Dr. Sunil Raj.R v. State of Kerala and others

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM PRESENT THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR.S.MANIKUMAR & THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SHAJI P.CHALY TUESDAY, THE 25TH DAY OF AUGUST 2020 / 3RD BHADRA, 1942 ## WA.No.1056 OF 2020 AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 27.05.2020 IN WP(C) 28420/2018(B) OF HIGH COURT OF KERALA ## APPELLANT/PETITIONER: DR.SUNIL RAJ.R AGED 54 YEARS S/O N. RAJAHAMSAN, CHIEF MEDICAL OFFICER, GOVERNMENT HOMOEOPATHIC HOSPITAL ARALAM FARM,KANNUR-670 674. BY ADV. SRI.GENS GEORGE ELAVINAMANNIL ## RESPONDENTS/RESPONDENTS: 1 STATE OF KERALA REPRESENTED BY SECRETARY, AYURVEDIC, YOGA AND NATUROPATHY, UNANI, SIDDHA AND HOMEOPATHY (AYUSH) DEPARTMENT, SECRETARIAT, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM-695 001. 2 PRINCIPAL AND CONTROLLING OFFICER, GOVERNMENT HOMOEO MEDICAL COLLEGE, IRANIMUTTOM, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM-695 009. 3 DR. AKB SADBHAVANA MISSION TRUST, REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT, MODAKKALLUR P.O.KOYILANDY, KOZHIKODE-673 321. R3 BY ADV. SRI.BABU KARUKAPADATH R3 BY ADV. SMT.M.A.VAHEEDA BABU R3 BY ADV. SRI.P.U.VINOD KUMAR R3 BY ADV. SRI.AVINASH P RAVEENDRAN R3 BY ADV. SMT.ARYA RAGHUNATH R3 BY ADV. SMT.VAISAKHI V. R3 BY ADV. SMT.SNEHA SUKUMARAN MULLAKKAL R3 BY ADV. SRI.SHELLY PAUL SRI. SURIN GEORGE IPE, SR.GP FOR R1 AND R2 THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 25-08-2020, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: W.A. No. 1056 of 2020 -2- ## **JUDGMENT** ## **Shaji P. Chaly, J.** The appeal is preferred by the petitioner in W.P.(C) No.28420 of 2018 challenging the judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 27.05.2020, whereby the challenge made by the writ petitioner against Ext.P9 order dated 21.07.2018 passed by the State Government pursuant to the direction contained in the judgment dated 10.07.2017 in W.A. Nos. 831 and 969 of 2017 filed by the Kerala Government Homoeo Medical Officers' Association, was found to be in order. By Ext P9 order State Government has found that the third respondent herein i.e., Dr. AKB Sadbhavna Mission Trust, Kozhikode is entitled to get permission to start Certificate Course in Pharmacy (Homoeo) (CCP (Homoeo), subject to the conditions stipulated in the annexure appended to the said Government Order. 2. The learned Single Judge, after taking into consideration the respective submissions and the pleadings put forth by the parties, has arrived at the following findings: “9. Having considered the contentions and having perused Ext.P9 impugned order, I am of the opinion that the Government has considered the relevant aspects of the matter including the fact that the 3rd respondent had the infrastructural facilities available and had been granted permission for the conduct of the NCP course after a due selection procedure. Since the Government had discontinued the NCP course and had permitted to conduct W.A. No. 1056 of 2020 -3- the CCP (Homoeo) course in the government sector, the decision of the Government, after examining the infrastructural facilities of the 3rd respondent, to permit the conduct of the course in the 3rd respondent's institution cannot be said to be illegal, arbitrary or violative of the Principles of the Constitution. Ext.P9 is an informed decision at the Government level. It is pertinent to note that the challenge is raised, not by any rival institution but by a Government Medical Officer and in the case of W.P.(C) No.39971/2018, by persons who have completed the CCP (Homoeo) course from the government institutions. I am of the opinion that the challenge raised against Ext.P9 is devoid of merits.” It is thus challenging the legality and validity of the said judgment, this writ appeal is preferred. 3. Brief material facts required for the disposal of the appeal are as follows: The appellant is a Government Homoeo Doctor working in the Government Homoeopathic Hospital , Kannur, functioning under the State Government ie., the first respondent. The first respondent, as per Ext.P9, granted permission Dr. AKB Sadbhavana Mission Trust to conduct CCP (Homoeo) Course, which according to the appellant, is against Exts.P1 and P2 Government policy to conduct the CCP (Homeo) course in the Government Homoeopathic Medical Colleges in Calicut and Thiruvananthapuram. According to the appellant, appellant is attempting to ensure that the courses are properly conducted and only qualified persons get appointed in the hospitals and dispensaries. It is W.A. No. 1056 of 2020 -4- further submitted that when the State Government granted permission to the third respondent to conduct discontinued CCP (Homoeo) course, the appellant was constrained to challenge the same before this Court resulting in Ext.P5 judgment of the Division Bench in W.A. Nos. 831 and 969 of 2017 dated 10.07.2017, whereby the issue with respect to the permission granted for conducting the CCP (Homoeo) course was relegated to the State Government. It was accordingly that the State Government has passed Ext.P9 order specified above cancelling permission granted to the third respondent to conduct discontinued CCP (Homoeo) course. Further, according to the appellant, it was exceeding the scope of Ext.P5 judgment, the third respondent was granted exclusive permission to conduct CCP (Homoeo) course. Therefore, it is the contention of the appellant that by granting permission to conduct the CCP (Homoeo) course, the State Government has created a private sector monopoly without any selection process, whatsoever, and in gross violation of the settled principles of distribution of State largesse and which also amounts to an illegal classification violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 4. With the above background facts, the case put forth by the appellant is that granting permission to the third respondent would adversely affect the quality of the CCP (Homoeo) course conducted in W.A. No. 1056 of 2020 -5- the Government Colleges and it will materially affect the interests and prospects of those candidates, who have obtained admission to the Government Medical Colleges purely on merit. That apart, it is also contended that the grant of exclusive permission to the third respondent by the Government would ultimately result in the unregulated conduct of the course by the third respondent producing incompetent candidates to be appointed as pharmacists. 5. The third respondent has filed a detailed counter affidavit in the writ petition refuting the allegations and the contentions raised by the appellant and also supporting the findings rendered by the Government in Ext.P9 order. 6. The State Government has also filed a detailed counter affidavit in the writ petition refuting the allegations and the contentions raised by the appellant, and also supporting the findings rendered by the Government in Ext.P9 order. It was assimilating the said factual and legal situations, the learned Single Judge has arrived at the findings extracted above. 7. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant, Sri. Gens Goerge Elavinamannil, learned Senior Government Pleader Sri. Surin Goerge Ipe and Sri. Babu Karukapadath appeared for the third respondent, and perused the pleadings and documents on record. W.A. No. 1056 of 2020 -6- 8. According to us, the primary question comes up for consideration is the _locus standi_ of the appellant, who is a Government Homoeopathic Doctor, to challenge Ext.P9 Government Order granting permission to Dr. AKB Sadbhavana Mission Trust to conduct the CCP (Homoeo) course. On the basis of the query raised by us with respect to the _locus standi_ , the learned counsel for the appellant has addressed arguments elaborately on the same. According to the appellant, he is an aggrieved person, since the CCP (Homoeo) course is allowed to be conducted in the private sector, which would reduce the standards maintained by the Government in the course conducted in the two Government Medical Colleges at Trivandrum and Calicut, and it is more so, since the Government have not permitted any other private institutions to conduct the CCP (Homoeo) course. Therefore, granting monopoly to the third respondent alone is an arbitrary action violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and viewed in that circumstances, the appellant, a qualified doctor, is an aggrieved person entitled to maintain a writ petition. In that regard, learned counsel for the appellant has brought our attention to the various judgments of the Apex Court. ## 9. In _**Gadde Venkateswara Rao v. Government of Andhra**_ _**Pradesh and others**_ [AIR 1966 Supreme Court 828], the Apex Court W.A. No. 1056 of 2020 -7- considered the question as to who can maintain a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, and held that the petitioner, who seeks to file an application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, should ordinarily be one who has a personal or individual right in the subject matter of the petition and a personal right need not be in respect of a proprietary interest but it can also relate to an interest of a trustee and it was held as follows : “ **8.** The first question is whether the appellant had locus standi to file a petition in the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. This Court in _Calcutta Gas Company (Proprietary) Ltd._ v. _State of West Bengal_ [(1962) Supp 3 SCR 1, 6] dealing with the of _locus standi_ of the appellant in that case to file a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution in the High Court, observed: “Article 226 confers a very wide power on the High Court to issue directions and writs of the nature mentioned therein for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III or for any other purpose. It is, therefore, clear that persons other than those claiming fundamental right can also approach the court seeking a relief thereunder. The Article in terms does not describe the classes of persons entitled to apply thereunder; but it is implicit in the exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction that the relief asked for must be one to enforce a legal right …. The right that can be enforced under Article 226 also shall ordinarily be the personal or individual right of the petitioner himself, though in the case of some of the writs like habeas corpus or quo warranto this rule may have to be relaxed or modified.” W.A. No. 1056 of 2020 -8- Has the appellant a right to file the petition out of which the present appeal has arisen? The appellant is the President of the Panchayat Samithi of Dharmajigudem. The villagers of Dharmajigudem formed a committee with the appellant as President for the purpose of collecting contributions from the villagers for setting up the Primary Health Centre. The said committee collected Rs 10,000 and deposited the same with the Block Development Officer. The appellant represented the village in all its dealings with the Block Development Committee and the Panchayat Samithi in the matter of the location of the Primary Health Centre at Dharmajigudem. His conduct, the acquiescence on the part of the other members of the committee, and the treatment meted out to him by the authorities concerned support the inference that he was authorized to act on behalf of the committee. The appellant was, therefore, a representative of the committee which was in law the trustees of the amounts collected by it from the villagers for a public purpose. We have, therefore, no hesitation to hold that the appellant had the right to maintain the application under Article 226 of the Constitution. This Court held in the decision cited supra that “ordinarily” the petitioner who seeks to file an application under Article 226 of the Constitution should be one who has a personal or individual right in the subject-matter of the petition. A personal right need not be in respect of a proprietary interest: it can also relate to an interest of a trustee. That apart, in exceptional cases, as the expression “ordinarily” indicates, a person who has been prejudicially affected by an act or omission of an authority can file a writ even though he has no proprietary or even fiduciary interest in the subject-matter thereof. The appellant has certainly been prejudiced by the said order. The petition under Article 226 of the Constitution at his instance is, therefore, maintainable.” ## 10. In _**Bar Council of Maharashtra v. M.V. Dabholkar and**_ _**others**_ [(1975) 2 SCC 702], the Apex Court has considered, who is a person 'aggrieved' in the light of the issue raised by the Bar Council as a person aggrieved and held that a person aggrieved under the Advocates Act, 1961 are of wide import in the context of the purpose and W.A. No. 1056 of 2020 -9- provisions of the statute, and that in disciplinary proceedings before the Disciplinary Committee there is no _lis_ and there are no parties. It was thereafter held that the word “person” will embrace the Bar Council which represents the Bar of the State and secondly, the Bar Council is “a person aggrieved” because it represents the collective conscience of the standards of professional conduct and etiquette, since the Bar Council acts as the protector of the purity and dignity of the profession. Thirdly, it was held that the function of the Bar Council in entertaining complaints against advocates is when the Bar Council has reasonable belief that there is a _prima facie_ case of misconduct that a Disciplinary Committee is entrusted with such inquiry, which indicates that the Bar Council is all the time interested in the proceedings for the vindication of discipline, dignity and decorum of the profession. Paragraphs 27 and 28 are relevant to the context, which read thus: “ **27.** The words “person aggrieved” are found in several statutes. The meaning of the words “person aggrieved” will have to be ascertained with reference to the purpose and the provisions of the statute. Sometimes, it is said that the words “person aggrieved” correspond to the requirement of locus standi which arises in relation to judicial remedies. **28.** Where a right of appeal to courts against an administrative or judicial decision is created by statute, the right is invariably confined to a person aggrieved or a person who claims to be aggrieved. The W.A. No. 1056 of 2020 -10- meaning of the words “a person aggrieved” may vary according to the context of the statute. One of the meanings is that a person will be held to be aggrieved by a decision if that decision is materially adverse to him. Normally, one is required to establish that one has been denied or deprived of something to which one is legally entitled in order to make one “a person aggrieved”. Again a person is aggrieved if a legal burden is imposed on him. The meaning of the words “a person aggrieved” is sometimes given a restricted meaning in certain statutes which provide remedies for the protection of private legal rights. The restricted meaning requires denial or deprivation of legal rights. A more liberal approach is required in the background of statutes which do not deal with property rights but deal with professional conduct and morality. The role of the Bar Council under the Advocates Act is comparable to the role of a guardian in professional ethics. The words “persons aggrieved” in Sections 37 and 38 of the Act are of wide import and should not be subjected to a restricted interpretation of possession or denial of legal rights or burdens or financial interests. The test is whether the words “person aggrieved” include “a person who has a genuine grievance because an order has been made which prejudicially affects his interests”. It has, therefore, to be found out whether the Bar Council has a grievance in respect of an order or decision affecting the professional conduct and etiquette. ## 11. In _**S.P. Gupta and others v. Union of India and others**_ [1981 Suppl. SCC 87], which considered the question of _locus standi_ in the context of specific legal injury either to the applicant or to some other person or persons for whose benefit the action is brought, arising W.A. No. 1056 of 2020 -11- from violation of some constitutional or legal right or legally protected interest, and in the case, what was complained of was a specific legal injury suffered by a person or a _determinate_ class or group of persons. It has also considered the issue where the State or a public authority acted in violation of a constitutional or statutory obligation or failed to carry out such obligation, resulting in injury to public interest or what may conveniently be termed as public injury as distinguished from private injury, who would have standing to complain against such act or omission of the State or public authority. And ultimately considered the question, can any member of the public sue for judicial redress? Or the _locus stand_ i is limited only to a certain class of persons? Paragraphs 18, 23 and 26 are relevant to the context, which read thus: 18. xxxxxxxx If the State or any public authority acts beyond the scope of its power and thereby causes a specific legal injury to a person or to a determinate class or group of persons, it would be a case of private injury actionable in the manner discussed in the preceding paragraphs. So also if the duty is owed by the State or any public authority to a person or to a determinate class or group of persons, it would give rise to a corresponding right in such person or determinate class or group of persons and they would be entitled to maintain an action for judicial redress. But if no specific legal injury is caused to a person or to a determinate class or group of persons by the act or omission of the State W.A. No. 1056 of 2020 -12- or any public authority and the injury is caused only to public interest, the question arises as to who can maintain an action for vindicating the rule of law and setting aside the unlawful action or enforcing the performance of the public duty. If no one can maintain an action for redress of such public wrong or public injury, it would be disastrous for the rule of law, for it would be open to the State or a public authority to act with impunity beyond the scope of its power or in breach of a public duty owed by it. The courts cannot countenance such a situation where the observance of the law is left to the sweet will of the authority bound by it, without any redress if the law is contravened. The view has therefore been taken by the courts in many decisions that whenever there is a public wrong or public injury caused by an act or omission of the State or a public authority which is contrary to the Constitution or the law, any member of the public acting bona fide and having sufficient interest can maintain an action for redressal of such public wrong or public injury. The strict rule of standing which insists that only a person who has suffered a specific legal injury can maintain an action for judicial redress is relaxed and a broad rule is evolved which gives standing to any member of the public who is not a mere busy body or a meddlesome interloper but who has sufficient interest in the ## proceeding. xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx This broadening of the Rule of locus standi has been largely responsible for the development of public law, because it is only the availability of judicial remedy for enforcement which invests law with meaning and purpose or else the law would remain merely a paper parchment, a teasing illusion and a promise of unreality. It is only by liberalising the Rule of locus standi that it W.A. No. 1056 of 2020 -13- is possible to effectively police the corridors of power and prevent violations of law. ## xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 23. We would, therefore, hold that any member of the public having _sufficient interest_ can maintain an action for judicial redress for public injury arising from breach of public duty or from violation of some provision of the Constitution or the law and seek enforcement of such public duty and observance of such constitutional or legal provision. This is absolutely essential for maintaining the rule of law, furthering the cause of justice and accelerating the pace of realisation of the constitutional objectives. ## xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 26. If we apply these principles to determine the question of locus standi in the writ petition of Iqbal Chagla in which alone this question has been sharply raised, it will be obvious that the petitioners had clearly and indisputably locus standi to maintain their writ petition. The petitioners are lawyers practising in the High Court of Bombay. The first petitioner is a member of the Bombay Bar Association, Petitioners 2 and 3 are members of the Advocates Association of Western India and Petitioner 4 is the President of the Incorporated Law Society. There can be no doubt that the petitioners have a vital interest in the independence of the judiciary and if any unconstitutional or illegal action is taken by the State or any public authority which has the effect of impairing the independence of the W.A. No. 1056 of 2020 -14- judiciary, the petitioners would certainly be interested in challenging the constitutionality or legality of such action. The profession of lawyers is an essential and integral part of the judicial system and lawyers may figuratively be described as priests in the temple of justice. They assist thecourt in dispensing justice and it can hardly be disputed that without their help, it would be well nigh impossible for the Court to administer justice. They are really and truly officers of the Court in which they daily sit and practice. They have, therefore, a special interest in preserving the integrity and independence of the judicial system and if the integrity or independence of the judiciary is threatened by any act of the State or any public authority, they would naturally be concerned about it, because they are equal partners with the Judges in the administration of justice. Iqbal Chagla and others cannot be regarded as mere bystanders or meddlesome interlopers in filing the writ petition. xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx **12.** In that context, a person aggrieved _vis-a-vis_ Section 96 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 as to the l _ocus standi_ was considered by the Apex Court in **Maharaj Singh vs State Of Uttar Pradesh & Others** [(1977) 1 SCC 155] and it is held in paragraphs 19 to 22 thus: **“19.** Aside from this stand, it is easy to take the view that the first plaintiff is ‘a person aggrieved’ and has the competence to carry an appeal against the dismissal of the suit. Of course, he who has a proprietary right, which has been or is threatened to be violated, is W.A. No. 1056 of 2020 -15- surely an ‘aggrieved person’. A legal injury creates a remedial right in the injured person. But the right to a remedy apart, a larger circle of persons can move the court for the protection of defence or enforcement of a civil right or to ward off or claim compensation for a civil wrong, even if they are not proprietarily or personally linked with the cause of action. The nexus between the us and the plaintiff need not necessarily be personal, although it has to be more than a wayfarer's allergy to an unpalatable episode. ‘A person aggrieved’ is an expression which has expanded with the larger urgencies and felt necessities of our times. Processual jurisprudence is not too jejune to respond to societal changes and challenges: “Law necessarily has to carry within it the impress of the past traditions, the capacity to respond to the needs of the present and enough resilience to cope with the demands of the future. A code of law, especially in the social fields, is not a document for fastidious dialectics; properly drafted and rightly implemented it can be the means of the ordering of the life of a people. [ “Law and Men of Law” — Address by Khanna, J. at the Birth Centenary Celebrations of Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, dated October 16, 1976 at Allahabad (1976) 4 SCC Journal 17] ” **20.** The classical concept of a “person aggrieved” is delineated in _Re Sidebotham ex p. Sidebotham_ [(1880) 14 Ch D 258] . But the amplitude of “legal grievance” has broadened with social compulsions. The State undertakes today activities whose beneficiaries may be the general community even though the legal right to the undertaking may not vest in the community. The State starts welfare projects whose effective implementation may call for W.A. No. 1056 of 2020 -16- collective action from the protected group or any member of them. New movements like consumerism, new people's organs like harijan or mahila samajams or labour unions, new protective institutions like legal aid societies operate on the socio-legal plane not to beat “their golden wings in the void” but to intervene on behalf of the weaker classes. Such burgeoning of collective social action has, in turn, generated gradual processual adaptations. Test suits, class actions and representative litigation are the beginning and the horizon is expanding, with persons and organisations not personally injured but vicariously concerned being entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of the court for redressal of actual or imminent wrongs. **21.** In this wider perspective, who is a “person aggrieved”? _Dabholkar_ [ _M.V. Dabholkar_ v. _State of Maharashtra_ , (1975) 2 SCC 702 : (1976) 1 SCR 306] gives the updated answer: “The test is whether the words ‘person aggrieved’ include ‘a person who has a genuine grievance because an order has been made which prejudicially affects his interests’, (p. 315) American jurisprudence has recognised, for instance, the expanding importance of consumer protection in the economic system and permitted consumer organisations to initiate or intervene in actions, although by the narrow rule of ‘locus standi’, such a course could not have been justified (see p. 807 — _New York University Law Review_ , Vol. 46, 1971). In fact, citizen organisations have recently been campaigning for using legal actions for protection of community interest, broadening the scope of “standing” in legal proceedings (see p. 403 — _Boston University Law Review_ , Vol. 51, 1971).” W.A. No. 1056 of 2020 -17- In the well-known case of Attorney-General of the _Gambia_ v. _Peirre Sarr N.'Jie_ [1961 AC 617] Lord Denning observed about the Attorney-General's standing thus: “.... The words ‘person aggrieved’ are of wide import and should not be subjected to a restrictive interpretation. They do not include, of course, a mere busybody who is interfering in things which do not concern him; but they do include a person who has a genuine grievance because an order has been made which prejudicially affects his interest.” (pp. 324-325) **22.** Where a wrong against community interest is done, “no locus standi” will not always be a plea to non-suit an interested public body chasing the wrongdoer in court. In the case before us, Government, in the spacious sense of “person aggrieved” is comfortably placed. Its right of resumption from the Gaon Sabha, meant to be exercised in public interest, will be seriously jeopardised if the estate slips into the hands of a trespasser. The estate belonged to the State, is vested in the Gaon Sabha for community benefit, is controlled by the State through directions to the Land Management Committee and is liable to be divested without ado any time. The wholesome object of the legislature of cautiously decentralised vesting of estates in local self-governing units will be frustrated, if the State, the watchdog of the whole project, is to be a helpless spectator of its purposeful bounty being wasted or lost. It must act, out of fidelity to the goal of the statute and the continuing duty to salvage public property for public use. Long argument is otiose to make out a legal grievance in such a situation of peril and, after all the star of processual actions pro W.A. No. 1056 of 2020 -18- bono publico has to be on the ascendant in a society where supineness must be substituted by activism if the dynamic rule of law is to fulfil itself. “Locus standi” has a larger ambit in current legal semantics than the accepted, individualistic jurisprudence of old. The legal dogmas of the quiet past are no longer adequate to assail the social injustices of the stormy present. Therefore, the State, in the present case, is entitled to appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure.” 13. So also, the learned counsel for the appellant has invited our attention to the judgment of the Apex Court in _**Akhil Bhartiya Upbhokta Congress v. State of Madhya Pradesh and others**_ [(2011) 5 SCC 29] to canvass that policy of allotting land on the basis of applications made by individuals, bodies, organisations or institutions dehors an invitation or advertisement by State is liable to be treated as arbitrary, discriminatory and an act of favourtism and nepotism vioilating soul of equality clause in Article 14 of the Constitution of India. By relying upon the judgment, the point that was put forth by the learned counsel for the appellant is that no exception can be taken to the use of discretion by the political functionaries and officers of the State and/or its agencies/instrumentalities provided that this is done in a rational and judicious manner without any discrimination against anyone. 14. Now coming back to the case, the soul of the contention advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant is that, by permitting W.A. No. 1056 of 2020 -19- the third respondent to conduct CCP (Homoeo) course in the private sector, it is an act of discrimination, since the Government has not granted permission to any other private Institutions to conduct such courses. Therefore, according to the learned counsel for the appellant, the appellant is an aggrieved person who is entitled to challenge the action of the Government in granting permission to the third respondent to start CCP (Homoeo) course which is a discriminatory action. 15. On the other hand, learned Government Pleader submitted that in Ext.P9, the State Government has clearly assigned reasons while granting permission to the third respondent to start CCP (Homoeo) course. It is also submitted that there is no violation of any policy condition as is contended by the appellant and there is no violation of Exts.P1 and P2 Government Orders. That apart, it is also submitted that while granting permission as per Ext.P9, the Government has clearly laid down the requirements that are to be adhered to by the third respondent,and the Government was also of the opinion that the Institution, which is having sufficient infrastructure is entitled to be granted with permission to conduct the CCP (Homoeo) course, though as per Exts.P1 and P2 orders the Government has taken a stand that CCP (Homoeo) course be conducted in the Government sector. Therefore, according to the learned Government Pleader, the contention put forth W.A. No. 1056 of 2020 -20- by the appellant that he has _locus standi,_ since Ext.P9 order is arbitrary violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and Exts.P1 and P2 policies of the Government, have no basis at all. 16. The learned Government Pleader has also invited our attention to the judgment of the Apex Court in _**Jasbhai Motibhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar Haji Bashir Ahmed**_ [(1976) 1 SCC 671], wherein the question of 'person aggrieved' was considered in the context of the Bombay Cinemas Regulation Act, 1953 and held as follows in paragraphs 34 to 39: **“34.** This Court has laid down in a number of decisions that in order to have the locus siandi to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, an applicant should ordinarily be one who has a personal or individual right in the subject-matter of the application, though in the case of some of the writs like habeas corpus or quo warranto this rule is relaxed or modified. In other words, as a general rule, infringement of some legal right or prejudice to some legal interest inhering in the petitioner is necessary to give him a locus standi in the matter, (see _State of Orissa_ v. _Madan Gopal Rungta_ [AIR 1952 SC 12 : 1952 SCR 28] ; _Calcutta Gas Co._ v. _State of W.B._ [AIR 1962 SC 1044 : 1962 Supp (3) SCR 1] ; _Ram Umeshwari Suthoo_ v. _Member, Board of Revenue, Orissa_ [(1967) 1 SCA 413] ; _Gadde Venkateswara Rao_ v. _Government of A.P._ [AIR 1966 SC 828 : (1966) 2 SCR 172] ; _State of Orissa_ v. _Rajasaheb Chandanmall_ [(1973) 3 SCC 739] ; _Satyanarayana Sinha Dr_ v. _S. Lal & Co._ [(1973) 2 SCC 696 : W.A. No. 1056 of 2020 -21- (1973) SCC (Cri) 1002] ). **35.** The expression “ordinarily” indicates that this is not a cast-iron rule. It is flexible enough to take in those cases where the applicant has been prejudicially affected by an act or omission of an authority, even though he has no proprietary or even a fiduciary interest in the subjectmatter. That apart, in exceptional cases even a stranger or a person who was not a party to the proceedings before the authority, but has a substantial and genuine interest in the subject-matter of the proceedings will be covered by this rule. The principles enunciated in the English cases noticed above, are not inconsistent with it. **36.** In the United States of America, also, the law on the point is substantially the same. “No matter how seriously infringement of the Constitution may be said called into question said, Justice Frankfurter in _Coleman_ v. _Miller_ [(1939) 307 US 433] ” “this is not the tribunal for its challenge except by those who have some specialised interest of their own to vindicate apart from a political concern which belongs to all.” To have a “standing to sue”, which means locus standi to ask for relief in a court independently of a statutory remedy, the plaintiff must show that he is injured, that is, subjected to or threatened with a _legal wrong._ Courts can intervene only where legal rights are invaded. [ _Chapman_ v. _Sheridan Wyoming Coal Co._ , 338 US 621] “Legal wrong” requires a judicially enforceable right and the touchstone to judiciability is injury to a legally protected right. A nominal or a highly speculative adverse affect [ American Jurisprudence, Vol. 2d ss 575, p. 334 ; _Joint Anti Fascist Refugee Committee_ v. _McGarth_ , 341 US 123] W.A. No. 1056 of 2020 -22- on the interest or right of a person has been held to be insufficient to give him the “standing to sue” for judicial review of administrative action. [ _United States Cane Sugar Refiners' Asson._ v. _McNutt_ , 138 F 2nd 116 : 158 ALR 849] Again the “adverse affect” requisite for “standing to sue” must be an “illegal effect”. [ _United States_ v. _Storer Broadcasting Co._ , 351 US 192] Thus, in the undermentioned cases, it was held that injury resulting from lawful competition not being a legal wrong, cannot furnish a “standing to sue” for judicial relief. [ _Kansas City Power & Light Co._ v. _McKay_ , 225 F 2d 924 (1955), cert denied 350 US 884 (1955).] **37.** It will be seen that in the context of locus standi to apply for a writ of certiorari, an applicant may ordinarily fall in any of these categories: ( _i_ ) “person aggrieved”; ( _ii_ ) “stranger”; ( _iii_ ) busybody or meddlesome interloper. Persons in the last category are easily distinguishable from those coming under the first two categories. Such persons interfere in things which do not concern them. They masquerade as crusaders for justice. They pretend to act in the name of pro bono publico, though they have no interest of the public or even of their own to protect. They indulge in the pastime of meddling with the judicial process either by force of habit or from improper motives. Often, they are actuated by a desire to win notoriety or cheap popularity; while the ulterior intent of some applicants in this category, may be no more than spoking the wheels of administration. The High Court should do well to reject the applications of such busybodies at the threshold. **38.** The distinction between the first and second categories of W.A. No. 1056 of 2020 -23- applicants, though real, is not always well-demarcated. The first category has, as it were, two concentric zones; a solid central zone of certainty, and a grey outer circle of lessening certainty in a sliding centrifugal scale, with an outermost nebulous fringe of uncertainty. Applicants falling within the central zone are those whose legal rights have been infringed. Such applicants undoubtedly stand in the category of “persons aggrieved”. In the grey outer circle the bounds which separate the first category from the second, intermix, interfuse and overlap increasingly in a centrifugal direction. All persons in this outer zone may not be “persons aggrieved”. **39.** To distinguish such applicants from “strangers”, among them, some broad tests may be deduced from the conspectus made above. These tests are not absolute and ultimate. Their efficacy varies according to the circumstances of the case, including the statutory context in which the matter falls to be considered. These are: Whether the applicant is a person whose legal right has been infringed? Has he suffered a legal wrong or injury, in the sense, that his interest, recognised by law, has been prejudicially and directly affected by the act or omission of the authority, complained of? Is he a person who has suffered a legal grievance, a person“against whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully deprived him of something or wrongfully refused him something, or wrongfully affected his title to something?” Has he a special and substantial grievance of his own beyond some grievance or inconvenience suffered by him in common with the rest of the public? Was he entitled to object and be heard by the authority W.A. No. 1056 of 2020 -24- before it took the impugned action? If so, was he prejudicially affected in the exercise of that right by the act of usurpation of jurisdiction on the part of the authority? Is the statute, in the context of which the scope of the words “person aggrieved” is being considered, a social welfare measure designed to lay down ethical or professional standards of conduct for the community? Or is it a statute dealing with private rights of particular individuals? 17. The learned counsel for the third respondent has also relied upon the judgment in **Jasbhai Motibhai Desai** (supra) and submitted that the appellant has no _locus standi,_ since he is not a person aggrieved and further that there is no violation of Article 14 of the Constitution, since no case was made out by the appellant before the writ court that other similarly situated persons who have sought for granting permission to conduct CCP (Homoeo) course were declined permission. It is further submitted that Exts.P1 and P2 orders only deal with the CCP (Homoeo) course and the only requirement contained under Exts.P1 and P2 is that the CCP (Homoeo) course examination should be entrusted with an Examination Board to be constituted with the approval of the Government and that in the certificate course for the year 2014-2015, only 50 students need be admitted in the Thiruvananthapuram and Kozhikode Government Homoeopathic Colleges and further there is no policy declared by the Government in Ext.P2 dated 22.06.2015 so as to W.A. No. 1056 of 2020 -25- create any fetter to any person applying for permission to conduct the CCP (Homoeo) course in the private sector. 18. We have evaluated the rival submissions made across the Bar. In order to have a comprehensive appraisal of the issues raised by the parties, it is better that Exts.P1 and P2 Government Orders are extracted,on which the case was exclusively built up by the appellant. 19. On a reading of Ext.P1, what we could gather is that the Government have decided to conduct CCP (Homoeo) course in two Government Medical Colleges situated at Trivandrum and Kozhikode. However there is no prohibition at all created thereunder so as to deprive permission to private institutions to conduct the CCP (Homoeo) course. Merely because the Government have decided to conduct the CCP (Homoeo) course in two of the Government Colleges and in accordance with the requirements contained thereunder, that cannot be treated as a policy declared by the Government so as to exclude any private entrepreneurs to conduct the course in private sector. On the other hand, it is quite clear and evident from Ext.P1 policy that it was realised that Nurse cum Pharmacy (NCP) course is not beneficial in the utmost interest of the Department and smooth functioning of the Government Homoeo Hospitals. It was in the light of the report of the Homoeo Director that non-availability of qualified pharmacists has W.A. No. 1056 of 2020 -26- adversely affected the functioning of the Homoeopathic Department, The Government have examined the matter in detail and thereupon, the Principal and the Controlling Officer has submitted a report to the Government dated 05.10.2013 proposing to commence a modern certificate course in pharmacy so as to include an additional training in hospital pharmacy and community pharmacy, in view of the earlier existing NCP course. Likewise, from Ext.P2 Government Order, it is specific and unequivocal that the Government have only issued certain instructions on the basis of the letter submitted by the Principal and Controlling Officer in respect of draft proceedings and syllabus for admission to certificate course in Pharmacy for the year 2015-2016 and the Government have examined the proposal in detail and draft prospects and syllabus for admission to certificate course in pharmacy for the year 2015-2016. We are of the considered opinion that at any stretch of imagination, Exts.P1 and P2 have not given any indication that the Government has a policy not to grant permission to conduct CCP (Homoeo) course in the private sector. It was accordingly that the issue was considered by the Government in Ext.P9 Government Order, which is relevant to the context and it reads thus: W.A. No. 1056 of 2020 -27- ## **ORDER** In the judgment dtd 10.03.2017 in W.P.(C) No.20803/2016 filed by Kerala Government Homoeo Medical Officer's Association the Hon'ble High Court had directed to comply with the direction of Hon'ble Court after affording an opportunity of being heard to a representative of the petitioner, 3[rd] respondent, the 4[th] respondent and a representative of the 5[th] respondent and after averting to all relevant materials including Exhibit P10 report and ratio and directions contained in Exhibit P11 and P13 judgments as expeditiously as possible, but not later than two months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this judgment. 2. Accodingly, the petitioner and the respondents 3[rd] , 4[th] and 5[th] were heard on 17.04.2017 in the presence of the Principal and Controlling Officer, Government Homoeo Medical College, Thiruvananthapuram. Later, in another judgment in W.A.No. 831/2017 & 969/2017 filed by Kerala Government Homoeo Medical Officer's Association & Dr. AKB Sadbhavana Mission Trust, the Hon'ble High Court of Kerala had also directed the Secretary to conclude the hearing, if not already concluded and if the hearing had been concluded as the proceedings have been stayed by this Court for sometime, it would only be fit and proper to allow the parties to address their problems and issues once again. However, the Secretary would ensure that a decision, one way or the other, is taken at the earliest preferably within one month after hearing the parties. 3. In accordance with the directions contained in the judgment dtd. 10.03.2017 in W.P.(C) No. 20803/2016 filed by Kerala Government Homoeo Medical Officer's Association Government had heard the petitioners on 17.04.2017. Since Government had already heard the petitioners including parties in the Writ Appeal case before the judgment dtd. 10.07.2017 in W.A. No. 831/2017 and 969/2017. Government had moved further without hearing the parties again with the sense that the directions of the Hon'ble High Court of W.A. No. 1056 of 2020 -28- Kerala were complied with in true spirit. After hearing the pros and cons of the parties the Government had decided to inspect whether the infrastructural facilities were available at the Dr. AKB Sadhbhavan Mission Institute. As per GO read as 6[th] paper above a team consisting of three members were constituted for inspecting the infrastructure facilities available in the institution and the team inspected the instruction on 16.10.2017 and submitted a report. In the report it was stated that the institution have all the infrastructure facilities for starting CCP course. Considering all these facts, Government have issued order permitting the Dr. AKB Sadbhavana Mission Trust, Kozhikode to start CCP Course subject to the conditions which will be framed by Government including the condition that 50% of the total seats will be filled up by the Government vide GO read as 7[th] paper above. 4. Now, Dr. Sunil Raj R, President of Kerala Government Homoeo Medical Officers Association has filed a Contempt of Court case CC(C) No. 669/2018 alleging violation on the stipulations contained in Annexure A1 judgment to the effect that, even if hearing had been conducted, the parties should be heard once again has been violated. In its judgment dated 08.06.2018 the Hon'ble Court has given an opinion that either to face the contempt or to pass fresh orders after giving the report of the committee to the parties. In the judgment dtd 08.06.2018 in CC(C) No. 669/2018, read as 8[th] paper above, it is directed to re-hear the parties after furnishing a copy of the report submitted by the 3 member committee constituted as per GO(Rt) No. 385/2017/AYUSH dated 03.08.2017. 5. In compliance of the directions contained in the judgment read as 8[th] paper above the concerned parties were heard on 02.07.2018 after furnishing a copy of the report to them. The President of Dr. AKB Sadbhavana Mission Trust and Sri. Gokul G.S have submitted separate representations, wherein it is stated that they have nothing to present before the Government other than the W.A. No. 1056 of 2020 -29- earlier notes presented by them in person as well as in writing. Dr. Sunil Raj, President of Kerala Government Homoeo Medical Officers Association (KHGMOA) has also submitted a representation at the time of hearing. In the representation it is stated that GO(Rt) No. 84/2018/AYUSH dated 21.02.2018 issued in purported compliance of the common judgment of the Hon'ble High Court of Kerala, dated 10[th] July in WA Nos.831/2017 and 969/2017 without hearing the KGHMOA went totally beyond the scope of the judgment, which has only directed the Government to decide on the legality of the GO(Rt) No. 160/2016/AYUSH dated 07.04.2016. It is also requested to invalidate the GO(Rt) No. 160/2016/AYUSH, dtd 07.04.2016. In addition to this, Dr. Sunil Raj stated in the hearing that they have no objection to start CCP course in AKB Mission Trust but the Trust must conduct the CCP Course only in accordance with the Government instructions/prospectus and in tune with the norms applicable to Govt. Colleges in all respect. The recruitment of the students will be done only through the list published by the LBS like the admissions being done in Government Colleges. He has also demanded to withdraw the GO(Rt) No. 84/2018/AYUSH dated 21.02.2018 and issue an order including the above said conditions also. As per GO read as 1[st] paper above Government had discontinued the NCP course from the Government Homoeopathic Medical Colleges. But, in view of the existing agreement and court directions the Dr. AKB Sadhbhavana Mission Trust, Kozhikode was permitted to conduct a final batch of the NCP course. After that the trust had again approached the Hon'ble Supreme Court through an SLP (Civil) No.(S) 25059/2013, and in pursuant to the judgment dated 28.10.2013 pronounced by the Hon'ble Supreme Court the Government have permitted for continuing the NCP Course in the institution of Dr. AKB Sadhbhavana Mission Trust under the conditions stipulated in the Agreement dtd. 04.07.2015 vide GO read as 4[th] paper above. W.A. No. 1056 of 2020 -30- 7. It is noted that Government have already discontinued the NCP course in Govt. Homoeopathic Medical Colleges and allowed to start CCP course vide GO read as 2[nd] paper above. In the light of the discontinuation of NCP course and starting of CCP course in Govt. Homoeopathic Medical Colleges, it is not better to give permission to a private institution to continue the discontinued NCP course. Moreover, the committee constituted for inspecting the infrastructure of Dr. AKB Sadhbhavana Mission Trust has also reported that the trust has sufficient infrastructure for starting CCP course. As such there is no irregularity in giving permission to the trust for starting CCP course because of the reason that the trust has been running NCP course by virtue of the court directions. In the light of the above facts, Government have examined the matter in detail and are pleased to grant permission to Dr. AKB Sadhbhavana Mission Trust, Kozhikode to start CCP Course (Certificate Course in Pharmacy) subject to the conditions stipulated in Annexure appended to the GO. The GO read as 7[th] paper is treated as cancelled. The directions contained in the judgment dated 10.03.2017 in W.P.(C) No. 20803/2016 filed by Kerala Government Homoeo Medical Officer's Association and in the judgment dated 10.07.2017 in WA No. 831 & 969 of 2017 filed by Kerala Government Homoeo Medical Officer's Association and Dr. AKB Sadbhavana Mission Trust and judgment dtd. 08.06.2018 in CC(C) No. 669/2018 filed by Dr. Sunil Raj R are hereby duly complied with. ## (By Order of the Governor) **Bhooshan V** Additional Secretary W.A. No. 1056 of 2020 -31- ## **Annexure** The conditions approved by the Government for the conduct of CCP (Homoeo) Course in the Institute of Dr. AKB Sadbhavana Mission Trust, are stated hereunder: 1. Admission to CCP (Homoeo) Course at Dr. AKB Mission's institute, are to be held when applications are invited by LBS for new batches of the CCP (Homoeo) course in the Government Homoeopathic Medical Colleges and when admissions of new batches are made. For the said purpose this institute has to prepare a prospectus approved by the Government. It has to be prescribed that the minimum qualification for the students applying for this course, is passing of SSLC or equivalent with 50% marks. 2. All students selected to AKB Mission, should be admitted from the list prepared by LBS. 3. As for the Government Colleges, a maximum of only 50 seats are to be allowed to AKB Sadhbavana Mission's institute. 4. Out of the total 50 seats, 50% (25 seats) are to set apart for meritbased admission by the Government. Government fees is to be made applicable to them. 5. As in the case of NCP course, AKB Sadhbavana Mission Trust is to enter into an agreement with the Government for conduct of the CCP (Homoeo) course. 6. After admitting all the students in manner stated hereinbefore, the said institute is to submit a list all the students, along with necessary documents, for the consideration and decisions of the Principal and Controlling Officer. W.A. No. 1056 of 2020 -32- 7. Classes at the AKB Sadhbavana Mission should begin when classes for the CCP (Homoeo) course begin in the Government Homoeo Medical Colleges. 8. The educational infrastructure and teachers prescribed by the course syllabus should be available at the AKB Sadhbavana Mission's institute. 9. The Principal and Controlling Officer, officers of the Government Homoeopathic Colleges deputed by him, officials of the AYUSH Department, would have the power to inspect AKB Sadhbavana Mission's Institute at any time to examine the functioning of the institute. 10. The responsibility for conducting examination for CCP (Homoeo) course in AKB Sadhbavana Mission's Institute would be upon the Board of Examinations of which the Principal and Controlling Officer is the Chairman. 11. The examination centre for the students of AKB Sadhbavana Mission's Institute would be Government Homoeopathic Medical College, Calicut, as it was for the NCP (Homoeo) course. 12. For the holding of examination, a fixed fee determined by the Government, is to be paid by the Institute, before the examination is held, to the office of the Principal and Controlling Officer. 13. Only students having a minimum attendance of 70% would be eligible for appearing in the Board exam. The attendance-statement proving this should be made available time before the office of the Principal and Controlling Officer. 14. The CCP (Homoeo) students in the Government Homoeo Colleges are given practical training for two weeks each at HOMCO, Aleppey and the dispensaries/hospitals under the Directorate of Homoepathy. Therefore, this would be applicable also to the CCP students of AKB Sadhbavana Mission. For the said training, the institution has to take necessary steps for all the students.” W.A. No. 1056 of 2020 -33- 20. Therefore the contention advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant that the action of the Government is also arbitrary, since it violates the policy declared by the State Government as per Exts.P1 and P2, is not sustainable under law, for the very same reason. There is also no basis for the contention advanced by the appellant that the Government have arbitrarily parted with its largesse, since we are of the view that in the medical field, courses are being conducted by various institutions in private sector parallel to the Government Medical Colleges and other Government institutions. In that view of the matter, there is no basis or legal foundation in the arguments advanced by the appellant in that regard . 21. Factual issues having found so, we proceed to consider the issue with respect to the _locus standi_ of the appellant as a person aggrieved. As we have pointed out earlier, the appellant has laid emphasis on the judgments of the Apex Court discussed above. It is true, there may be circumstances where any member of the public may be at liberty to challenge any Government action which is arbitrary, and materially affecting the public. The dictum laid down by the Apex Court in the above discussed judgments would make it clear that, the legal injury suffered by the person who have invoked the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India should be able to be deciphered W.A. No. 1056 of 2020 -34- from the facts and circumstances put forth by him. In the case at hand, even though the appellant has stated that he is a person aggrieved consequent to the violation of Exts.P1 and P2, the alleged policy declared by the Government in respect of the conduct of the CCP (Homoeo) course in private sector, we have already found that there is no basis or rationale in advancing such a contention since in Exts.P1 and P2, the Government have not declared any such policy at all so as to exclude any private institutions entering the field of the CCP course. Situations being so, we do not think that the proposition of law canvassed by the appellant flowing out of the judgements supra, would come to the rescue of the appellant. On the other hand in Ext. P1, consequent to the discontinuance of the NCP course, the Government was exploring the possibility of mitigating the circumstances by permitting to start the CCP course so as avert dearth of qualified persons for better service of pharmacists. Similar was the situation when Government considered the case of the 3[rd] respondent. Moreover, even though the appellant has repeatedly stated in the pleadings that he is a person personally aggrieved consequent to the excessive action of the State Government, it is not explained or deliberated as to how he was affected by the action of the Government. The sole reason stated is that there would be fall of standards when the said course is conducted in private sectors. We are W.A. No. 1056 of 2020 -35- unable to accept the same since from the Anenxure attached to Ext.P9 Government Order itself, it is clear that the Government have formulated the modalities to carry on with the permission granted to conduct the CCP (Homoeo) course. Which thus means, the appellant has failed to establish before this court that he is prejudicially affected by the act of Government and no supporting materials are forthcoming also to point out any specific instance of such an injury. We also do not think that any legal wrong was committed by the Government to prejudice the public or that matter, the appellant and so also, we could not locate any injurious affection or infringement of the rights of the public or the appellant in that regard. That apart, it was submitted by the appellant that the earlier round of litigation was authored by him, but from the records we find that it was filed by Kerala Government Homeo Medical Officers Association represented by its President and we are at a loss to understand the reason for withdrawal of the association from pursuing the matter and how and under what circumstances suddenly the issue has become a personal aggrievement of the appellant. Therefore, the substratum built up by the appellant on account of personally aggrieved' has no legalistic foundation so as to entertain the contentions raised in the appeal, that unregulated conduct of the CCP (Homoeo) course in the private sector would adversely affect the prospects of the students who W.A. No. 1056 of 2020 -36- have secrured admisison to study the course. In the Government Homoeo Medical Colleges in Trivandrum and Calicut. According to us, the said submission is a falacious one without any legal or factual significance, especially due to the fact that appellant has failed to specify any instances accordingly and we are at a loss to understand as to how the starting of the CCP (Homoeo) course in private sector would affect the prospects of the students persuing their carreer in Government Colleges. Anyhow, none of the students have come forward with any such contention and we are surprised to note that a Government Homoeo Doctor has filed the writ petition without bothering to narrate the circumstances under which his apprehensions are founded. By saying so, we genuinely suspect the _bona fides_ of the appellant in pursuing the matter. Assimilating the facts and the the legal situations, we do not think that the appellant has made out a case of _locus standi_ being an aggrieved person. 22. Yet another contention put forth by the learned counsel for the appellant is that in Ext.P5 judgment, the Division Bench of this Court has only directed the Government to consider the issue with respect to the conduct of the NCP course by the third respondent Trust; but the Government has exceeded the scope of consideration and decided to permit the third respondent to conduct CCP (Homoeo) course. However, W.A. No. 1056 of 2020 -37- we do not find any merit in the said submission, since, even though the issue before the Division Bench was only with respect to the conduct of the NCP course, that would in no manner disable the Government to consider the grant of permission to CCP (Homoeo) course, which is the absolute domain of the State Government, and further in Ext.P5 judgement, such a course of action is never prohibited. Upshot of the above discussion is, the appellant has not made out any case of interference in the discretionary power exercised by the learned Single Judge. Needless to say, writ appeal fails and it is accordingly dismissed. sd/- **S. MANIKUMAR, CHIEF JUSTICE.** sd/- **SHAJI P. CHALY, JUDGE.** _Rv_