DILIP S. v. HARIPRIYA S. @ ASWATHY (RPFC No. 167 of 2019 and RPFC No. 197 of 2020)

## **IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM** ## **PRESENT** ## **THE HONOURABLE MRS. JUSTICE MARY JOSEPH** **FRIDAY, THE 13TH DAY OF NOVEMBER 2020 / 22ND KARTHIKA, 1942** ## **RPFC.No.167 OF 2019** **AGAINST THE ORDER IN M.C.No.25/2017 DATED 27.02.2019 OF FAMILY COURT, PALA** ## **REVISION PETITIONER (RESPONDENT IN THE COURT BELOW):** **DILIP S., AGED 33 YEARS, SON OF V.K.SIVAN PILLA, VENGALATHUMADOM HOUSE, KOTHAMANGALAM.P.O, ERNAKULAM DISTRICT, PIN-686 691.** **BY ADV. SRI.S.VINOD BHAT** ## **RESPONDENTS(PETITIONERS IN THE COURT BELOW):** |**1**|**HARIPRIYA S.@ASWATHY,**| |---|---| ||**AGED 31 YEARS,**| ||**WIFE OF DILIP.S, UMAVELAYUDHAVILASAM HOUSE,**| ||**CHAKKAMPUZHA.P.O, VELLILAPPALLY,**| ||**KOTTAYAM DISTRICT, PIN-686 574.**| |**2**|**THARUN DILIP(MINOR),**| ||**AGED 5 YEARS,**| ||**REPRESENTED BY HIS MOTHER AND GUARDIAN**| ||**HARIPRIYA.S.@ ASWATHY,**| ||**UMAVELAYUDHAVILASAM HOUSE,**| ||**CHAKKAMPUZHA.P.O, VELLILAPPALLY,**| ||**KOTTAYAM DISTRICT, PIN-686 574.**| ## **BY ADV.P.C.HARIDAS** **THIS REV.PETITION(FAMILY COURT) HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 01-10-2020, ALONG WITH RPFC.197/2020, THE COURT ON 13-11-2020 PASSED THE FOLLOWING:** R.P.(FC) No. 167 of 2019 and R.P.(FC) No.197 of 2020 -:2:- ## **IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM** ## **PRESENT** ## **THE HONOURABLE MRS. JUSTICE MARY JOSEPH** **FRIDAY, THE 13TH DAY OF NOVEMBER 2020 / 22ND KARTHIKA, 1942** ## **RPFC.No.197 OF 2020** **AGAINST THE ORDER IN M.C.No.25/2017 DATED 27.02.2019 OF FAMILY COURT, PALA** ## **REVISION PETITIONERS/PETITIONERS:** **1 HARIPRIYA S.@ ASWATHY, AGED 31 YEARS, WIFE OF DILIP.S, UMAVELAYUDHAVILASAM HOUSE, CHAKKAMPUZHA.P.O, VELLILAPPALLY, KOTTAYAM DISTRICT, PIN-686 574. 2 THARUN DILIP( MINOR), AGED 3 ½ YEARS, REPRESENTED BY MOTHER AND GUARDIAN HARIPRIYA.S.@ ASWATHY, W/O DILIP S, AGED 31 YEARS, UMAVELAYUDHAVILASAM HOUSE, CHAKKAMPUZHA.P.O, VELLILAPPALLY, KOTTAYAM DISTRICT, PIN-686 574. BY ADV. SRI.P.C HARIDAS** ## **RESPONDENT/RESPONDENT:** **DILIP S., S/O V.K.SIVANPILLA, AGED 32 YEARS, VENGALATHUMADOM HOUSE, KOTHAMANGALAM.P.O, MATHIRAPPALLY BHAGAM, ERNAKULAM DISTRICT, PIN-686 691** **BY ADVS. SRI.S.VINOD BHAT SMT.ANAGHA LAKSHMI RAMAN** **THIS REV.PETITION(FAMILY COURT) HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 01-10-2020, ALONGWITH RPFC.167/2019, THE COURT ON 13-11-2020 PASSED THE FOLLOWING:** R.P.(FC) No. 167 of 2019 and R.P.(FC) No.197 of 2020 -:3:- ## **ORDER** **Dated this the 13[th] day of November, 2020** The revisions on hand are filed against an order passed by the Family Court, Pala on 27.02.2019 in M.C No.25 of 2017. By the above order, the Family Court, has ordered the revision petitioner to pay Rs.8,000/- each as monthly maintenance to the respondents. 2. The facts of the case relevant for disposal of the above Revisions are narrated in a nut shell hereunder : For clarity, the parties to the revision on hand will hereinafter be referred to as the respondent and 1[st] and 2[nd] petitioners in accordance with their status before the Family Court. The respondent married the 1[st] petitioner on 12.12.2013 and the 2[nd] petitioner was born in the wedlock. The ill treatment of the respondent caused the marital relationship strained. Ultimately, from January, 2017 onwards, the 1[st] petitioner alongwith the child started residing separately from the respondent. The respondent was a B.Tech Graduate and was earning Rs.25,000/- monthly. He was also obtaining income from R.P.(FC) No. 167 of 2019 and R.P.(FC) No.197 of 2020 -:4:- real estate business and agricultural operations conducted by him. Despite having sufficient income, he willfully neglected to maintain the petitioners. In the said circumstances, having no source of income of her own and finding unable to maintain herself and the child, the petition was preferred by the 1[st] petitioner before the Family Court seeking to obtain Rs.15,000/and Rs.10,000/- respectively as monthly maintenance. 3. The respondent in the objection filed in the M.C has admitted the status of the 1[st] and 2[nd] petitioners respectively as his wife and child. It is contended that the 1[st] petitioner is living separately from him without any reasonable cause, that she was working as a Tutor in Bharat School of Nursing and was getting Rs.45,000/- monthly as salary, that having no job or other source of income, he is unable to pay monthly maintenance to the petitioners, that he is prepared to maintain the 2[nd] petitioner and that the petition seeking maintenance at exorbitant rates is devoid of merits and is only to be dismissed. 4. During trial, the 1[st] petitioner tendered oral evidence as PW1 and marked Exts.A1 and A2. The respondent examined himself as DW1 and marked Exts.B1 to B3. A witness was also examined by him as DW2. The Family Court appreciated the R.P.(FC) No. 167 of 2019 and R.P.(FC) No.197 of 2020 -:5:- evidence and found both petitioners entitled to get maintenance from the respondent and directed the latter to pay Rs.8,000/monthly to each of them, with effect from the month in which the Maintenance Case was filed. Revision Petition was moved by the respondent challenging the order granting maintenance as R.P.(FC) No.167 of 2019 and by the petitioners as R.P.(FC) No.197 of 2020 raising challenge against the quantum ordered to be paid as monthly maintenance to each petitioners for the reason that it is only deficient. According to him, the Family Court ought to have granted monthly maintenance at the rates of Rs.15,000/- and Rs.10,000/- to the petitioners as claimed by them. 5. Sri.S.Vinod Bhat and Sri.P.C.Haridas tendered arguments respectively for the respondent and the petitioners. It is urged by Sri.Vinod Bhat that the 1[st] petitioner was employed as Tutor in Bharat School of Nursing, Kottayam and was earning sufficient income at the relevant time when the M.C. seeking maintenance was pending consideration of the Family Court. According to him, the respondent had taken a specific contention in his counter statement that the 1[st] petitioner is employed in Bharat School of Nursing as a Tutor and is getting Rs.45,000/- as salary and R.P.(FC) No. 167 of 2019 and R.P.(FC) No.197 of 2020 -:6:- therefore, is disentitled to get maintenance from the respondent. But, the 1[st] petitioner did not state the said factum in the M.C. 6. When cross examined by the respondent with specific reference to that aspect, the 1[st] petitioner as PW1, has admitted that she has Masters Degree in Nursing and had worked as a fulltime Tutor in Bharat School of Nursing on contract basis for a period of one year from 11.12.2017 and on expiry of the contract period on 10.12.2018, has been terminated from her job by the institution. A certificate issued by the Principal, School of Nursing, Bharat School of Nursing, Kottayam was also produced and got marked in evidence as Ext.A2, which also certifies that the engagement of PW1 at Bharat School of Nursing as Tutor on contract basis was for a period of one year commencing from 11.12.2017. Copy of the Appointment letter was produced by the respondent and got marked in evidence as Ext.B1. It discloses that PW1 was appointed on fixed tenure contract basis as Tutor Nurse with effect from 01.07.2018 till 10.12.2018. Copy of the letter incorporating the terms of contract was produced by the respondent, which shows that contract of employment of PW1 with Bharat School of Nursing though originally was entered for a period of one year, the period could be extended further by the R.P.(FC) No. 167 of 2019 and R.P.(FC) No.197 of 2020 -:7:- School on expiry of the term. The Principal of Bharat School of Nursing was summoned and examined by the respondent as DW2 with a view to establish that even at the time of consideration of the M.C., PW1 is continuing her work as Tutor at the Nursing School. DW2 has also stated that the contract period of employment of PW1 was due to expire on 10.12.2018 and on that day PW1 resigned from the job. DW2 had taken dual stand on the cause that puts an end to the employment of PW1 by stating initially that she was terminated and later that she has resigned. Despite the inconsistency, PW1 failed to seek any clarification on that aspect from DW2. It was urged by the learned counsel in the context that by resigning from her contract job as Tutor PW1 restrained her employer from exercising discretion in the matter of extension of the contract period of employment further for one year. According to him, her resignation on the last date of her contract period of employment was only to impress the court in seizin of her petition seeking maintenance that she was totally devoid of income and therefore unable to maintain herself and thus to extract money in the form of maintenance from her husband. It was contended that had the 1[st] petitioner not resigned from her job as Tutor on R.P.(FC) No. 167 of 2019 and R.P.(FC) No.197 of 2020 -:8:- 10.12.2018, the contract period would have been extended further for another year. Documents obtained by DW1 on applying under the Right to Information Act, 2005 were marked in evidence as Exts.B1 and B2. Ext.B1 is the copy of the appointment letter issued on 28.06.2018 and Ext.B2 is the copy of the contract letter. The learned counsel has apprised this Court on the basis of the recitals in Ext.B2 that the period of one year could be extended further by the School on expiry of one year tenure. According to the learned counsel, the 1[st] petitioner as PW1 has stated that she was terminated by her employer on expiry of the one year contract period. But, the employer of PW1 during examination has stated so and also that PW1 had resigned on the last date of the contract period. 7. As per Ext.B1, PW1 was getting Rs.15,050/- monthly as salary from the School of Nursing from 01.07.2018 till 10.12.2018. According to the learned counsel at the time when PW1 was examined in court, her contract period of employment was over and by marking Ext.A2 in evidence and by abstaining to produce and mark in evidence, a document akin to Ext.B1, she had proved herself to be devoid of bonafides. According to him, by producing Ext.A2 and failing to apprise the court on the true R.P.(FC) No. 167 of 2019 and R.P.(FC) No.197 of 2020 -:9:- state of affairs exist then, the attempt of PW1 was to impress the court that she was getting only Rs.7,000/- monthly which is a highly deficient sum, insufficient to meet even her basic requirements and to extract more money from the respondent under the label, monthly maintenance. According to him, PW1 by doing so, has suppressed a factum very relevant and material for adjudication of her entitlement to get maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C. According to him, in a context when it was plausible for the one year tenure of employment to be further extended by the employer of the petitioner on the term getting expired, by resigning, PW1 had played a fraud on the court solely with a view to grab money from the respondent in the form of monthly maintenance, for which in fact, she was not entitled to. According to the learned counsel, the Family Court ought to have dismissed the petition seeking maintenance, for want of bonafides for the petitioner. According to him, the Family Court has overlooked these aspects while passing the impugned order and therefore is unjustified. The learned counsel canvassed in the context to set aside the impugned order directing the respondent to pay Rs.8,000/- as monthly maintenance in favour of the 1[st] petitioner. R.P.(FC) No. 167 of 2019 and R.P.(FC) No.197 of 2020 -:10:- 8. A contention was also taken by the learned counsel that the 1[st] petitioner is working as Tutor at Bharat School of Nursing, Kottayam even now. But, evidence is not forthcoming to establish that. A suggestion on continuity of employment of PW1 was put to DW2, but she outrightly denied the same and added in clarification that on the last date of the tenure itself, PW1 resigned. 9. Neither the respondent nor the 1[st] petitioner sought to establish through DW2 that had resignation not tendered by PW1, the tenure of the job would have been extended further. Therefore, the argument of the learned counsel that but for the resignation, PW1 could have continued in her job and the resignation was tendered only to impress the court on her inability to maintain herself, for being eligible for getting money in the form of maintenance from the respondent. 10. The nature of the job in which PW1 was employed temporarily assumes much relevance in the context on hand. Evenif the contract period was extended, it could have only been for one year further and absolutely no evidence is forthcoming to establish the likelihood of it to be regularised. There cannot be R.P.(FC) No. 167 of 2019 and R.P.(FC) No.197 of 2020 -:11:- any dispute on the qualification of the 1[st] petitioner to work as a Nurse. She being a Post Graduate, is qualified also to work as a Tutor. Evenif the respondent succeeds in establishing that the 1[st] petitioner is still working as a Tutor at Bharat School of Nursing, the nature of the job being temporary, it cannot have much relevancy while proceeding to decide on the entitlement of PW1 for maintenance as contended by the learned counsel. 11. Sri.P.C.Haridas has urged on behalf of the petitioners that the petitioners are entitled to live in the same standard of living of the respondent and canvassed that only when the sums claimed by the petitioners are awarded, they could live so. He has relied on the dictums laid by the Apex Court and various High Courts to fortify his stand. **Pyla Mutyalamma alias Satyavathi** **v. Pyla Suri Demudu and another** [(2011) 12 SCC 189] has been cited by the learned counsel to contend that a Court exercising revisional jurisdiction in a proceedings under Section 125 Cr.P.C cannot reassess evidence and substitute its own findings. According to the learned counsel, appreciation of evidence is not contemplated while exercising revisional jurisdiction and therefore this Court is refrained from doing so. The learned counsel also contended that positive findings arrived R.P.(FC) No. 167 of 2019 and R.P.(FC) No.197 of 2020 -:12:- at by the court in the impugned order in favour of the petitioner will not be interfered with by the High Court while exercising revisional jurisdiction. Accordingly, it was pleaded that the finding on entitlement for maintenance being entered by the Family Court in favour of the 1[st] petitioner, it cannot be interfered with by this Court in the revision on hand. The learned counsel has also relied on **Sunita Kachwaha and others v. Anil Kachwaha** (2014 KHC 4690 = AIR 2015 SC 554), wherein the Apex Court has held that proceedings under Section 125 Cr.P.C being summary in nature, there is no need for the Court to evaluate the minute details of the matrimonial dispute to see who infact was at fault. The learned counsel canvassed on the basis of the dictum in the case supra that evenif a justifiable reason was not there for the wife for leaving the matrimonial home, maintenance cannot be deprived to her. The dictum has also been relied on to canvass that merely for the reason that the 1[st] petitioner is qualified professionally or there is probability to get an employment in future based on the qualification she has, maintenance shall not be declined to her. According to him, the Apex Court has also held in the case supra that when the wife after separation has chosen to do some work for the sustenance R.P.(FC) No. 167 of 2019 and R.P.(FC) No.197 of 2020 -:13:- of herself and her family as well, her claim for maintenance ought not to have been rejected by the court. 12. The learned counsel for the petitioner has relied on **Chaturbhuj v. Sita Bai** [(2008) 2 SCC 316] to contend that a wife claiming maintenance for herself under Section 125 Cr.P.C is burdened to establish that she is unable to maintain herself. She must also establish that the respondent is having sufficient income and has neglected or refused to maintain her. When these two aspects are established by the petitioner, a court dealing with the claim of a wife seeking maintenance cannot decline it. 13. The learned counsel strenuously urged that in the struggle of PW1 to sustain the life of her family, she opted to serve as a Tutor in a Nursing School on temporary basis, that too, after filing of the petition seeking maintenance, and in that context, the view sought to be taken by the learned counsel that she is able to maintain herself and therefore is disentitled to get maintenance is only to be discarded as being totally devoid of merits. Such a view is probable, if the job obtained by the wife immediately after separation or during the pendency of the petition seeking maintenance was a permanent one with R.P.(FC) No. 167 of 2019 and R.P.(FC) No.197 of 2020 -:14:- reasonable salary or though a temporary one, with possibility for it to be regularised in future. According to the learned counsel, the petitioner was employed for a period of one year duration and therefore, it cannot be taken to have any impact while her ability to maintain herself is considered. 14. In **Shahin Shahad v. Areej** [2018 (1) KLT SN 50 (C.No.69)] the court has considered what exactly is meant by employment of the words “unable to maintain herself” in Section 125 Cr.P.C. As the dictum speaks, it could not be taken to mean that the claimant wife is incapable of earning herself. According to him, the reason that the wife is well educated and probable to obtain a decent job are not at all reasons to deny her the right to get maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C. According to him, the question to be considered by the Court while dealing with an application under Section 125 Cr.P.C is, whether at the relevant time of applying for maintenance, the lady has sufficient means to maintain herself. According to the learned counsel, the wife in the case on hand was evidenced as employed only for a short duration of one year, probable to be extended further, but, not established by evidence as liable to be regularised in future and in that context, she cannot be considered as having the ability to R.P.(FC) No. 167 of 2019 and R.P.(FC) No.197 of 2020 -:15:- maintain herself. According to him, being a Post Graduate in Nursing, she may be capable to obtain a job as a Tutor permanently but till that is fructified, she cannot be said to be able to maintain herself. The purpose behind incorporation of Section 125 into the Code is to prevent vagrancy and destitution, the prospects of the lady to be employed in future cannot be taken to hold that she is able to maintain herself. The word 'ability' in Section 125 Cr.P.C must be taken to have the meaning of having sufficient means to meet the day to day expenses of life reasonably. Whatever be the earning from the job in which, the lady is employed, if it is only of a temporary duration, it won't help her to sustain lifelong. Therefore, the words 'ability to maintain' contemplate ability to maintain oneself reasonably for the remaining period of life. 15. **Shamima Farooqui v. Shahid Khan** [(2015) 5 SCC 705] is also relied on by the learned counsel to raise an argument that sustenance does not mean bare survival and it gains more weightage when children are also with wife. According to him, the Apex Court has held in the case that the quantum fixed as maintenance should be adequate so as to enable the wife to live with dignity in tune with the standard of living she had been R.P.(FC) No. 167 of 2019 and R.P.(FC) No.197 of 2020 -:16:- enjoying while was in the company of the respondent. It is contended by the learned counsel on the basis of the above dictum that the wife in the case on hand is entitled to get a reasonable sum as maintenance so as to maintain a life in tune with the standard of living she had been enjoying while in the company of her husband. According to the learned counsel, even if it is established that the wife is employed, the factum remains for consideration is whether she was able to live the status akin to the one she was enjoying while living in the company of the respondent. 16. **Shailja and another v. Khobbanna** (2017 KHC 2725) was relied on by the learned counsel to contend that the capacity of the wife to earn is not a sufficient reason to reduce the maintenance awarded by the Family Court. According to him, the wife must be proved to have reasonable earning to sustain her life in the status of her husband while she was living in his company. According to the learned counsel, the wife in the case on hand was proved as employed as a Tutor in a Nursing School on a temporary basis. She has opted to do the work only to survive for the time being. According to him, the Family Court has correctly appreciated the evidence on record and had found R.P.(FC) No. 167 of 2019 and R.P.(FC) No.197 of 2020 -:17:- that she was unable to maintain herself and accordingly fixed Rs.8,000/- as the maintenance payable monthly to her. According to him the sum fixed being a reasonable sum, it does not deserve interference. 17. True that the petitioner has only produced and marked in evidence Ext.A2 wherein her salary was certified as Rs.7,000/-. The respondent has produced the copy of the appointment letter issued by the Administrator, Bharat School of Nursing, Kottayam, and a certificate issued from the Nursing School wherein the salary of the 1[st] petitioner was certified as Rs.15,050/-. The documents were obtained by applying under the Right to Information Act and were also marked in evidence as Exts.B1 and B2. True that by failing to produce a document like Ext.B2, the petitioner sought to convince the court that she was getting only Rs.7,000/- as salary. Evenif the petitioner is taken to have suppressed the factum that she was earning Rs.15,050/- as salary at the relevant time when the application seeking maintenance was filed, since the job of Tutor in which she was employed being only of a temporary nature of one year duration, and evidence is totally lacking to establish probability to regularise it in future, the factum suppressed cannot be taken to R.P.(FC) No. 167 of 2019 and R.P.(FC) No.197 of 2020 -:18:- have much impact when the entitlement of the petitioner for maintenance is considered. Or in otherwords, the factum evenif taken to have suppressed by the 1[st] petitioner, being an immaterial one, will not have the impact of defeating the bonafides of the 1[st] petitioner as claimant for maintenance. 18. Whatever be the income earned by the 1[st] petitioner at the relevant time, the job being of a temporary nature the capacity to earn will only be for the tenure for which the appointment was made. On expiry of the contract period of employment, though there was a chance as evidenced from Ext.B2 for the period to be extended for another year, there is a likelihood of the petitioner to be again put to a situation of vagrancy and destitution on expiry of the extended term. Similarly with the educational qualification, though it is probable to obtain a job, until the job is obtained, she will only be a destitute. As held by the Court in **Shailja** supra capability of the lady is different from her ability to sustain the livelihood herself. Similarly the post of Tutor with a salary of Rs.15,050/-, in which the petitioner was employed, though could be extended at the discretion of the employer, evidence is totally lacking to show that it was liable to be extended had the petitioner not resigned. The R.P.(FC) No. 167 of 2019 and R.P.(FC) No.197 of 2020 -:19:- learned counsel has contended that the petitioner resigned from the job of Tutor on the last day of the contract period. He has relied on the version of DW2 to convince the court that the petitioner had resigned her job. But, DW2 has said firstly that the job of the petitioner as a Tutor was terminated on expiry of the contract period and lateron that the job was resigned by the petitioner. DW2 being not static in her version, the cause by which the job was put to an end cannot be said with precision. The argument of the learned counsel that the petitioner resigned from the post of a Tutor which was liable to be extended for further duration only to impress the court that she was devoid of any means of earning at the relevant time and thereby to extract money in the form of maintenance from the respondent is discarded, being devoid of any merits. Evenif the petitioner's term of employment was extended by the employer, it could only be an extension for successive tenures of one year duration and absolutely no evidence is there to establish the scope for it to be regularised in future. Therefore, evenif it is taken for granted that the petitioner evaded to apprise the court of certain facts, those being not material in the matter of adjudication of the entitlement of the 1[st] petitioner for maintenance, her bonafides is not defeated. It is R.P.(FC) No. 167 of 2019 and R.P.(FC) No.197 of 2020 -:20:- made clear from the discussion above that the petitioner was unable to maintain herself at the relevant time when she had applied for maintenance and the Family Court is perfectly right in holding that she is entitled to get maintenance from the respondent. 19. Now, it is turn to see whether Rs.8,000/- found payable as monthly maintenance by the impugned order to each of the petitioners is a reasonable sum or not and need modification either by way of enhancement or reduction as canvassed by the respective counsel. 20. As revealed from the evidence adduced by the petitioners, the 1[st] petitioner had sworn in tune with the averments made in the petition seeking maintenance. Admittedly the respondent was an Engineering Graduate. Therefore, the petitioner has only to establish the job in which the respondent was engaged at the relevant time and the monthly income obtained therefrom. According to the petitioner, the respondent was earning more than Rs.50,000/- in total from his profession as well as the real estate business and agriculture pursued with by him. Respondent during cross examination has stated that though was a Graduate in Engineering, he did not attempt to R.P.(FC) No. 167 of 2019 and R.P.(FC) No.197 of 2020 -:21:- obtain any employment based on his qualification. Admittedly he is doing agriculture in rubber, bananas etc. and is getting Rs.7,000/- monthly. Admittedly, he owns an Innova car, a Maruti car and a motorcycle. 21. Where actually the respondent was working and the nature of profession pursued by him are not proved by the 1[st] petitioner. She does not have a say on the exact quantum of income earned by the respondent at the relevant time from each source of income allegedly he has. 22. As PW1, she has stated only that a sum more than Rs.50,000/- was obtained by the respondent in total from his different sources of income. In that context, the evidence tendered by the respondent assumes relevance. As DW1, he has stated that he was not employed anywhere on the basis of the B- Tech Degree he was having. Admittedly agricultural operations are carried out by him in rubber and bananas and Rs.7,000/- is earned monthly. 23. Admittedly an Innova car, a Maruti car and a motorcycle were owned by him. A man with a substantial income alone could own two four wheelers and a two wheeler. Admittedly, the respondent owns land and agricultural operations R.P.(FC) No. 167 of 2019 and R.P.(FC) No.197 of 2020 -:22:- are carried out by him. According to him, Rs.7,000/- is also earned as monthly income from agricultural operations. It is pertinent to note that, rather than his interested version, independent evidence is not forthcoming. It is difficult to believe that a man with B-Tech Degree would remain satisfied with agricultural operations which yields to him only a monthly income of Rs.7,000/-. The maintenance of the three vehicles itself would cost more than Rs.7,000/-. Therefore, it can be gathered from the attendant circumstances that the respondent was not speaking truth about his monthly income and that the actual monthly income was suppressed by him. 24. The respondent is a B-Tech Graduate. It may be that he is not employed anywhere at the relevant time, on its basis. At the sametime he does not have a case that he was not maintaining good health at the relevant time. In that context, the respondent can only be treated as an ablebodied man and therefore, it is his obligation to see that the genuine needs of the wife and the child deserted by him are meted out from his income reasonably. If he is having no sufficient income, with his able body and the professional qualification, he must find out means to earn sufficient income. R.P.(FC) No. 167 of 2019 and R.P.(FC) No.197 of 2020 -:23:- 25. It is settled that the wife or the child as the case may be, is entitled to get monthly maintenance which enable her or him to survive in the same status of living of the respondent, which either of them was enjoying while being in his company. The respondent being a qualified B-Tech Graduate, the 1[st] petitioner as his deserted wife is entitled to receive monthly maintenance at the rate that enables her to live in the former's standard of living. The respondent if not possessed of sufficient income, being qualified and possessed of agricultural lands is capable to earn more income and to meet the payment of any reasonable sum as monthly maintenance. 26. It is evident that the 1[st] petitioner has no job and income of her own at the relevant time when the M.C was considered and finally disposed of by the impugned order. A reduction of the sum stands ordered as monthly maintenance to the petitioners by the impugned order was sought for the reason that the respondent was also looking after his aged and ailed parents. It was contended that a portion of the monthly income earned by the respondent is also spent on that count. The contention is devoid of any basis for the reason that 13 acres of agricultural land is evidenced as owned by the parents R.P.(FC) No. 167 of 2019 and R.P.(FC) No.197 of 2020 -:24:- themselves. If that be so, the respondent need not have to spent any amount for their maintenance from his own pocket. Evenif it is established that the respondent is maintaining his parents, that cannot be a reason to evade from his statutory obligation to maintain the deserted wife and the child. 27. The 2[nd] petitioner was a minor aged 2½ years at the relevant time of consideration of the M.C. and he is in the custody of the 1[st] petitioner. The 1[st] petitioner though was established as working temporarily at the relevant time of passing the impugned order, was not proved as working anywhere. The M.C. was filed in the year 2017 and was disposed of in the year 2019. When the cost of living and price index at the relevant time and the status of the respondent is considered, Rs.8,000/- fixed by the Family Court as monthly maintenance in favour of the 1[st] petitioner does not call for interference. The 2[nd] petitioner was aged only 2 ½ years at the time of filing of the M.C. When M.C. was disposed of by the Family Court in the year 2019, the 2[nd] petitioner was only 4 ½ years. The 1[st] petitioner failed to adduce any cogent evidence before the Family Court to establish the expenses incurred by her for the 2[nd] petitioner. Therefore Rs.8,000/- fixed as monthly maintenance in favour of R.P.(FC) No. 167 of 2019 and R.P.(FC) No.197 of 2020 -:25:- the 2[nd] petitioner appears to this Court, excessive and deserves modification by reduction. In the result, R.P.(F.C) No.167/2019 is allowed in part and R.P.(F.C) No.197/2020 is dismissed. The impugned order is modified by reducing the sum directed to be paid as maintenance to the 2[nd] petitioner to Rs.5,000/-. Rs.8,000/- stands ordered as monthly maintenance to the 1[st] petitioner is maintained. **Sd/-** **MARY JOSEPH** **JUDGE** ttb/MJL/jj