside. The Apex Court, while restoring the judgment of the learned Single Judge made the following observations in paragraphs 6, 7, 8 and 9: _“6. After carefully going through the judgment(s) and order(s) passed by the Court (s) below and in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case we are of the view that the judgment and order passed by the Division Bench of the High Court cannot be sustained and needs to be set aside._ _7. Accordingly, while allowing this appeal, we set aside the judgment and order passed by the Division Bench of the High Court._ _8. Now, while restoring the judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge , we direct the respondent(s) to accommodate the_ 5 _**WA.1356/14**_ _appellant-herein for MBBS Course against the available vacant seat in the ESIC Medical College, K.K.Nagar, Chennai, for the present academic year. If such admission is granted, we direct the Medical council of India to accord necessary permission for such admission._ _9. We make it clear that we have not expressed any opinion on the Clause 8 of the Prospectus adverted to by the learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 3 and 4 and this order shall not be treated as a precedent in any other case.”_ 5. The Apex Court although directed to accommodate the candidate as the ward of an insured person, but specifically observed that the Court has not expressed any opinion on clause 8 of the Prospectus. 6. We are also of the view that admission granted need not be disturbed with. The reason being that last date for taking admission to MBBS course was over. The admission of the writ petitioner was confirmed by the learned Single Judge and the candidate has been admitted. 6 _**WA.1356/14**_ 7. Even if for argument sake, we proceed to examine clause 8 of the Prospectus and accept the submission of learned counsel for the appellants, no admission can be granted to the seat, which is already filled and the result might be to leave the seat unfilled. It is necessary that all the medical seats are filled up in the interest of the society. 8. In the light of the above, we are of the view that we need not enter into the various submissions raised with regard to the correctness or otherwise of clause 8 of the Prospectus. Leaving the question open, we confirm the judgment of the learned Single Judge. We clarify that the observation made in the judgment of the learned Single Judge regarding interpretation of clause 8 are left open for consideration afresh in an appropriate case. The Apex Court has already observed in its judgment as quoted above that the judgment shall not be treated as a precedent. We reiterate the said observation and clarify that the judgment of the learned Single Judge in _**WA.1356/14**_ 7 _**Remya Krishnan's case (supra)**_ need not be treated as a precedent. The Writ Appeal is dismissed. **ASHOK BHUSHAN ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE** **A.M.SHAFFIQUE, JUDGE** vgs1/10/14