High Court of KeralaSingle JudgeOriginal petition dismissed; no relief to petit...

Dr. Narayana Pisharadi and others v. STANCASH CHITS (P) LTD.

Case / Petition Number:OP(C) No.1111 of 2021

Case Details & Bench

Court
High Court of Kerala
Hon'ble Judges
  • V. G. Arun
Judgment Date
2022-04-29
Court Decision / Holding
Original petition is dismissed; the court declines to release title deeds and upholds order dismissing the deposit-release application.
Final Disposition
Original petition dismissed; no relief to petitioners on release of title deeds.

Parties to the Case

Appellants / Petitioners

  • Dr. Narayana Pisharadi
  • Jaya Narayanan
  • Rohith Pisharadi
  • Abhijith Pisharadi

Respondents

  • STANCASH CHITS (P) LTD.

Legal Representation & Advocates

Counsels for Petitioners

  • • N.M.Madhu
  • • C.S.Rajani

Counsels for Respondents

  • • Liji J.Vadakedom
  • • Rajeev Jyothish
  • • George Tom
  • • E.Jacob
  • • Rexy Elizabeth Thomas

Case Synopsis & Summary

This is an original petition under OP(C) 1111/2021 arising from O.S. 4/2021 in the Principal Sub Court, Thrissur. The plaintiff-bank sought a decree for recovery of Rs 57,50,000 with 18% interest on a plaint schedule property. The petitioners (defendants 3–6) contend that after a kuri, the first petitioner deposited title deeds and created an equitable mortgage; they allege subsequent settlement signed in their favor and a sale-related dispute concerning a bipolar-illness-afflicted third defendant’s transactions with a third party. The petitioners maintained that they did not deposit any title deed or create an equitable mortgage in relation to the schedule property; they sought permission to deposit the entire plaint amount and to restore the original title deed, arguing that the trial court erred by a hyper-technical application of Sections 60 and 83 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, without invoking the court’s inherent powers under Section 151 CPC. The respondent contended that the title deeds can be released only after a decree is satisfied and that inherent powers cannot override statutory provisions. The High Court held that the remedy for release of title deeds lies within Sections 60 and 83, invoked pre-suit; it rejected the plea to rely on Section 151 CPC to override express rights, citing Padam Sen, Ferro Concrete Construction, and Manjeri Municipality to emphasize limits on inherent powers. The petition is dismissed.

Provisions of Law Cited

Transfer of Property Act, 1882 - Section 58Transfer of Property Act, 1882 - Section 60Transfer of Property Act, 1882 - Section 83Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Section 151

Legal Doctrines & Maxims

  • Inherent powers under CPC Section 151 are limited to procedural matters and cannot override substantive rights.
  • Where express statutory provisions apply, inherent powers cannot override or circumvent them (as held in Ferro Concrete Construction Pvt. Ltd. and Manjeri Municipality).
  • Padam Sen v. State of U.P. recognizes that inherent powers cannot be used to alter substantive rights.

Submissions & Arguments

Contentions of Appellants / Petitioners

The petitioners argued that having offered to deposit the entire plaint claim, the court should release the title deeds deposited by the first petitioner. They contended that the trial court erred in applying Sections 60 and 83 of the Transfer of Property Act in a hyper-technical manner and ignored the court’s inherent power under Section 151 CPC to grant relief so as to prevent injustice and to secure substantial ends of litigation. They maintained that the release of title deeds is a just and equitable relief in light of the deposit/offer and should be permitted before final decree, especially since the mortgage context and the suit are connected with securing an amount and rights under the mortgage.

Contentions of Respondents

The respondent contended that the documents can be released only after a decree is satisfied and that release cannot be ordered merely on an offer to deposit. They argued that Sections 60 and 83 govern redemption and deposit before filing a suit for redemption, and that the court correctly declined the application in Ext. P8. They asserted that Section 151 CPC cannot be invoked to contravene express statutory provisions, relying on Padam Sen, Ferro Concrete Construction, and Manjeri Municipality to demonstrate that inherent powers cannot defeat substantive rights or statutory commands.

Cited Precedents (4)

Case NameCitationTreatmentExplanation
Padam Sen v. State of U.P.AIR 1961 SC 218PositiveCited to support that inherent powers under Section 151 CPC are for procedure and cannot override substantive rights; court follows this principle.
State of Rajasthan and another v. M/s Ferro Concrete Construction Pvt. Ltd(2009) 12 SCC 1PositiveUsed to emphasize that Section 151 cannot override express statutory provisions or create rights/liabilities beyond law.
Manjeri Municipality, Manjeri v. A.M.Mohammed AliILR 2015 (2) Kerala 69PositiveCited for the principle that express legal provisions govern the topic and inherent powers cannot substitute them.
Poulose (supra)Poulose (supra)PositiveCited to support that remedies under Sections 60/83 must be invoked prior to institution of a suit for enforcement of mortgage; reinforces statutory sequence.

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Extracted Judgment Text

Exact text extracted from official judgment records.

## **IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM** ## **PRESENT** ## **THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE V.G.ARUN** **FRIDAY, THE 29[TH] DAY OF APRIL 2022 / 9TH VAISAKHA, 1944** ## **OP(C) NO. 1111 OF 2021** **(OS 4/2021 OF PRINCIPAL SUB COURT THRISSUR)** ## **PETITIONER/S:** 1 DR. NARAYANA PISHARADI AGED 65 YEARS S/O.LATE DR.SAROJINI PISHARASSIAR, KATTUR PISHARATH VEETTIL, SHORNUR ROAD, THRISSUR VILLAGE, DESOM, THRISSUR TALUK. 2 JAYA NARAYANAN AGED 59 YEARS W/O.DR.NARAYANAN PISHARADI, KATTUR PISHARATH VEETTIL, SHORNUR ROAD, THRISSUR VILLAGE, DESOM, THRISSUR TALUK. 3 ROHITH PISHARADI AGED 35 YEARS S/O.DR.NARAYANAN PISHARADI, KATTUR PISHARATH VEETIL, SHORNUR ROAD, THRISSUR VILLAGE, DESOM, THRISSUR TALUK. 4 ABHIJITH PISHARADI AGED 31 YEARS S/O.DR.NARAYANAN PISHARDI, KATTUR PISHARATHVEETIL, SHORNUR ROAD, THRISSUR VILLAGE, DESOM, THRISSUR TALUK NOW EMPLOYED AT U.A.E. REPRESENTED BY HIS POWER OF ATTORNEY HOLDER ROHITH PISHARADI, THE THIRD PETITIONER (P.A.DEED PRODUCED EXT.P1). BY ADVS. N.M.MADHU C.S.RAJANI ## **RESPONDENT/S:** STANCASH CHITS (P) LTD. REGD. OFFICE CHEMBUKAVU VILLAGE,COLLEGE ROAD, THRISSUR TALUK, REP. BY LITIGATION CLERK, BABU M., AGED 57 YEARS, S/O.ANTONY, MANJALI HOUSE, MAHATMA STREET, OLLUKKARA, THRISSUR, PIN- 680 655. BY ADVS. LIJI.J.VADAKEDOM RAJEEV JYOTHISH GEORGE TOM E. JACOB REXY ELIZABETH THOMAS THIS OP (CIVIL) HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 09.11.2021, THE COURT ON 29.04.2022 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: O.P.(C) No.1111 of 2021 -2- ## **JUDGMENT** Dated this the 29[th] day of April, 2022 The petitioners are defendants 3 to 6 in O.S.No.4 of 2021 pending on the files of the Principal Sub Court, Thrissur. The first respondent herein has filed the suit seeking a decree for recovery of an amount of Rs.57,50,000/- with 18% interest from the defendants, charged on the plaint schedule property. As per the averments in the plaint, defendants 1 and 2 had joined a kuri conducted by the plaintiff and had availed the prized kury amount after executing necessary documents. Later, when the plaintiff demanded more security for the amount, the title deed of the first petitioner was deposited and an equitable mortgage created by deposit of title deeds. Defendants 1 and 2 are not made parties to this original petition. The first petitioner is the O.P.(C) No.1111 of 2021 -3- third defendant in the suit. Petitioners 2 to 4 are arrayed as defendants 4 to 6, alleging that, subsequent to the deposit of title deeds, first petitioner had created a settlement deed in their favour. The petitioners' case before the trial court is that the third respondent is suffering from bipolar disease and had entered into a sale agreement with one Hammeed. Although the agreement was terminated subsequently, the title handed over to Hammeed during the subsistence of the agreement was not returned. The plaintiff in collusion with Hammeed had filed the suit on the strength of that document. According to the petitioners, the first petitioner had not deposited any title deed or created equitable mortgage with respect to the plaint schedule property. 2. In the suit, the petitioners filed I.A.No.4 of 2021, seeking permission to deposit the entire plaint claim and to return the O.P.(C) No.1111 of 2021 -4- original of the title deed deposited by the first petitioner. The first respondent opposed the prayer, contending that the documents can be released only after the decree passed in the suit is satisfied. By Ext.P8 order, the trial court dismissed the application, upholding the objection of the first respondent. Hence, this original petition. 3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that, the petitioners having volunteered to deposit the entire plaint claim, the trial court ought to have released the title deeds. Instead the trial court took a hyper technical view by relying on Section 60 and 83 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 completely overlooking the court's inherent power to grant any relief under Section 151 of CPC. 4. Learned Counsel for the first respondent contended that the impugned order being well reasoned, warranted no interference in exercise O.P.(C) No.1111 of 2021 -5- of the jurisdiction under Article 227. The decisions in _**Padam Sen v. State of U.P. [AIR 1961 SC 218], State of Rajasthan and another v. M/s.Ferro Concrete Construction Pvt.Ltd [(2009) 12 SCC 1]** and_ _**Manjeri Municipality, Manjeri v. A.M.Mohammed Ali [ILR 2015 (2) Kerala 69]**_ are relied on to contend that the inherent power saved by Section 151 of the Code is not intended to be exercised over the substantive rights which a litigant possesses. Reference is made to Sections 60 and 83 of the Transfer of Property Act to point out that the learned Sub Judge had rightly held that an application for return of title deeds by the mortgagor has to be filed before institution of the suit for enforcement of the mortgage and even there, the mortgagor should volunteer to deposit the entire amount. It is submitted that in the instant case, the petitioners had approached the court after ## O.P.(C) No.1111 of 2021 -6- institution of the suit and their offer was to deposit the amount conditionally. Hence, the trial court had rightly rejected the request for release of the title deed. 5. Section 58 defines mortgage as the transfer of an interest in specific immovable property for the purpose of securing the payment of money advanced or to be advanced by way of loan, an existing or future debt, or the performance of an engagement which may give rise to a pecuniary liability. As per Section 58(f), mortgage by deposit of title deeds takes place when a person delivers to a creditor or his agent a document of title to immovable property, with intent to create a security thereon. Section 60, dealing with the mortgagor's right of redemption, reads as under; “ _60. Right of mortgagor to redeem.—At any time after the principal money has become due, the mortgagor has a right, on payment or tender, at a proper time and place, of the_ O.P.(C) No.1111 of 2021 -7- _mortgage money, to require the mortgagee(a) to deliver to the mortgagor the mortgage-deed and all documents relating to the mortgaged property which are in the possession or power of the mortgagee, (b) where the mortgagee is in possession of the mortgaged property, to deliver possession thereof to the mortgagor, and (c)at the cost of the mortgagor either to re-transfer the mortgaged property to him or to such third person as he may direct, or to execute and (where the mortgage has been effected by a registered instrument) to have registered an acknowledgment in writing that any right in derogation of his interest transferred to the mortgagee has been extinguished: Provided that the right conferred by this section has not been extinguished by act of the parties or by decree of a Court. The right conferred by this section is called a right to redeem, and a suit to enforce it is called a suit for redemption.”_ 6. The other relevant provision, _viz_ , Section 83; is also extracted hereunder for easy reference; “ _83. Power to deposit in Court money due on mortgage.—At any time after the principal money 4 [payable in respect of any mortgage_ O.P.(C) No.1111 of 2021 -8- _has become due] and before a suit for redemption of the mortgaged property is barred, the mortgagor, or any other person entitled to institute such suit, may deposit, in any Court in which he might have instituted such suit, to the account of the mortgagee, the amount remaining due on the mortgage.”_ 7. Section 60 enables the mortgagor to pay the mortgage-money to the mortgagee and demand delivery of all documents relating to the mortgaged property in the possession or power of the mortgagee. Section 83 envisages deposit of the principal money payable in respect of the mortgage to the account of the mortgagee, by depositing the amount in the court in which the mortgagor could have instituted a suit for redemption of the mortgage property. In both instance, the payment/deposit has to be made prior to the institution of the suit by the mortgagee. This precise question was considered in _**Poulose** (supra)_ . Therein, after careful scrutiny of Sections 60 and 83, it is held that O.P.(C) No.1111 of 2021 -9- the remedy available to the mortgagor under the provisions aforementioned has to be invoked before the mortgagee files a suit for enforcement of the mortgage. The trial court rightly relied on the decision in _**Poulose**_ (supra), for declining the request for release of the title deed. 8. The contention that, _dehors_ Sections 60 and 83 of the Transfer of Property Act, the trial court could have ordered release of the title deeds by exercising its power under Section 151 cannot be countenanced, as Section 151 CPC cannot be resorted to, as if the provision is a panacea for all ailments. As held by the Apex Court in _**Padam Sen,**_ the inherent powers saved by Section 151 of the Code are with respect to the procedure to be followed by the Court in deciding the cause before it and is not a power to be exercised over the substantive rights of a litigant. For that, specific powers have to be conferred on the ## O.P.(C) No.1111 of 2021 -10- Courts for passing orders affecting substantive rights of a party. Such powers will not come within the scope of inherent powers of the Court, which essentially is the power to regulate the court's practice and procedure. The legal position is ex-posited well in _**M/s.Ferro Concrete**_ _**Construction Pvt.Ltd**_ by holding that Section 151 cannot be invoked with reference to a matter covered by a specific provision in the Code and cannot be used either to create or recognise rights, or to create liabilities and obligations not contemplated by any law. After detailed analysis of the precedents on Section 151, a Division Bench of this Court held in _**Manjeri Municipality, Manjeri v. A.M.Mohammed Ali [ILR**_ _**2015 (2) Kerala 69]**_ that, if there are express provisions covering a particular topic, then no power shall be exercised in respect of the said topic, otherwise than in the manner prescribed by O.P.(C) No.1111 of 2021 **==> picture [23 x 8] intentionally omitted <==** the provisions. Both grounds urged on behalf of the petitioners having been repelled, the original petition is dismissed. Sd/- **V.G.ARUN JUDGE** Scl/ O.P.(C) No.1111 of 2021 -12- ## **APPENDIX OF OP(C) 1111/2021** ## PETITIONER EXHIBITS |Exhibit P1|TRUE COPY OF THE POWER OF ATTORNEY| |---|---| ||DATED 02/12/2015.| |Exhibit P2|TRUE COPY OF THE PLAINT IN| ||O.S.NO.4/2021 ON THE FILES OF THE SUB| ||COURT, THRISSUR.| |Exhibit P3|TRUE COPY OF THE INJUNCTION PETITION| ||DATED 04/01/2021 (IA NO.2/2021) IN| ||O.S.NO.4/2021.| |Exhibit P4|TRUE COPY OF THE ADVERTISEMENT IN| ||MATHRUBHOOMI DAILY DATED 26/05/2015,| ||THRISSUR EDITION.| |Exhibit P5|TRUE COPY OF THE OBJECTION DATED| ||23/01/2021 FILED BY THE PETITIONERS TO| ||EXT.P3.| |Exhibit P6|TRUE COPY OF THE APPLICATION DATED| ||23/01/2021 FILED AS I.A.NO.4/2021 IN| ||O.S.NO.4/2021.| |Exhibit P7|TRUE COPY OF THE OBJECTION FILED BY| ||THE RESPONDENT TO EXT.P6.| |Exhibit P8|TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED| ||25/03/2021 IN I.A.NO.4/2021 IN| ||O.S.NO.4/2021 PASSED BY THE PRINCIPAL| ||SUB COURT, THRISSUR.|