High CourtDivision BenchAppeal allowed

DISTRICT PROGRAMME CO-OORDINATOR, MAHILA SAMKHYA & ANR v ABDUL KAREEM & ANR

Case / Petition Number:Civil Appeal No. 5815 of 2008
Neutral Citation:[2008] 13 S.C.R. 677

Case Details & Bench

Court
High Court
Hon'ble Judges
  • S.B. Sinha
  • Cyriac Joseph
Judgment Date
2008-09-18
Court Decision / Holding
Appeal allowed. The Court held that although the Labour Court’s and High Court’s findings on camouflage of dismissal were factual, the termination was not appropriate to order reinstatement because the project had ended. Instead, the appellants were directed to pay Rs. 56,000 as compensation for the remaining period (July 1998–October 1999), within eight weeks, with interest at 12% per annum if delayed.
Final Disposition
Appeal allowed

Parties to the Case

Appellants / Petitioners

  • DISTRICT PROGRAMME CO-OORDINATOR, MAHILA SAMKHYA & ANR

Respondents

  • Abdul Kareem
  • Anr.

Legal Representation & Advocates

Counsels for Petitioners

  • • Naveen R. Nath
  • • Lalit Mohini Bhat
  • • Hetu Arora

Counsels for Respondents

  • • Raja Venkatappa Naik
  • • Raja Raghavendra Naik
  • • R.K. Gupta
  • • Rameshwar Prasad Goyal

Case Synopsis & Summary

This appeal concerns the termination of a driver engaged by Mahila Samkhya, a Karnataka society, under a fixed-tenure arrangement during a project funded by the Government of India. The respondent was initially appointed in 1992 and re-hired for 1997–1999 under a fixed-term contract. His services were terminated by a letter dated 3 July 1998, purportedly under para XIV of the appointment letter. An industrial dispute was raised before the Labour Court at Gulbarga, which held that the termination was illegal and awarded reinstatement with back wages. The High Court upheld reinstatement but reduced back wages to 30%. The appellants challenged these orders, contending that the termination did not arise from non-renewal under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and was governed by the appointment terms; the project’s end in 1999 meant reinstatement would not subserve justice. The respondents argued the termination was punitive for improper conduct and thus falls within the protections of the IDA. The Court ultimately found that the termination appeared to be a camouflage for dismissal, but because the project had ended, reinstatement was not appropriate. Instead, it directed payment of Rs. 56,000 as compensation for the remaining period (July 1998–October 1999), with interest if delayed, and allowed the appeal.

Provisions of Law Cited

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, Section 2(oo)(bb)Chapter VA of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947Section 20 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947Article 136 of the Constitution of India

Submissions & Arguments

Contentions of Appellants / Petitioners

The appellants argued that the termination of the respondent was under para XIV of the appointment letter and on fixed tenure terms, not governed by the protections of Chapter VA of the ID Act. They claimed the termination did not arise from non-renewal under Section 2(oo)(bb), and contented that the project’s life ended in 1999, so reinstatement would not serve justice. The management contended that the letter of termination was a camouflage for dismissal and that the project did not constitute an “industry” in the statutory sense; thus the Labour Court’s order of reinstatement was erroneous and the appropriate remedy was compensation rather than reinstatement.

Contentions of Respondents

The respondents argued the termination was effectively punishment for improper conduct (not a simple contract non-renewal) and thus should fall under the protections of the IDA. They contended that the project period extended under the five-year plan, and termination before completion affected the project’s functioning; Article 136 should not be invoked to permit reinstatement where the project had logically ended. They asserted that the termination was not a mere contractual non-renewal and warranted reinstatement or adequate compensation.

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Extracted Judgment Text

Exact text extracted from official judgment records.

t ## [2008] 13 S.C.R. 677 # DISTRICT PROGRAMME CO-OORDINATOR, MAHILA SAMKHYA AND ANR, A ## _v_ ABDUL KAREEM AND ANR. (Civil Appeal No. 5815 of 2008) SEPTEMBER 18, 2008 B **[S.B. SINHA AND CYRIAC JOSEPH, JJ]** _Industrial Disputes Act, 1947:_ _s. 2(oo)(bb)_ - _Driver engaged by_ a _Society in_ a _project-_[c ] _Termination of his services_ - _Reinstatement by Labour court_ - _Affirmed by High Court_ - _Held: It is not_ a _case where termination of services of workman emanated from non-renewal of contract of employment_ - _The Finding arrived at by Labour Court that the termination relying upon or based on_ a _clause_ D _of offer of appointment was camouflage, has been affirmed by High Court_ - _However, it is not_ a _case where reinstatement could be ordered, as the project itself has come to an end_ - _Since services of workman could be terminated at the end of tenure of project, instead of instatement, workman be paid_ a E _sum of Rs.56,0001- as compensation for the remaining pe. riod._ CIVILAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 5815 of 2008 F From the final Judgment and Order dated 9.12.2005 and 20.06.2006 of the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in Writ Petition No. 27673 of 2000 (LITER) and Writ Appeal No. 130 of 2006 (LITER) Naveen R. Nath, Lalit Mohini Bhat and Hetu Arora for the[G ] Appellants. Raja Venkatappa Naik, Raja Raghavendra Naik, R.K. Gupta and Rameshwar Prasad Goyal for the Respondents. 677 H SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] '13 S.C.R. 678 A The following Order of the Court was delivered Delay condoned. Leave granted. 8 Mahila Samkhya, Karnataka, is a society registered under the Karnataka Societies Registration Act, 1960. This society is engaged in various activities, like encouraging, assisting, promoting, decision making and encouraging group action by women as means of their empowerment and c equal participation in the process to bring about social changes and to empower the women. The activities of the said society is being carried out in the districts of Gulbarga, Bidar, Raichur, Bijapur, Bellary, Koppal and Mysore in the State of Karnataka. It has been receiving funds from the Government of Netherlands 0[for the aforementioned activities. ] The services of respondent No.1 herein as a driver were hired by the appellants. He was initially appointed in the year 1992 on fixed tenure basis. On or about 20[1] h October, 1997, his services were again hired inter alia for the period 1.11.1997 to E 31.10.1999. Appellants were, however, entitled to terminate his services with 30 days notice on either side or by payment of compensation of one month's honorarium in lieu of notice. It is now not much in dispute that some acts of omission and commission on the part of the 1 •[1 ] respondent were brought F to the notice of the authorities of the Society and some purported oral enquiry was conducted at Bangalore in connection with some vehicle bearing No. KA-39 M-42. > By reason of a letter dated 3rd July, 1998, however, the G services of respondent No.1 were terminated in terms of para 14 of the offer of appointment, stating: "Vide the above referred letter, you were appointed as a driver in MSK, Gulbcirga as per the terms and conditions mentioned therein. In accordance with para XIV of your H appointment letter, your services are no longer required in DIST. PROGRAMME CO-OORDINATOR, MAHILA 679 SAMKHYA & ANR. _v._ ABDUL KAREEM & ANR. this organization and hence your services are terminated A with immP.diate effect, i.e. with effect from 3.7.98 with one month notice in lieu of which you are being paid one month's honorarium." ·An industrial dispute was raised by the 1 •[1 ] respondent s· before the Labour Court at Gulbarga. Both the parties adduced their respective evidences before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court. Having regard to the deposition of Ms. Jyothi Kulkarni examined on behalf of the appellants as NW-1, the Labour Court opined: c "The main contention of the 2nd party is that the termination of the workman 1st party was only a termination simplicitor and the same cannot be disturbed by the Court. In this case the 2nd party has produced the letter dt. 3.7.98. Of course the said letter shows that the appointment was only temporary in nature. This statement as reflected in the letter cannot be D accepted. In fact the 1st party has produced before the court the letter issued by the establishment. The said letter issued by the officials of the 2nd party marked as W1 clearly indicates that the serVice of 1st party was terminated not on account of temporary work but it was due to the fact that the same was E not proper." Holding that as no disciplinary enquiry was conducted, the termination order dated 3. 7 .1998 was illegal, an award of reinstatement in service with full back wages was made. Aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said award the appellants filed writ F petition in the High Court. The High Court while upholding the award of reinstatement in service reduced the back-wages to 30 per cent. Appellants are, thus, before us. G Mr. Nath, learned counsel for the appellants would submit that the Labour Court and consequently the High committed a serious illegality in passing the impugned award and the judgment, in so far as they failed to take into consideration that the order of termination did not attract the provisions contained in H 680 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 13 S.C.R A Chapter VA of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 inasmuch as the termination of services of the 1st respondent came within the purview of clause (bb) of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Mr. Naik, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the reB spondents, on the other hand, would urge that from the letter dated 5th August, 1997 issued by the Ministry of Human Resource Development, Department of Education, Government of India, it would appear that the Project during the 9[1] h Plan period was to continue from 1997-98 to 2001-2002 and in that c view of he matter, the services of the 1st respondent should not have been terminated before the Project came to an end. From the deposition of Ms. Jyothi Kulkarni t erself, the learned counsel submitted, it is abundantly clear tt at the serD[vices of ][the ][1st ][respondent ][were ][terminated ][by ][way ][of punish-] ment in lieu of dismissal from service as his behavic 1ur was not proper and, thus, this Court should not exercise its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. ~ Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 194 7 E[reads ][as ][under: ] "termination of the service of the workman a~ a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a s ipulation in that behalf contained therein;" F It is not a case where the termination of these vices of the 1st respondent emanated from non-renewal of cor tract of employment. Under the general law, the appellants migl 1t have been G[entitled ][to ][take ][recourse ][to ][clause ][XIV ][of ][the ][offe · of appoint-] ment dated 20.10.1997, but in view of the fact th it the terms and conditions of services of the 1st respondent we re governed by the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, the order oftermination must satisfy the requirements ~;18reof. We may place on record that although a co itention has H ., DIST. PROGRAMME CO-OORDINATOR, MAHILA 681 SAMKHYA & ANR. _v._ ABDUL KAREEM & ANR. '\ .... i been raised both before the Labour Court as also the High Court A that the society does not satisfy the test of an 'industry' as con- · tained in Section 20) of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947. Mr. Nath did not raise any such contention before us. A finding has been arrived at by the Labour Court that the termination of the services of the 1st respondent, relying on or B on the basis of clause XIV of the offer of appointment, is a camouflage and the said finding has been affirmed by the High Court. We are not inclined to interfere therewith, being a finding of fact. > It is, however, not a case where an award of reinstatement c could be made. The Society runs the project. The project came to an end in 1999. The plea that the tenure of the project was extended by the Government of India was not put to the Management. Such a plea cannot be raised for the first time before us. D We, therefore, are of the opinion that as the services of the 1st respondent could be terminated on or about 31.10.1999, i.e. at the end of the tenure of the project, interest of justice will be subserved if in stead and place of upholding the award of reinstatement in service, we direct the appellants to pay a sum E of Rs. 56,000/- to the 1st respondent by way of compensation which would cover the amount of honorarium to which he would have been entitled to for the period July, 1998 to October, 1999. We direct accordingly. ,, The said payment shall be made within a period ofeight[F ] weeks from the date of communication of this order, failing which the same shall bear interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum. The appeal is allowed in the above terms. G R.P. Appeal allowed . ...